DC Voting Rights

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Sections 1, 2, and 3, were contingent on Section 4 (the plebiscite); but Section 1 is not dependent on Section 3.  The dependency is the other way around.  Were it not for Section 1, there would be no reason for Sections 3.

Strange.  You argue that section 3 does not limit the action of section 1 at the same time that you admit that section 4 did limit the action of section 1.  You're being inconsistent here.  the clear construction is that Section 1 is the core of the bill, delimiting what is to be ceded if the retrocession takes place.  Sections 2, 5, and 6 establish limits on what will happen if the act of cession occurs.  And last but not least, sections 3 and 4 establish conditions for the cession to occur.

Read the verb tenses.  Section II speaks in the present tense.  The cession is happening now.   Section IV uses the past tense, referring to Congress of "having accepted".

If you must resort to grammar, please use a better argument.  In English, the present tense also serves for future and habitual actions.  Indeed, with the shalls floating about in sections II, III, and IV, a stronger grammar based argument can be made for futurity, not instantaneity being the intent.  As for your assertion of past action  being mentioned in section IV, not only is "having accepted the said cession" a dependent clause in this sentence, but "having accepted" is here a perfect gerund, and has nothing to do with any use or implication of a past event.  Rather the sentence is laying out what Congress must do to complete (or to use the grammatical terminology, to perfect) the cession and that is to "provide for the government thereof, under their jurisdiction".  Congress did not do so until February 27, 1801 and thus the cession was not complete until then.

So if a mob had approached the Capitol, Congress would dispatch a messenger to Annapolis requesting that the militia be called out?

Other than the fact that they sent such messengers to all the State capitols, isn't that essentially what they did at the start of the Civil War?  Congress has authority "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" independent of having established an area of exclusive jurisdiction.

After 1801, Georgetown remained a city, and did so until 1872 when it was annexed to Washington.

Yet another of your non sequiturs.  Nowhere did I even suggest that Georgetown stopped being a city when the district was ceded.  But in 1801 it did stop being a city in Maryland and instead became one in Columbia.

[jimrtex]

Sorry about taking so long to respond.

Sections 1, 2, and 3, were contingent on Section 4 (the plebiscite); but Section 1 is not dependent on Section 3.  The dependency is the other way around.  Were it not for Section 1, there would be no reason for Sections 3.

Strange.  You argue that section 3 does not limit the action of section 1 at the same time that you admit that section 4 did limit the action of section 1.  You're being inconsistent here.  the clear construction is that Section 1 is the core of the bill, delimiting what is to be ceded if the retrocession takes place.  Sections 2, 5, and 6 establish limits on what will happen if the act of cession occurs.  And last but not least, sections 3 and 4 establish conditions for the cession to occur.

Section 1 itself says that it is dependent on Section 4 ("That with the assent of the people of the county and town of Alexandria, to be ascertained as hereinafter prescribed...")

I am willing to accept that when Section 1 says that it is a "cession", that it is a "cession".  I think it is a contorted reading to claim that the cession did not occur until Virginia provided a legal framework for the area.

Read the verb tenses.  Section II speaks in the present tense.  The cession is happening now.   Section IV uses the past tense, referring to Congress of "having accepted".

Rather the sentence is laying out what Congress must do to complete (or to use the grammatical terminology, to perfect) the cession and that is to "provide for the government thereof, under their jurisdiction".  Congress did not do so until February 27, 1801 and thus the cession was not complete until then.

So the area was in some sort of legal limbo until then?  Could Maryland have unilaterally withdrawn its cession?  No.  Since the United States could terminate the application of Maryland laws and legal system at any instant, it was exercising its sovereignty by permitting residents to vote in Maryland, etc.

So if a mob had approached the Capitol, Congress would dispatch a messenger to Annapolis requesting that the militia be called out?

Other than the fact that they sent such messengers to all the State capitols, isn't that essentially what they did at the start of the Civil War?  Congress has authority "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" independent of having established an area of exclusive jurisdiction.

The mob would be domestic violence.   Congress could help out if they had received a request from Annapolis.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Sorry about taking so long to respond.

Don't worry about it.  I think we've exhausted this topic.  I don't see any likelihood that either of us will convince the other and I have no interest in repeating or restating my arguments again.  I didn't note any new arguments from you in your last post, just restatements of ones you've made before, and I don't have any of mine own.

