Between Two Majorities | The Cordray Administration

[The_Doctor]

More my area:

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Correct.

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We'll have to agree to disagree. I don't believe there will be a natural demographic realignment. The problem with the coalition you sketch out is that it's highly vulnerable and not a steady and strong one. For example, if you leave out the white working class out of this coalition, minorities and upscale whites do not reach 55-60% of the vote.

I'm not sold on the belief there is a inherent tension between the worldview of populist Democrats and working class whites. One reason that I don't view this is that racial and sectarian tensions may ease significantly in the next decade. Historically, sectarian and ethnic tensions have eased as the United States transformed. I've pointed to the Irish and Eastern Europeans as two key examples of how they integrated successfully. I would point out that Irish and Eastern Europeans are now constituted among the highest levels of American political and economic power.

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I strongly disagree and the simple reason is math. The Republicans are not able to have any sort of majority in the next decade and past that without significant buy in from minorities. Racism is not a winning strategy in a country that will see minorities 40-45% of the electorate by the year 2036. Even by 2024, minorities will make a powerful 33% of the vote.

Republicans cannot afford to continue playing with that formula. That's a formula for electoral disaster, and the continual scramble to win more and more whites isn't really viable, as I think whites are also maxed out (or near maxed out) for the GOP.

One huge reason for realignment is that the GOP cultural conservatives implode because they don't simply have the power to carry the party post-crisis. But even barring that, the country is rapidly changing to the point that I don't think the GOP can just be a "whites only" party. That's not mathematically possible. At the very best, it creates a chaotic 51% GOP majority and 49% Democratic opposition. The last 3 elections on the Presidential level demonstrate this.

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We agree and one thing I do believe is that American politics will reorder to try to be more stable. At least, that's the hope.

[The_Doctor]

A good question. Nixon’s and Reagan’s presidencies have been the ones I’ve focused the most in my research. I feel like writing a story so here goes. Someone needs to write a book “Nixon and Reagan,” but I digress. This is going to be one of my favorite articles to write.

The story begins in 1938, when Southern Democrats and Republicans united to stop the New Deal advancing. The coalition, in effect, remained a loose alliance that squared off against the Democratic majority. The South often picked and chose their battles and sometimes won, sometimes lost.

Richard Nixon comes into the picture in 1948, with his strident anti-Communism, in which he takes down Alger Hiss. He’s transformed from a little no name Congressman to U.S. Senator in 1950 and a darling of the conservative wing. In 1952, Eisenhower taps him for vice president to shore up the conservative base after he dispatches right wing Senator Robert Taft for the GOP nomination. During the Vice Presidency, Nixon plays the conservative agitator to Eisenhower’s nonpartisan statesman. As the NYT’s review of the “President and the Apprentice” puts it, “At home, Eisenhower used Nixon to rally the Republicans’ restive right-wing base, occasionally wincing when Nixon verged on charging Democrats with treason but never ordering him to curtail his Reds! Reds! Reds! Roadshow.” To put it this way, during the 1950s and 1960s, Nixon is the preeminent voice of interventionist anti-communism in the Republican Party.

You have to understand, Eisenhower won by being essentially non-ideological and promising not to do anything major. The Eisenhower Republican coalition was basically the American coalition, because to be anti-Eisenhower was to be almost anti-American. There was no ideological conservatism under Eisenhower’s Republican Party. This changed radically in 1964 to 1968. Goldwater is not part of the story in a direct way so I’m going to skip over Goldwater (he figures more prominently in 1980).

In 1968, after his devastating loss to John F. Kennedy, Nixon decides to come back and try again for the Presidency. Unlike 1960, where Nion had run as Eisenhower’s non-ideological heir, Nixon tries a different tack. Nixon campaigns for the votes of culturally conservative America, which up to this time had either leaned Democratic or split their votes. Nixon is the first one to call for strict constructionists to sit in the federal judiciary. When he nominates a replacement to Earl Warren, Richard Nixon says, echoing his campaign, “I happen to believe that the Constitution should be strictly interpreted.” It’s to be noted that Nixon attempted to nominate Georgian G. Harrold Carswell and South Carolinian Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court unsuccessfully in a bid to appeal to the Wallace votes. Nixon appoints, among others, the young William Hubbs Rehnquist to the Court, in a bid to win cultural conservatives over.

Nixon, here, is the first one to successfully bring cultural conservatives into the Republican Party and win a Presidential election. The Republican Party’s platform in 1968 says, “we must re-establish the principle that men are accountable for what they do, that criminals are responsible for their crimes, that while the youth's environment may help to explain the man's crime, it does not excuse that crime.”  As mentioned, he is the first GOP winning candidate for President who advocates strict constructionism, a code word for social conservatism. Nixon also opposed school busing, a hot button issue in 1968. In 1971, he says, “I expressed views with regard to my opposition to busing for the purpose of achieving racial balance, and in support of the neighborhood school in my statement of March of last year.” (While the rest of the article kind of spins it, Nixon is clear in who he’s appealing to). Law and order, constructionist judges, and opposition to school busing all presage the cultural conservatives becoming a core component of the GOP, unlike Eisenhower’s time.

The South, during this time, switches from voting Democratic to Republican for President and begins its march towards the GOP and becoming an instrumental political wing in the Republican Party. The West is already there, but now the South joins them.

Having established that Nixon brought the first leg of the GOP’s three legged stool, let’s talk about the neoconservatives. The history is there, but more murky. Nixon did not set out to lose the war in Vietnam. He continues Lyndon Johnson’s war (and ironically, Jack Kennedy’s war). As this points out, Nixon sought to win the war in Vietnam. It should be pointed out that Nixon very much disliked and openly agitated against the peaceniks taking over the Democratic Party. By virtue of both the peaceniks and Nixon’s behavior, the neoconservatives began shifting to the GOP. Ford was the one who withdrew from Vietnam, not Nixon. Between Nixon’s fairly hawkish actions (bombing Cambodia and Laos, the Christmas bombings of 1972) and the Democratic Party’s peacenik revolution, Nixon becomes the refuge of the hawks during his Presidency. Just before the 1972 election, Irving Kristol (father of noted anti-Trumpist Bill Kristol) and other neoconservatives sign an endorsement of Richard Nixon’s re-election against Democratic nominee George S. McGovern. While the neoconservatives are not Republicans (they are still with Henry “Scoop” Jackson, at this point) they are switching from the Democratic to Republican Party.

