How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War, Or a Refutation of the Lost Cause Ideal

[Senator Ben]

Few military men throughout history have been as lionized in a country’s collective memory as Robert E. Lee has in the minds of Americans, particularly Southerners.  For one hundred and fifty years, due in large part to the Lost Cause mythology propagated by men like Jubal Early and Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee has become a heroic figure, the only reason that a Confederacy lacking in weapons, manpower, and supplies was able to nearly achieve its independence from the United States of America.  This view is, in fact, a misperception.  Rather than being the only reason the South was able to stay alive, Robert E. Lee is the man most responsible for the South losing the Civil War.  Lee misused the troops he was given; he made poor strategic decisions, made mistakes in terms of personnel, and focused too much on defending his home state of Virginia, all contributing to the defeat of the South.

From the start of the War until the end, Lee continually misused his troops.  Lee continually ignored the severe numbers deficit faced by his army (Gallagher, 479).  At the Battle of Antietam, Lee was outnumbered by a full 2/3, but decided to fight anyways, suffering major losses (Bailey, 60).  Leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg, rather than conserving his troops for the Northern Invasion, Lee decided to send a large number of troops West, in a vain attempt to save Vicksburg (Randal and Donald, 401).  Pickett’s Charge, considered the High Point of the Confederacy, was a foolhardy maneuver that Lee lacked the troops for from the very start (McKenzie, 159).  On entering the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee faced a deficit of more than 22,000 troops in comparison with the Northern Army (Busey and Martin, 125, 260). 

Throughout the course of the war, the only battle that Lee commanded where the North lost a higher percentage of troops than the South was the Battle of Fredericksburg (McKenzie, 58).  George Pickett, one of Lee’s major subordinates and a leader of the ill-fated Pickett’s Charge, says of Lee, “That man destroyed my division” (Tagg, 240).  Lee was too confident about his troops, and this made him send them into more unwinnable situations (Fuller, 198).  Lee failed to recognize that his Army was at a significant disadvantage in terms of numbers, and this had an extremely negative effect on the South, as they were unable to keep up with a Northern Army that had a significant numerical advantage.  Lee’s misuse of the troops only exacerbated the North’s numbers advantage, because while both sides suffered from the large casualty battles, the North could always bring in more troops, while the South would simply continue to bleed out troops following every battle.

Lee has a reputation for being a strategic genius; this reputation is undeserved.  Lee made numerous strategic mistakes throughout the course of the war.  Following the Battle of Antietam, Lee decided to retreat rather than chase McClellan, which could potentially have resulted in a war ending victory for the South (McKenzie, 42).  Lee’s invasion of the North, culminating in the Battle of Gettysburg, was a movement which lacked any concrete objectives (McKenzie, 95).  During the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee failed to coordinate the attacks of his various subordinates, leading to confusion and unnecessary casualties (Coddington, 454-455).  In addition, on Day 2 of Gettysburg, Lee failed to act promptly with his troops, giving the North time to reorganize and prepare to fight, likely ending any chance the South had of winning the Battle (Wert, 98-99). 

Lee insisted on offensive tactics which resulted in large numbers of Southern casualties and an inability to switch into defensive measures once the offensive attempts had failed (McWhiney and Jamieson, 7).  Lee was also using tactics which did not work against the improved weaponry of the time (McKenzie, 350).  Lee’s multiple strategic errors resulted in a myriad of problems for the Confederacy.  By failing to chase McClellan, Lee missed out on an opportunity to end the war; likewise with his mistakes at Gettysburg.  His overly ambitious ideas, like invading the North at Gettysburg and Antietam, and his eschewing of defensive measures for more offensive attacks, caused significant casualties for the Confederacy, preventing them from recovering before going off to fight the next battle.  Ultimately, these mistakes would prove to be a major reason the South failed to win the war.