As for the side issue of mobs and what Congress could do about them:

[

So if a mob had approached the Capitol, Congress would dispatch a messenger to Annapolis requesting that the militia be called out?

Other than the fact that they sent such messengers to all the State capitols, isn't that essentially what they did at the start of the Civil War?  Congress has authority "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" independent of having established an area of exclusive jurisdiction.

The mob would be domestic violence.   Congress could help out if they had received a request from Annapolis.

Well even if for some reason you don't consider a mob acting to prevent Congress from meeting to rise to the level of being an "Insurrection", I'd like to think that even the most literal of strict constructionists would hold that the Capitol itself falls with the scope of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" and thus Congress could use such measures as it deemed needful to secure the Capitol grounds from an approaching mob, even if it had never assumed jurisdiction of the District.

[jimrtex]

Well even if for some reason you don't consider a mob acting to prevent Congress from meeting to rise to the level of being an "Insurrection", I'd like to think that even the most literal of strict constructionists would hold that the Capitol itself falls with the scope of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" and thus Congress could use such measures as it deemed needful to secure the Capitol grounds from an approaching mob, even if it had never assumed jurisdiction of the District.

Bringing this full circle, Congress has legislated that residents of Forts, etc. be permitted to vote in State elections where the fort is located, even though such residents may not be subject to State jurisdiction, taxation, or other general application of the laws.

Is the jurisdiction that Congress exercises over the District unlike that it exercises over other federal installations?

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Well even if for some reason you don't consider a mob acting to prevent Congress from meeting to rise to the level of being an "Insurrection", I'd like to think that even the most literal of strict constructionists would hold that the Capitol itself falls with the scope of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" and thus Congress could use such measures as it deemed needful to secure the Capitol grounds from an approaching mob, even if it had never assumed jurisdiction of the District.

Bringing this full circle, Congress has legislated that residents of Forts, etc. be permitted to vote in State elections where the fort is located, even though such residents may not be subject to State jurisdiction, taxation, or other general application of the laws.

Is the jurisdiction that Congress exercises over the District unlike that it exercises over other federal installations?

Yes.

In the case of Columbia it exercises control over territory, the property of which is not owned by the United States.  Furthermore, Columbia is not part of any State.  The residents of Columbia are apportioned separately from the States for purposes of determining Presidential Electors by the XXIIIrd Amendment.  Even compared to the Territories, Congress has slightly more power in the District, as it exercises exclusive Legislation there, but in the the Territories it is required to respect any Claims that a State may have.  (Not that save for any residual claims Hawaii might have inherited from the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi to Midway and Palmyra, would any State have any claims over the current Territories of the United States.)

[jimrtex]

Bringing this full circle, Congress has legislated that residents of Forts, etc. be permitted to vote in State elections where the fort is located, even though such residents may not be subject to State jurisdiction, taxation, or other general application of the laws.

Is the jurisdiction that Congress exercises over the District unlike that it exercises over other federal installations?

Yes.

In the case of Columbia it exercises control over territory, the property of which is not owned by the United States.  Furthermore, Columbia is not part of any State.  The residents of Columbia are apportioned separately from the States for purposes of determining Presidential Electors by the XXIIIrd Amendment.  Even compared to the Territories, Congress has slightly more power in the District, as it exercises exclusive Legislation there, but in the the Territories it is required to respect any Claims that a State may have.  (Not that save for any residual claims Hawaii might have inherited from the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi to Midway and Palmyra, would any State have any claims over the current Territories of the United States.)

"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsover" applies to both the district and federal installations, doesn't it?

Clearly the shadow-apportionment under the 23rd amendment is not done separately from the States.  Congress need not include residents of military bases in the apportionment population of the states.  It is a discretionary exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

In the case of Columbia it exercises control over territory, the property of which is not owned by the United States.  Furthermore, Columbia is not part of any State.  The residents of Columbia are apportioned separately from the States for purposes of determining Presidential Electors by the XXIIIrd Amendment.  Even compared to the Territories, Congress has slightly more power in the District, as it exercises exclusive Legislation there, but in the the Territories it is required to respect any Claims that a State may have.

"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsover" applies to both the district and federal installations, doesn't it?

Yes, which is why I mentioned it only with respect to the difference between the Territories and the District.

