Taiwanese election, Jan 2016

[jaichind]

ROC laws says that polls done 10 days before the election cannot be published.  But polls are allowed to be done, just not published before voting ends.  Right after polls closed, TVBS published its last poll followed by vote projections.  It was somewhat more off this time than 2004 2008 and 2012 where it was pretty accurate.  The reason it was off was for the same reason why the DPP victory was so large: turnout.

TVBS had for polls the days running up to the election



The 104 and 105 in the X-axis is means the 104th (2015) year and 105h (2016) year of the Republic of China which was founded in 1912.

Its final poll which was done 2 days before the election had

DPP   43
KMT  24
PFP   16

and from that it projected



DPP   52
KMT   32
PFP    16

Its final poll also, based on the responses on likelihood of voting, projected a turnout of 71.7% which is already a significant drop from the 74.4% turnout in 2012.  Based on that it projected the total votes to be

DPP    7.0 million votes
KMT    4.3 million votes
PFP     2.0 million votes

Which would be a 2.7 million vote victory by DPP over KMT.

TVBS's seems to have overestimated KMT/PFP turnout or was not able to take into account of the  周子瑜 (Chou Tzu-yu) incident which really reached a peak the day before the election on social media.  So the turnout ended up being 66.23% and votes being

DPP     6.89 million votes    56.12%
KMT    3.81 million votes    30.04%
PFP     1.58 million votes    12.84%

So the TVBS projection mostly got the DPP vote correct but overestimated the KMT and PFP turnout.

[jaichind]

So RIP KMT? Although looking on polls I guess it wasn't really shocking? And on Taiwan people really use Minguo calendar?

Well, the Pan-Blue bloc for sure is not dead.  Back in 2008 when the KMT beat DPP 59-41 there were talk that DPP was dead and it was clear to me it was not.  I felt back then the Blue-Green balance was around  55-45 and the 2008 victory represented a temporary lull in DPP fortunes due to a poor second DPP term.  Same thing here although I agree now that the Blue-Green balance is now roughly 50-50.  The DPP landslide more reflected a small Green gain followed by a temporary Blue lull given the poor KMT second term of 2012-2016.  It is likely but not assured that the KMT will be the dominate party on the Blue side so in that sense KMT is most likely not dead.  On the Green side if and when Tsia falters, NPP will be a much more difficult Pan-Green rival when compared to the TSU.

As for Mingguo calendar, all official documents uses ROC or Mingguo calendar.    It is unlikely the DPP will change that.  They had their chance in 2000 and that bus left already as Tsai DPP 2016 campaign is the most moderate ever on identification with ROC.   Taiwan Independence is for sure out given the power of PRC. What the PRC should worry about is an attempt by the DPP regime to align ROC with the USA-Japan alliance in the Pacific at the military level even as a majority of the population on Taiwan Province ROC seems to want to stay out and not take sides.

[jaichind]

Just to report on a result of a family friend that ran in this election.  One 范雲 (Fang Yun) who is the chairperson of the pro-Independence SDP ran in the Taipei 6th district on the Green Party-SDP ticket with DPP support.  She is quite close to the pro-Taiwan Independence branch of my family, especially my cousin and uncle.  She is a strong feminist, social justice activist and Taiwan Independence supporter and had held several positions in the DPP before bolting from DPP over the corruption scandal of DPP President Chen.  While I despise her politics, just like she despises my,  I know her to be a very friendly and interesting person to talk to, so while I backed her KMT opponent, just like I back the KMT across the board, I did wish her good luck in her race in the Deep Blue 6th Taipei District.

Her official campaign picture


She was defeated by her KMT incumbent opponent 46.1% vs 35.4% with various pan-Blue and pan-Green splinters taking the rest.  It is quite an accomplishment to hold the KMT to below 50% in the Taipei 6th district.  The KMT won here 60% to DPP 30% back in 2012 with PFP getting 6.6%.  

[jaichind]

There were two sets of events which led to this KMT disaster after it was soundly defeated in the 2014 County Magistrate and Mayoral elections.  First everyone within KMT expected new KMT Chairman Chu to run in 2016.  Everyone expected Chu to lose but perhaps keep it close.  Chu declined to run hoping to avoid to stench of defeat but also from having to deal with the continued internal battles between KMT Prez Ma and KMT Speaker of the House Wang.  So Hung, who was a radical Chinese unification supporter  ran and was nominated by default.   This provoked PFP's Sung to run as a moderate Pan-Blue alternative and began to catch fire.  With the KMT way behind in the polls, Chu was asked to step in and run instead of Hung more to save the KMT in legislative races.  This provoked the Deep Blue bloc within the KMT who felt betrayed.  They mostly did not turn out in this election and the KMT got the worst of both worlds.   The result being

Turnout   66.27%
DPP    56%
KMT    31%
PFP     13%

Playing what if.  If KMT and Chu just left it alone and let Hung run in the fall of 2015.  I would expect a lot of moderate KMT voters to vote DPP or PFP but the Deep Blue turnout would be large for Hung.  Result most likely being something like

Turnout   72%
DPP    53%
KMT    30%
PFP     17%

In many ways, as long the PFP voters mostly vote Pan-Blue in the Legislative races the results there might actually be better than what took place.  Tsai would have received something like 7.5 million votes and much greater mandate from a total votes point of view but with a somewhat smaller Legislative majority with a very powerful PFP.

