Jas v. Peter

[Sam Spade]

Masterjedi/Jas:  Please change the title of the other thread to Jas v. InksLWC solely.  Thanks.

Official Atlasia Supreme Court Release

Writ of Certiorari
The Atlasian Supreme Court grants certiorari to hear this case. 

However, the Court has decided that Plaintiff's case should be divided into two separate cases, one against Deputy Secretary of Forum Affairs, InksLWC and one against Attorney General Peter.

The formal title of these two separate matters shall be Jas v. InksLWC and Jas v. Peter.  Briefs will be filed separately, but the Court will hear both matters concurrently (as addressed below).

Relief Requested
The Court, by a 2-0 vote, grants the plaintiff's injunction against InksLWC from exercising his powers utilized through the Secretary of Forum Affairs as Deputy SoFA.  Since the Southeast special election has concluded, our injunction, to the extent needed in that election, extends solely to InksLWC's certification of the election result.  It will be lifted effective immediately at the disposition of the case, unless this Court should decide, pursuant to merits of the case, that the election is null and void.  If Earl AW is confirmed as Secretary of Forum Affairs prior to the conclusion of this case, he shall not be subject to this injunction in exercising his powers as Secretary of Forum Affairs, except to the extent of certifying the election result in the above-cited Southeast special election.

Additionally, the Court, by a 2-0 vote, grants the plaintiff's injunction against Peter from exercising his powers as Attorney General.  If Brandon H is confirmed as Attorney General prior to the conclusion of this case, he shall not be subject to this injunction in exercising his powers as Attorney General.

Schedule
Jas v. InksLWC
Because of the electoral implications of this case, the Court has decided that it should be heard first.

The plaintiff has until Wednesday to file his brief.  It is expected no later than 5:00PM EDT on Wednesday July 16, 2008.

The defendant has an additional twenty-four hours to file his brief.  It is expected no later than 5:00PM EDT on Thursday, July 17, 2008.

Additional time may be granted to either party upon a showing of sufficient need.  However, the Court wishes to proceed as quickly as possible given the electoral implications of this matter.

A possible period of argument (Q&A) may be scheduled after presentation of the briefs in case any member of the Court has any questions for the parties.

So ordered.

Jas v. Peter
The plaintiff has until Saturday to file his brief.  It is expected no later than 5:00PM EDT on Saturday, July 19, 2008.

The defendant has an additional twenty-four hours to file his brief.  It is expected no later than 5:00PM EDT on Sunday, July 20, 2008.

Additional time may be granted to either party upon a showing of sufficient need. 

A possible period of argument (Q&A) may be scheduled after presentation of the briefs in case any member of the Court has any questions for the parties.

So ordered.

Notes

1. We presume that Jas will present his own briefs in support of his cases and that InksLWC and Peter will present briefs respectively in support of each case.  If any party wishes to substitute counsel to argue in either election, please let the Court know by public post on this thread.  As always, amicus briefs are welcome from any citizen or group on this case and will be considered by the Court.

2. Considering the importance of this matter, the Court's grant of certiorari and grant of injunction was made without the input of Brother Opebo, who has been away on vacation to Thailand since the introduction of this case.  I have sent him our disposition of these matters and welcome his public input on this thread as soon as he arrives back.

[Sam Spade]

My only question for Jas is simply whether he has any response to Peter's point about mootness of this case and whether any action exists that he is seeking to overturn.

[Sam Spade]

Isn't that an inherent judicial right?

Please explain.

Some might argue the power to dismiss a case for mootness is contained in the US constitution's cases and controversies clause, a clause not copied over in our constitution.

Does the right to dismiss for being moot, come from that clause?  If so, how could we dismiss for that in that clause's absence, or if not, where does the "right" come from?

It is an inherent judicial power to not decide a case when there remains no real party in interest, because events have caused any decision to have no impact on the litigants. I am unaware of statute or Constitutional provision in the US dealing with mootness. It is a common law concept.

AFAIK, the federal court's mootness requirements derive from the Article III "cases and controversies" requirement.

All state courts have some version of a mootness requirement, but they differ greatly and some are quite lax.

I note that F.L. 4-3 attempts to make applicable the common law of the US on our decisions, but fails to tell us what the "common law" means or how it applies.

I would presume that all parties would agree that the court is allowed to create mootness requirements on its own, as its own version of the "common law".

My question would be the extreme case, does F.L. 4-3 require the court to follow mootness requirements of the "common law", and if so, which "common law"? 

Or can the court use this vagueness to create its own "common law", where mootness requirements do not apply, except if statutorily provided, since the Constitution is silent (as noted above)?

[Sam Spade]

We are hoping to have a decision on this case fairly shortly.