Clearly the shadow-apportionment under the 23rd amendment is not done separately from the States.

I think you misinterpreted what I wrote.  I used "separate" because the residents of the District are separated from those of the States in location, not in time.

  Congress need not include residents of military bases in the apportionment population of the states.  It is a discretionary exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction.

Actually I would argue that in that case it is an exercise of its Amendment XIV Section 5 powers to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.  Persons living on a military base located in a State are clearly resident in that State and hence citizens of that State if they are citizens of the United States.

[jimrtex]

Clearly the shadow-apportionment under the 23rd amendment is not done separately from the States.

I think you misinterpreted what I wrote.  I used "separate" because the residents of the District are separated from those of the States in location, not in time.

This is due to discretionary legislation by Congress.  Congress has decided to include residents of other federal enclaves in the apportionment population of the states.  Under the Rohrbacher legislation, residents of Columbia would be included in the apportionment population of Maryland.

  Congress need not include residents of military bases in the apportionment population of the states.  It is a discretionary exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction.

Actually I would argue that in that case it is an exercise of its Amendment XIV Section 5 powers to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.  Persons living on a military base located in a State are clearly resident in that State and hence citizens of that State if they are citizens of the United States.

Do you read Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) to indicate that the residents of a federal enclave have an absolute right to vote in state elections; or that it is only because of the extent under which Maryland treated them as residents for other purposes?  And if that latter, isn't this specifically because Congress has legislated differently with respect to federal enclaves than it has with respect to the District.   Congress has the discretionary power to include or not include residents of federal enclaves in apportionment populations.  Because Congress did include residents in the apportionment population was cited as more compelling evidence for requiring Maryland to extend suffrage to residents of the federal enclave.

If Congress had exercised its exclusive legislative authority in a different manner in the NIH enclave then Evan v. Cornman could have been decided differently.  And Congress has the same exclusive legislative authority with respect to Columbia as it does with respect to the NIH enclave.  The Rohrbacher bill would simply make the exercise of legislative authority for Columbia more like that for the NIH enclave.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Neither Evans v. Corman, nor Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624 (1953), which settled the question of whether a federal enclave remains part of the State in which it is located, has any bearing on the voting rights of the District.  Columbia is not an enclave of Maryland.  It was ceded by Maryland to the Federal Government and is no longer a part of the State, a distinction that is not the case for the NIH compound.

[jimrtex]

Neither Evans v. Corman, nor Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624 (1953), which settled the question of whether a federal enclave remains part of the State in which it is located, has any bearing on the voting rights of the District.  Columbia is not an enclave of Maryland.  It was ceded by Maryland to the Federal Government and is no longer a part of the State, a distinction that is not the case for the NIH compound.

Evans v. Corman was decided on the basis of how Congress exercised its authority over a particular territory; for example choosing to include the residents in the apportionment population of the including State.  If Congress had exercised its authority over the residents of the NIH enclave in a manner equivalent to its exercise of authority of Columbia, then Evans v. Corman would have been decided the other way.  Howard v. Comissioners simply recognized that Congress could permit collection of state taxes in a federal enclave.  That is, despite having exclusive jurisdiction, they permitted exercise of state laws in the area (as Congress had between 1790 and 1801 in Columbia).

If Congress includes the residents of Columbia in the apportionment population of Maryland, and apportions a 9th representative to Maryland, on what basis could Maryland deny residents of Columbia the right to vote in federal elections?

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Howard v. Commissioners is not as simple as you infer.  It ruled that the enclave in question remained part of the State of Kentucky.  Ever since Congress assumed jurisdiction of Columbia in 1801, Columbia has not been part of the State of Maryland. Under the Constitution, Maryland cannot be forced to accept it back against its wishes, so Maryland can certainly deny the residents of Columbia the right to vote in Federal elections for the simple reason that they aren't residents of Maryland and no law that Congress passes can make them residents.

[jimrtex]

Howard v. Commissioners is not as simple as you infer.  It ruled that the enclave in question remained part of the State of Kentucky.  Ever since Congress assumed jurisdiction of Columbia in 1801, Columbia has not been part of the State of Maryland. Under the Constitution, Maryland cannot be forced to accept it back against its wishes, so Maryland can certainly deny the residents of Columbia the right to vote in Federal elections for the simple reason that they aren't residents of Maryland and no law that Congress passes can make them residents.

