Talk Elections

According to U.S News and World Report, June 30, 1975 citing the just released, formally top secret, “Rules of Engagement for the Vietnam War” (Congressional Record June 6, 1975, pp. S9897-S9904) our men had to fight under horrendous conditions not imposed from the enemy but from our own State Department.  What follows are some of those rules. On-ground assaults in urban areas “known to shelter enemy forces generally had to be preceded by loud-speaker warnings and leaflet drops.”  Our troops could return fire “only when the enemy was positively identified and in close contact.  Sniper and mortar fire were not counted as ‘contact’ unless ‘such fire interferes with the scheme of maneuver or is inflicting casualties or damage to equipment.’ ”  Only flat-trajectory weapons (rifles, machine guns, grenades and recoilless rifles) could be used in civilian-populated areas, which largely exposed our men, and “then only if there was a specific, identifiable target.” Obviously on the ground, U. S superiority in firepower was deliberately not exploited.

Nor was it in the air.  Pilots were not allowed to fire where they thought the enemy was hidden- even when fired upon- until they were “sure the strike would be positively oriented against the source.”  And in many areas there was the nightmare of getting approval at higher levels even if you spotted the enemy or you were taking ground fire.  The chain of command often went through the “province chief, district chief, sector commander and a battalion or higher command” which by the time this was completed, the enemy had disappeared.  Enemy airfields were off limits if a “plane with a third nation’s markings was present.” Dams, locks, dikes and targets within 11 1/2 miles of the enemy’s major cities were “banned without prior approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”  Good luck on that one.

These rules actually aided the enemy, and it is because of them that this 14-year-long-war lasted so long and was lost.  

Another part of the ROEs restricted pilots from attacking certain types of targets that were off limits; some of these were: enemy airfields, SAM sites, power plants, naval craft in some areas, a 30 mile area around Hanoi, and a 10 mile area around Haiphong.4 The inability to attack certain targets made it difficult to stop the flow of men and materialinto South Vietnam, and the requirements to spare North Vietnamese civilians limited the use of certain types of munitions, such as B-52s and napalm. Until early 1967, in many instances U.S. pilots were not allowed to engage enemy fighters unless they themselves had been attacked first. [.....]

American air losses over North Vietnam rose continuously with over 500 aircraft lost during 1966 and 1967. Crews began to see that it was highly unlikely they would survive a 100-mission tour in Southeast Asia.16 Many of these losses resulted from restrictions against attacking SAM sites or other significant targets in or around populated areas. The ROE restrictions allowed the North Vietnamese to continuously build up their air defense systems in the most critical areas of the region
 
The restrictive ROEs in North Vietnam aided the enemy by providing sanctuaries and restricted areas where they had the space and time to build up their air defenses to engage U.S. aircraft. The piecemeal approach to attacks in North Vietnam did not allow concentrated bombing and actually strengthened the will of the North Vietnamese as opposed to weakening it. American leaders made it clear in public statements that we had no intention of destroying the government of North Vietnam; the leaders in North Vietnam saw this as an opportunity to exploit an American weakness.

However, at the time of reporting, there is no evidence that President Johnson proposes to do the things which most American military experts are agreed must be done to achieve genuine victory.

A recent survey of the views of these American military experts reveals that they all agree that the number one priority is to blockade the North Vietnamese Port of Haiphong. This survey was undertaken by the monthly magazine Science and Mechanics, and a long report appeared in the March 1968 issue of that journal.
General Nathan F. Twining, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states "either we should hit the North of Vietnam with everything we've got, bring them to their knees fast, or get out. My own opinion is that we should declare a state of war and invade the North. Then we could legally blockade the Harbor of Haiphong - and sink any shipping that attempts to violate the blockade. Running the blockade would be a tacit act of war against us - and the Russians as well as Red China and any other nation supplying the North well know this."

General Twining is not concerned at all about the threat of Red China coming into the war. He is worried that the longer the war goes on, the longer the time available to the Communists to build up their strength." General Twining is satisfied that the Vietnam War can be won within a matter of months.
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the only man to hold the position of Chief of Naval Operations for three successive terms, a member of the UN Truce Delegation which negotiated with the Communists in Korea, and at present Director for the Centre of Strategic Studies at the Georgetown University, warns, "At no time in the entire history of warfare has a war been won through minor escalations. Yet this is what we are doing in Vietnam…So the enemy must feel that he can hold out…At the present rate of minor escalation of the war, we'll be in Vietnam for another five or six years - or more."
In answer to the question about the possibility of the Soviet and Red China entering the war if America and allies applied to their total military strength against North Vietnam, Admiral Burke said, "Our Navy and Air Force could strike and destroy vital targets anywhere inside the great Chinese land mass…As for the USSR, their logistics would be formidable…
Asked how long it would take him to win in Vietnam. Admiral Burke said, " . . .considering the time required to mobilise and deploy the required forces, I would guess at from eight weeks to three months."

General George H. Decker, a former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army said in answer to the question, "What can we do that we are not doing now, to win the war in Vietnam fast?" replied "Invade the North and blockade the Port of Haiphong. "
General Decker stressed that, "We do not have to fire shots to blockade. We merely tell the Soviet Union, Red China, Britain - whatever nation is delivering supplies to Hanoi - to keep their ships out of the area, if they do not want them damaged or sunk. This would be an effective deterrent. We have to be credible. Because of our present position of weakness, neither Hanoi, nor the Soviet Union, nor Red China believes us. They do not believe that we are determined to win."
General Decker's summary was that "We have never won the war in Korea - because of our methods. We are not winning in Vietnam for the same reason"

[...]

