Jas v. Peter

[Јas]

Well, this might sound familiar...

Submission of the Plaintiff in the matter of Jas v. Peter

Statement of Facts

30 March 2008: Peter begins term as Attorney General following Senate confirmation.

4 July 2008: New Presidential term begins. Mr. Moderate swears-in.

5 July 2008: Peter announces that he will be staying on as AG until a successor is appointed.

Question Presented

On or after noon, 4 July 2008, was Peter legally entitled to continue as Attorney General?

Argument

If I may, I wish to submit the argument to the Court that the Attorney General (and indeed all cabinet officials) lose their offices automatically when a new executive term begins, in this instance at noon, 4 July 2008, and that any continuance in office requires re-nomination and re-confirmation.

According to Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution, executive power is vested in the President for his term of office. All executive actions are therefore ultimately carried out in his name, including those actions of the various Departments of the Government. I submit that it would be ultra vires the President to authorise any official to carry out executive acts beyond the term of the elected administration and that the power of such officials lapses with the end of the administration; just as the power of the President lapses with the end of his administrative term.

As an executive official carrying out executive acts, I contend that the office of Attorney General is subject to the lapsing of executive power and so after such point the outgoing AG wields no legal authority to maintain acting as AG without being re-nominated and re-confirmed.

References:
Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution:
“The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic of Atlasia. He shall be elected with a Vice President for a term of approximately four months.”

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, I submit that Peter has since noon, 4 July lacked standing as Attorney General and that he was not legally empowered to perform any functions associated with the role lest he be reconfirmed by the Senate.

[Јas]

My only question for Jas is simply whether he has any response to Peter's point about mootness of this case and whether any action exists that he is seeking to overturn.

Ah, but he did issue this official notice (!!!) in the name of the Attorney General during the period in question - which i suppose I'm reduced to arguing against the legitimacy of. Nonetheless it is an edict of the Attorney General and in the absence of anything else could be taken as precedent for future occasions that the act in question is legally sound. (Also the notice is on  headed paper (!!!) - which obviously involved significant public expense!!! Think of the poor Atlasian taxpayer!!!)

I'd say also that Peter's argument would infer that my argument when made first and accepted for hearing by the court was not, at least yet, moot. I would ask the court to consider that it is at this point when mootness arises for prime consideration.

I would finally submit that given the possible implications of the case, it is in the interests of public policy that a judgment be issued on this matter to clarify this important point of constitutional law.

[Јas]

My only question for Jas is simply whether he has any response to Peter's point about mootness of this case and whether any action exists that he is seeking to overturn.

Ah, but he did issue this official notice (!!!) in the name of the Attorney General during the period in question - which i suppose I'm reduced to arguing against the legitimacy of. Nonetheless it is an edict of the Attorney General and in the absence of anything else could be taken as precedent for future occasions that the act in question is legally sound. (Also the notice is on  headed paper (!!!) - which obviously involved significant public expense!!! Think of the poor Atlasian taxpayer!!!)

I'd say also that Peter's argument would infer that my argument when made first and accepted for hearing by the court was not, at least yet, moot. I would ask the court to consider that it is at this point when mootness arises for prime consideration.

I would finally submit that given the possible implications of the case, it is in the interests of public policy that a judgment be issued on this matter to clarify this important point of constitutional law.

Does the plaintiff wish to propose his version of a rule as to when this court should or should not rule a case moot?  Should it be based on policy grounds (ie even moot cases have important points of law) or should merely be a temporal rule (if plaintiff files while not moot, the case should be decided no matter how moot it is)?

I would submit that the appropriate time for deciding upon mootness should be when the case is filed, and that thereupon it should not be a stringent consideration, primarily because it may encourage a party to stall a case until such time as he wins by running out the clock, and secondly because it favours the development of our jurisprudence (something I feel which should be encouraged generally) without any significant cost or harm to anyone or anything.

Regarding public policy considerations, I would say simply that the court should weigh up the benefits of issuing a judgment where significant public policy considerations exist against the potentially unwarranted or undue harm to those persons who may be negatively affected by the ruling.

[Јas]

Oh well, 0 for 3.
At least I'm consistent...

Once again I thank the Honorable Justices for their time and effort and am glad that we have received clarification on this point of law.