Algerian Presidential Election 2014
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Sir John Johns
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« on: April 12, 2014, 11:45:31 PM »

Presidential elections will be held the 17 April. There is no question of the outcome, thanks to massive fraud and patronage, and the turnout will be abysmal (possibly around 10%).

Incumbent president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, 77-year old, is running for a fourth consecutive term in office. After a stroke in April 2013, he was hospitalized in France for several weeks. Since then, he can't stand up and has big problems speaking. Last month, for the first time in almost one year, he spoke on television for 15 seconds while submitting his candidacy papers. However, there are strong allegations that he was 'helped' by a video editing.

Yesterday, he finally made a short and surprising television intervention: during a filmed meeting with Spanish foreign minister, he attacked, without naming him, his main challenger Ali Benflis, denouncing him as having a 'not very democratic' behavior and as 'carrying out terrorism through the use of TV'. This is a reference to comments Benflis made three days ago on television when he denounced possible electoral fraud and called the walis (governors of wilaya) and the heads of daïras (subdivisions of the wilayas) to 'think about the safeguarding of their families'. Nevertheless, he still appeared very ill and remained seated during the whole televised meeting.

Despite his illness, Bouteflika was unanimously chosen as presidential candidate by the National Liberal Front (FLN, former single party) and the National Democratic Rally (RND, led by former prime minister and potential Bouteflika's successor Ahmed Ouyahia). Various ministers have stated that Bouteflika is doing better and is totally able to lead the country. One notably said that Bouteflika run the country 'with his head not with his feet'. Obviously opposants disagreed and there are many discussions about Bouteflika's actual health.

Will Bouteflika be candidate ? Algerians want to know.
- Blink one for yes!

There were supposedly some disagreements inside the military over a Bouteflika's fourth term. Broadly speaking the military establishment is divided into two rival factions: the Army Staff and the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS). The latter is led since 1990 by the secretive and hardliner anti-islamist Mohamed Mediène 'Toufik'. Toufik is said to be an opponent to another Bouteflika's candidacy and rumored to be behind the investigation of corruption scandals involving individuals close to Bouteflika's own brother, Saïd. In 2013, Bouteflika (or the power behind the throne) took advantage of the terrorist attacks on In Amenas to reduce the powers of the DRS in favor of the presidency and Bouteflika's ally, the People's National Army Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaïd Salah.

In last February, Amar Saïdani, the secretary general of the FLN, openly called for Toufik's resignation in an interview and blamed him for letting the terrorists to organize the In Amenas hostage-taking. Saïdani's interview provoked the uproar of the DRS but also of some parts of the FLN. Bouteflika was forced to issue a press release stating that 'nobody should be entitled to slag off the People's National Army nor the other constitutional institutions of the country' and denying any split within the military.

There are debates on how to interpret the Saïdani incident, but since then the DRS has keep a low profile, possibly waiting Bouteflika's death before opening the succession struggle. However, last month, former president and retired general Liamine Zeroual broke cover in a public letter stating in veiled terms that Bouteflika is now incapable of running the country and should not go for reelection. Zeroual also denounced Saïdani's attacks on the DRS and stated that the next president should ensure a transition process toward democracy during a last-ditch term in office. Finally, he showed his support for the protests (see below) against Bouteflika's fourth term.

The campaign is very bizarre as Bouteflika is physically unable to campaign nor to made extended television appearances. The outgoing president's campaign is managed by former prime minister (he  resigned several weeks ago) Abdelmalek Sellal who previously ran Bouteflika's campaigns in 2004 and 2009. Bouteflika's partisans campaigned on the president's record in office highlighting the relative political stability the country has enjoyed in sharp contrast with the bloody 1990s. They usually portrayed other candidates, and especially Benflis, as seeking to tip Algeria into chaos.

Sellal and other prominent government are in charge of campaigning and holding the political rallies on behalf of the ghost candidate. They have met strong opposition in several places, notably in Béjaïa (Kabylie) where rioters prevented the holding of a political meeting on behalf of Bouteflika and burned down the local headquarters of the FLN.

Five other candidates managed to gather the signatures to be on the ballot. They are mostly seen as playing the role of democratic alibi as they don't have the financial means to mount a serious challenge nor have significant support inside the military establishment or amongst the population.

The most serious challenger is Ali Benflis, 69, running as an independent with the support of a bunch of small and irrelevant parties. A former prime minister and general secretary of the FLN, Benflis ran against Bouteflika in 2004 with some hopes for success but finished a very distant second with a terrible 6.4%. For a decade, he retired from political life but returned into politics this year. There are rumors he had gain the support of some parts of the military (possibly the DRS) and he could appear as a potential successor to Bouteflika.