Postscript: Nixon goes to China to split the Communist bloc and to isolate the Soviet Union. He certainly promotes detente as a coexistence between us and the Soviet Union, but this is not necessarily as liberal as the peaceniks and figures the United States is better off with this strategy. Nixon was no liberal (and I mean that in the 1970s sense) on the use of military power and confronting America’s enemies. Nixon isn’t necessarily endorsing the Soviet Union as much as endorsing coexistence. Additionally, the isolationist GOP loses out under Nixon as Nixon follows up on his long held belief in fighting Communism aggressively. Oh, yeah, and we overthrew the Chilean government for being Communist in 1973.

Lastly, Nixon was no peacenik and was the mortal foe of the anti-war left during this era. No Republican President would be so reviled as Richard Nixon. He believes the United States cannot afford to lose the war and wants to win “peace with honor.” Your own Orange County white Republicans loved this. The national security key slips away from the Democratic and switches to the Republican Party during this time. The Democrats become the party of the anti-war left while the Republicans reinforce their newfound hawkishness during Nixon’s reign. Remember the movie Forrest Gump? These pro-war folks are Nixon’s Silent Majority.

Nixon lacked the last leg of the Republican majority, though. Nixon agreed to let the Democrats continue their “big government” philosophy in return for a conservative Supreme Court and an unchecked foreign policy. This meant he would sign the EPA (Democratic in origins), and try to uphold the Great Society (since he didn’t have the political coalition to toss it, not after Barry Goldwater’s 1964 loss), and the price controls was in response to the crisis of 1971. Nixon was no fan of Keynesian spending. If memory serves, he fought the idea of Medicaid and Medicare. The economic liberalism was to support a minority coalition.

The economic third leg - the great neoliberal addition of 1980 - is what transformed the rump Republican coalition from that 1938 anti-FDR coalition to the grand GOP - Southern majority coalition of 1980. Reagan would take a much more conservative line on economics and domestic spending than Nixon did,
 
So, Nixon has two out of the three legs of the emerging GOP majority. (Actual book in 1969, written by Nixon advisor, Kevin Phillips: “The Emerging Republican Majority,” a very famous political book). Obama has built the cultural liberalism of the emerging Democratic Party plus the new hawks of the Democratic Party. What’s left - as was the case in 1968 - is for President Rich Cordray to build the economic rationale to create the new grand Democratic majority.

[The_Doctor]

I have a question. I noticed that most of the realignments usually involve the South in a Prominent Fashion.

The Abraham Lincoln 1860 Realignment had the South Break away after Lincoln's Election thus starting the Civil War.

FDR's 1932 Coalition basically was the Southern Democrats but then was expanded to include the North in the New Deal.

Nixon and Reagan's emphasis on Law and Order that really attracted the South.


Maybe I am not making sense here but why is it always the South that starts the next realignment ? In my View ?

Good question. The South plays a prominent role in the last two realignments because traditionally the Democratic Party has usually won support from the populist South (with its attendant ugly racism). For the GOP in 1860-1932 it was Northeastern - Midwestern. The Republican South and Interior Western alliance had a lot to do with race too. So the only time the South wasn't part of the majority coalition was 1860-1932 and maybe the upcoming one.

For a lot of weird reasons Dixie has been our national problem child. I don't have a good answer there.

[The_Doctor]

TD,

What do you think about the idea of North and South Dakota flipping before West Virginia and Kentucky in 2024? I ask this because surprisingly Obama came within 8-9 points of flipping both Dakotas in 2008 while he was behind in WV by 13 points and KY by 16 points respectively.

Plus the Dakotas have trended twice Dem and twice Rep since 2000 while WV and KY have both trended Rep 4 times in a row now. The Dakotas also seem just as fitting for a Cordray candidacy since they are technically Midwestern states. Even though you described Appalachia and the Deep South as being populist regions while the Interior Plains were much more technocratic, you did concede that you we're surprised at how well Trump did in the interior plains even though he ran a much more populist campaign than Hillary Clinton did.

I put the Dakotas Republican in 2024 because of their reliance on oil and gas to power their economy. North Dakota, a few years ago, had the lowest unemployment because of the booming energy sector in the Bakken Formation. They're also with a longer record of being Republican than the South.

All that said, you're right, I was surprised at Trump's strength in the Interior region. I will also add Dukakis had strength in the Dakotas in the late 1980s over the farm belt not doing well (this also is why he won Iowa and Wisconsin).

I guess, I can see the Dakotas flipping before WV/KY, flipping with WV/KY, or ND, SD, WV, KY, all going GOP. (This only puts Cordray at closer to 450 electoral votes, rather than his 480 or whatever he got).

[The_Doctor]

What happened to Trump post Presidency? I can't imagine he goes quietly. How would he be remembered among the base?

An excellent question, actually. You'll see why shortly.

I said on page 9 (February 8, 2017):

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I thought about it today. I suppose, I stand by this. I had a couple of thoughts of how Trump goes and I've concluded a few things, which I will try to be very concise to state. I'd like to expand on the subject.

1. Trump is not going to be impeached over collusion with Russia. While I may believe personally x or y, the problem is this. Pence can't pardon him in this scenario, the Republican Party would be implicated in basically a treasonous act, and the political system would be mortally threatened. The consequences could be a permanent crippling of conservative politics, and this would be an "unnatural" crippling; not a traditional realignment (possibly akin to the lingering aftermath of the Civil War that has plagued our politics). It would be basically a felling of one of the two major coalitions in the United States.

So, I increasingly think Trump will be taken down for other reasons because the political stability in the United States will be a paramount concern for all concerned. The FBI and intelligence agencies, as well as Congress, will probably try to remove him for other reasons other than direct collusion.  

Have we faced this option before? Yes. Richard Nixon conspired to stop the Vietnam talks in October 1968, with Anna Channault acting as the conduit. President Lyndon Johnson and the intelligence services took that secret to the grave with them. He could have revealed it and Nixon would have been taken down possibly long before he even took the oath. But the damage to the GOP could have been so extensive that we never get the normal realignment towards Reagan and the natural end of the New Deal Democratic Party.

We learned about this recently for a fact, this year, long after the death of Richard Nixon and all involved. (It had been rumored, but never proven). We can process it today and deal with it. It might have been far different in 1969, to hear a President committed treason to get to the White House.