If Chu just ran in early 2015 for the KMT nomination, Hung would have never entered the race.  And if Chu manages to unify the Pan-Blue bloc or at least the KMT,  then the KMT would still lose but by a less smaller margin as the PFP would have never had a chance to take off.  I would expect the result to be something like

Turnout 71%
DPP    51%
KMT   41%
PFP      8%

or if PFP does not run

Turnout 70%
DPP   52%
KMT   48%

[jaichind]

Here's something not totally unexpected.

Compare the map of home usage of Hokkein.




And a map with the Soong+Chu votes combined.



And they line up perfectly.



Also i didn't think that Hsinchu had that much Hokkein speakers since i always considered it mostly demographically Hakka. But turns out that its actually majority Hokkein speaking not Hakka.

Yeah, that is part of it.  But it is also true that speaking Hoklo at home is highly correlated to income (higher income tend to not speak Hoklo at home) which is also highly correlated to level of education (higher education tends not to speak Hoklo at home.)  And it is a fact that Pan-Blue Pan-Green vote split has higher income and education voting Pan Blues and lower income and education voting Pan Greens.  BTW there is also a gender gap where women tend to vote Pan Blues and men tend to vote Pan Greens.  In 2012 Tsai performed worse among women when compared to men even as she is a women herself.  I think this time around the same will be true.   But yes, the rise of the DPP to some extend is part of the assertion of Hoklo majoritarianism in reaction of the domination of the Mainlanders  in Taiwan Province politics and high society in the 1940s-1990s period.   Of course this provoked a reaction from Hakkas and Aborigines which then embraced Pan-Blues.  Of course the the 2016 DPP campaign is the least Hoklo-centric campaign it has ever ran.  Tsai being a Hakka herself and not being able to speak Hoklo well (in fact she does not speak Hakka well either is a separate point) is one reason for this.  But Tsai 2016 for sure speaks less Hoklo on the stump than Tsai 2012.  One problem with the Tsai 2012 campaign was she tried to speak Hoklo in her speeches but it was going so badly that she then just switched to Mandarin.  This time around they pretty much junked the Hoklo dialect approach and Tsai pretty much spoke Mandarin the entire campaign.  The DPP logic is pretty much "We got this one won since the Pan-Blues are not going to turn out, so lets tone down the Taiwan Independence and Hoklo stuff to stop provoking the Pan-Blues."  

Of course understand that the Hoklos being spoken today in different parts of Taiwan Province is diverging.  In richer parts of Taiwan Province the Hoklo being spoken, if a all, is becoming a more corrupted version of Hoklo with ever higher borrowing of Chinese Mandarin over time.  Even though I am a strong Chinese nationalist and for sure support the Mandarin movement as a part integration of one Chinese culture, I think the preservation of pure Hoklo outside of official use has great cultural benefits.  Hoklo is an ancient Chinese dialect which is a window to ancient Chinese culture and literature.  All Chinese poems written in the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and before, especially around the Jin Dynasty (265-420) rhyme almost perfectly when spoken in Hoklo whereas they pretty much does not rhyme well when spoken in Chinese Mandarin.  Over the last twenty years I am saddened to see pure Hoklo disappear from the more advanced areas of Taiwan Province (it is quite generational) and I suspect in more backward parts the same trend is already starting.  

[jaichind]

I will have to do my township by township result analysis once I get a hold of the data.  But doing the swing analysis on a regional basis.

Pan-Blue vote

2012       2016          Swing
91.80%   82.16%    -9.64%   Greater Jinmen (The Fujian Province counties)
74.06%   63.06%   -11.00%   Hualian County
69.50%   61.59%    -7.91%   Taidong County
66.82%   54.55%   -12.27%   Miaoli County
65.24%   53.54%   -11.70%   Greater Hsintsu (Hsintsu County+Hsintsu City)
60.15%   48.97%   -11.18%   Taoyuan County
58.41%   46.64%   -11.77%   Greater Taipei (Taipei City+New Taipei City+Keelong City)
57.63%   47.77%   - 9.86%   Naotou County
55.32%   44.99%   -10.33%   Greater Taichung (Old Taichung County+Old Taichung City)
54.35%   49.19%    -5.16%   Penghu County
53.51%   43.53%    -9.98%   Changhwa County
47.47%   37.94%    -9.53%   Yilan County
46.58%   36.61%    -9.97%   Greater Kaoshiung (Old Kaoshiung County+Old Kaoshiung City)
44.87%   36.51%    -8.36%   Pingdong County
44.19%   36.59%    -7.60%   Yunlin County
43.88%   36.46%    -7.42%   Greater Jiayi (Jiayi County + Jaiyi City)
42.28%   32.48%    -9.80%   Greater Tainan (Old Tainan County+Old Tainan City)
54.37%   43.88%   -10.49%   Total

Clearly shows the narrative of the election which is the abandonment of the urban Deep Blue section of the Pan-Blue vote base.  The Pan-Blue vote fell more in urbanized regions.  It is not even regression to the mean.  Greater Tainan which is the weakest Pan-Blue region but somewhat more urbanized had a greater drop than in Pan-Blue votes than other Green strongholds like Yunlin County, Greater Jiayi and Pingdong County even though they have stronger Pan-Blue presence.    Rural Penghu had a much smaller drop than the massively urbanized Greater Taipei even as Greater Taipei traditionally is much more strongly Pan-Blue.  Strong Pan-Blue regions like Taidong County fell a lot less than more urbanized counties.  The biggest falls of the Pan-Blue vote besides Greater Taipei are newly industrialized and urbanized areas like Greater Hsintsu (emerging IT industries), Miaoli (emerging biotech and healthcare industries) and Taoyuan (industrial spillover of Greater Taipei) even though Chu was a 2 term popular County Magistrate of Taoyuan in the 2001-2009 period. The favorite son could not stop the non-turnout of the Deep Blue vote bloc.

