Purple State, Petitioner v. Lief, President of Atlasia-Respondent

[bullmoose88]

Purple State,
Petitioner

v.

Lief,
The President of Atlasia,
Respondent

Justice Sam Spade authored the opinion of the Court, which the Chief Justice joined.

In July 2009, the Attorney General brought charges against devilman88 for violating the Consolidated Criminal Justice Act after he admitted that he held the account of Josh22, a separately registered voter in Atlasia.  On July 21, 2009, Justice Opebo found devilman88 Guilty of violating Section 3, Clause 1 of said Act and sentenced him to a four-month voting ban and a four-month office holding ban.

Subsequently, on August 25, 2009, President Lief pardoned devilman88 from serving the remainder of his sentence.  Thereafter, Petitioner brought this challenge specifically to the President’s power to pardon convicted criminals under federal law.

The Court, sua sponte, asked both parties to brief responses to the question of whether the lawsuit brought by Petitioner had the requisite standing to be heard, and, as a corollary, what particular test should apply to the standing question.  In the alternate, we asked whether standing requirements should be created for lawsuits in Atlasia considering the special circumstances of our nation’s creation and function.

Prior Courts have left the standing issue unanswered but we choose to answer that question today.  We hold that Petitioner lacks standing to bring the present suit against the President for his actions in pardoning devilman88.  Consequently, we do not reach the question of whether the President has power to pardon convicted criminals under federal law.

The United States Constitution tells us that in order for its Supreme Court to have “standing”, a lawsuit must be a “Case” or “Controversy”, meaning that there must be 1) Injury; 2) Causation; and 3) Redressability.  However, the Atlasian Constitution’s Article III lacks the “Case” or “Controversy” limitation to its “judicial power” grant.  Therefore, the Court believes it inappropriate to use this standard to guide our standing doctrine.

Rather, the Court holds that two possible methods exist to have the requisite standing to sue with this Court, which we shall hereafter describe as “actual standing” and “theoretical standing”.  We shall use the rest of this opinion to lay out the requirements of each scheme.  Furthermore, we reason that the limits of these two means of standing sufficiently restrain the Court’s power to review disputes while allowing for all potential litigants with legitimate challenges a chance to have their grievances heard.

Initially, the Court addresses perhaps one of the most contentious questions in Atlasia, namely which parties could theoretically be “harmed” such as to have standing to sue in front of this Court.  While we do not close our proverbial doors to future arguments that other persons or entities should have standing to sue under the provisions of our Constitution, we hereby find that only Atlasian citizens (i.e. duly registered voters), governmental entities, whether Regional or federal, and, in limited situations specified by our Constitution, political parties, have standing to sue in this Court.  These are “persons” who we deem protected by our Constitution, those whose interests that document requires us to address if violated.

Next, the Court turns to the first method of standing, which we will henceforth call “actual standing”.  The requirements for this method rest with the Court’s definition of standing itself.

The Court hereby defines standing, as “the ability of a party to demonstrate to the Court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.”  The definition gives us two particular requirements: 1) Sufficient connection to the law/action challenged; 2) Harm from the law/action challenged.  “Harm” is the threshold requirement for the theoretical Petitioner.  If the Petitioner is harmed, then he must show a “sufficient connection” to the law/action challenged.

The Court surmises that “harm” is narrow, and means actual harm caused to Petitioner, not theoretical harm, as properly stated by Justice Opebo during oral argument.  In the present action, Petitioner has only been able to show theoretical harm to his interests.  Prior to Saturday, September 23, 2009, Devilman88 had not voted or held office since the Presidential pardon.  Nevertheless, Petitioner’s interests cannot have not been said to be endangered or “harmed” after Devilman88 voted in the Southeast Emergency Initiative election because Petitioner is not a member of the Southeast Region.  In sum, Petitioner’s post-pardon situation does not differ materially than his situation prior to the pardon.

Since Petitioner fails to meet the “harm” requirement of the “actual standing” test, the Court does not need to delve specifically into the second requirement of “sufficient connection.”  We merely note that such a requirement places a means-end fit on the question of “harm” for the purpose of preventing indirect and unrelated third-parties from bringing challenges where the law/action in question is not intended to cause injury to said parties.