Lincoln faced this quandary in 1865 when he basically beat the Democratic Party, which had been engaged in treasonous action against the United States. The pre-1860 Democratic majority had been largely rooted in the South and was pro-slavery. Lincoln had no choice but his post-1865 plans included national unity and moving past the Civil War and avoiding Reconstruction's heavy handed approach. He was assassinated and replaced by the radical Republicans after 1866, who inflicted a heavy political price on the South, which, all said and done, may have led to the bitter wounds remaining open - and they have stayed open - for nearly two centuries. (I believe fully the South committed treason; I'm just assessing the political consequences of a momentous act like this).

The counterargument is that if we had taken Nixon down in 1969 instead of 1974, the rift over Watergate might have never happened. Also, had we maintained Reconstruction for a generation, the South's legacy might not have been so bitter for our national politics. So I'm not fully 100 percent behind my thinking; it's 60-40 for it.

a. Ford pardoned Nixon to move past Watergate. The specter of a President of the United States on trial would have probably shaken the system to its roots. We have never had a President go to trial for crimes -- possibly for good reason. The public spectacle might have basically wrecked the confidence in our government or the ability of a president to lead us. Again, the counterargument holds, but still.

2. Trump will probably stand by Pence until Pence begins to fail. After his fall from grace Trump will try to move on with his life. In his past failed ventures he has swiftly left the field and gone onto other ventures. I don't know how he manages with the Presidency (I doubt very much he will even be a successful President, even if he avoids impeachment). I really do believe he will tweet time to time but I suspect his focus will be rehabilitating his image, his family's image, and trying to salvage the damage. One thing to remember is this. Pence's success is critical to Trump's rehabilitation, in this scenario. Trump can be terribly self-destructive, but in a case like this, I think a 75 year old man will realize that he has little choice but to be supportive of Pence and be far more cautious.

a. The Republican base will, IF my thinking prevails among the intelligence agencies, the FBI, Congress, and Mueller, probably be allowed to respect Trump but I think at this point, they will shift their energies to actively supporting Pence. I have some experience in this. My first political hero was Richard M. Nixon. I thought he had been given a bum rap by the Democrats over Watergate and been unfairly harmed. Only much later did I learn about the Anna Chennault incident and only this year was that verified. But it's not such a huge deal, in a political relative sense, because Nixon's enemies removed him from the scene for lesser crimes. So Nixon remains that "hidden admired GOP" figure, that victim of Democratic villainy. Trump might occupy a role like that, but to a much lesser extent.

IF the prosecutors DO bring Trump down on collusion, the GOP base will rapidly most likely abandon Trump completely but we'd be in uncharted territory as to whether there'd be a Republican base afterwards.

That's my thinking anyway. Grain of salt, etc.

[The_Doctor]

It's on the To Do List, as I'm working through Rick Perlstein's trilogy of the conservative movement between 1964 and 1980. (Thanks to Ted Bessell). Foundation is next.

[The_Doctor]

It's on the To Do List, as I'm working through Rick Perlstein's trilogy of the conservative movement between 1964 and 1980. (Thanks to Ted Bessell). Foundation is next.

Wait, wait, wait, you haven't read the Invisible Bridge and Nixonland and still know all of this?!?

More or less.

[The_Doctor]

Maybe I missed it, but what's Cordray's campaign slogan(s) in 2024 and 2028?

"Cordray Cares"

"The Real Deal."

Appalachia and working class whites need to appreciate a non-SJW Democratic slogan that focuses on economic rebalancing. This also emphasizes the need to create economic equilibrium. It also builds on the most successful Democratic slogan in American history: "The New Deal" (with supporting "Fair Deal") and the best populist GOP slogan "the Square Deal."

[The_Doctor]

Everyone take a look at 2008. Don't answer if I PM'd you the answer. But if Obama was a foreshadowing President what should've happened in 2008 but didn't happen? Trust me it's a traditional major factor in the run up to a realignment.

I'll throw up two articles on this issue but I think what I've concluded will be interesting. You'll want to read it.

[The_Doctor]

Everyone take a look at 2008. Don't answer if I PM'd you the answer. But if Obama was a foreshadowing President what should've happened in 2008 but didn't happen? Trust me it's a traditional major factor in the run up to a realignment.

I'll throw up two articles on this issue but I think what I've concluded will be interesting. You'll want to read it.

A serious 3rd party bid?

I'm thinking it's this - considering 1912 and 1968.

Yup. And the reason why it didn't happen is definitely interesting; sort of the Holmesian "the dog that didn't bark." It's also going to answer a number of questions about this majority.

I have the first article written, but I'll post it tomorrow after editing. Or tonight.

[The_Doctor]

The Weakest Realignment of American History and Why: Part I

I would recommend you read this and this. It provides you important background to the story I’m about to tell.

First, hat tip to darklordoftech for providing the key clue that solved a number of nagging doubts I had.

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So, the election of 1848, 1912, and 1968 saw the victory of a second minority coalition presidency over the dominant coalition - and a strong third party. The crucial key noted in the clue is that the third parties provided part of the coalition to the later realignment (1860, 1932, and 1980). The anti-slavery Free Soilers (1), the Bull Moose populists, and the conservative Southern Democrats all became integral to the ascendant majority coalition in the realignment.

These third parties at that point in time are critical to the ascent of a new majority because they allow factions of the old majority to pass through the third party candidacy on the way to integrating into the new majority. This was their way of shedding their partisanship and adopting a new one. (This is essentially, J. Strom Thurmond’s career).

By that logic, the election of 2008 should have seen a major conservative third party candidacy (maybe Donald Trump as an independent, had he thought about it). The old GOP neoliberal neoconservative evangelical majority was on the point of collapse with a failed Iraq war and neoliberal policies (that leave a rank taste to this day). However, strangely, it didn’t happen. The popular vote for the two major parties totaled 98.46% - with Senator Barack Obama (D-Illinois) taking 52.86% and a ten million vote lead over Senator John McCain (R-Arizona). During the Obama years, the ACA and a number of other initiatives proved that he was the foreshadowing presidency to the Great Realignment.

What gives? It seems the transition from the Republican neoliberal evangelical majority to the emerging Democratic populist socially liberal majority had missed a key stage.

However, when you look at the Reagan - Bush majority, a number of details leap out that look bizarre in a typical realignment.