From a PVI point of view, there were almost no shifts, the pro-Green areas are still Changhwa County, Yilan County, Greater Kaoshiung, Pingdong County, Yunlin County, Greater Jiayi, and Greater Tainan.  The only difference is Penghu County which had a pan-Blue lean but starting in 2008 had a pan-Green lean as the Pan-Blue gained relative strength in urban areas with rural Penghu County having a pan-Green lean.  With the collpase of the urban vote for the Pan-Blues Penghu reverts to having a pan-Blue lean.

One good long term news for the Pan-Blue is the slow drift of Yilan to tilt more and more toward the Pan-Blue continues.  Yilan which is relatively rural for a Northern County but getting more advanced economicaly given its proximity to Greater Taipei  used to be the most pro-Green county back in the 1990s.  As it got more urbanized and influenced by Greater Taipei it has been drifting Pan-Blue throughout the late 1990s to 2012 period.  Yilan County for the Pan-Blues today is a lot like Virgina for the Democrats in the 1990s at the presidential level.  A couple of more election cycles could push Yilan in tilt Pan-Blue territory.

The flip side for the Pan-Greens is Changhwa County which has been slowly tilting toward the Pan-Greens over the last decade.  Despite being a fairly rural county the swing toward the Pan-Greens is fairly large compared to other rural counties.  Over time Changhwa County will most likely become more of a tilt Pan-Green County instead of being a bellwether County with a tiny tilt toward the Pan-Greens. I suspect over the next couple of election cycles Changhwa County and Yilan Counties will swap places where Changhwa County is solidly in the Pan-Green camp while Yilan will be a bellwether County with a slight Pan-Green tilt.

[jaichind]

One positive thing for the Pan-Blues about DPP control of the Legislature on the long run is that it could plant the seeds for a partial Pan-Blue revival in Southern Rural Counties.  One of the reasons why the Southern Counties drifted to the DPP in the late 1990s was the feeling that the KMT administration over the 1980s and 1990s negelcted the economic development of Southern Taiwan Province, especially rural Southern Taiwan Province.   Support for Taiwan Independence was a proxy for envy of  Northern Taiwan Province economic gains from trade with Mainland China  During the disastrous second term DPP Chen administration of 2004-2008, there were swings away from the Pan-Greens in Southern Counties but it was much lower then one would expect and DPP continues to hold the County Magistrate positions in Southern Counties based on the rural vote.  The main reason for this was that DPP Prez Chen was able to make the argument that he could not implement his agenda for Southern Taiwan Province economic revival due to the Pan-Blue majority in the Legislature and that the Northern Taiwan politician dominated Legislature is out to get Chen, who is from the Southern Tainan.   This argument is not really valid as the economic problems of backward Southern Taiwan counties are more structural in nature.  Now with a DPP majority in the legislature  this argument goes away.   When the Tsia administration is shown up as not being able to turn around the relative economic advantage of Northern Taiwan Province the Pan Green Solid South will begin to drift to the Pan-Blues almost by default.   

[jaichind]

The signs are starting to be quite ominous for the Pan-Blue Camp. Lots of young Taiwanese are not going to vote for them. Also the more older mainlanders are deceased due to old age and this makes the Pan-Blue camp have less of a base.

Pending the Pipe Dream of China somehow becoming Democratic within the next ten years which would result in the Pro vs Anti China/Reunification issues becoming sanitized and the politics in Taiwan switching to a generic Centre-Left vs Centre-right Spectrum. The future for the Pan-Blue Camp isnt really bright.

What you say above is a totally possible future.  But it is not a necessary future.  Yes, the Youth vote went heavily for the Pan-Greens this election and has been trending Pan-Greens for a couple of election cycles already.  On the other hand part of that is a one off related to the  周子瑜 (Chou Tzu-yu) incident the day before the election.  All polling done on the last day before the election and after it pretty much confirmed that the  周子瑜 (Chou Tzu-yu) incident swung around 4%-5% of the vote which mean that without the  周子瑜 (Chou Tzu-yu) incident Tsai was going to win around 50%-51% of the vote.  But note that among the youth the swing was 16% or so.  This is actually very similar to the 2004 election 319 incident where President Chen was shot and wounded the day before the election.  Polls done on the day before and after the election confirmed the incident swung around 4%-5% toward Chen giving him a close 50.1-49.9 victory.  Again, there the 319 incident seems to swung the youth vote around 16%-17%.  This trend reverted to the norm in the 2004 Legislative elections  a few months later.

It is totally possible that the Tsai DPP regime can rule in way that makes some of these shifts permanent, but it is totally possible it will not, just like 2004.  And if we are talking about trends, yes the youth vote today could mean the population as a whole could lean Pan-Greens tomorrow.  But on the flip side, the voting population is getting more urban which leans Pan-Blues which implies that the future will trend Pan-Blues.  Both trends are bogus because people can shift their voting pattern as they age or bring their old partisan loyalties to new urban centers.   As for Mainlanders, they are their decedents that identify themselves as such are now less than 8% of the voting population as of 4-5 years ago.  In 2012 this bloc was so small that poll does not even bother to break them out as a category.  But this fact did not stop the Pan-Blues from winning 2008 in a landslide and winning 2012 in a fairly decisive way.

