Junkie v. Atlasia

[Marokai Backbeat]

I would like to point out that I was writing my answer to the Court's question at what appears to be the same time that the Vice President was writing his response.  I would have posted earlier, but had to read a bed time story.  My responses were written before reading opposing counsel's brief.  When I went to post, I saw the warning that someone had posted.  I decided to post because I thought that it was important that I answer the Court's questions.  I did not include responces to the Vice President brief, because I do not think that would appropriate without the Court's permission.

I am willing to answer any questions.  I just did not want anyone to think I was ignoring counsel.  If the court or counsel wants me to respond, I would be willing to do so.  Counsel has been fair and courteous and I wanted to make sure I was the same.

I've no problem with having a short little back and forth if you'd like.

Sounds good to me.  How do you want to do it?

Critique me if you like, ask me questions, whatever you like.

[Sam Spade]

Just fyi, we're working on something, but it might not until labor day weekend.

[Junkie]

Just fyi, we're working on something, but it might not until labor day weekend.

Thank you Your Honor.

While we are waiting, it might be illuminating for the Vice President and myself to engage in further argument, even if only for our own benefit.

To begin with, I would point out that I agree with the Vice President in the fact Bono II is decade old precedent.  I assume then you are arguing for it's interpretation to be overturned.  The Court clearly could do that.  However, in order to do so, under your interpretation of either Article I, Section 5, Clause 4 or the 22nd Amendment, the Court would be granting very large latitude to those areas of power. Quite frankly, it would seem that almost anything, and I mean anything, would thus within the realm of the Senate to regulate. Where would the Senate's power end? What is the point of all the other enumerated powers as these two broad sections would seem to cover everything.

More to the point, if this Court were to overturn Bono II under your interpretations, would they not also be overturning Fritz v. Ernst, requiring Senate powers to be specifically articulated in the Constitution?  In my opinion, it would appear that would be the case, rendering the in dependant powers of the region almost moot.

[Ebowed]

Are you meaning to suggest that court decisions cannot, or should not, be rendered outdated when amendments to the Constitution are passed, contradicting the previous decision(s)?  This is the very impetus for passing many constitutional amendments, and I am getting the impression that you would prefer we did not acknowledge the existence of the 22nd amendment at all.

[Junkie]

Are you meaning to suggest that court decisions cannot, or should not, be rendered outdated when amendments to the Constitution are passed, contradicting the previous decision(s)?  This is the very impetus for passing many constitutional amendments, and I am getting the impression that you would prefer we did not acknowledge the existence of the 22nd amendment at all.

Not what I am saying at all.  We definitely should acknowledge the 22nd Amendment.  I just don't believe it effects the Bono II decision.  To say that the SEDZI Act is saved by the 22nd has two problems.  First, to stretch the 22nd to apply to this act would increase the Senate's powers beyond all limitations.  Second, to interpret the 22nd this way puts it in direct conflict with Art I, Sec 5, Clauses 1 and 4. 

This is my point:  Bono II interpreted those two powers.  The 22nd added another power, but did not in any way address the limitations already existing in Clauses 1 and 4.  So while the Senate may legislate to "protect public health and commerce" (and I know I am the only one that believes that the "and" is limiting, not expansive) the Senate may only do so under the limitations of the Constitution.  Thus the Senate must make sure that those laws not favor one geographic area over another.

Court decisions may be abrogated by Amendments to the Constitution.  In my opinion (which I said from the beginning) that is the appropriate way to deal with this situation.  I just don't believe that the 22nd did that.

[Sam Spade]

There's an opinion circulating, so be patient folks.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

There's an opinion circulating, so be patient folks.

OK...

[Badger]

There's an opinion circulating, so be patient folks.

OK...

Before Sam can jump in:

There's an opinion circulating, so be patient folks.

[Sam Spade]

Opinion to be delivered in a few minutes.

Ray S. Judicata,
Law Clerk

[Sam Spade]

The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Today the Court examines the question of whether the Social & Economic Development Zone Improvement Act (SEDZIA) is constitutional.  In particular, we shall determine whether Section 3, Clause 2 and the entirety of Section 4 of this Act is valid under the Atlasian Constitution. 

