Justice Sam Spade, dissenting,I strongly dissent from the decision by the Court. In sum, my learned colleagues' opinion:
1) Provides a convenient "out" for the soon-to-be Governor to hold office by misreading a clear statutory provision and
2) Improperly ignores the valid Constitutional arguments as to Regional rights which must be addressed in order to reach the statutory question.
I.The appropriate first question to ask when reviewing the scope of a statute is to determine the power under which the Senate created the law. If the Constitution does not provide power to enact the statute in question, it is void.
See Fritz v. Ernest. Most Senate powers are found within Article I, Section 5, but some exist within other clauses of the Constitution. In this case, Xahar was convicted under Section 1, Clauses 1 & 2 of the CCJA and his punishment is provided for in Section 2, Clause 1. As a result, only the Constitutionality of the provisions in question need to be addressed.
Initially, I believe that these provisions of the CCJA were made under the power provided in Article I, Section 5, Clause 7, which provides that:
The court has addressed and interpreted parts of this clause before. Namely, in Peter v. Atlasia, we wrote that Fraud in our Constitution is to be defined as common-law fraud, namely:
Clause 1 of the CCJA fits perfectly with the definition of Fraud provided here because the "impersonation" of "another Atlas Forum member" is a "knowing misrepresentation of the truth",
specifically, of the injured poster's identity, whose purpose is solely to "induce" other members of the Forum to act in a certain way towards the Fraudster, most likely to their own "detriment."
Clause 2 of the CCJA does not fit quite as well with this definition, but an expected consequence of the actions forbidden clearly constitutes Fraud. The "hacking" or "taking over control" of the injured poster's account can lead to the Fraudster either knowingly misrepresenting his identity as that of the injured poster or concealing the "material fact" that he is not the injured poster. Such actions would induce other members of the Forum to act to their own "detriment" in the same manner as Clause 1.
Finally, in Peter v. Atlasia, we did not address whether Punishment constitutes criminal punishment, civil punishment or both. I firmly believe, and my learned colleagues have assumed, that both criminal and civil punishment is covered under the language for the simple reason that Anglo-Saxon common law fraud is punishable both civilly and criminally. Consequently, no such distinction should be found in the text of this Constitution.
Thus, according to its plain language, Section 2, Clause 1 of the CCJA constitutes criminal punishment and can be upheld as a valid exercise of the power under Article I, Section 5, Clause 7.
II.Having found that the provisions of the CCJA in question are legitimate under the Constitution, the second question to ask is whether this Senatorial power can be applied to the Regions. I answer this question primarily because 1) my learned colleagues failed to address it in their opinion; 2) it was heavily debated at oral argument; 3) an answer is required to reach the question of whether the Senate
has actually exercised the power.
To be blunt, the Constitutional provision in question says:
To hold that the Senate could not punish Fraudsters by preventing them from holding Regional as well as Federal office would do injustice to any reasonable meaning of the word "uniform" found in this Constitution or in ordinary use. One might also say that it is "necessary and proper" for the Senate to make a law punishing Fraudsters by forbidding them from holding Regional and Federal offices because such punishment is a method by which the Senate may execute its powers provided in this Section.
Therefore, any arguments based on Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 would fail because power to forbid Fraudsters from holding Regional office has been delegated to the Senate in the Constitution. Moreover, an argument based on Article I, Section 6, Clause 7 would fail because the right of the Senate to punish Fraud in a uniform manner must be preserved, even though it requires any Region to take the action of not allowing a Fraudster to hold Regional office.
Finally, at oral argument, the main reason put forth why the federal government could not make laws concerning Regional office-holders was because the federal government did not have jurisdiction over regional elections. This argument is far off the mark and must be corrected fully. Restrictions on holding Regional office have nothing to do with regional elections. Rather, the restrictions limit an elected candidate from holding the office after the election has concluded and its process and law are no longer relevant.
Let me illustrate: Unless specified by Regional election law, nothing would forbid Xahar from running for Regional office, collecting votes as a candidate, voting for himself as a candidate (a question exists whether that part of the sentence applies to him - but is not relevant here), even being certified as the winner of the election or suing to be certified as said winner. These issues are not addressed by a ban on holding office, but rather constitute the sum of the body of law that deals with regional elections.
This is a mistake commonly made by the Senate, by our elected politicians and what-not, but the key point must be made again -
restrictions on holding office are not the subject of election law.As such, any argument for Regional election law supremacy based on Article IV, Section I, Clause 4 would fail.
III.Finally, I turn to the question actually answered by my learned colleagues. Since Section 1, Clauses 1 & 2 and Section 2, Clause 1, Part 2 are valid exercises of Senate power that may apply to Regional offices, did the Senate intend to restrict Regional offices in the punishment provided for in Section 2, Clause 1, Part 2?
I believe that the Senate did.
The text of Section 2, Clause 1, Part 2 states:
The term "any" is the broadest statute that the Senate can use to define a class of persons or entities. It is essentially synonymous with "all" and therefore a fair interpretation would categorize "all" offices under the Republic of Atlasia to fall under its purview.
In addition, the phrase "holding any office under the Republic of Atlasia" appears in one important place within the Constitution.
Article I, Section 2, Clause 4 states that:
I question whether my learned colleagues seriously believe that a person convicted of impeachment can still hold Regional office, yet that is apparently the conclusion based upon their opinion.
Nevertheless, even the section of the Constitution quoted in the majority opinion backs up my conclusion that the Senate intended to forbid Fraudsters from holding Regional offices.
Article V, Section 1, Clause 1 states that:
The majority opinion interprets the "addition of 'at any level of government' as a clear intention to include regional office." It states that "the former language does not specify this, since 'any office under the Republic of Atlasia' could be interpreted as Federal Office alone."
This interpretation is, on its face, irrelevant. We are not placed with the duty of interpreting Article V, Section 1, Clause 1, rather we are tasked with finding out what the term "office under the Republic of Atlasia" might be understood to mean in the CCJA. As the majority opinion says, the addition of "at any level of government" means that the language "offices of the Republic of Atlasia" is meant to include
all offices, whether Regional or Federal. Therefore, language in the CCJA which restricts convicted Fraudsters from "holding any office under the Republic of Atlasia" must clearly apply to both Regional and Federal offices.
In short, the majority opinion lets Xahar free to hold office based on a technicality which, under any reasonable reading of the statute or the Constitution, does not exist. This type of reasoning does serious damage to future interpretation of the text of either statute or Constitution and furthermore, may inspire the legislature to redouble those mistakes through improperly drafted changes.
At any rate, I dissent.