If the KMT can get past his current transition and wait for the DPP regime to falter as it deals with the "One China" issue with the PRC while trying to maintain economic growth which is now very dependent on the Mainland Chinese market, the KMT domination of local politics will keep a strong farm league for the future.  Of the 22 City/County legislatures, Pan-Blues managed to elect speakers for 18 of them with 4 of them for the Pan-Greens.  And that was based on the disastrous 2014 local elction results or else the KMT domination will be even greater.  This will not bring charismatic leaders like Ma and Tsai  that can win Prez races but will keep the KMT in the game at the legislative and local levels.    

[jaichind]

Also i didn't think that Hsinchu had that much Hokkein speakers since i always considered it mostly demographically Hakka. But turns out that its actually majority Hokkein speaking not Hakka.

Urban Hsinchu and especially Hsinchu City is for sure majority Hoklo.  It is rural Hsinchu which are dominated by Hakkas.  This is expecially true since the 1980s when Hsinchu emerged as a IT powerhouse which attracted a lot of IT personnel from Greater Taipei.   Most of this migration are of course Hoklo.

[jaichind]

I am still doing all sorts of data analysis based on township election data.  In the meantime the first post-election DPP power struggle is already emerging now that the DPP has capture a majority in the legislature.  It involves who will be the Speaker of the House.  There are three DPP candidates vying for the spot and none seems to be backing down.  They are

蘇嘉全 (Su Chia-chyuan) - former County magistrate of Pingdong County (where Prez election Tsai is from) who ran in 2010 for Mayor of Taichung and losing narrowly just like Tsai did for New Taipei City in the same year.  He ran as Tsai's running mate in 2012 in a losing effort.  He was elected on the DPP Party List in 2016 as a MP for the first time.  He is very close to Tsai and is really Tsai's candidate.  But he has never been a MP before so this poses a problem.

陳明文 (Chen Ming-wen) - was a KMT MP and leader of the pro-KMT Lin faction of Jiayi back in the 1990s.  Jiayi County politics up until 2001 was a de facto 3 party system where we had the pro-KMT Lin faction, pro-KMT Huang faction and DPP.  When Chen led his Lin faction to defect over the DPP in 2001 in order to finish off the Huang faction it lead to a realignment in Jiayi County where Chen became the dominate politician in Jiayi politics.  Chen was then DPP county magistrate for Jiayi County then handed that role to another Lin faction politician and he resumed being an MP.  His main selling point is that is that he can deliver the votes for the DPP in Greater Jiayi.  He could also be a bridge toward working with the KMT since his Lin faction still contains some KMT members, including his own brother. 

柯建銘 (Ker Chien-ming) - Founding member of DPP and a MP since 1992 representing Hsintsu City which tilts Pan-Blue.  Has deep roots in the DPP caucus and things equal should win the largest support in the DPP caucus if it was a free and fair vote.

The issue emerging is that Tsai clearly wants Su but the DPP legislative caucus seems to prefer Ker.  There were some attempts to work out a deal to prevent a DPP civil war by getting a consensus candidate which failed and it was decided that there will be a DPP caucus vote.  Ker is pushing for such a vote since he would most likely have the advantage although the pro-Tsai MPs might converge on Su while the non-Tsai bloc in the DPP might split the vote between Ker and Chen.  Tsai is still trying to talk Ker and Chen to back down which seems possible for Chen and unlikely for Ker.  A last minute move seems to be the powerful New Tide faction of the DPP seems to have moved to back Su instead of Ker.  In theory there will be a vote tomorrow in the DPP caucus but behind the screens talks are continuing.  If Ker and Chen back down before of pressure from Tsai and a result of arm-twisting of DPP MPs it could create friction on the long run between DPP caucus and Tsai. 

[jaichind]

I am mostly done with my township by township analysis and will be posting various interesting aggregate data.   Label each township with different tags.  Each township is labeled "Urban" "Semi-urban" or "Rural."  Also I do PVI labeling as well at the township level.   I call all townships where it is Pan-Blue 2016 PVI +6 or higher "2016 Deep Blue", 2016 PVI +6 to PVI O I call "2016 Light Blue", 2016 PVI 0 to -6 I call "2016 Light Green" and I call 2016 PVI -6 or lower "Deep Green."

It has been the trend that the population shifts over the last couple of decades has been more favorable to Pan-Blues.  Meaning the "Deep Blue" and "Light Blue" townships tend to gain in terms of relative population.  We see the same thing this time around as well.
          
                                                       2012 to 2016                 1996 to 2016
                                                     Voter roll growth              Voter roll growth
"2016 Deep Blue" townships                4.46%                           30.11%  
"2016 Light Blue" townships                5.65%                           44.66%
"2016 Light Green" townships             3.33%                            32.23%
"2016 Deep Green" townships             2.03%                            19.72%

Here the trend is clear.  Blue townships, especially "Light Blue" which are usually are Northern Urban centers is continuing to gain relative population while Green townships,  especially "Deep Green" which are usually Southern rural townships, is losing relative population.  The demographics of PVI tends to be in Blue's favor in terms of trend and this seems to continue in 2016.

Of course the pan-Blues were beaten badly.  As I mentioned before this seems to be a function of the collapse of Pan-Blue turnout where around 25% of the Pan-Blue voting bloc did not show up at the polls.  Looking at turnout numbers seems to indicate this

                                                       2012 turnout          2016 turnout           fall
"2016 Deep Blue" townships                73.49%                 64.62%               -8.87%
"2016 Light Blue" townships                74.79%                 66.74%               -8.05%
"2016 Light Green" townships              75.23%                 67.46%               -7.77%
"2016 Deep Green" townships              73.88%                 66.13%               -7.76%

The turnout falloff is the largest in Deep Blue regions.  Of course the nature of this Pan-Blue turnout drop off is different in different regions which I will explore further later.   Anyhow this drop-off obviously lead to swings against Pan-Blue which is greater in Deep Blue townships since the turnout drop-off is greater there.
  