There is nothing in the Constitution that supports the distinction you are making between Columbia and other federal enclaves.  The Constitution refers to two types of entities over which Congress has like exclusive legislative authority.  You are saying that the authority of Congress is unlike between the two types of entities.

Whether the States retain some residual legislative authority over federal enclaves was determined decisively during the 1860s.  Nonetheless the Congress has permitted some State jurisdiction over both federal enclaves and Columbia.  Between the time that Congress accepted the cession of Columbia in 1791 and 1801, voters were permitted to vote in Maryland and Virginia elections.  Since the 1950s, voters resident in federal enclaves have been permitted to vote in the State where the enclave is located, and Congress has permitted levying of certain State taxes within federal enclaves.  It has even permitted levying of taxes by other States (see 4 USC 115).

There is nothing in the Constitution that requires "the district" to be outside the territorial extent of any State.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Nothing in the Constitution?  It's in plain language.  The District is ceded and therefore no longer a part of the State(s) it was formerly part of, whereas the other places in which Congress exerts like authority (not the same authority) are clearly indicated as remaining in the State in which they were at the time at which the authority was obtained.
Hence, Congress' like authority over those other places is conditional.  It lasts only so long as the United States continues to hold title to the property and when it ends the authority reverts to the State in which the place was located.

For example, Congress could not make the NIH enclave part of a State other than Maryland, as it could in the case of Columbia, if that other State were agreeable.  Also, if Congress chose to abandon its authority over the NIH enclave, Maryland would have no choice but to resume its authority, whereas if the Congress ever chose to abandon Columbia, Maryland would be under no obligation to resume authority.  Indeed, since it would be a change of that State's territory, it would require the assent of both Maryland and Congress to do so and not the mere abandonment of Columbia.

Plus I wish you would stop stating as fact your assertion that the cession took place in 1791.  I realize that we disagree on the date that cession occurred, with you holding it to be in 1791 and I in 1801, but continuing to assert that point does not strengthen your case in the least.

Even if the cession happened in 1791, and that your view Congress, Maryland, and Virginia allowed the residents of Columbia to be treated as citizens of Maryland and Virginia were correct, the fact remains that whereas in 1791, the issue of who was a citizen of a State for purposes of State law was largely in the hands of each State, with Federal authority limited to establishing a uniform Rule of Naturalization.  However, in 1868, the fourteenth amendment came into force and established a uniform rule for State citizenship that requires that State citizens be State residents.  Furthermore, in 1961, the twenty-third amendment, which gave Columbia Presidential Electors, logically requires that the residents of Columbia not be considered residents of any State.  Hence, even with the most generous interpretation of the Constitution to support your viewpoint, since 1961 Congress has not had the authority to allow or require Columbia voters to be treated as Maryland voters for any election, State or Federal.  That's without even resorting to my view that Congress never did such a thing and it never had the authority to do so.

[jimrtex]

In the case of Columbia, most of the buildings and other facilities are not owned by United States, they are privately owned.  What other difference is there?  The cession of Columbia is for a particular purpose, and should Congress choose not to use it for that purpose, how is different than a post office that it decides to discard?

I don't see how you can distinguish between "like" and "same" when that applies to "exclusive legislation in all cases whasoever".

Congress has chosen to exercise its authority over Columbia and other federal enclaves in different manner and changing over time.  They didn't have to permit residents of the NIH enclave to be subject to so much Maryland authority or include them in apportionment population.  It was a political decision.  Had Congress wished to reverse the effect of Evans v Corman, they could have.

The Constitution uses the specific words, "cede" and "accept".  Maryland and Virginia and the United States used these specific words in their statutes passed in 1790 and 1791.  I don't see how there can be any interpretation other than that the cession of exclusive jurisdiction occured in 1791.

The date is in fact a key part of my argument.  Congress chose (by omission) to permit voters to vote in Maryland from 1791 to 1801.  They also acquiesced in 1801 when Maryland cut them off.  Had there been a representative from the area in 1801, or if the population would have been necessary for Maryland to gain another representative, then there might well have been a different decision.

If Columbia residents are granted the right to vote in Maryland federal elections, the Supreme Court could well accept an argument that it legitimate under terms of the the 14th Amendment, so that State citizens may move to Columbia and not lose their right to participate in elections for representation in Congress (we'll assume that the the 14th Amendment applies to the elective franchise).

