Will a North Korean General now make his bid for power?

[seanobr]

The problem faced by any actor inside North Korea sufficiently empowered to remove Kim Jong-un and the individuals surrounding him from their perch in government is the unique role that ideology has played in legitimating the Kim family's rule over the country to the present.  That may not appear relevant initially, until you realize the significance of the juche ideal in reconciling the state's ability to function in its current form and how the mythology of Kim Il-sung and Jong-il is inseparable from that ethic.  The paradox inherent in the D.P.R.K.'s creation is that the division of the peninsula is fundamentally unnatural; if the country were to ever dispense with its commitment to unifying Korea under Communist control, it would be relinquishing its very reason for existence.  As a result, even if the North's adherence to it is purely rhetorical rather than practical, the revolutionary concept -- developing a self-reliant and powerful nation under the benevolent control of the Kim family -- is at the heart of the state, and the only plausible end is acquiring the South by force, compulsion, or consent.  I don't think that the actual content of the ideology is relevant, in the sense that distinguishing between a paternal or maternal depiction of the leader, or racial superiority against more temperate nationalism has no tangible impact on the country's internal policy.  What is important is accepting that the Kim family is central to the purpose of the state, and a product of that belief system is the military's ability to prey on its population with impunity and a government pervading every aspect of society.  A military figure could conceivably consolidate influence throughout the bureaucracy while maneuvering Kim Jong-un publicly to preserve the fiction of dynastic rule, but we have no idea how much structural resistance there might be to such an accumulation of power.  An individual such as Vice Marshal Ri Yong-Ho has that potential and was at Kim Jong-un's right in a photograph from today's ceremony at the Kumsusan Palace, but his elevation in the political sphere occurred in concert with the rejuvenation of the party last year for the purpose of succession, implying his adherence to it.  Ri Yong-Ho was also responsible for the Pyongyang Defense Command from 2003 to 2009, a post only awarded to an intimate of Kim Jong-il or his inner circle.

A more interesting question is whether or not it would be in a military official's self-interest to attempt to interfere with the succession, given the institution's preeminent position in society and the danger of destabilizing the system.  Since Kim Jong-un will be at his most vulnerable during the mourning period that many expect him to observe, I anticipate a significant degree of continuity until he is able to embrace his role publicly, as any significant deviation in policy could create a situation where the absence of Kim Jong-il's legitimacy would be evident.  Kim Jong-il's replacement, be it a single regent or a conclave of the elite, may not be able to perfectly replicate his interaction with the state, and whether you believe he ruled in the totalitarian tradition or as a balancer of disparate actors, that will invariably create the potential for conflict.  The contradiction in trying to find justification for an outright usurpation of power from the military's perspective is that no government will ever be as amenable to the military's interest as the current regime.  Furthermore, the military has been an ardent opponent of political and economic reform, so it has no ideological rationale for attempting to overturn the present order.  Someone like Ri Yong-Ho might have the ability to acquire control of the country, but as a representative of the military he has nothing to gain, and with his proximity to the center of authority, he may not be willing to sacrifice his position or the very existence of the country if his ploy went wrong.  Another complication is that Kim Jong-un, or someone in his place, has been quite active in re-imaging the D.P.R.K.'s provincial and county level bureaucracy since 2009, which is an instrument of the party, and any military officer making an overt move for control would have to be able to ensure their loyalty, which could be impossible to obtain.  

I can envision a scenario in which the party, military and cabinet of the D.P.R.K., while not dependent on Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il to function, derive their legitimacy from the Kim family rather than the inverse.  If so, any attempt to reform the country into a more credible Communist state, with a government not reliant on the aura of Kim Il-sung for its right to exist, would only jeopardize the integrity of the state.  When Kim Jong-il decided to adopt the title of General Secretary of the KWP, he did so by acclamation rather than the plenum session of the Central Committee that was legally required to formalize his appointment, an example of his inexplicably bypassing an institution that should've been completely pliant.  If the party was reluctant to embrace Kim Jong-il, they clearly felt constrained in how strongly they could resist his authority; it could be that they accepted that repudiating the Kim family would quite probably bring the entire edifice down.