In the first place, the Reagan-Bush majority never assumed the huge Congressional majorities the three prior realignments had provided. The Federalists never won a majority after Jefferson’s presidency (or even came close to; the Democratic-Republicans and the Democrats held huge majorities, on balance). The Whigs won it only once in 1842. At the midpoint of the GOP majority in 1896, it was 210-124 Republican in the House and 46-32 in the Senate (282-153 and 59-41 in modern terms). In 1960, at the midway point, it was 262-175 Democratic in the House and 64-36 Democratic in the Senate. But at the midpoint between Reagan and the likely realignment, the GOP held a 221-212 House majority and a 51-50 Senate majority after the 2000 elections. Even after 2014, they held a 247-188 edge and a 54-46 edge. Very clearly, the Reaganite and Bush Republicans never were able to command a majority on the scale of their predecessors.
 
The second oddity. The House popular vote is lost for us in 1828 and 1896 but we have the House popular vote for 1960: 55.4% Democratic, 44.8% Republican. Given the seats won in 1896 and 1828 by the confirmation president, we can probably assume these coalitions won the popular vote by a significant margin. But in the current metric, the Democrats have lost the popular vote by more than 5 points only (counting only post-1994, when the Southern Democrats were tossed out) in 1994, 2010, and 2014. Every other election, the Democrats have been within 2-3 points or won the popular vote. This is highly at odds with prior majorities. Even Lincoln’s Republican majorities, who had a rough decade in the 1880s, commanded strong, impregnable majorities at times (particularly the election of 1872).  

An important postscript. To be clear, President Ronald Reagan counted among his partisans many Southern Democrats. We can test how many Democrats effectively counted themselves as part of the Reagan Republican-Southern Democratic majority during his tenure based on his 1981 budget and tax votes. A crucial procedural vote on the tax bill in 1981 served as a proxy to test Reagan’s Southern Democratic - GOP majority. Reagan prevailed 238-190 with 48 Democrats joining 190 Republicans. A budget vote served as another test. 63 Democratic Congress members joined the Republicans to pass the sweeping budget of 1981 253-176. So we can guess the Southern Democratic - Republican majority was at 239-254 in the House; which is weak by historical standards but stronger than anything the GOP has garnered for the most part after 2000.

The final aberration comes in the popular vote. In every Presidential election since 1992 the Democrats have won the popular vote every single time except 2004. Not since 1988 have the Republican Party been able to win the popular vote by more than 2.5% (and lost every popular vote except 2004). To make matters worse, the Democrats won the popular by significant margins twice in that era and won it by a comfortable margin the other two times. Historically, this isn’t supposed to happen. The Democratic-Republican majorities were so strong that James Monroe (for some unknown reason as the man was a nonentity) won re-election unopposed. The Lincoln GOP prevailed in the popular vote 6 times leading up to 1896 (with 4 to the Democrats, including two electoral college losses). The Roosevelt Democrats swamped the Republicans four times in a row and won the fourth election by 4 points. (Over the entire era, they won 5 landslides and two close victories; the Republicans three landslides and one close victory).

Registration, throughout this period, should have favored the Republican Party. In 1960, roughly half of all voters were Democrats. There are no registration data for the earlier eras, but it is strongly assumed that the majority coalition held more political partisans. (Almost certainly, the Democratic-Republican coalition held a majority of the country's registered voters, if there had been registration). In 1980, 45% of voters were Democrats, 29% independent, and 23% Republicans. By 2014, according to Pew, that number was 39% independent, 32% Democratic, and 23% Republican. Exit polling in 1980 showed that 43% of voters were Democratic, 28% Republican, and 23% independent. In 2016, Democrats made up 36% of the electorate, 33% Republican, and 31% independent. This wasn't the sign of a strong GOP majority coalition; it was the sign of a weak one.

These three aberration from the three prior majorities are important clues. So is the fourth clue: Ronald Reagan never assembled a partisan Republican majority and relied on Southern Democrats to form his governing coalition. It is no accident that Bill Clinton, a Democrat from Arkansas, blew apart that coalition by being from the South and may have indirectly forced the Republicans to convert to being a straight up partisan majority.  

[To be Continued]

[The_Doctor]

So why was there no third party challenge? The answer is this.

The Republican majority formed in 1980 was the first plurality, not majority, coalition in American history. Traditional majorities enjoy broad support (in 1960, half of all registered voters were Democrats; today the Republicans are roughly anywhere behind the Democrats by 3-4% or at parity). However, the Republican House alone won 43-47% of the vote in the 1980s and only grew to majority support in the 1990s. The Southern Democrats were essential to garnering a majority.  However, in the 1990s, as they garnered that southern support, the Pacific Coast and Northeast broke away, leaving the GOP in a very precarious position as George W. Bush became President(2). The GOP had vaulted from a 45% majority with carry-and-support from the Southern Democrats to being a very narrow 51% majority.

Now, the answer to why no 2008 third party challenger.

Third party challenges usually form after a long period of hegemonic dominance by one party. 1992, 1968, and 1948 were all after clear and hegemonic dominance by the reigning majority. 1912 came after sixteen years of GOP rule, including the blowout victories of 1904 and 1908. 1924 was after the decisive GOP victory of 1920 (and even then so, Coolidge won 54% of the vote). Only once has a major third party candidacy emerged after a string of close victories - that would be 1892, when the Populists won 8.5% of the vote, even as Grover Cleveland won re-election.  

The majority coalition had a wing to break away and still remain the majority, in essence. Even without the South, the 1969 Democratic Party could enjoy political power. After 1912, the Republicans may have been weakened but still enjoyed broad national support (as the string of GOP victories from 1920 to 1928 showed). Without opposition in the 1850s, the Democrats successfully elected two one term presidents. They could afford to see breakaways and still govern. The Reagan-Bush GOP majority does not have that wing to break away and still remain a stable majority party.

But, for the current majority: as a result of the weak standing in the majority coalition, the Republicans chose to polarize and to harden their partisans to avoid further weakening. They had lost the moderate Republicans in the 1990s and 2000s by losing the Pacific Northwest and New England, which were incompatible with the strengthened South - Interior West GOP core. So, Fox News and talk show radio was drafted in this endeavor. As a result of their hardened partisanship, polarization soared and in 2008, even as they faced certain destruction, Republicans did not break ranks. This is why there was no major third party candidacy in 2008 -- even though there SHOULD have been.

This also goes a long way to explain why Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell acted the way he did in 2009 to obstruct at all costs. It is plausible, in fact, that the GOP was indirectly guided by this weakness and unknowingly acted to reinforce it. But in the act they invited even further pushback against the opposition gravitational forces arrayed against them. Given the kind of majority they had, they probably were locked into the strategy they chose.