Air Force Major-General Gilbert L. Meyers, one of those directing the war in Vietnam until just over a year ago, is bitterly critical of the manner in which the Vietnam War is being conducted. He said, "What we are doing now violates every principle of warfare that we in the military have ever known. You can't win wars necessarily by killing people. You've got to overwhelm the enemy. And when you overwhelm him, you kill fewer people than you do by picking at him day after day…Westmoreland and the Army people certainly feel the same way about this as I do."

In 1972, President Nixon authorized all of the targets that the JCS requested with the exception of three.  The results were reported by Admiral Stockdale, who was a prisoner of war in the Hanoi Hilton at the time.

What is the purpose of the L.A. Times expose? What is to be achieved by these revelations? Is it a concern for the people of SE Asia? A concern for justice? When all is considered, there seems to be no purpose beyond the desire to wallow in habitual masochism and national flagellation regarding U.S. involvement in SE Asia. It can't be a concern for the SE Asian people or justice. A content survey of the L.A. Times internet archives, extending from 1 Jan 1985 to the present, shows the following:

• My Lai-695 entries

• Dak Son Massacre(where 250 Montagnards were killed and burned alive in 1967 by NVA using flamethrowers-NO entries.
http://www.11thcavnam.com/main/dak_son.htm

• VC/NVA Assassinations(over 36,000 South Viet Namese teachers, district chiefs, agricultural extension advisors, civil servants were killed, often in hideously brutal fashion, by the VC. Another 60,000 or so were abducted with only several thousand returning, indicating tens of thousands others were assassinated. The 36,000 figure alone, given Viet Nam's 17 million population, represents a national mortality proportion that would equal about 420,000 Americans assassinated, exclusive of combat fatalities, of which South Viet Nam's military sustained 275,000)-NO entries

• Mrs. Nguyen Thi Thu, a Hoa Hoa Buddhist widow who immolated herself in 1999 to protest Hanoi's religious oppression-NO entries
http://www.pghh.org/news/hot_news/102699_ngthu_en.html

• Mr. Ho Tan Anh, a Buddhist who immolated himself in 2001 to protest Hanoi's religious oppression- NO entries.
http://www.radicalparty.org/vietnam/imolation_e.htm

• Thich(Venerable) Chan Hy, a Buddhist monk who immolated himself in 2003 to protext Hanoi's religions oppression-NO entries.
http://www.news14charlotte.com/content/local_news/mecklenburg/?ArID=49737&SecID=3

• The 2004 fatal beating of Buddhist Monk Thich Duc Chinh in a Hanoi prison-NO entries
http://www.queme.net/eng/news_detail.php?numb=640

• Hue Massacre, 1968, when the VC/NVA systematically executed as many as 5,000 civil servants, teachers, etc. who were sytematically rounded up and executed, some buried alive in mass graves, some tied up and shot in the back of the head, around Hue City during 25 day NVA occupation of the city-NO entries.
http://ngothelinh.50megs.com/Hue.html

• Oppression of Montagnards-systematic cultural genocide of the indigenous highland people, resulting in scores dead, scores jailed, scores beaten in past 2-4 years-NO entries
See Montagnard-Foundation.org

• Decimation of Hmong people in Laos by Pathet Lao and North Viet Namese troops
(See factfinding.org and http://www.huntingtonnews.net/national/060708-staff-laos.html)-NO entries

• Recent republication of North Viet Nam dissident poet Nguyen Chi Thien's book, "Flowers from Hell/Hoa Dia Nguc." Mr. Thien, dubbed the "Solzhenitsyn of Viet Nam" by author Michael Lind, spent 27 years in Hanoi prisons(12 years in solitary confinement) for writing anti-communist poetry. He recently in Garden Grove and spoke before a crowd of about 600 people-NO entries
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=43

• Egregious Hanoi Human Rights violations, documented by Human Rights Watch(hrw.org), Free Viet Nam Alliance(fva.org), Amnesty International (amnesty.org), Transparency International (transparency.org), Mother Land(queme.net), Global Witness(globalwitness.org), and scores of others.- NO entries.

• Hanoi economist Le Dang Doanh's revelation that Viet Nam's per capita income, 80% of Thailand's in 1950, was only 20% of Thailand's in 2000, all due to smothering dictatorial communist policies and endemic corruption-NO entries.
http://www.fva.org/2005/03Mar/story02.htm

• Inimical result of communist economic policies producing average infant and maternal mortality rates, for the three communist Indochina countries, twice that of the average for the nearby non-communist countries of Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand(UN and World Bank data for 2002)-NO entries

The pattern is clear and evident: L.A. times stories for the past 21 years dwell disproportionately, and hence dishonestly, with American atrocities, and ignore far more lethal and wretched established behavior patterns, in the form of VC/NVA atrocities committed as a matter of routine. Were the L.A. Times, or readers sanctimoniously gloating over the recent article, even remotely concerned with the well-being of the Viet Namese, Laotian and Cambodian people, these topics would have been discussed, in excrutiating detail.

Poland. On December 17, 1981, Mr. Reagan stated during a news conference that "it will be impossible for us to continue trying to help Poland solve its economic problems while martial law is imposed on the people of Poland, thousands are imprisoned, and the legal rights of free trade unions -- previously granted by the Government -- are now denied." In January 1982, when the Polish Government failed to repay the $71.3 million that it owed U.S. Banks, Mr. Reagan decided to have the Commodity Credit Corporation (part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture), which had guaranteed the loans, acquire the debt and pay the $71.3 million without first requiring the obligatory declaration of default.

In December 1984, the Reagan Administration lifted its objections to Polish membership in the IMF.

Romania. On May 20, 1981, Mr. Reagan determined that "it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank of the United States to extend a credit in the amount of $120,742,500 to the Socialist Republic of Romania in connection with its purchase of two nuclear steam turbine generators and related services and spare parts." (Presidential Determination No. 81-7.)