Confirmation Hearing: Oakvale for Associate Justice (Confirmed)

[Oakvale]

I am, of course, honored to be considered for the Court, and thank the President for this nomination.

If confirmed, I can only hope to acquit myself as well as the illustrious figures who've preceded me. I will answer all questions to the best of my ability, and hope I can provide an indication of how I'd rule as Associate Justice.

Again, thank you for the nomination, and I look forward to a grilling.

[Oakvale]

I've got no problem opining on past cases, and I'm perfectly happy to address Marokai's concerns. If it's okay, I'll respond en masse to the questions so far later today, I'll just be away from the computer for a few hours from now.

[Oakvale]

Oops, apologies, everyone, unintended absence. I'm writing my answers now.

[Oakvale]

To address Marokai's question regarding my opinion of some past cases -

Atlasia v. Southeast

Mr. SPC's argument strikes me as fairly tortured legal reasoning, based on the conceits that the government isn't recognizing the "dixies" produced as legal tender per se, and that "circulating" currency is significantly different from the production thereof to be Constitutional.

As Alfeitch points out in the discussion, the "dixies" are, effectively, vouchers. So, since they're being produced by an outside entity, it's technically within the limits of the Constitution. But the circulation (and the withdrawal of dollars from circulation) of the "dixies" by the regional government as amounts to tacit, if not explicit recognition of the currency by the government.

More obviously, the FoCA itself uses "currency" to describe the "dixies" twice -

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...meaning that the defense's argument hinges on the idea that "circulating" currency produced by an outside company is meaningfully different to "issuing". I find this to be a stretch. To quote the relevant passage from the second Constitution -

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Even if we're to accept that the FoCA doesn't grant de facto legal recognition of the currency as legal tender, the amendment falls afoul of  - "no Region may issue Coin or Currency...".

I must say that SPC's argument is fairly impressive in its audacity, but I'm not convinced. If I'd been on the Court at the time, I would have voted to overturn the amendment.

On standing to sue, I think this is an example of something that makes sense in the real world and much less in Atlasia. It's not like we're exactly plagued with frivolous lawsuits, and it adds an unnecessary hurdle for people with legitimate grievances to deal with before they can file suit.

Responses to UNEPSE v. Northeast , SPC v. Atlasia and Peter v. Atlasia coming up shortly...

[Oakvale]

UNEPSE v. Northeast

To premise this for those of you who don't want to read through the whole thread, the case concerns a ruling made by the Northeast Chief Judicial Officer (CJO) which declared a strike by the Union of Northeast Public Sector Employees (UNEPSE) in response to the passage of the Practical Labor Policy Act.

The union alleged that the PLPA violated its collective bargaining rights as gauranteed by the Constitution by Article VI, Section 10, [1] which states -

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It's my opinion that this clause is incompatible with the PLPA, and the Act is, thererfore, unconstitutional. Given that, the question is whether the UNEPSE has the right to strike in response to violation of its constitutional rights. I'll explain my reasoning, and why I disagree with Justice Sam Spade's partial dissent.

In his ruling, the Northeast CJO charged the union with breach of contract, and fined the union for expenses incurred accordingly. However, no written contract existed - a notable and probably unavoidable problem with Atlasia's... not-real-ness - and, as such, we have no way of knowing what the imaginary, implied contract mandated. It seems absurd, then, for the CJO to charge the union with breach of contract when no contract existed. How are we to know this unspoken, implied contract didn't contain a clause allowing strike action?

If no contract exists, there can be no breach of contract. Thus, the UNEPSE employees who striked in response to the passage of the PLPA were simply excercising their right "to organize for the purpose of colective bargaining", as provided by Article VI, Section 10 of the then-Constitution. It's my opinon, then, that the fines levied by the CJO upon the union should have been overturned, and I agree with the Court's decision to do so.

For argument's sake, though, even if we're to assume that the implied contract carried legal weight, if a union can't strike in response to the passage of a bill infringing on their very right to strike - and, in effect, have any bargaining power whatsoever - what can they strike in response to?

I won't go into too much detail on why I think the PLPA's unconstitutional - although if a Senator wants more detail on my thinking, I'd be more than happy to provide a longer analysis. Suffice to say that Article VI, Section 10 places regulation of collectie bargaining firmly in the hands of the federal government, specifically the Senate.

The clause of the PLPA allowing the government of the Northeast to replace striking workers with non-union employees at a whim stands out, as it effectively renders striking useless, and makes "collective bargaining" a rather meaningless term. While the PLPA doesn't out-and-out outlaw union action, but it's a clear effort to intimidate public sector employees into not striking - just take a look at the clause providing for massive fines on public employees who strike. While the PLPA doesn't directly impact the employees of the UNEPSE, as it only applies to new contracts, I think it's well within reason that the UNEPSE strike in response to legislation that infringes upon their rights to collective bargaining, and would render the union toothless.

In his dissent, Justice Sam Spade has a more narrow interpertation of the right to organize, arguing that it only covers individual rights, not collective ones. I disagree - It's my opinion that if a clause allows for "collective bargaining" there's an implicit recognition of collective rights. The Justice's contention is that if that was the intention, it would have been explicit rather than implied. This might be something the Senate could clarify - we've had a string of recent amendments, and this issue could arise again.

Again, if necessary I'll go into more detail on my thinking re: the PLPA, but I want to move on to the other cases.


[1] Actually Article VI, Section 11 in the current Constitution, but it's identically worded.

[Oakvale]

SPC v. Atlasia

This case concerns the Constitutionality of the Protection of Public Health Act (PPHA), which made it illegal to smoke in buildings "open to the public".

SPC (again) charged that there was no Constitutional basis for such a law, citing the relevant passages, specifically from Article 1, Section 5, which gives the government the power to

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and

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Also relevant is the 22nd Amendment to the second Constitution, the "Public Interest Amendment" which expanded upon the government's power to regulate in the interests of public health. Most relevantly, it gave the government power...

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As far as I can tell, the justification for this Act would have to come largely from the 22nd Amendment. My interpreation of Article 1, Section 5's two relevant clauses isn't broad enough to cover a smoking ban -

To take the 13th clause, for example -

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While then-Justice Marokai makes a compelling argument for the alternative meanings of "demonstration", it's clear to me that this clause refers to medical research. I'd rather not get bogged down in semantics, but it's unavoidable. While a use of force is a valid meaning for "demonstration", I find it implausible in the context of the clause. I'm not a staunch literalist by any means, but the interpretation here is too broad, in my opinion. I disagree with the first part of the Court's ruling

However, the 22nd Amendment provides enough justification for the PPHA that I'd have voted to uphold the Act.

The 22nd Amendment allows the government to protect the public health by "making such regulaions as shall be necessary for the protecton of those in employment". Since there's a well-established danger from second-hand smoke, this Amendment, in my view, allows for the prohibition of smoking in, as the Act states, restaurants, public transportation, cinemas, etc, etc.

In short, I disagree in part and agree in part with the Court's ruling. While I don't find sufficient grounds in  Article 1, Section 5 to allow for a smoking ban, I do think it's permissable under the 22nd Amendment, and, thus, I would have voted to uphold.

[Oakvale]

Aye. (shocking!)