This likely means the realignment will continue on pace but it may unfold in an unusual fashion, akin to 1980 on a bigger scale. That year, John Anderson won 6.5% of the vote which later voted for Ronald Reagan in 1984. The realigning Democratic Presidency is very likely to win power with 51-53% of the vote but the Republican vote would be between 35 and 40% of the vote and a third party conservative challenger (say, John Kasich, for argument’s sake) would take up 9-12% of the vote. However, four years later, the Democrats may expand their majorities by winning the Kasich voters in an accelerated timetable and the completion is seen eight years later after the realignment with the successful election of the Democratic Vice President. So, for example, Rich Cordray could win 52% of the vote in 2024 with 35% for the GOP nominee and 11% remainder to Kasich and 1% to assorted third parties, but win 58% of the vote against 40% for the GOP nominee in 2028; with Vice President Castro cementing the gains in 2032 with a solid 53-45% win.

There is also an outside chance of a rare short third term minority presidency but I’m skeptical of this because I think the Democrats are much more coherent and stable than the rapidly fragmenting Republican coalition (which is warring under Trump and the wars do not seem likely to calm after his departure).  

Now, the biggest question is: how did the GOP majority coalition start out so weak? And we’ll cover that next time.

--------------------------
1. A fun note: the Free Soilers won 26% of the vote in New York, their best major state showing outside Massachusetts. Twelve years later, it would be the deciding state that put GOP Presidential nominee Abraham Lincoln in the White House. Had you combined the Free Soilers and the Whig vote, the Midwest turns from Democrat Cass to Whig Taylor while the Northeast becomes a literal Whig fortress. This wound up the heart of the 1860-1932 GOP coalition. Republican Lincoln won a majority of the vote in every Midwestern state outside Kentucky and Missouri in both 1860 and 1864. Zachary Taylor’s showing in the South probably attributes to him being a Louisianan slaveholder, which, obviously, Lincoln was not.

2.  President Bush became the first Republican to fail to carry California and Illinois and upper New England while winning the White House twice. During his tenure, these states became increasingly Democratic on the state and federal level.

[The_Doctor]

The Weakest Realignment of American History and Why: Part II

This article is going to be a broad, short, and to the point; I haven’t read Perlstein’s trilogy in full so I may end up revising this article very heavily. As a consequence, it’s not as detailed as the first article in this segment. Nevertheless, having demonstrated that the Reagan coalition is several orders weaker than the prior realigning coalitions, it’s probably a good idea to explore why. And I don’t think you people want to wait like 5 months while I finish the trilogy.

So: the working theory I have right now is that the inability to overturn, significantly alter, or adequately replace the New Deal, the Great Society, and the administrative state has seriously weakened the Republican Party’s ability to govern as a true comprehensive majority party.

History time. The Southern Democratic - GOP minority of 1938 formed to resist the expansion of the New Deal, and in the 1950s, the National Review magazine resisted Eisenhower accommodationist conservatism, grumbling about how much Eisenhower was not only cementing but expanding the New Deal. Senator Barry Goldwater’s doomed 1964 bid was built on arguing against the modern welfare state. In 1976, Ronald Reagan called Social Security a Ponzi scheme and lost the Florida Republican Party for his troubles. And of course, every Republican agitated against Medicare between 1961 and 1965.

Having finished the first 100 pages of the Perlstein trilogy on the 1980 - present day realignment, I will add that many of the figures that propped up Goldwater had an extremely strong aversion to the New Deal, unlike the Tories of the 1950s. Clarence Manion, William Buckley, and Barry Goldwater all decried the New Deal among others; and the most powerful opponents of the New Deal and labor were small businesses and manufacturing interests.

So,  very clearly, there is an ideological history of resentment against the New Deal, the Great Society, and the progressive era and labor unions. The lodestar of the GOP is Calvin Coolidge, not Teddy Roosevelt. After all, William Taft and his ideological heirs won the fight of 1912 and set the GOP on a more conservative path. Up to 1952, Republicans were fighting to roll back the New Deal and there is significant evidence that they never wanted to give up.

The election of 1980 enacted an uneasy compromise. The Republican majority coalition was built on the backs of blue collar white voters who had switched their allegiances and populist Southerners who had revered Franklin Roosevelt. In short, the GOP would include the poorest region in the United States and link itself with populist voters, who were not naturally disposed to hate the New Deal. The binding social conservative + tax cuts + some budget cuts glue held together the GOP coalition for the next couple of decades. The safety net for these Republican voters would not be touched (but it was OK to cut benefits like welfare for Democratic minorities). Reagan lived up to his word in 1983 with a bipartisan proposal to protect Social Security.

However, Republicans don’t ever seem to have quite given up the dream. In 1994, the Gingrich Congress sought to end welfare as they knew it (winning bipartisan support from President Bill Clinton). Governor George W. Bush (R-Texas) campaigned on allowing people to invest a portion of their Social Security benefits into the private market (which spectacularly blew up in his face politically in 2005). In 2011, Rep. Paul Ryan (later the 2012 Vice Presidential nominee and Speaker) pushed for reform to Medicare. In 2017, despite Trump’s pledge to not touch Medicare and Medicaid, the Republicans are attempting to roll back the Medicaid expansion.
 
Clearly, voters don’t like this and as a result don’t have the trust in the GOP that they did in prior political majorities. Consistently, voters have backed Social Security, Medicaid, and elements of the welfare state (outside TANF). They have acted consistently to punish Republicans when they thought Republicans were hurting these programs.  However, Republicans seem to have found an existential crisis here. The “starving the beast” refers to slowly killing the welfare state by lowering tax receipts in order to provide less funds to the state.

Voters don’t really agree with this. Including Republican voters. Here’s an example. (Thanks TT.)  



As you can see obviously, working class Republicans prioritize their benefits over ideological goals of budget deficit reduction. However, ideologically motivated Republican leaders and activists have long sought the destruction of the administrative state and the erasure of the Progressive era as a holy grail.

More to the point, 55 million Americans are on Medicare. 73 million Americans are on Medicaid. 60 million Americans are on Social Security.  Needless to say, the constituencies behind these programs are extraordinarily powerful. Roughly 10 million Americans are receiving subsidies to pay for healthcare. These constituencies cut across a broad swath of demographics and have done so since their inception. In the process, they have probably weakened a political coalition from being much stronger than they would have been otherwise.  

Republicans never comfortably became “Tories” as in embracing their European counterparts’ comfort with the welfare state across the continent. Their resistance to universal health care dates to 1949. The intrinsic opposition to socialism in the American conservative mind has probably created this radical opposition.  

