Hitler dies in 1938...how is he remembered/what changes?

[ag]

Goering was less of a believer. For one, there would not have been a "final solution". Nazi antisemitic propaganda would continue, but it would have lost some of its vehemence, and the implementation would have been less oriented in the direction of massacre.

The question is, would Goering manage to hold power. He was a drug addict, and in periods of addiction he was insufficiently cut-throat and active. It is also hard to see Himmler or Goebbels, or the others having the same sense of loyalty to Goering as they had to Hitler. There would have been an inevitable period of "collective leadership" - and it is not clear who would emerge as the leader by, say, 1941. And, until that would be resolved, hard to see a major war.

[ag]

The thing is in 1938 the SS is a shadow of what it was in 1943/44, or even 1941. Their power is very limited and massively eclipsed by the Army. In 1938 it is not within the capacity of the SS to seize power for the hardliners. Also as for Gobbles although he was a key part of the regime he didn't really wield too much personal power or influence IIRC. He's more of a card then a player if you will.

SS had been powerful enough in 1934, hadn't it?

I believe that in 1938 the Army would, actually, support any government it would view as legitimately constituted. Goering's problem would not have been the Army - it would have been the Party. Now, in 1938 Hess is the party No. 2, but, obviously, he is not leader material. Still, he occupies an important enough position to make Goering, at least, count with his presence. Goebbels is the party leader in Berlin (besides being the face of the propaganda), and, as such, controls a not insignificant machinery right where it matters. Well, and Himmler has SS, Gestapo, other police - he is pretty damn powerful. There is als, Luetze in the SA (though, of course, by then dramatically weakened - so much so he might not count) and Ley at the Labor Front. All these are the people Goering would have to deal with - and none of them would consider themselves unconditionally Goering men. In fact, Goering as chancellor would solidify the others' interest in weakening him. It is not obvious that Goering becomes an undisputed leader. Even if he does, he does not become one fast.

Think of the Soviets after Lenin and after Stalin. In both cases, for a few years there was a genuine "collective leadership", with various Politburo members juggling chunks of control. In the 1920s they started by ganging up on and eliminating Trotsky. In the 1950s they quickly killed of Beria. Both were, probably, the most obvious successors - definitely, the most powerful men in the hierarchy after the dead leader. And both lost completely. Neither Stalin nor Khrushchev were obvious successors in 1924 and 1953.

[ag]

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I think you bring up some very good point, but the problem is that Himmler and Goebbles simply lacked the legitimacy Hitler had, as he had won the elections which brought the party in power. So if Himmler and Goebbles even had the ability to take power, we would likely see a military coup. Hess while political incompentent and lacking in charisma, do have some legitimacy, but I think his failings will keep him from power. But Goring is really the only man with the connections to the army and the establishment to take power, plus he was also seen as the likely successor to Hitler and when he has become president, kansler or whatever title he want to take, I can't see anyone in the party being able to get rid of him, even if he turn into a junkie.  

It would not have to be a coup. Nor would it even have to be immediate ouster of Goering. It is just that chancellor Goering would not have automatic control or loyalty of the institutions of the party and the state. By 1938 Himmler had solidified control over the police: he was no longer merely an SS chief, he was already immensely powerful in terms of control over internal security. While he could not safely take on the army, he did not need to, in order to develop an autonomy from Goering. Likewise, thoug the Länder were largely atrophied by that point, the authority of Gauleiters locally was quite substantial - and independent of the machinery of the State. Technically, they were subordinate to Hess - and that would remain the case even if Goering were to be chancellor. Thus, the local authority, though by no means democratic, would be substantially independent of Goering. Of course, Hess was incapable of maintaining strong control over the Gauleiters - but more than capable of making sure such control would not revert to Goering. Goebbels, as the Gauleiter of Berlin and, simultaneously, a member of the top leadership, would be in a particularly strong position: especially if he could come to an understanding with Himmler.  Etc., etc.

So, Goering would not merely not be a fuehrer in name - he would not be one in practice. He would need an agreement of the other leaders to implement his wishes. And, collectively, they would be able to seriously threathen him. Conversely, if he were to try to consolidate power, this might have been taken by the other leaders as a sufficient threat to gang up on Goering himself. And, if and when they did, they could always dress up the decision to get rid of Goering into a constitutional form acceptable to the military. Reichstag would be duly assembled, informed that the chancellor was asking to retire due to some unspecified sickness (rumors of his drug addiction would be fed to the military and the public: remember, Goebbels had control over that stuff) and that somebody else was to take his place - the nomination that would be unanimously supported by the jubillant "legislature". Alternatively, the increasingly drug-addled Goering would stay in nominal power, but the real decisions would gradually start happening elsewhere - until some point in the future when one of the other leaders would accumulate enough power to impose himself instead.

[ag]

Good point, but the 3rd Reich was not USSR, USSR had three groups which a successor had to deal with; the party, the army and the security service.

Germany had many faction, the party, the army, Gestapo, the nobility, the capitalists, the churches etc. and while some can be ignored, not a single faction can take power on it own, maybe with the exception of the army.

You overestimate the homogeneity of the USSR (especially in 1924) and underestimate how much Germany had been homogenized by 1938.  The party and the security services were pretty much in control by then. State organs were increasingly atrophied. Bureaucracy and business had willingly gone to serve the new system, and the army showed no desire to move into politics - and quite demoralized after the Blomberg-Frisch affair, its leadership effectively overthrown in early 1938. And churches... Who really cared at that point? And, in any case, there is no reason to believe most of these outside forces, to the extent they survived, would have been very friendly to Goering. If anything, it is precisely their multiplicity that would make it possible for the party leaders to maneuvre. It would take, at least, a couple of years (possibly longer) for a sole leader to emerge - by which time he would seem legitimate. And who knows, who that would have been.

[ag]

The question is, would Goering manage to hold power. He was a drug addict, and in periods of addiction he was insufficiently cut-throat and active.

hasn't that been true of many of our dear leaders?  the Founding Fathers were, by our standards, alcoholics: George Washington: Boozehound

there are also rumors about Kennedy and painkillers and etc... an addict with a rock-solid supply can run a country.

Whatever you may say about the others, in case of Goering it did noticeably affect his day-to-day performance. When on drugs he was very inert, unwilling to do much, even when activity was crucial to his political goals. Speer remarked in his memoirs how notably more alert he was in Nuremberg - clean and sober (courtesy of Allied medics).