In addition to his strategic mistakes, Lee made mistakes involving personnel as well.  At Gettysburg, to make up for the death of Stonewall Jackson, Lee gave significant command to Richard Ewell and Jubal Early; neither of whom was particularly competent in leadership roles.  In the end, these men, along with JEB Stuart and James Longstreet, would make numerous mistakes, costing the South dearly (Sears, 504).  Lee’s staff, rather than being filled by competent men from throughout the South, was made up mostly of Virginia aristocrats, who lacked military experience (McKenzie, 177).  In addition, Lee failed to replace, or even discipline, lieutenants who disobeyed his orders (Roland, 33).  These continual personnel mistakes by Lee prevented the South from getting the best possible leadership, and it also hampered Lee even further, by making it difficult to get his orders carried out in the way he wanted; this was particularly devastating at Gettysburg, when Ewell failed to take Culp’s Hill, which Jackson would certainly have done (Sears, 503).  Lee’s failure to select competent subordinates severely hampered the South’s ability to win battles, as the men actually leading the fights were unable to lead effectively.  If Lee had been able to put competent people into leadership positions, the South would have had a much better chance to win the critical battles, like Gettysburg, and would have been able to achieve their independence.

Lee’s priorities were far on the side of defending Virginia, rather than winning independence for the Confederacy.  Lee admitted that his loyalties lay with Virginia, and the only reason he agree to resign from the US Army and join the Army of the Confederacy was because Virginia seceded (Freeman, 425).  As has been already noted, Lee’s staff was made up entirely of Virginians; in the Army of Northern Virginia, all of the principal subordinates to Lee except for James Longstreet were Virginian.  Multiple times during the war, Lee put the defense of Virginia ahead of other goals.  Following the Battle of Fredericksburg, Lee passed up a chance to end the war, in order to secure Virginia (McKenzie, 109).

As the war moved into 1864 and 1865, Lee continued to give the priority to Virginia; he declined multiple times to engage Grant, preferring instead to focus on defending the City of Richmond (McKenzie, 269).  Lee continued to take defensive measures in order to protect Richmond, until the very end, costing many Confederate lives that could have been either spared completely, or better used protecting supply lines in North Carolina and Georgia (McKenzie, 279).  Lee’s determination to protect Virginia, at all costs, prevented the South at the start from winning major victories that could have forced a settlement.  Lee refused to attempt to stall Grant, when victory was still possible, and at the end of the war, Lee sacrificed what little hope the South had of maintaining supply lines in order to defend Richmond.

The American Civil War was the bloodiest conflict in American history.  The South suffered catastrophic casualties, both in terms of body count and deeper psychological traumas.  In order to deal with these traumas, the Southern people awarded to Robert E. Lee divine status; it was only because of Lee that the South had managed to nearly achieve its independence.  In actuality, however, the opposite is true.  Because of his misuse of troops, poor decisions regarding both strategy and personnel, and his undying loyalty only to Virginia, Robert E. Lee in fact is the biggest reason that the South was unable to win the Civil War.

Works Cited:
•   Bailey, Ronald H., and Editors of Time Life. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. 1st. 1 vol. New York, NY: Time-Life Books, 1984. Print.
•   Busey, John W., and David G. Martin. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg. 4th. 1 vol. Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 2005. Print.
•   Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign; A Study in Command. 1st. 1 vol. New York, NY: Scribner's, 1968. Print.
•   Freeman, Douglas Southall. R. E. Lee, A Biography. 1st. 4 vols. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935. Print.
•    Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Grant and Lee, A Study in Personality and Generalship. 1st. 1 vol. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1957. Print.
•   Harman, Troy D. Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg. 1st. 1 vol. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. Print.
•   McKenzie, John D. Uncertain Glory: Lee's Generalship Re-Examined. 1st. 1 vol. New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 1997. Print.
•   McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage. 1st. 1 vol. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama, 1984. Print.
•   Randal, JG, and David Donald. The Civil War and Reconstruction. 2nd. 1 vol. Boston, MA: DC Heath and Company, 1961. Print.
•   Roland, Charles. Reflections on Lee. 1st. 1 vol. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995. Print.
•   Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. 1st. 1 vol. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. Print.
•   Tagg, Larry. The Generals of Gettysburg. 1st. 1 vol. New York, NY: Savas Publishing, 1998. Print.
•   Wert, Jeffry D. Gettysburg: Day Three. 1st. 1 vol. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001. Print.

[Bo]

Bravo. Very impressive.

[Senator Ben]

You never really examined whether Lee's mistakes were any more significant than the first three factors, and ignored the fact that his "mistakes" were due to these three factors.