[Sam Spade]

Justice Sam Spade delivers the opinion of the Court, in which the Chief Justice Bullmoose88 joins.  Chief Justice Bullmoose88 issues a concurring opinion.

Prologue

Today, the Court address the flip side of the question asked in Jas v. Inks.LWC - whether a cabinet officer, in this case Attorney General Peter, may carry out the duties and responsibilities of an Executive Department after the beginning of a new Presidential term of office.

While we decline, as Respondent urges, to either 1) address the scope and application of the mootness doctrine in Atlasia, or 2) apply it to the facts in this matter, we hold that a cabinet officer may exercise the powers as Secretary of an Executive Department after the beginning of a new Presidential term of office.

PART I

Initially, Respondent asks that this Court dismiss Petitioner’s case on the ground that it is moot.  Specifically, he argues that since he did not act in his role as Attorney General after the new Presidential term of office began on July 4, 2008, Petitioner cannot seek to overturn a hypothetical action.  Respondent further surmises that since Brandon H has been confirmed for the position of Attorney General, this de facto dismissal which removed Peter from his cabinet office means that Petitioner cannot sue to remove him from office again.

While we feel that Respondent’s assertion may have merit in some future action, we believe there is no need to apply it to the facts of this case.  Moreover, we think that the present case provides a poor canvas with which to paint our vision of a mootness doctrine in Atlasian jurisprudence.

Furthermore, the basic question of this case is one that is likely to arise again if the Court chooses to ignore it now.  We believe that the Atlasian government will function more efficiently if we render a decision today, rather than postponing it to some future date, since we think that this decision will give members of the executive branch a clearer understanding as to where their powers lie during a change in administration. 

Most importantly, considering our recent decision in Jas v. Inks.LWC, this case provides the Court the perfect opportunity to fill in some of the gaps of that decision, particularly as it applies to cabinet officers. 

In sum, we decline to address Respondent’s mootness argument, thereby holding that it does not apply to the facts of this case.

PART II

The crux of Petitioner’s argument has already been mostly addressed by our opinion in Jas v. Inks.LWC. 

In that case, we found that the “executive power” vested in the President of the Republic of Atlasia by Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 “adheres to the Presidential office itself.”  We reasoned that, “Since the executive power remains with the Presidential office, rather than the person who inhabits the office, it will continue, without termination, until this Constitution is no longer effective.”  In conclusion, we held that “the power of duly appointed government officials who have sworn the oath of office… to carry out executive actions does not end until the President uses his executive power affirmatively to dismiss said officials.”

As noted above, our decision in Jas v. Inks.LWC only dealt with government officials who serve under the executive departments as designated by the Senate.  We now extend this holding to apply to the “Principal Officers” or cabinet officers of the executive departments as well, as designated under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and Article VIII, Section 2, Clause 1. 

Therefore, we must find, as concerns the facts of this case, that Attorney General Peter legally conducted the duties and responsibilities of the Department of Justice after the beginning of a new Mr. Moderate’s presidential term until he was de facto dismissed from his position by the appointment of Brandon H as Attorney General.

In passing, we note three important results of the ruling, as it pertains to future conduct by the executive and legislative branches. 

First, once a cabinet officer is appointed by the President under his Article II, Section 2, Clause 4 powers and approved by the Senate, he may only be removed from office by four methods: 1) voluntary resignation, 2) impeachment by the Senate, or 3) dismissal by the President, or 4) de facto dismissal by the President, which occurs only when the President nominates a new cabinet officer who is approved by the Senate and who takes the oath of office. 

Second, until a cabinet officer is removed from office by one of these four methods, he exercises his power in that position at the pleasure of the President.  In other words, he is not subject at any point during his term to a re-confirmation hearing or examination by the Senate, except as defined by Law or statute or in a valid impeachment hearing.

Third, since Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 mandates the appointment and removal process for cabinet officers of the executive departments, the Senate may not use its legislative powers under Article I, Section 5 to change this process through statute.

Epilogue

By the powers placed in this Court by the Constitution of the Republic of Atlasia, we hereby lift the injunction against (former) Attorney General Peter from exercising his (former) powers as Attorney General.

So ordered.

[Sam Spade]

We have been unable to reach Brother opebo to get his thoughts on this decision.

If he wishes to join in this opinion, join in CJ Bullmoose88's opinion, file a concurrence or a dissent, he may do so in this thread, and I will PM him saying such.

Thanks.

[Sam Spade]

The decision and concurrence has now been added to the Wiki.

[Sam Spade]

Oh well, 0 for 3.
At least I'm consistent...

Once again I thank the Honorable Justices for their time and effort and am glad that we have received clarification on this point of law.

Keep going - there are plenty more issues that need clarification out there.