The idea of life at conception

[muon2]

I'm not sure I agree with the statement that what constitutes a legal person is necessarily subjective. In particular the law of estates is very much concerned with when a legal person ceases to be. Here is the definition of death in statute from IL, and I suspect many states have similar language:

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In the dictionary death is defined as the end of life, so life must be present for there to be death. If the above is the legal definition of the end of life, then logically the existence of the two conditions in the statute above are the necessary conditions for a person to have life. Thus it follows that a human organism that exhibits both blood flow (circulation) with the exchange of gases in the blood (respiration) and brain functions at the most basic level is legally alive.

[muon2]

I'm not sure I agree with the statement that what constitutes a legal person is necessarily subjective. In particular the law of estates is very much concerned with when a legal person ceases to be. Here is the definition of death in statute from IL, and I suspect many states have similar language:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

In the dictionary death is defined as the end of life, so life must be present for there to be death. If the above is the legal definition of the end of life, then logically the existence of the two conditions in the statute above are the necessary conditions for a person to have life. Thus it follows that a human organism that exhibits both blood flow (circulation) with the exchange of gases in the blood (respiration) and brain functions at the most basic level is legally alive.

Engineers use extremes to prove their concepts and I do the same with mine.

You have given the potential human quite a ways to grow before calling it life.

Let's play with a scenario.

Let' say you and I are from an advanced civilization and come to earth to save the people from a plague that has infected all that have been born.

We have the technology to maintain life from conception on or from what I say begins live. When sperm and egg fertilize and begin to split. What I call a potential human.

Let's also say that we will be well paid for every human we can extract from people and grow to term.

I cannot see us only harvesting only those who "exhibits both blood flow (circulation) with the exchange of gases in the blood (respiration) and brain functions at the most basic level is legally alive" as legality does not apply to our harvest.

Would you say goodbye to all that cash you can get if you bring the less developed zygotes and fertilized  and growing eggs. I would not.

Regards
DL

My example was in response to the statement that a legal person is subjective. I was not saying when there was biological life, but rather how one might define a legal person entitled to legal rights. The difference can be important, so let me provide you with an additional scenario.

An egg is fertilized and forms a zygote of undifferentiated cells. Suppose one were to call this a legal person as defined by the act of fertilization. It is not uncommon for live cells to flake off the zygote, just as they do from our own bodies. Sometimes those flaked-off cells spontaneously begin to form a new zygote, and thus an identical twin. In this case there was no fertilization to mark the beginning of the twin. So if fertilization defines the person, then the identical twin is not a person and has no legal rights, though I certainly think the identical twin should have rights.

Since that's not a satisfying conclusion, let's travel an alternate path. Suppose that the twin is a person at the point the cell is shed from the zygote. We don't know a priori which shed cells will develop into new zygotes, but it is presumably rare based on the number of identical twins. Therefore to protect the identical twin as a legal person at the moment the cell is shed from the original zygote, we would have to ascribe personhood to all shed cells from zygotes, most of which never develop. That creates the prospect of not one or two but many persons in the form of separate zygotic cells in the womb at the same time. As they die off, which most will, they now potentially have legal issues that must be resolved as would any person who dies. This also seems an entirely unworkable definition to me.

One path of definition fails to recognize humans that should have rights, and the other path recognizes cells that would never reach a point that should have rights.  Instead I offered one possible consistent test that can be applied to determine when a legal person exists.

[muon2]

Most cells that are shed are dead but that aside, in my description of a potential human, I included dividing and joining cells so I covered my rump on that.

You introduce the issue of rights which is a completely different issue.

I agree that the issue of rights is a completely different issue than the issue of life, and I said as much. However, it is the issue of rights in our society that makes this question so open to debate, especially when the rights of individuals come into conflict. To recognize the root of the debate before us today one needs to say when a human deserves their most basic of rights, and what those rights are. The rights granted by some ancient society doesn't bring much light to the question before us now.

But I'm trying to focus on the first part, the part the defines the beginning of rights in our society today. If you did make a specific definition of the onset of life that includes the twin, I apologize that I missed it. I would appreciate it if you stated it again.

[muon2]

If you define 'life' at conception, then armed with the fact that 50 to 80 percent of even implanted embryos spontaneously abort, then those spontaneous abortions are the ending of a 'life', without anyone's knowledge. Something that happens as a natural cycle. This is before we even get to known miscarriages later in a woman's pregnancy. These are now 'deaths', even if you want to treat them or categorise them differently. You are then saying that the womb, that a woman's reproductive system effectively is a place where death occurs far more often than life. That's a dangerous psychological route to go down and a worrying subversion of womenhood and pregnancy.

Even from a scientific perspective there isn't a neat consensus. Gastrulation for example is the point at which an embryo can no longer divide to become identical twins. It can no longer become more than one thing. Surely before that point, then all that embryo is, is a 'potential'; potentially one thing, or two things or three things or nothing. I think Anthony's point on life v existence above is quite an important one.

Thanks for the embryological back up to what I was saying in response to GIA. I firmly agree that it is very hard to make a case for personhood before that point. I would also add that we have the technology to cause stem cells to begin forming clones. A single cell or simple division definition could add all those stem cells to the list, because in the right conditions they can grow to be a human like a fertilized egg.

[muon2]

I'm not Ernest, but I think he is saying that "mother's connection" is a too arbitrary standard. It would lead to the absurdity of Baby A and Baby B having more or less identical characteristics (heartbeat, feel pain, whatever), yet only one would be a person.

Pretty much any definition of when a human life begins is going to be arbitrary, be it the physiological definitions that generally are the subject of the abortion debate or the physiological definition Andrew is giving. My objection is not over it being arbitrary but his position giving absolute preference to individual concerns regardless of societal concerns.

Though as I said upthread, a definition that is consistent with the end of life is less arbitrary. Right now there are separate definitions for the beginning and end of human life. If one definition is arbitrary, then arguably both are. If there is only one definition at all stages of human life then even if it arguably arbitrary, it is only one such definition, not two.

[muon2]

Actually I think I have avoided the issue by constraining myself to the definition of legal person. Life already has a number of different definitions depending on the context. Even within scientific use there are multiple definitions. Hence I'm not interested in trying to contest between them, since sometimes the differences in definition are useful. I also recognize that both sides for the debate are going to find issue if they are attached to one of the various definitions of life. My main point is that a definition of legal personhood can be crafted that functions at all points in time, rather than one that relies on a definition that shifts after personhood begins.

[muon2]

Actually I think I have avoided the issue by constraining myself to the definition of legal person. Life already has a number of different definitions depending on the context. Even within scientific use there are multiple definitions. Hence I'm not interested in trying to contest between them, since sometimes the differences in definition are useful. I also recognize that both sides for the debate are going to find issue if they are attached to one of the various definitions of life. My main point is that a definition of legal personhood can be crafted that functions at all points in time, rather than one that relies on a definition that shifts after personhood begins.

Then how do you respond to the argument that someone's personhood doesn't actually end with their death? I don't know if I would necessarily make this argument, but I think it's a reasonable one to make in light of what I've pointed out.

If I understand your argument, then the question is whether there is a situation when death occurs but personhood continues. Would this be something like when someone who is clinically dead is subsequently revived? If so, then the legal person existed past death because the cessation of heart or brain activity was not irreversible.