The public routinely checked the GOP majority since 1980 by propping up enough Democrats to resist the GOP. When George W. Bush tried to reform Social Security in 2005, Democrats were backed by the public and won a decisive victory (and began the process of cracking Bush’s support). Governor Romney in 2012 was pilloried for supporting RyanCare. Today, the AHCA has the support of 17% of Americans, with the opposition of a majority of the voters. Voters are telling pollsters this is an issue that rates higher than the Russian investigation, and other issues.

On the issues of the day, the public routinely backs the more liberal option than the conservative option. That has only intensified in recent decades (gay marriage, the death penalty, among other issues).  That has also helped weaken the GOP’s ideological majority and probably kept it from attaining far more seats than they have otherwise.

Ultimately, it appears that the strength of the welfare and administrative state - and the Republican Party’s ideological opposition to it - have caused the GOP to be weaker than imagined when becoming a majority coalition. And coupled with the public’s liberal ideology on balance, the GOP finds themselves in a weak majority coalition with limited public backing.

I'll take questions and theories and ideas now.

EDIT: Added "or adequately replace" the New Deal and Great Society, June 19, 2017.

[The_Doctor]

If the Republican coalition is very weak because the public is more comfortable with social programs and liberal in general than the GOP wants them to be and acts like they are, wouldn't that mean that the coming Democratic majority will be the strongest coalition in US history, at least in the first half?

Not known at this point. Could be a weak Democratic coalition, if I've gotten my analysis wrong on the why. Could be extremely strong. Nobody really knows what the next Democratic majority will look like and why. We've seen a number of precedents destroyed on this realignment, so it's hard to guess.

In theory yes ... but we don't know for sure. I'm venturing an educated guess on why the Reagan realignment was so weak.

Maybe part of the reason why the Reagan realignment was so weak was because it came too soon.
Jefferson--->Lincoln was 60 years.
Lincoln--->Roosevelt was 72 years.
Roosevelt--->Reagan was only 48 years.

I actually would point out the Roosevelt coalition lasted 48 years but was extremely strong. Technology might be speeding up realignments as news cycles become faster and information time lags are less and less. In other words, the next Democratic realignment is unlikely to be 60 years, but could be as short as 40 years, presaging a Republican realignment in 2056-2072 but that's kind of bonkers to guess on that.

[The_Doctor]

OK, I'm going to stop these articles because I really need to bang out this economic article, which is the final piece of the realignment supplementals and I want to finish the Perlstein trilogy. (So far, the trilogy is confirming what I knew from other books).

[The_Doctor]

OK, I'm going to stop these articles because I really need to bang out this economic article, which is the final piece of the realignment supplementals and I want to finish the Perlstein trilogy. (So far, the trilogy is confirming what I knew from other books).

Cool

What role (if any) does Sherrod Brown play in this timeline from 2020-2024 and onwards?

Al Smith.

I'm curious, how different do you think your outlook would have been if we had a narrow Clinton victory? A weak Clinton landslide, winning Arizona and Georgia?

Defeat in 2020, realignment in 2024 or 2028.

Were you still planning on writing the article on Elise Stefanik's election as the first Republican President post-Cordray that you mentioned earlier, TD?

Maybe sometime in the fall.

Although I'm new, I've been keeping up with your TL for awhile. I really like what you've done. All the events seem incredibly plausible.

Thank you and welcome to Atlas.

[The_Doctor]

So something else that's bothering me. Take a look at the House elections of 1848 and 1860; 1912 and 1932; 1968 and 1980. For some reason the majority coalition matches in both the foreshadowing and realigning election. The popular vote and House majority in 1968 to 1980 are eerie.

Use the link here and change the year at the end in the url.

For the life of me I don't understand why the realignment appears briefly in the House totals but not the White House. The third party candidates have their voters voting for the realigning party down-ballot but they aren't doing it up ballot. And I don't understand why.

I'm gonna study these four elections more and figure out why. I'll try to get the popular vote for the House in these years and also examine the election of 1848 [Whig Zachary Taylor was the second minority coalition presidency -- his vice president Millard Fillmore, ran for president as a third party candidate in 1856].

A friend says that the sample size is too small and that's a plausible answer. The question is is that the answer? Or is it something more than coincidence?

Anyone have thoughts? Is the theory crazy?

[The_Doctor]

^ Wish I could find an answer to your question but I'm stumped for answers.

Could you see Pence replicating the Trump coalition but not being able to narrow the gap enough with Hispanics and Asians to where he narrowly loses the popular vote but wins the EC in 2020?

How do you think that'll affect his presidency in your timeline? Do you think Cordray makes any attempt to change the EC or does 2024-onwards present such an innate advantage for the Dems in the EC that they'll just forego reform entirely?

1. I think Pence ekes out an Electoral College and popular vote victory, although I'm now thinking that it will not be on his own strength but Kasich mopping up third party votes from both sides, allowing Pence to rely on his base to take the White House for a full term of his own. (I'll be revising the 2020 stories and totals). Kasich could serve as the breakup vehicle of the Republican Party and if he runs but Pence wins, these morass of voters could shift to the Democratic Party in 2024.

2. It's really a tossup on the Electoral College. I have no clue what President Cordray would do on the Electoral College. A popular vote loss but EC win would definitely fuel the flames to where the EC is going to go through severe reform. The EC might go, or it might stay, it all depends on what Democrats wake up in 2025 and how they feel with their majorities.

[The_Doctor]

Friendly reminder that this, written December 2016, is now an active objective for the Republican Party. In this timeline, the law is set to take place in 2018, if memory serves. I'm speaking of the Kobach "election integrity" commission.

As for race in America? It continued to be a violent, messy, and thorny issue. Republicans in the states continued to expand "voter ID" requirements and to cut early voting hours in a bid to limit minority voters. The Trump Administration joined them in a national voter ID law and in a bid to force the states to adopt the restrictive laws that would help the Republican advantage. But in the end, these laws amounted to a flimsy gate against the dam of destiny.

I'm also especially proud of the RyanCare article on page 1 of this timeline.  We'll see what happens though on that front. But I like that the dynamics were captured accurately as far as passing a major entitlement reform law went.

[The_Doctor]

We now have a Table of Contents thanks to NJ is Better than TX. Thank you to him! I've updated the first page with full credit to him.