Politically, Benflis favors a more open economy and is more open than Bouteflika toward former members of the Islamist Salvation Front. He advocates an independent justice (he is himself a lawyer and a founder of the Algerian Human Rights' League), a new constitution, more civil and political liberties and less corruption.

Moussa Touati, 60, is running for his own Algerian National Front (FNA), a conservative and nationalist party. Touati is the founder of an organization defending the children of chouhada (the Algerians killed during the Independence War). He previously ran in 2009 (2.31%). and has threatened to withdraw from the race because he was prevented from campaigning in the town Blida (the local authorities didn't allocated him an auditorium and rather allocated it to Bouteflika's spokesman).

Louisa Hanoune, 59, is the only woman and run for the trotskyist Worker's Party. She was previously candidate in 2004 (1%) and 2009 (4.22%). She is running on a far-left platform that promises the creation of a planning ministry, the entrenchment in the Constitution of the state-ownership of the oil and gas companies and the introduction of a wealth tax. She has been criticized for spending more time attacking Benflis and denouncing alleged foreign conspiracies than actually criticizing Bouteflika.

Ali Fawzi Rebaïne, 59, is running for his own Ahd 54 (Generation 54, an allusion to the year of start of the independence war). He also ran in 2004 (0.6%) and 2009 (0.93%). A human rights militant, he is running on a vaguely social-democratic platform that promises to give priority to agriculture and to ensure food self-sufficiency. Rebaïne claims to be the only real opponent to the regime in the election. He has promised to abolish the military service and to build a state founded on the rule of law.

Abdelaziz Belaïd, 51, is both the youngest candidate and the only candidate to run for president for the first time. He led the National Union of Algerian Students from 1986 to 2007 and was a deputy for the FLN. In February 2012, he left the party to launch his own movement, the El Moustakbal Front (Front of the Future). Belaïd tries to target the young people and proposes “a Constitution adopted by the people” and an elected Constitutional Court.

Various other candidates failed to gather the required signatures (60,000 signatures of citizens or 600 signatures of elected officials). Among them, the writer Yasmina Khadra and the pretty insane Rachid Nekkaz who previously attempted unsuccessfully to run for presidency in France. Former Prime minister Ahmed Benbitour withdrew after Bouteflika announced his own candidacy and joined the Boycott Front.

The Boycott Front and the Barakat movement

The Boycott Front is formed by various opposition parties (the secularist center-left Rally for Culture and Democracy and the islamist Society Movement for Peace, Jil el-Jadid, Front for Justice and Development and Ennahda). Claiming (fairly) that the election will be rigged, they have organized several protests.

However, the novelty is the involvement of young peoples without political background into peaceful protests against Bouteflika's fourth term in office. The so-called Barakat ('Enough') movement managed to organize several protests and is quite popular on the social networks. However, the movement is mostly formed by young people from upper middle-class and has failed to reach the larger popular class. The government has claimed Barakat is part of a foreign conspiracy and has tried to link the self-described peaceful movement to the riots in Béjaïa.

To be complete, since last December, the wilaya of Ghardaïa has been subject to communal clashes between  the Mozabites (Berbers following the Ibadi Islam) and the Chaâmba (Arabs following the Maliki Islam). Several people have been killed and hundreds have been wounded. This weekend two more people have been killed. The Algerian government has been criticized for failing to restore calm.
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Famous Mortimer
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« Reply #1 on: April 13, 2014, 09:32:32 AM »

The split between the army and the DSR is the same as the split between the Dialoguists and the Eradicators, right?

How did a terrorist attack make the Eradicators look bad? I would think it would prove them right. Or were people saying that their hardline policies had pushed the Islamists to act?
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Sir John Johns
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« Reply #2 on: April 13, 2014, 07:45:47 PM »

The split between the army and the DSR is the same as the split between the Dialoguists and the Eradicators, right?

How did a terrorist attack make the Eradicators look bad? I would think it would prove them right. Or were people saying that their hardline policies had pushed the Islamists to act?

It's hard to describe the real motives of the various military clans as most of their leaders act behind the scene (there are very few known pictures of Toufik). Experts have to decipher what transpires through the media (controlled by the military) to have a general understanding of what is happening inside the military. An article give no less than five different interpretations of the disavowal of Saïdani's interview! I'm not an expert, so what follows is only what I have understand from various sources (I could be wrong).

The split is more a fight for political influence and for the control of the oil windfall than an ideological one. On one hand there is the DRS which had built a powerful intelligence network on the cover of fighting the terrorism; in the interview that I mentioned above, Saïdani claimed that the  DRS is spying every politician in Algeria. On the other hand, there is the military (or certain segments of the military led by Chief of Staff Gaïd Salah) which is unhappy with the influence the DRS had acquired.