Before the Court discusses “theoretical standing”, we wish to note one minor exception to the rule that “actual standing” requires “actual harm” plus “sufficient connection” to the law/action challenged.  In some rare cases, a law/action may create “potential harm” to an Atlasian citizen, governmental entity or, in limited situations specified by our Constitution, political party, that would cause irreparable injury to the petitioner upon the occurrence of the “actual harm”.  If said petitioner provides the Court with undisputed proof that he would suffer irreparable injury by a “potential harm” created by the law/action challenged, we would deem that petitioner to have standing to sue and would grant an injunction to prevent the “potential harm” from ripening into an “actual harm.”

With the principles of “actual standing” described above, the Court addresses its second method of standing, which we will henceforth call “theoretical standing.”  We think this method represents a necessary legal construct to protect those persons or entities that will never actually have standing to sue in front of this Court because any “harm” they suffer will always be theoretical.

In short, “theoretical standing” can only exist where an Atlasian citizen, governmental entity or, in limited situations specified by our Constitution, political party can never be injured by the specific “harm” created by the law/action challenged.  We need not list ever situation where “theoretical standing” could exist, but a few illustrations will help define our thoughts.

For example, if a law/action would “actually harm” a private corporation such as to violate the Atlasian Constitution, then any Atlasian citizen, governmental entity or, in limited situations specified by our Constitution, political party, would have “third-party” standing to sue on behalf of a “theoretical” injured private corporation.  Or, if a law/action “harmed” the parents of children in Atlasia such as to violate the Atlasian Constitution, then any Atlasian citizen, governmental entity or, in limited situations specified by our Constitution, political party, would have “third-party” standing to sue on behalf of the theoretical “injured” parent.

In the present matter, Petitioner cannot claim “theoretical standing” because an Atlasian citizen or governmental entity could be “actually harmed” by the President’s action of pardoning devilman88.  Specifically, that moment of harm will occur at any point devilman88 casts a vote in an Atlasian election or holds office in Atlasia.  Until then, standing cannot exist with Petitioner or any other citizen or governmental entity within Atlasia to challenge the pardon.

Finally, the Court reminds any and all Petitioners that we reserve the unquestioned ability to delegate to Regional courts, insofar as they may exist, those questions which we do not possess original exclusive jurisdiction to answer, regardless of whether we find “actual” or “theoretical” standing to hear the matter.  Additionally, we continue to reserve the unquestioned right to reject any request for writ of certiorari on the ground that the case in question lacks merit, including on any other suitable justiciability grounds other than standing.

The Court recognizes that the issue of whether the President has the “power to pardon” may soon appear before us again and we remind those relying on this opinion that we make no decision as to that question at this time.

Petitioner's case dismissed.

So ordered.

[Sam Spade]

Guess cinyc is next and we should expect more soon on this front.  (he said as he responds to his own decision)

[Marokai Backbeat]

Guess cinyc is next and we should expect more soon on this front.  (he said as he responds to his own decision)

Lord have mercy.

[Lief 🗽]

Huh. Well, I do like the result (my pardon standing), but I wish the Court had been able to make a ruling on the issue of presidential pardons.

[Marokai Backbeat]

Huh. Well, I do like the result (my pardon standing), but I wish the Court had been able to make a ruling on the issue of presidential pardons.

So do I. It took a month just to dismiss the case? Nothing has has been accomplished at all.

[Badger]

Huh. Well, I do like the result (my pardon standing), but I wish the Court had been able to make a ruling on the issue of presidential pardons.

So do I. It took a month just to dismiss the case? Nothing has has been accomplished at all.

Well, that's judicial restraint. A good thing usually. Not sure here though.

[Хahar 🤔]

Well, then, I think that I have standing to sue.

[Marokai Backbeat]

Well, then, I think that I have standing to sue.

Look forward to The Ruling, coming out Christmas 2009.

[Purple State]

I agree with the Court's definition of standing, although I do believe there was ample "potential harm," as shown by devilman88's recent vote and the impact of that vote on the GM's need to form a corresponding news story, for this case to be heard on its merits.

I thank the Court for its time.

Well, then, I think that I have standing to sue.

As does the VP. If one of you would get on that...

[Fritz]

 Okay, heres what confuses me.  If Purple State didn't have "standing" to sue Lief in this matter, then why did Peter have sufficient standing to sue the government (and win) over the constitutionality of the GLBT bill?  This seems to be an irreconcileable contradiction on the part of the Court.

[Marokai Backbeat]

Okay, heres what confuses me.  If Purple State didn't have "standing" to sue Lief in this matter, then why did Peter have sufficient standing to sue the government (and win) over the constitutionality of the GLBT bill?  This seems to be an irreconcileable contradiction on the part of the Court.