Unfortunately, I don't have any more space to argue.  My teacher has said she won't read anything over five pages, and this takes up the last line of the fifth page.  If I could make it 10-12 pages, I would argue those points, but I don't have the space to do so.

[Uncle Albert/Admiral Halsey]

Very nice! What history class are you taking?

[Senator Ben]

Very nice! What history class are you taking?

It's actually for my English class   We read The Killer Angels, will be performing skits at Arlington House, and are writing a Lee oriented research paper.

[Uncle Albert/Admiral Halsey]

Very nice! What history class are you taking?

It's actually for my English class   We read The Killer Angels, will be performing skits at Arlington House, and are writing a Lee oriented research paper.

Oh cool. Are you submitting this through turnitin.com? Because you might want to delete this thread if you do, as turnitin.com might register your paper as plagiarism simply because the exact same essay shows up on this website (even if you wrote it yourself).

[Senator Ben]

Oh cool. Are you submitting this through turnitin.com? Because you might want to delete this thread if you do, as turnitin.com might register your paper as plagiarism simply because the exact same essay shows up on this website (even if you wrote it yourself).

No, it's gonna be done in person.  Plus, this is only a rough draft; hopefully I won't need to change much, but I'll also post the final copy when I'm done.

[True Federalist]

Lee had no choice but to emphasize the defense of Virginia.  Had Virginia been lost, the South would have lost a good portion of its limited industrial capability and the ability to threaten Washington that pinned down a large portion of the Federal forces.

The failure to realize that the Minié ball had taken away the advantage of the tactical offensive strategies used in the Napoleonic wars (and by the Americans in the Mexican-American War) was a failing common to most Civil War generals.

Finally, everyone remembered Scott's Mexico City campaign.  With inferior numbers at the start of the campaign, he managed to continually outflank and devastate Santa Ana's army as he marched from Vera Cruz into Mexico City.

In short, based on pre-Civil War experience, Lee (and other Civil War generals) had good reason to favor the offensive over the defensive.

Plus, if you are going to criticize Lee for not adopting a more defensive strategy, you need to ask if the Confederacy could have won by pursuing such a strategy.  That was exactly what Johnson was doing when he was injured during the Peninsula Campaign and was replaced by Lee as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.  Based on the results of the Peninsula Campaign both before and after the change in command, one need not have much imagination to infer that had Johnston remained in command, Richmond would have fallen in the summer of 1862.

Lee had his flaws, but he was in large part responsible for the Confederacy lasting as long as it did.

[N.i.K.]

A fine read, however I don't really believe it was the fault of Lee. Virginia was essential to Confederate independence, as Ernest pointed out. I believe that much of the loss is inconclusive; there were a lot of missed opportunities on both sides, and too numerous to be counted. There are the Union's mistakes at First Bull Run, Antietam, as well as Jeff Davis's numerous tactical flaws in his choice of generals.

In the type of war that was fought, frankly I am surprised that the Confederacy lasted as long as it did. The Union severely outnumbered the Confederacy in numbers, resources, and industrial output, and yet it took them four years to squash the rebellion.

[Senator Ben]

Furthermore, while tactically, perhaps, some of his victories were a bit Pyrrhic, each one of them sent the Army of the Potomac into ineffectiveness for months and the feeble Union government into convulsions.

But ultimately, Pyrrhic victories were not going to work for the South.  They needed to fight defensive wars, and just wear down the North.  Lee was fighting battles the South could not recover from.

[True Federalist]

Furthermore, while tactically, perhaps, some of his victories were a bit Pyrrhic, each one of them sent the Army of the Potomac into ineffectiveness for months and the feeble Union government into convulsions.

But ultimately, Pyrrhic victories were not going to work for the South.  They needed to fight defensive wars, and just wear down the North.  Lee was fighting battles the South could not recover from.

Lee was largely fighting battles that he had no choice but to fight.

Both the 1862  and 1863 invasions were strategic successes.  They served as large scale foraging raids to gain needed supplies and they kept Northern armies out of Virginia during harvest time.

Lee did make tactical mistakes, especially at Gettysburg.

[dead0man]

Again, the South never had a chance.  They didn't make things like guns and food and relied heavily on imports which they lost because they had a sh**tty Navy.  They didn't have as many people.  The states were divided and it was sometimes hard to get boys willing to die for Mississippi to leave the state at all.