The In Amenas attack showed that a terrorist group is able to organize a large-scale terrorist attack on the Algerian soil and that the oil and gas industry isn't secured in Algeria. Previously, the DRS had launched a series of investigations of corruption cases in the oil industry forcing the resignation and the exile of the Energy Minister Chakib Khelil (Bouteflika's close ally) but also provoking the disorganization of the whole oil sector. After the failure of the hostage recue operation (of which the Army was totally excluded by the DRS from the planning and the execution), the DRS was exposed as unable to ensure the internal safety of Algeria, supposedly its main task and its raison d'être, while pushing its own interests in politics and economics. Finally, some military considered that the DRS has its share of responsibility for the mess in the Sahara (islamist and separatist rebellions, trafficking) as it has infiltrated and manipulated various illegal groups. For example, the head of the commando in In Amenas is said to have been a former member of the Polisario, a movement supported by the DRS in its fight against Morocco over Western Sahara; Jihadist leader Belmokhtar, responsible of the hostage-taking, is rumored to have worked for the DRS back in the 1990s.

In his fight against the DRS, Gaïd Salah is allied with the Bouteflika clan whose main interest is to keep its share of power and of the oil windfall. There are disagreements over the extent of the power Bouteflika and his civil allies actually have with some saying that Bouteflika is only a puppet of the military leaders while others are arguing that Bouteflika has managed to build power and influence by its own.

Apparently there is no clear overlapping between the DRS/Army rift and the éradicateur/islamist-friendly rift. The Benflis's candidacy is rumored to be supported by Toufik, but Benflis has made overtures toward islamists. There is a rift inside the FLN between the former secretary general Abdelaziz Belkhadem (also PM between 2006 and 2008) and the current secretary general Saïdani (the one who publicly attacked the DRS). Belkhadem was removed from the leadership of the FLN in January 2013 for alleged corruption and for his perceived too islamist-friendly stance (he is seen as an 'islamic-conservative'). Ouyahia, the head of the other pro-Bouteflika party (the RND) is an 'éradicateur'.
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Sir John Johns
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« Reply #3 on: April 16, 2014, 09:29:58 PM »

Algerian policers brutally repressed the protest Barakat organized in Algiers. It seems that there were very few people in the protest.

A protest organized by the RCD in Tizi Ouzou (Kabylie) had more success, gathering several thousands of people in favor of a boycott of the election. Protesters also demanded the recognition of the Tamazight as an official language. This latter proposition has been by every presidential candidate, even by Bouteflika. Kabyle militants however are do no have confidence in Bouteflika's promise as he is in office since fifty years.

Ali Benflis has stated that in case of fraud he will not recognize the election and that he will organize peaceful protests. He has however recruit 60,000 scrutineers (one by poll station) to monitor the vote process.
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Sir John Johns
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« Reply #4 on: April 17, 2014, 09:14:24 PM »

Bouteflika has voted in a wheelchair, reportedly his first true public appearance in two years.

Official results will be proclaimed today, but unofficial reports indicated that Bouteflika won 76% against 15% for Benflis, still the most competitive election since 1999. Louisa Hanoune has already conceded defeat and recognized Bouteflika as the winner without even waiting the proclamation of the official results. She claimed that the voting took place in better conditions than the previous years.

According to the Ministry of Interior, turnout was 51.7%, apparently the lowest one in a presidential election, but the RCD claimed it was actually of 10%. Lowest turnout was recorded in the Kabylie wilayas of Tizi Ouzou (20.01%) and Béjaïa (23.58%); best turnout was in the northwest wilayas of Relizane (82%) and Mostaganem (79.88%) and in the Saharian wilaya of Tindouf (78.26%). Turnout was pretty low in the wilaya of Algiers (37.84%).


Note: this is possibly still provisional results (source)

There were several fraud attempts (all in favor of Bouteflika) reported and riots has broken out in the wilaya of Bouira (Kayblie) where the turnout is officially 34.66%. Benflis has claimed there was widespread fraud and that he will use all legal means to contest the results. During the evening, phone and internet lines were cut in Benflis's HQ.
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RogueBeaver
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« Reply #5 on: April 18, 2014, 08:19:50 AM »

It's official: Bouteflika has won his fourth term.
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Sir John Johns
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« Reply #6 on: April 18, 2014, 11:26:37 AM »

Official results (in brackets, variation compared with 2009 results)

Abdelaziz Bouteflika 81.53% (-8.71%)
Ali Benflis 12.18% (+12.18%)
Abdelaziz Belaid 3.36% (+3.36%)
Louisa Hanoune 1.37% (-2.85%)
Ali Fawi Rebaine 0.99% (+0.06%)
Moussa Touati 0.56% (-1.75%)

Turnout: 51.7% (-22.84%)
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Sir John Johns
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« Reply #7 on: April 24, 2014, 05:08:54 PM »

The Constitutional Council has announced the definitive results, but still no result at wilaya level.
(in brackets: change compared with 2009 in pp. and in raw numbers)*
Bouteflika: 81.49% (-8.73pp, -4,488,476)
Benflis: 12.31% (+12.31pp, +1,288,338)
Belaïd: 3.13% (+3.13pp, +328,030)
Hanoune: 1.51% (-2.99pp, -491,840)
Rebaïne: 1.01% (+0.14pp, -19,336)
Touati: 0.56% (-1.48pp, -236,257)
Invalid votes: 9.76% (+3.73pp, +206,365)
Turnout: 50.7% (-23.86pp, -3,755,040) – the lowest turnout in a presidential election.

