The idea of life at conception

[Antonio the Sixth]

Thought-experiment.

Technically, both the egg and sperm cells are "alive" as defined by the definition of a cell. Mono-cell organisms are clearly "alive" and therefore, both the sperm and egg are living beings as well. We don't consider them to have rights, as they have very short lifespans (at least the sperm do), and do not grow into full humans on their own. However, the idea that life begins at conception is technically wrong. Life exists through conception, it is simply a transformation between two completely random interacting human cells.

The question you really need to ask is "when do people intrinsically have rights?" At the moment that the sperm and egg merge, some time after but before birth, or only upon birth? Secondarily, at what point does the right of the mother to agency over her body, and the chemicals she ingests, become secondary to that of the fetus?

I'm not saying I have a clear answer, but I think the framing is wrong. "Life" doesn't begin at conception, it changes. Rights and agency are the topic at hand.

This strikes me as semantics. People generally have a pretty clear idea of what's being asked with this question.

I have to disagree. The fact that this question is so often used as a proxy for support or opposition to abortion rights strikes me as inherently tendentious, because it poses life (as opposed to other notions such as personhood) as the relevant criterion. Obviously, under this unspoken assumption, pro-lifers will akways have the high ground, because it's scientifically obvious that life exists after conception. Pointing out that life exists before conception too is a good way to challenge this assumption.

[Antonio the Sixth]

There's another problem with Muon's argument: that, like many pro-lifers, he starts from the assumption that life and personhood are one and the same. You can certainly make the argument that one is a person if and only if they are alive, but acting as if those two are conceptually the same thing is disingenuous.

It's disingenuous not only because (as some pro-choice argument goes) it's theoretically possible to be alive and not be a person, but also because (and this is the potential "pro-life" rebuttal to Muon's argument) one can also not be alive and still be a person! Indeed, are dead people non-persons in our society? The fact that the judiciary takes care to ensure that wills are respected suggests the contrary: clearly, dead people are considered still be individuals with certain rights (even if they are limited in their ability to exercise them by virtue of being... well, dead). So you could well argue that a dead person is still a person. And similarly, an abortion opponent could accept your argument about the need of a heartbeat to be considered alive, and still consider that the "non-alive" fetus is a person deserving of rights.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Actually I think I have avoided the issue by constraining myself to the definition of legal person. Life already has a number of different definitions depending on the context. Even within scientific use there are multiple definitions. Hence I'm not interested in trying to contest between them, since sometimes the differences in definition are useful. I also recognize that both sides for the debate are going to find issue if they are attached to one of the various definitions of life. My main point is that a definition of legal personhood can be crafted that functions at all points in time, rather than one that relies on a definition that shifts after personhood begins.

Then how do you respond to the argument that someone's personhood doesn't actually end with their death? I don't know if I would necessarily make this argument, but I think it's a reasonable one to make in light of what I've pointed out.