I.  Powers of the Senate – Overview

Before the Court tackles the crux of the petition, we think it necessary to step back for a moment and discuss the concept of the Powers of the Senate section (A1, S5) and Senate powers in general.  Since prior court decisions have often created or added confusion to the extent of Senate powers granted under A1, S5 and other sections of the Constitution, not to mention the means of application, it is understandable how legal minds and the Court itself can misunderstand the present scope of such powers

The basic tenet of Fritz v. Ernest is that the Senate must be granted affirmative power in order to make laws.  Without this affirmative creation of lawmaking ability, laws passed by the Senate are merely suggestions to the Regions and to the people of actions to take.  As a result of that decision, a Constitutional amendment was quickly passed which gave the Senate such affirmative powers, and which largely remains the body of A1, S5 today. 

While the extent of such powers is broad, it is certainly not universal.  Prior court decisions have correctly found that laws passed by the Senate must fit within the scope of its affirmative powers, as defined by the plain meaning of words and phrases that the drafters utilized, or those powers necessary and proper to carry out the aforementioned, in order to be found constitutional.

However, as the Court shall stress today, these powers are “affirmative” grants of lawmaking ability.  Except where limited within the actual grant of power itself, each affirmative power given to the Senate does not limit the other affirmative powers of the Senate.  They exist separately, in and of themselves.  And even where separate powers duplicate each other, each affirmative grant of power to the Senate is not limited by this overlap.  Rather, each provision supplements the other respective power.

The Court cannot emphasize enough that the sole limitation to these powers of the Senate is provided by the other parts of the Constitution, whether written in an affirmative grant of power to some other entity/group or in a negative denial of some part of the power granted to the Senate.  Moreover, there is no requirement that the Senate actually utilize its powers by writing laws.  Where the Senate has not legislated under its powers, the Regions possess full police powers, except where limited by other clauses of the Constitution, to enact laws.
II. SEDZIA – Section 3, Clause 2

Petitioner argues that Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA is unconstitutional because, under Bono v. Atlasia II, (1) non-uniform taxes violate the Constitution under A1, S5, C1 and (2) laws that do not promote “a single market where competition is free and undistorted” violate A1, S5, C4.  As shall be discussed below, to the extent that the ruling of Bono v. Atlasia II, specifically Sections 2 and 9 of that decision, conflicts with this decision, it shall no longer hold force in our jurisprudence.

Initially, the Court thinks Petitioner goes about his argument the wrong way.  Our presumption, with regards to any law passed by the Senate, is that any Senate law is unconstitutional unless found within those powers granted to the Senate in A1, S5 or through other parts of the Constitution.  We, therefore, examine the law in question, with the Senate’s stated purpose in mind, as expressed by the Senate itself or by counsel for the government, to see if the Senate has legitimately passed the law according to its Constitutional mandate.

Section 3 of SEDZIA reads as follows (with Section 2 bolded):

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Petitioner has chosen not challenge Clause 1 of this section, wisely in the Court’s view.  After all, we think it abundantly clear that distributions of funds for infrastructure improvements and projects is allowed under A1, S10, among other clauses.

Moreover, the Court finds that the Senate legitimately used its broad powers in Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA to “lay… taxes”, as prescribed by A1, S5, C1.  However, Petitioner insists that this A1, S5, C1 does not apply, referencing our previous decision in Bono v. Atlasia II. We disagree.

The plain text of the Constitution could not be clearer.  A1, S5, C1 gives the Senate “the power…To lay and collect taxes, duties, imports and excises, but all duties, imports and excises shall be uniform throughout the Regions of the Republic of Atlasia and the District of Columbia.”  The exclusion of the word “taxes” from the list of things that “must be uniform” can only mean that the Senate’s power to lay and collect taxes that are not duties, import taxes or excises need not be uniform.