Please, don't bother. They almost never answer questions.

[Fritz]

I make a good point though, don't I?

I'm not really expecting them to respond.

[cinyc]

Guess cinyc is next and we should expect more soon on this front.  (he said as he responds to his own decision)

I'm going to need until next week to prepare my brief, if the court will allow that.  This week isn't a good time.

Thanks.

[bullmoose88]

I make a good point though, don't I?

I'm not really expecting them to respond.

I'll give you a theory, and you may or may not buy it.  I'll borrow a page from Spade's book and go annoyingly cryptic.  Here goes...

Two.

[Sam Spade]

Okay, heres what confuses me.  If Purple State didn't have "standing" to sue Lief in this matter, then why did Peter have sufficient standing to sue the government (and win) over the constitutionality of the GLBT bill?  This seems to be an irreconcileable contradiction on the part of the Court.

As a practical matter, when we heard Peter v. Atlasia, the Court lacked any type of standing doctrine, did not wish to create any standing doctrine, and thusly, did not address the issue when reaching its decision.  We cannot go back in time and address the issue such as to change the decision after the fact. 

History is a helpful guide here - the US Supreme Court did not create any standing guidelines until 1927.  Just because the Supreme Court heard a matter pre-1927 which might not have had standing post-1927 does not render that decision null and void, nor does it create an irreconcilable contradiction in the Court's logic.

Anyway, if you wish to address Peter's standing, the Senate could pass the LGB law again, at which point a lawsuit would undoubtedly be raised again on stare decisis and standing might play an issue in addressing such a dispute.

I happen to believe that the answer as to whether Peter would have standing to bring such a challenge lies clearly in the rules I have outlined above.  Obviously, I am only one vote, but I believe the bright lines drawn here can be used to adjudge whether Peter or Purple State did have standing.  Neither case falls into the gray, undefined areas.

One of the reasons why we agreed to post this decision in a separate thread is because it outlines important Court guidelines for future reference and does not address the key issue of Purple State's lawsuit.  That, I am sure, we will address soon enough and has already been the topic of great conversation among the Court.

[Sam Spade]

Guess cinyc is next and we should expect more soon on this front.  (he said as he responds to his own decision)

I'm going to need until next week to prepare my brief, if the court will allow that.  This week isn't a good time.

Thanks.

We have not agreed to grant/deny you certoriari at this time.

[opebo]

Purple State,
Petitioner

v.

Lief,
The President of Atlasia,
Respondent

Justice Sam Spade authored the opinion of the Court, which the Chief Justice joined.

.............................

Petitioner's case dismissed.

So ordered.

I respectfully dissent to the above decision regarding the issue of standing.  I do not share the desire of my fellow justices to create a standard for standing.  As there was, before this decision, no limit or condition upon the courts discretion regarding this issue in either the Constitution or precedent, I see no reason to create same.  It seems the height of judicial activism - no less so because it reduced the Court's power and purview (or so attempts.

J. opebo.

[Peter]

Purple State,
Petitioner

v.

Lief,
The President of Atlasia,
Respondent

Justice Sam Spade authored the opinion of the Court, which the Chief Justice joined.

.............................

Petitioner's case dismissed.

So ordered.

I respectfully dissent to the above decision regarding the issue of standing.  I do not share the desire of my fellow justices to create a standard for standing.  As there was, before this decision, no limit or condition upon the courts discretion regarding this issue in either the Constitution or precedent, I see no reason to create same.  It seems the height of judicial activism - no less so because it reduced the Court's power and purview (or so attempts.

J. opebo.

Yes, I must say that Justice Emsworth and I resisted creating such a standard when we served on the Court for these very reasons.

[opebo]

Purple State,
Petitioner

v.

Lief,
The President of Atlasia,
Respondent

Justice Sam Spade authored the opinion of the Court, which the Chief Justice joined.

.............................

Petitioner's case dismissed.

So ordered.

I respectfully dissent to the above decision regarding the issue of standing.  I do not share the desire of my fellow justices to create a standard for standing.  As there was, before this decision, no limit or condition upon the courts discretion regarding this issue in either the Constitution or precedent, I see no reason to create same.  It seems the height of judicial activism - no less so because it reduced the Court's power and purview (or so attempts.

J. opebo.

Yes, I must say that Justice Emsworth and I resisted creating such a standard when we served on the Court for these very reasons.

Yes, it really came out of left (I mean right) field.