*using the numbers from the Official Journal, not the numbers of Wikipedia as above as they turned to be only preliminary results.

Really, only Belaïd could be considered as a 'winner' in this election.

Bouteflika lost nearly 4.5 million of votes compared to 2009 despite the fact that the total number of registered voters has increased by nearly 2,3 million. Bouteflika's vote accounts for only 37.29% of the total registered voters compared to 63.22% in 2009. This is generally interpreted as meaning the regime can't, this time, 'boost' the turnout to excessively exaggerated levels and must take into account the public distrust of government. Still, the turnout level has been fixed just over the symbolic threshold of 50%.

According to Benflis, only 6 million of voters go to the polls (so an actual turnout of around 26%) and he won the election with around 4 million of votes. He has still announced that he will launch a new party and said he is ready to cooperate with the parties that boycotted the election. However, he will have a hard time to convince the latter as he is a former FLN bigwig and a former Bouteflika's prime minister and because he choose to participate in the election, ignoring the obvious risks of fraud.

Except Belaïd, who made a good score for a first candidacy and who will possibly become a minister in the next government, the other candidates got even more insignificant results compared with 2009. The worst case is that of Louisa Hanoune who finished fourth and certainly paid the price for her very Bouteflika-friendly campaign.

So, it seems that the regime refused to leave room and to give some legitimacy to the opponents who 'play the game'. More generally, the traditional opposition parties are inaudibles, divided or discredited. The legal islamist movement is divided into four or five parties and marred by the memory of the 1990s' civil war; Ait Ahmed's Socialist Forces Front choose to litterally go nowhere by calling to 'neither participation nor boycott'; RCD was forced to make an unholly alliance with the islamists.

The 'real' opposition is embodied by civil society and non-political movements: Kabyle militants, Barakat movement, human rights defenders, movement of the unemployed. This last one organized protests in the wilaya of Ouargla (in the Saharan desert and home to important petroleum industry; turnout was 44.23%) last year to denounce the lack of investment and the hiring of foreigners and migrants from northern Algeria instead of Ouargla natives; they also disrupted meetings organized by Sellal and Louisa Hanoune in Ouargla these last weeks. According to the article I link above, there were more than 6,500 street protests and 1,500 strikes in Algeria in 2013.

Since the election, there were a resurgence of political violence: eleven Algerian soldiers were ambushed and killed in Kabylie by AQIM, the bloodiest raid against military since 2011; a march to commemorate the 1980 Berber Spring degenerated into riots in Kabylie which were brutally repressed by the Algerian police; finally young unemployed attempted to burn down the seat of the Ouargla wilaya using Molotov cocktails.
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Sir John Johns
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« Reply #8 on: April 25, 2014, 09:58:57 PM »

I have made some maps of the 2009 presidential election. I took the opportunity to revamp my base map. The whole process was obviously rigged, but the areas where the opposition is 'strong' (or the regime a bit less unable to manipulate the numbers) are nonetheless quite apparent: the Kabylie, Algiers, Tipaza wilaya (partly Berber), the most eastern Saharan wilayas, Oran and the neighboring wilayas, Algerians living abroad.

Younsi and Saïd were both moderate islamist candidates.




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Sir John Johns
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« Reply #9 on: April 26, 2014, 05:53:04 PM »

Official results (results by wilayas are pages 5 and 6)



Benflis only won his native wilaya of Batna (51.28%). Closest result was in the Béjaïa wilaya: 44.14% of Bouteflika against 43.27% for Benflis. Best results for Bouteflika appears to be in the former Wilaya V. The Wilaya V was established by the FLN during the Independence War and Bouteflika was there a 'contrôleur' and then Boumediene's personal secretary back into the 1950s and the very begin of the 1960s.

See this map from Wikipedia.


The political and military leadership of the Wilaya V was dubbed as the 'Oujda clan' (as they used the Moroccan border city of Oujda as a rear base) and later formed the backbone of the Boumediene regime. I have no idea why the Bouteflika vote in this area was not as prominent back in 2009. Perhaps it is just a coincidence as, thanks to fraud, the numbers are still very close to the other Bouteflika >90% wilayas.
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