Noting that you seem to have totally abandoned the accusation that I didn't ask you those questions, which is about the third baseless accusation you've totally abandoned.
Your sheer verbosity is what's obfuscating. In many cases you could have stated your questions/arguments clearly and concisely and instead chose to go on into a long-winded rant which included some relevant bits mixed with some irrelevant ones, some (maybe not deliberate) misconstructions, and a good deal of pointless affected outrage. You clearly like hearing yourself talk (or in these case, seeing yourself type, I guess), but, if brevity and clarity was your concern, you probably could have made the same points with about 67% less characters.
I don't think I wrote anything that a twelfth-grader couldn't understand. You did fine. Your problem wasn't big words; it's that you weren't responsive to ideas...and I guess that you consistently misused a word that a first-grader
Because, in my argument, the morality of animal suffering is based on the utility that it procures, ie the disutility that avoiding it causes. Since this disutility is higher for the customer than it is for the corporation, it makes perfect sense that the corporation's actions might be immoral while the customer's aren't.In #3 here
No, that is not what I said. I said that the disutility for the customer is big enough to warrant the suffering, while the disutility for the corporation isn't. If the disutility for the customer were smaller, the action would be immoral even if the corporation's disutility were still smaller than the customer's. I already illustrated this with the example of fur.
, you indicated that you believe the responsibility to correct social injustices generally falls on "public action," not "individual activism." You invoked this to explain why you don't "go out of your way" to find meat that didn't result in suffering (understatement of the year). When I challenged this, you responded by noting that it's much easier for corporations to change (or be regulated) than individuals accept disutility
. How is this a coherent response to my criticism unless you were somehow arguing that your individual responsibility to avoid suffering is modulated by not only the extent of the resulting suffering, but also the relative gap between the disutility to the disutility to the customer vs. company in mitigating suffering?
You now seem to be claiming you merely meant that the disutility to the customer being higher than to the corporation is consistent with asserting a moral obligation for the customer but not the corporation. That would make the context of your original statement make absolutely no
sense. If that was all you meant, why would the gap in disutility have been a relevant response to me asserting you had moral responsibility to avoid suffering? Indicating that x
has less more difficulty than y
being responsible for a
does not prove or imply that x
has no responsibility for a
, unless you assert that y
has no responsibility for a
, which you didn't.
See, when I use complicated sentence structures to be precise, this is why
. Not that I think complicated sentence structure is the problem there -- I think you're just not making much sense.
This point should also debunk your bookie metaphor, if you connect the dots.
I'm pretty good at connecting the dots, and no, I don't see how it does.