[The_Doctor]

I picked him mainly to represent the emerging power of the Latino coalition and the integral nature of the Sunbelt to the Democratic Party. Traditionally, realigning tickets tend to have one or both members from the rising majority's geographic dominance. (Reagan - Bush, Lincoln - Hamlin,  Roosevelt - Gardner, Jefferson - Burr). The Midwest is not necessarily going to remain a Democratic stronghold. There is an even odds it could emulate Reagan's California and Pacific Coast and become Republican after the Cordray Administration.

It could be easily Kamala Harris but it will be someone from that region or the South.

Castro seemed a rising star in the Democratic Party's growing Sunbelt - South geography and spoke to the increasing power of Latinos within the Democratic Party so I thought it was a natural fit.

EDIT: Ah, I didn't make him a statewide officer. Whatever lol. I had originally planned him to make him a governor or Senator but I screwed up the planning. You get the idea. If Donald Trump can be president ...

[The_Doctor]

#TwoPaths: The Republican Populist Third Party Candidacy
 
I’ve decided to not alter this timeline regarding John Kasich’s likely third party candidacy (or a Republican populist independent candidacy). I should have incorporated it into the timeline but in hindsight, I’m glad I didn’t. One reason is that I cannot decide between 2020 and 2024. I’ll explain why in a bit. In lieu of rewriting the timeline, I’m going to write a supplemental arguing that a Republican will launch a significant third party bid in 2020 or 2024. How that plays out will factor into the Democratic Party’s eventual realignment.
 
For a variety of reasons, I think that the third party candidacy will resemble Ross Perot’s 1992 bid. J. Ross Perot ran for President despite being a Reagan Republican in the 1980s on a nationalist economic agenda that called for opposition to NAFTA and balancing the budget. A lot of Perot voters had been Reagan - Bush voters, but shifted towards Perot in 1992 and 1996. Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton picked up some of these voters in his 1996 re-election and Texas Governor George W. Bush won them over in 2000 on his compassionate conservative platform. In sum, Perot introduced a - dare we say, Kasichian - strain of conservatism in the 1990s that played out well and defined the Democratic Party. I think history is due for a repeat.
 
Likewise, as the Republican Party’s civil war intensifies, Governor Kasich has played up the #TwoPaths theme that has dominated his political discourse since Donald Trump became President. In fact, as Donald Trump fails to enact his agenda that his base voted for, Kasich could easily step into the opening and couple it with his moderate conservatism. It would be a good fit for an Ohio Governor who has experience in playing to blue collar voters and has emerged as a bipartisan moderate figure. He also, famously, was the House Budget Chairman when the budget was balanced in the 1990s.
 
The Republican Party’s establishment is probably at the weakest point since 1964, when Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) launched a successful insurgency to win the nomination. For a dominant majority, it is at the weakest point since President William Howard Taft (R-Ohio)’s 1912 re-election bid. The alt-right grassroots, the moneyed political establishment, and the swing moderates all hold the keys to the GOP majority but increasingly are at loggerheads and locked in a civil war.
 
The alt-right holds the grassroots and the White House. However, they don’t have a majority of the Party and have reluctant buy in from the other wings of the Party. Without a serious ideological framework or path, or strategic direction, they are unable to really execute a takeover of the Party. With President Trump’s 46% and significant popular vote loss, they are not in a position to claim serious legitimacy. The GOP establishment has been crippled by President Trump’s insurgency nomination and later election, but they retain the party’s donors and political class, thus retaining influence. The moderates hold the keys to the Republican Party being a 50% party instead of a 40% party. Given their wars with each other, it seems increasingly improbable that the Party can be unified behind a common agenda. President Trump’s chaotic tenure is also threatening any unity that was possible after the 2016 election. In fact, the President is demonstrating that he is the weakest Party leader in the White House since Jimmy Carter in the 1970s.
 
The tea party launched the Republican Party’s internecine warfare (and arguably, the Tea Party existed because of the lack of a strong conservative third party candidacy in 2008 to “let off the steam”). Donald Trump’s takeover of the Party did nothing to end the civil war, as many Republicans refused to endorse him.  I think it’s clear that since 2010, the GOP is undergoing a long civil war that will come to mark the end of its majority. Had Trump won a clear popular vote victory, I might have said the Tea Party successfully recreated the 1896 and 1960 election, where they would lead the second segment of the Reagan realignment, but at this point, I am more convinced that President Trump represents the first failed Presidency.  (It’s worth noting the GOP civil war of 1992 mirrors closely the current GOP civil war, except the Buchananites have gained more this time around).
 
So with that said, let’s sketch out 2020 and 2024. Both have the same outcomes but the coalition assembled by Kasich (let us say for simplicity’s sake, he’s the 2024 third party candidate as well). 
 
In 2020, in this timeline, Vice President Mike Pence is the incumbent Republican in the White House.  As we’ve said in this timeline, he has acted both Trumpian and establishmentarian, meaning that he is unlikely to placate everyone given the hostility the wings have to each other. It’s likely that Governor John Kasich could use this moment to launch a bid against the President, to strengthen the moderates and the pragmatic Perotian Republican ideology that prevailed in the 1990s. Governor Kasich has expressed deep dismay for how the GOP has governed and could utilize the disunity to campaign as such. He would pick up a lot of GOP votes and possibly Democratic votes. Nevertheless, it’s difficult to see the Republican coalition breaking up in 2020 absent a major crisis, so it could literally be the rerun of 1924, where President Coolidge won re-election but Robert LaFollette won 16%. This would lead to this outcome:
 
Michael Pence/Nikki Haley (Republican) - 65,257,064 - 46.44% - 328 - WINNER
Sherrod Brown (Democratic) - 62,769,876  - 44.67% - 209
John Kasich/Evan McMullin (Independent) - 10,932,385  - 7.78%
Independents - 1,559,762 - 1.11%
 
Totals:  140,519,087  | 1.77% margin
 
The Kasich coalition would be disaffected mainstream Republicans, some economic populists who might be disappointed in how the Trump-Pence ticket didn’t deliver on their populist agenda, and some upscale voters who voted for Romney-Clinton but were disgusted by the GOP. They may even include a good deal of voters who were Obama-Trump in the Midwest, in search of a candidate who would shake up the system. This eclectic mix could easily transition in 2024 to becoming part of the Cordray coalition as the crisis deepened and they evaluated their options. One reason I am hesitant to say that 2020 will feature this and the transition would be easy is that for one, prior such major third party candidacies voted for the realigning party downballot, but if Pence won re-election he would be maintaining GOP Congressional majorities. In any case, I’m uncertain so I can’t make a prediction.
 