                                                       2012 Pan-Blue          2016 Pan-Blue         Swing  
                                                             Vote                        Vote                                                    
"2016 Deep Blue" townships                67.09%                 54.81%              -12.27%
"2016 Light Blue" townships                57.57%                 45.87%              -11.70%
"2016 Light Green" townships              51.35%                 40.41%              -10.91%
"2016 Deep Green" townships              41.84%                 32.35%               -9.49%

[jaichind]

As for how swings took place at the Deep Blue to Deep Green levels it would useful to look at the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green votes in 2012 and 2016 in terms of vote share of the total electorate which would take into account turnout drops.

                                                          2012                  2016
                                                   Pan-Blue Vote       Pan-Blue vote            Dropoff
"2016 Deep Blue" townships              48.96%             35.42%                 -13.54%
"2016 Light Blue" townships              42.76%             30.61%                 -12.15%
"2016 Light Green" townships            38.36%             27.28%                -11.08%
"2016 Deep Green" townships           30.65%              21.39%                 -9.26%

On the Pan-Green side we have vote share as a percentage of the entire electorate

                                                          2012                  2016
                                                   Pan-Green Vote       Pan-Blue vote         Growth
"2016 Deep Blue" townships              24.02%             28.30%                  4.28%
"2016 Light Blue" townships              31.52%             35.23%                  3.71%
"2016 Light Green" townships           36.35%              39.34%                 3.00%
"2016 Deep Green" townships           42.61%              43.89%                 1.28%

Of course if we look at it the decline of the Pan-Blue vote and rise of the Pan-Green vote a a percentage of the 2012 Pan-Blue vote we get

                                                       Pan-Blue              Pan-Green
                                                       Decline                   Rise
"2016 Deep Blue" townships            -27.65%               8.74%              
"2016 Light Blue" townships            -28.41%               8.68%                  
"2016 Light Green" townships          -28.88%              7.82%                
"2016 Deep Green" townships          -30.21%              4.18%

Which makes the picture clear.  In  "2016 Deep Blue" "2016 Light Blue" "2016 Light Green" townships around 28% of the 2012 Pan-Blue vote failed to vote Pan-Blue with around 8% of that vote voting Pan-Green and the remaining 20% did not turn out.  In "2016 Deep Green" the swing toward Pan-Greens is smaller at 4% but 26% of the Pan-Blue vote failed to turn out.  Of course this is net swing and does not take into account of the real increase in youth turnout which mostly went to Pan-Greens.  So these implied Blue-Green swing are exaggerated a bit.

[jaichind]

One of the reason why the Pan-Blue turnout fell while the Pan-Green turnout held up other than the obvious disastrous second KMT term of 2012-2016 are the balance of fears on Unification versus Independence.  Back in the late 1990s and early 2000s where were great fear of Pan-Blue voters that a DPP regime will provoke the PRC by a push toward independence. With the rise of economic integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Province since the early 2000s and the fact that DPP has moved away from Taiwan Independence as a platform this fear has gone away.  The fear on the Pan-Green side has risen that Taiwan Province will be absorbed by the PRC has only risen since 2008.  A good example is a recent poll that asked ROC voters BOTH on the issue of Unification versue Independence AND what is likely to take place in the future.

 

It has

Unification           16.1%
Independence      46.4%
Go either way      37.5%

But when asked what is likely to take place in the future it has

Unification          49.7%
Independence     35.9%
Status Quo         14.4%

This poll overall I think overestimates Taiwan Independence support as the long time series by the ROC government Mainland Affairs Council tend to show about a 50/50 split between those that would consider Unification and those that prefer Independence but the relative data is quite illustrative.  In fact almost 40% of those that favor Independence feel Unification is the most likely future.  This fear clearly is driving the Pan-Green turnout from not falling in a non-competitive race and driving youth turnout up for Pan-Greens.   

[jaichind]

Now that the new Tsai/DPP regime has been in power for 4 months now it would be interesting to give an update on where things are.  The best way to describe how the new regime in the  is doing is "bungling to catastrophic."  A series of unforced policy and administrative errors has shown up the DPP as unprepared for total power (the last DPP regime of 2000-2008 was really power sharing as the Pan-Blues had a narrow legislative majority the entire period.)  

If anything this is NOT helping the KMT as much as it should as negative memories of the last KMT administration are fresh in the voter minds so the rapid fall in DPP support has not translated into significant increased party support for the Pan-Blues even as it gives a boost to KMT party approval.  This gives the DPP regime a chance if it can recover lost ground by the end of the year before support start finally increasing for the KMT.

As a result the DPP has lost 9 local by-elections in a row since coming to power (6 of them they did not bother nominating a candidate) and won 1 by-election narrowly in deep green township.  Taking into account the pan-Blue bias in local elections these local by-elections seems to imply that Blue/Green support should be at near parity at an all ROC level even if the polls still has KMT still behind.

Pollster TISR which has a slight pro-Green tilt has historical approval rating index for DPP and KMT from 2006.  They added the CCP recently.  The graph is what things look like as the DPP came into power in May 2016



The latest approval rating index is DPP 48 KMT 40 CCP 30.  

If you look at the graph, the disastrous DPP second term of 2004-2008 has driven KMT approval index to the low to md 50s by the 2008 election with DPP at low 30s.  Once the KMT came into power in 2008 the trend reversed as memories of the DPP regime begin to fade plus the pressures of incumbency for KMT.  The 2008 global financial crisis also hurt the KMT as it pushed the economy into deep recession.  So the KMT approval rating index fell to high 40s by 2009 and mid 40s by 2010.  While the DPP rose to mid 30s by 2009 and low 40s by 2010.  Parity was mostly reached by 2011.