I'm not saying Lee was the greatest General ever or even the best of his era, but to say it's his fault the South lost is... I don't know, just wrong.

[WillK]

A couple  comments:

 In the second paragraph you cite Gallagher but there is no work by Gallagher in the bibliography at the end.

 Also in the second paragraph, you wrote "Leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg, rather than conserving his troops for the Northern Invasion, Lee decided to send a large number of troops West".  I dont think thats true.  Check the citation again.  Lee sent troops west after Gettysburg, not before.

 In the fourth paragraph you wrote "Following the Battle of Antietam, Lee decided to retreat rather than chase McClellan".  That doesn't make any sense.  How would he chase McClellan? McClellan hadn't gone anywhere right after the battle.


 Sixth paragraph you wrote "Ewell failed to take Culp’s Hill, which Jackson would certainly have done".  While you are attempting to refute the lost cause ideal of Lee, you seem to have bought into the lost cause ideal of Jackson.  I dont think Ewell deserves the criticism he gets from you and I dont think Jackson would certainly have taken the hill.

[hawkeye59]

A fine read, however I don't really believe it was the fault of Lee. Virginia was essential to Confederate independence, as Ernest pointed out. I believe that much of the loss is inconclusive; there were a lot of missed opportunities on both sides, and too numerous to be counted. There are the Union's mistakes at First Bull Run, Antietam, as well as Jeff Davis's numerous tactical flaws in his choice of generals.

In the type of war that was fought, frankly I am surprised that the Confederacy lasted as long as it did. The Union severely outnumbered the Confederacy in numbers, resources, and industrial output, and yet it took them four years to squash the rebellion.

In addition, Lee probably helped more than he hurt.

[??????????]

They didn't make things like guns and food

Yes they did, they had heavy industry but the problem was it couldn't reproduce at the high quantity of the north. They did have plenty of food in places such as North Carolina but the problem was that the transportation system was pathetic due to the fact that railroad gauges weren't standardized. As a matter of fact a train load of food was captured by the Union Army right before the surrender at Appomattox.

[cpeeks]

That is horrible!!!!!!!!A gross lie.Lee kept the south in the war.He didnt lose it!!!! He was aggressive and he tried to land a knock out blow which nearly happened several times!!!!!!!!!!!HORRIBLE!!!!!!!!!!

[dead0man]

Yes they did, they had heavy industry but the problem was it couldn't reproduce at the high quantity of the north. They did have plenty of food in places such as North Carolina but the problem was that the transportation system was pathetic due to the fact that railroad gauges weren't standardized. As a matter of fact a train load of food was captured by the Union Army right before the surrender at Appomattox.

The south had 3% of firearm production in the US before the war started.  link

[??????????]

Yes they did, they had heavy industry but the problem was it couldn't reproduce at the high quantity of the north. They did have plenty of food in places such as North Carolina but the problem was that the transportation system was pathetic due to the fact that railroad gauges weren't standardized. As a matter of fact a train load of food was captured by the Union Army right before the surrender at Appomattox.

The south had 3% of firearm production in the US before the war started.  link

Yes, the largest armory was at Harpers Ferry, VA. However, they didn't need a massive amount of weapons manufacturing to win the war.

[dead0man]

It wouldn't have hurt.....I assume you agree with everything else in my first post?  (not enough people, sh**tty Navy, love of state over love of Confederacy, Lee didn't lose the war)

[??????????]

It wouldn't have hurt.....I assume you agree with everything else in my first post?  (not enough people, sh**tty Navy, love of state over love of Confederacy, Lee didn't lose the war)

Pretty much.

[cpeeks]

"if the south would have won we would have had it made i probably run for presidnet of the southern states when elvis passed away that would be our national holiday  if the south would have one we would have it made"..............." well im a good ole rebel thats just who i am and for this yankee nation i do not give a damn im glad i fought agin her i only wish we won and i dont wont no pardon for anything ive done"

[Senator Ben]

That is horrible!!!!!!!!A gross lie.Lee kept the south in the war.He didnt lose it!!!! He was aggressive and he tried to land a knock out blow which nearly happened several times!!!!!!!!!!!HORRIBLE!!!!!!!!!!

Thanks for the constructive criticism