I’m not clear that Governor Kasich would cause President Pence’s defeat either, for one reason. President George H.W. Bush lost because of the economic downturn, not because of Ross Perot. He also lost, tangentially, because the Republicans had held the White House since 1980. Likewise, if the economy was on stable ground, President Pence would win re-election, although without a clear majority. I’m simply not seeing the crisis come that fast by 2020 that would bring down Mike Pence.
 
The other intriguing thing about 2020 under this framework is that President Pence would be able to rely on the Republican base to deliver 44-45% of the vote, picking up some #NeverTrump voters, and would reinforce the narrative that the Republican Party is a weak majority coalition unable to establish a majority on its own. In essence, Kasich would play enabler to President Pence by allowing him to have an easier time to reach victory by needing a smaller pool of voters in a stable economy. We have to see if this is actually what will happen or if Pence will be forced to reach a much higher 48-49% of the vote to claim the 328 electoral votes I expect him to.
 
Were Kasich to launch a bid in 2024, amidst the realignment crisis, it would also be logical in a sense. The GOP crackup would be fully underway and the President would be in an extremely weak position. A segment of the Republican Party would be disillusioned (the aforementioned Kasich voters of 2020, basically) and ready to flock to the third party candidacy. A crucial distinction from 2020 is that they would probably, most likely, vote Democratic downballot but vote for Governor Kasich.  It would make sense as the GOP finally broke apart that a Republican third party would be able to mop up a significant amount of votes and per realignment theory, this segment of the electorate would go to the Democrats in 2028 as they completed their transition. (Of course, it should be said, while I don’t endorse this, Kasich could play a 2024 esq role in 2020 if the crisis came earlier).
 
In either scenario, what is happening is that there is a transition that ends the GOP’s majority and transforms the Democratic Party into a majority coalition. That has been a necessary precondition in the past three realignments. With the current populist mood, and given the role Perot played in 1992, it’s easily seen that President Cordray would reprise President Clinton’s triangulation - this time towards the Left and cementing the Kasich - Cordray coalition into one grand Democratic coalition that was a majority coalition, instead of a minority one.
 
So the results would be something on the order of:
 
Richard Cordray/Julian Castro (Democratic): 72,856,418 - 50.19% - 478 -- WINNER 
Michael Pence/Nikki Haley (Republican): 56,830,619 - 39.15% - 60
John Kasich/Evan McMullin (Independent): 13,862,897 - 9.55%
Others: 1,611,290 - 1.11%
 
Totals: 145,161,224 | 11.04%

[The_Doctor]

The re-election would be basically the Kasich + Cordray voters, while the GOP slipped to something like 37%. (So 61-38% Cordray which this timeline also says will happen).
 
One thing that is overlooked is that about 7 million voters voted for both Presidents Obama and Trump. They are clearly politically alienated and deeply angry at Washington’s inefficiency. They are not explicitly racist (having voted for a black man)  but may hold semi-culturally conservative viewpoints. They might be a natural constituency to a Kasich candidacy that plays upon their anger at Washington’s dysfunction. 7 million out of a possible 140 million is not nothing. That’s 5% of the electorate, and if doubled, is 10%. Clearly, this group of voters are the group that is willing to realign and the winning party that cements this group’s loyalty might be the realigning party. I should add that since Obama won clear majorities, both times, while President Trump won 46%, this group might even lean a little to the Democratic Party.
 
I’ve said, consistently, that white working class populist Republicans are crucial to the emerging Democratic majority. Midwestern white working class Democrats who voted for Trump, or, working class white voters in the South who might vote Democratic on the local but not federal level - and may not be rich enough to vote Republican on economic grounds. Think West Virginians who have retained a Democratic Governor in 2016 but voted for a GOP Legislature (and in the same breath, re-elected Sen. Joe Manchin in 2012). While upscale voters are also going to come along for the ride, they are far more likely to be temporary transients that return to the Republican Party, post crisis. Think of the Rockefeller Republicans that abandoned the Republicans in 1992 for the Democrats after sticking with Reagan post-realignment.  So, places like Georgia’s Sixth would temporarily be Democratic, but as the Republican Party realigns itself to be a technocratic party, that type of place returns to the GOP. But these are also areas John Kasich could do well in.
 
With independents growing, it’s not unreasonable to imagine a Presidential election where John Kasich plays a strong third party role. I just can’t decide because 2020 and 2024 are equally viable candidates and the political situation is in flux enough that it could happen either year. I’m fairly confident in that it will happen on some level; Evan McMullin’s 2016 bid is a harbinger of that, but I just can’t tell when. (McMullin won 500,000 votes in his little funded bid that focused on Utah; and a lot of Republicans did write in votes).
 
So, this timeline is officially predicting a major Republican populist third party candidacy in 2020 or 2024. I am also saying that this candidacy - if it happens - will be the vehicle for a segment of Republican voters to become Democratic voters, akin to the Northern Free Soilers of 1848, the progressive Republicans of 1912, and the Southern Democrats of 1968. It may not preclude a realignment on its own but it could aid one.

[The_Doctor]

The irony, when I wrote this, I was designing it to make the Republicans happy the first half of the series then the second half much more friendly to the Democrats (since I figured, that way, both sides would take away stuff they liked). The Walker timeline is very Republican-leaning in language and closely predicts the Trump win in a lot of ways. There were a lot of things in the timeline(s) for both sides to appreciate.

For instance, Republicans should be heartened that the immigration stuff remains into the Cordray era and obviously, Walker/Trump won and Clinton lost. There's a lot of GOP legislation and stuff done between 2017 and 2021.

Meh.

I could've written it better. But welcome to Atlas!

[The_Doctor]

How much does Pence preach his religiosity in 2020? You mentioned that the strategy was to go for a 2000/2004 compassionate conservative angle in 2020. They wanted to humanize the candidate as a way of reaching out to more minority voters.

Does Pence's religiosity play a role at all? Because Donald Trump virtually never mentioned religion on the campaign trail (something I hadn't realized until I heard him mention God in his inaugural address).

Yes. Pence's religiosity is designed to cover up for the harder edged parts of Pence's ideology and is designed to present a studied contrast to Trump's agnostic and realist behavior that tends to be less moralistic and far more transactional and pugilistic. so, i imagine President Pence would use his faith to bind together the Republican coalitions behind him and to paper over divisions.

Think Coolidge in 1924 after Harding's presidency was more or less judged a disaster.