Now about being in power for 4 months DPP already fell to 48 which is consistent with the KMT by the end of 2008 but without a world financial crisis and deep recession.  The KMT is already up to low 40s within 4 months of being in the opposition whereas the DPP had to wait 2 years of being in the opposition to get to low 40s in approval index.    The KMT approval index is now the highest since early 2013 when things started to fall apart for the KMT second term of 2012-2016.  The CCP approval index is also record high but that might be just part of increased negativity toward DPP.  

When the Tsai regime came into power I certain she would win reelection in 2020 although I felt that the KMT recovery at the local and legislative level and given a pan-Blue bias in the way the legislative  districts  are drawn the Pan-Blues would get near parity with Pan-Greens in 2020 in the legislature.  Now if Tsai does not turn things around very soon I would say Tsai's chance of reelection is even money now with the Pan-Blues having a solid chance at recapturing legislative majority in 2020.

[jaichind]

A ROC version of the RCP average of Prez Tsai approval rating.  This average has too many pro-Green pollster so the real average would be somewhat worse than this.    But the trend is clear.  Obama, in comparison, did not reach parity in approval-disapproval until 2010, almost 1.5 years after coming into office. 





Of course most of the unforced errors mostly came from the Cabinet so the approval for PM Lin has collapsed to 32/47.  An that is an average that has a pro-Green bias.

 

Now, Lin is pro-Green but fairly moderate and not a member of the DPP so DPP and for sure Deep Green voter have very little loyalty to him.    Based on these numbers Lin's will most likely go soon, mostly likely early 2017.  But if he is replace with someone with a Deep Green background then Tsai might be conceding political middle ground to the KMT.  

[jaichind]

Since Tsai won the election, the commies have been trolling her almost non-stop.

They got other countries to deport Taiwanese telemarketing fraudsters to Commieland, thus putting her in a lose-lose situation.

Taiwan's tourism sector has crashed due to the chill from its largest natural market.

The commies invited mayors of counties/cities which voted KMT for a conference, and announced their areas won't be economically penalized. They implied if the deep green southern counties elect KMT mayors, their fruit exporters will benefit.

Taiwan wasn't invited to this year's ICAO conference, with the commies openly admitting it's because Tsai doesn't accept the 1992 consensus.

Yep, this is all par for the course.  The reason Tsai and Lin approval ratings are sinking is stems from the fact that their 2016 election campaign promised economic and diplomatic status quo with the PRC without having to accept the 92 Consensus.   When it turned was obviously not true (like in Mainland China tourist numbers) the DPP regime was trying to cover it out by claiming that there was no fall in tourism which then was just proven wrong.  The way out is for Tsai the run a Deep Green regime much like Chen did after 2002 when he had to turn that way to improve on his poor ratings.  It is a way to make sure of about 40-45% support which is enough to  survive on instead of trying to please everyone and expand the DPP base.   KMT Prez Lee also effectively polarized the electorate against the PRC in 1995 to ensure a landslide re-election in 1996.  Main problem here is the PRC is significantly more powerful than it was in 2002 and dramatically more powerful than it was in 1995.  The diplomatic and more importantly economic blow back could be quite large on ROC.    I figured on the long run this was where the Tsai regime was headed after it was clear it could not create a permanent DPP majority based on the 2016 election victory.  I was just surprised how quickly it took place.  It is a rerun of the Chen regime of 2000-2008 but in fast forward mode.

I think the PRC has been pretty tame so far just hitting Tsai in places where it does not really hurt.  When the PRC runs out of patience with Tsai they might hit the direct flight and trade links that PRC has with ROC which was created based on the 92 Consensus after KMT regime took over in 2008.   Doing so would create significant damage to the ROC economy and most likely send it into a deep recession.

[jaichind]

But is the KMT even capable of playing its part in a Third United Front? It doesn't seem particularly united or motivated.

No, its is unlikely it can play that role.  It is too divided internally between different blocs of interests ranging from anti-DPP political and economic interests but devoid of Chinese national identity to white collar workers that prefer the stability  of KMT rule to anti-CPP Chinese nationalists to pro-CCP Chinese nationalists.  I think the only way out of the PRC-ROC trap is for the PRC regime to evolve into a more pluralistic regime with competitive local elections and along with greater economic interrogation Chinese unification achieved by some sort of Confederate relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan Province.

The alternative is some sort of future military invasion/pressure which leads to the direct control of Taiwan Province by PRC at great diplomatic and perhaps economic cost.  The thing that is getting concerning about the current status is that the PRC regime and increasing the population does not seem to care anymore about the "hearts and minds" of the population of Taiwan Province.   They way they see it is they bent backwards to give diplomatic and economic concessions to ROC under the KMT regime of 2008-2016 and the result was a landslide election victory for a pro-Taiwan Independence party.   They read this as "nice guys finish last."  So fine, they are beginning to reason, there is not need to be nice.  What is not appreciated, I think, by the PRC regime is that while these economic concessions were quiet  significant, given the fact that the PRC economy, at least for advance provinces, have moved up the economic chain quite quickly to directly compete with Taiwan Province, this means that most of the benefits only accrue to certain economic sectors and the top 1% on ROC with much of that wealth often being re-invested right back on Mainland China.  The average middle class Joe on Taiwan Province saw no real net economic benefit from greater economic integration with the Mainland.