Furthermore, the Court thinks that the terms “duties, imports and excises” cannot, in any way, cover the types of taxes defined with Clause 2.  First, duties are typically associated with customs or goods that travel between countries and states.  They differ from more common taxes in that they are imposed on commodities, financial transactions and estates, not on individuals.  The decision to suspend a tax in Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA clearly deals with taxes individuals pay on the sale of goods, not taxes on goods because of their particular movement.  An import tax, also, fits within the same basic type of tax as that imposed by a duty, namely the tax on movement of goods.  Excises, on the other hand, function as taxes on goods produced within the country.  For example, taxes on alcohol or tobacco production within Atlasia would be examples of excises.  A tax on the sale of goods is, once again, not applicable.

Altogether, the gist of this examination is to lead to the Court’s unquestioned conclusion that the decision of the Senate to suspend sales and business taxes within SEDZs is valid under the Constitution.

As for the impact of A1, S5, C4 upon our holding, the Court finds it irrelevant to our conclusion.  While we certainly acknowledge that a valid justification for the Senate’s passage of laws could be found by promotion of “a single market where competition is free and undistorted”, as noted above in Part I, there is no requirement that the Senate must promote “a single market where competition is free and undistorted” when it appropriately legislates under its other powers derived from the Constitution.

In sum, the Court holds Section 3, Clause 2 of SEDZIA constitutional as a valid use of the Senate’s power to “lay taxes” under A1, S5, A1.

[Sam Spade]

III. SEDZIA – Section 4

To avoid covering already discussed matters, the Court notes that Petitioner has also challenged Section 4 of SEDZIA on the ground that it violates A1, S5, C4.  As noted above, A1, S5, C4 does not mandate that the Senate promote “a single market where competition is free and undistorted” when it enacts laws, but rather provides that laws passed which promote “a single market where competition is free and undistorted” are Constitutional.

However, the Court does choose to examine Section 4 of SEDZIA to determine whether the Senate legitimately used its powers in the Constitution to pass these provisions.  In that, we find in the affirmative.

Section 4 of SEDZIA provides:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

While the Court has no issue in upholding the parts of SEDZIA which regulate workers after being employed under the 22nd Amendment, the actual creation of the Atlasia Works program, we think, falls outside those parameters.

The 22nd Amendment reads:

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In his concurrence to the Court’s opinion in South Park Conservative v. Atlasia, Justice Sam Spade noted:

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However, with regards to actions which “protect…commerce”, such a limitation to negative actions is not inherent in the phrase.  After all, commerce can be “protected” both by government regulation which limits commerce or government regulation which expands commence. 

The Court’s problem here lies with the phrase “for the protection of those in employment.”  Such language cannot mean anything else other than those who are presently employed, not those who “out of employment”, i.e., those who are unemployed for whatever reason.  As such, to be valid under the 22nd Amendment, laws passed by the Senate to “protect the Public Health and commerce” must be devised to protect those “in employment.”  Accordingly, since the Atlasia Works program hires unemployed individuals to work for businesses in the SEDZ and then subsidizes their salaries once hired, only the latter part of this equation can be deemed for the “protection of those in employment.”

Nevertheless, the Court does hold that the creation of the Atlasia Works program, which provides jobs for unemployed individuals with public benefits at businesses within the SEDZ is constitutional under A1, S5, C17 of the Constitution as a part of “system of Insurance for Unemployment.”

In particular, A1, S5, C17 provides that:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Although the traditional definition of “insurance” is “risk management which hedges against the risk of an uncertain loss”, it is plainly clear to the Court that it is quite allowable, if not sensible, to include, as part of a system which protects against the risk of unemployment, creation and funding of government programs which facilitate the creation of new jobs for those who are unemployed.  As such, the creation of the Atlasia Works program, whose purpose is to provide jobs for those who are unemployed and on public assistance within the SEDZ, is a valid means of protecting against the loss of employment.

Therefore, the Court holds that Section 4 of SEDZIA is a valid exercise of the Senate’s power under both A1, S5, C17 and the 22nd amendment.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Expect case recorded on wiki today.

[MASHED POTATOES. VOTE!]

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Expect case recorded on wiki today.

OK, all preserved for the eternity.

See any mistakes, please just PM me and kick my ass

[Junkie]

Thank you for your time.  A very fascinating opinion.  It has truly been a pleasure.