  

[jaichind]

Tsai approval ratings falling in to the low 30s high 20s after being in power for 6 months.



DPP approval also falling.



DPP approval index below 50 while KMT approval index closing in on 40.  Relative approval ratings are approaching early 2013 levels.  CCP approval index closing in on 30 at around where DPP was in 2008 when DPP was thrown out of power in a landslide.

Of course the DPP is falling apart too quickly for KMT to take advantage of.  It will be 2-3 years before the anti-KMT negatively from 2012-2016 wears off.   The Trump upset is pushing rumors that pro-Blue Foxconn CEO 郭台銘(Terry Gou) might run as an independent in 2020 with KMT support to oppose Tsai on the premise that KMT support would not be enough to capture the entire anti-Tsai anti-DPP vote.  Recent polls has Guo winning in a landslide 62-24 against Tsai.

[jaichind]

TVBS just did a bunch of polling in every ROC county/city to survey the approval rating of the local county magistrate/city mayor over a two month period.   It also had vote ID breakdowns for each county/city and as expected the Blue camp is making a comeback relative to its disastrous performance in the Jan 2016 election.  It is interesting to look at where the comeback is taking place.  It seems in traditional pan-Blue urban areas the Blue camp is still polling badly but in rural areas the KMT/Blue support is coming back.  A breakdown below is interesting

                                    Jan 2016                 Nov/Dec 2016
                                Green lead  over          Green lead over
                                    Blue vote                   Blue party ID
City/County
Taidong County               -11%                           -11%    (Deep Blue rural county)
Hualian County               -20%                          -19%    (Deep Blue rural county)  
Yilan County                  +24%                           +3%    (Light Green rural county - trending Blue)
Keelong City                     -4%                            -3%     (Deep Blue urban city)
Taipei City                       +4%                             0%     (Light Blue urban city)
New Taipei City              +10%                           -1%     (Bellwether semi-urban city)
Taoyuan City                   +2%                           +3%    (Light Blue semi-urban city)
Hsintsu City                    +2%                            +1%    (Light Blue urban city)
Hsintsu County              -15%                           -21%    (Deep Blue rural county)
Miaoli County                   -9%                           -12%   (Deep Blue rural county)
Taichung City                 +10%                            0%    (Bellwether semi-urban city - trending Green)
Changhua County          +13%                           +2%   (Bellwether rural county - trending Green)
Nantou County               +4%                            -7%     (Light Blue rural county)
Penghu County               +2%                            -3%    (Light Blue rural county - trending Blue)
Yunlin County               +27%                           +6%    (Deep Green rural county)
Jiayi City                       +20%                           +5%    (Light Green urban city)
Jiayi County                  +30%                         +18%    (Deep Green rural county)
Tainan City                   +35%                         +18%    (Deep Green semi-urban city)
Kaoshiung City             +27%                          +16%    (Deep Green semi-urban city)
Pingdong County          +27%                          +17%    (Deep Green rural county)
Jinmen County             -64%                            -55%    (Very Very Deep Blue rural county)

The places where the KMT/Blues are coming back are not in their traditional urban centers where they seems to be stuck at the same levels as back in Jan 2016.  Same is true for most Deep Blue rural counties.  Instead they are gaining in bellwether, light Green and deep Green rural or semi-urban counties.  I guess the pro-Blue voters in metropole area's disappointment in the second KMT Ma administration have not worn off yet while the bungling of the new Tsai DPP administration are driving away independent and lean Green voters in Green and bellwether regions.  

In many ways this poll might understate the fall of Greens in Deep Green counties since the Deep Green counties were polled back in late Oct and Tsai's fortunes has fallen since then.

These sort of numbers seems to imply that if the election were held today it would be Green/Blue 52/48 versus Green/Blue 56/44 back in Jan 2016.  The 2000-2016 long term trend Green/Blue balance has historically been 45/55.   The KMT recovery will be slow and most likely take a couple of more years to even think about getting back to that sort of level, if ever.  I suspect we are in a era where it is more like 50/50 long term between Green/Blue or at best 48/52 advantage for Blues.

[jaichind]

Tsai approval rating after 1 year of taking office from TVBS poll.  Comparison to Lee Chen and Ma after they were elected and took office after 1 year.

5/2017   Tsai (DPP)   28/56
5/2009   Ma (KMT)    38/41 ->won re-election in 2012 with a 6 point margin despite Pan Blue splinter
5/2001   Chen(DPP)   41/46->won re-election in 2004 with a 1 point margin against united Pan Blues
5/1997   Lee (KMT)    37/48 -> KMT lost power in 2000 due to split of the Pan-Blue vote

Comparison between 2017 and 2009

Is the Ma administration (2009) taking us in the right direction 48/29
Is the Tsai administration (2017) taking us in the right direction 38/36

2009 Partisan breakdown Pan-Blue/Pan-Green   38/15
2017 Partisan breakdown Pan-Blue/Pan-Green   32/33

In theory Tsai should be very vulnerable in 2020.  The current weak and divided state of the KMT and the possibly that the Pan-Blues might have a splinter candidate means Tsai is still a slight favorite to win re-election in 2020 assuming NPP does not run their own candidate in a splinter of the Pan-Green vote.

[jaichind]

In 2018 KMT will hold onto all their currently controlled administrations, whilst picking up Taipei, Yilan and Chiayi city.

Sounds about right.  Taipei would really depend on if DPP nominates their own candidate to opposed the pro-DPP Ko to make it a three way race in which case a KMT is a shoe-in.  If it is DPP backed Ko vs the KMT it would depend on the KMT candidate.  Current New Taipei City mayor Chu running here would make the race lean KMT else it is really a tossup if it is Ko vs KMT.

New Taipei City would be a risk for the KMT to lose if they do not come up with a good candidate although the DPP is struggling to come up with a good candidate.  One wildcard for both Taipei City and New Taipei city is if DPP Tainan mayor Lai were to run in either Taipei City or New Taipei City.  Lai is seen as a threat to Tsai and Tsai is trying to push Lai to run in either city in 2018 to make sure he does not challenge Tsai for the 2020 DPP nomination.  The less popular Tsai becomes the less likely Lai will run.

It would awesome if in 2018 Taipei city it becomes Ko (independent) vs Chu (KMT) vs Lai (DPP).  It would be a true clash of titans with all 3 possible future Prez candidates in 2020 or 2024.  It would be just in 2010 Taipei City when we had Chu vs Tsai.

Yilan is slowing trending KMT and will be an open seat so it would be ripe for the KMT to win.

Chiayi city has a first term DPP incumbent that seems unpopular so in a good KMT year the KMT could win.  The same is true for Changhua County which to be fair is trending slowing toward DPP over time.

In theory Taoyuan City, Hsintsu City, Keelong City are pro-Blue cities that could go KMT but with fairly popular first term DPP incumbents the KMT might have to wait until 2022 to recapture them.   Out of these 3 Keelong might be the best shot for the KMT but I still rate it as below 50%

The win-loss for KMT in 2018 comes down to Taipei City and New Taipei City.  If the KMT can win both then it is still in the running in 2020. Else Tsai should be able to win in 2020.

[jaichind]

Pan-blue will likely to nominate Wu Denyih (ex-VP and probably next KMT leader) than not and lose by a couple points (around 6-8 points).
Soong is not energetic to run for another election.
In this scenario, KMT will pick up Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu (county with city), Miaoli and Nantou (Wu's home-boy edge), compared to 2016.
If DPP nominate their candidate for 2018 Taipei mayoral election (that candidate is tipped to lose), KMT could actually draft Dr Ko to be their independent presidential candidate.

Wu has a high floor and but low ceiling.  If it is Tsai vs Wu in 2020 1-on-1 I think right now Tsai wins 52-48.  I agree Soong will most likely not run (which really spells the end for PFP.)  The KMT Chairperson race which the first round is this weekend could lead to a KMT civil war and potentially a rebel KMT candidate that is not Soong in 2020.  Only way out is for Wu to win in a convincing manner (more than 50% of the vote this weekend.) It is for that reason I back Wu in the KMT Chairperson race.

There is no way KMT would draft Ko for its candidate.  If Ko were to lose the 2018 Taipei mayor election it is likely that Ko might run as an independent in 2020 with unpredictable results but mostly to the benefit of the KMT.  This is one reason why despite worsening relationship between Ko and the DPP chances are DPP will not run a candidate in Taipei City in 2018.

The independent that the KMT might nominate in 2020 would be Terry Gou of Foxconn.  It is clear in a 1-on-1 race he would beat Tsai.  Main issue is: will he run and will the KMT be desperate enough to nominate Guo.  If Wu win the KMT chairperson election this weekend in a decisive fashion then KMT will nominate Wu in 2020 assuming 2018 goes reasonably well for the KMT.  If it is Hao that wins the KMT might go with Guo especially Hao has as part of his platform that he will not run in 2020 if he were to win the KMT chairperson race and would instead draft Guo.  If 2018 goes badly for KMT then KMT might have no choice but to draft Guo to give Tsai a real fight.

Of course as much as Tsai is turning off the unification bloc the radical pro-independence bloc are equally unhappy that Tsai is not pushing the Taiwan Independence line when they see time running out before the PRC gets too powerful.  The radical Taiwan Independence bloc might run their own candidate in 2020 if they see Tsai as unpopular and perhaps a lost cause.  

[jaichind]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuomintang_chairmanship_election,_2017

Kuomintang chairmanship election first round is this weekend 5/20.  If no one wins 50% then it moves to a second round with the top two vote winners.

Right it is a 3 way race between Wu (former PM and VP) vs Hung (current Chairperson) vs Hau (former Taipei mayor).  It seems Wu has the upper hand and could just win on the first round.  If radical unification bloc Hung wins then KMT might face a split and rebellion from the KMT moderate faction.  If will be Wu vs Hung or Wu vs Hao in the second round then it really becomes a 50/50 race.  If Wu is to win he has to win on the first round.  I am backing Wu mostly on the premise that he is most likely to be able to united the party despite my own radical pro-unification leanings.

[jaichind]

KMT Chairperson election today.

Hau has a low floor but high ceiling but Hung has a high floor but low ceiling.  Wu clearly is ahead and the undecideds are mostly anti-Hung. Wu is calling on the undecided to vote for him to get him over the 50% mark the end the race.  Hau is saying that Wu will not win 50% and those who are voting for Hau in the first round for sure will most likely vote Hung in a Wu vs Hung second round  and the undecided should vote for him to make sure it is the inevitable second round is a Wu vs Hau race.

So it will either be
Wu    50
Hung 30
Hau   15

Or
Wu    35
Hau   30
Hung 30

I think the way the KMT members vote historically is toward a decisive result so the former scenario is much more likely. 

[jaichind]

With half the vote (around 118K counted so far out of roughly 260K votes cast) in for KMT chairperson vote looks like Wu is way ahead and likely to win on the first round

Wu     52.5%
Hong  18.1%
Hau    17.9%
Han      5.3%
Dang    4.5%
Pang     0.8%