The 23rd Amendment simply gives the authority for Congress to choose a method of appointing 3 electors.  Congress is quite free to appoint thoseelectors on the basis of elections held in Vermont.  Were Congress to grant Columbians the right to vote in Maryland federal elections, while choosing not to appoint 3 electors, or appointing them on the basis of the national popular vote, I am quite certain that the SCOTUS would have no problems with that.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

In the case of Columbia, most of the buildings and other facilities are not owned by United States, they are privately owned.  What other difference is there?

As I have repeatedly said, Columbia is not part of any State while the other enclaves you bring up are part of the State they are located in.

The Constitution uses the specific words, "cede" and "accept".  Maryland and Virginia and the United States used these specific words in their statutes passed in 1790 and 1791.  I don't see how there can be any interpretation other than that the cession of exclusive jurisdiction occured in 1791.

As I have already pointed out, the conditions established by the 1791 acceptances for the cession to occur were not fulfilled until 1801, thus the cession itself did not occur until then. If we applied the interpretation you are following to the purchase of a house, if we sign a contract for me to buy your house contingent on my paying you $100,000, it doesn't matter if I ever pay you the $100,000,  the house is mine immediately because we signed a contract saying that it would be mine once I fulfilled my obligations under the contract.  What happened in 1790-1791 was the signing of the contract.  Columbia didn't come out of escrow until 1801 when Congress provided for the governance of the district.  Let me know if you want to sell your home under those equivalent conditions.  Of course it'll be quite a while before I finally pay the $100,000.  More than ten years in fact, since why should I pay since the house is by your logic, already mine.

The 23rd Amendment simply gives the authority for Congress to choose a method of appointing 3 electors.  Congress is quite free to appoint those electors on the basis of elections held in Vermont.  Were Congress to grant Columbians the right to vote in Maryland federal elections, while choosing not to appoint 3 electors, or appointing them on the basis of the national popular vote, I am quite certain that the SCOTUS would have no problems with that.

Congress does not have the authority to grant Columbians the right to vote in Maryland federal elections because the 23rd amendment logically requires that the residents of the federal district not be a resident of any of the fifty individual States and thus not a citizen of any of them under the 14th amendment.  This is regardless of how Congress chooses to have the electors alloted to the District be elected, or even if it refuses to have the Electors be chosen.

[jimrtex]

In the case of Columbia, most of the buildings and other facilities are not owned by United States, they are privately owned.  What other difference is there?

As I have repeatedly said, Columbia is not part of any State while the other enclaves you bring up are part of the State they are located in.

The different manner in which Columbia and the federal enclaves have been administered is due to poltical decisions of Congress.  It is not a distinction that the Constitution mandates.

Your argument, IIUC, is that Congress could not prevent residents of federal enclaves from voting in State elections, or paying taxes to the inclusive States.  But in fact, the SCOTUS in Evans v. Corman made particular notice of the fact that Congress had included residents of federal enclaves in apportionment populations.  Howard v. Commissioners only made it to the SCOTUS because of the Buck Act that permitted State taxation in federal enclaves.  It was decided on hyper-technical issues as to whether Louisville could annex the territory of a federal enclave or whether the type of fee imposed was the type of tax that Congress had permitted the application of.   As noted, 4 USC 115 even permits Tennessee to impose taxes on income from a federal enclave in Kentucky.

And similarly, Congress is not mandated under the Constitution to prevent application of State laws within the capital district.  During the period from 1791 to 1801 it specifically permitted Maryland laws to be executed within Columbia.

The Constitution uses the specific words, "cede" and "accept".  Maryland and Virginia and the United States used these specific words in their statutes passed in 1790 and 1791.  I don't see how there can be any interpretation other than that the cession of exclusive jurisdiction occured in 1791.

As I have already pointed out, the conditions established by the 1791 acceptances for the cession to occur were not fulfilled until 1801, thus the cession itself did not occur until then. If we applied the interpretation you are following to the purchase of a house, if we sign a contract for me to buy your house contingent on my paying you $100,000, it doesn't matter if I ever pay you the $100,000,  the house is mine immediately because we signed a contract saying that it would be mine once I fulfilled my obligations under the contract.  What happened in 1790-1791 was the signing of the contract.  Columbia didn't come out of escrow until 1801 when Congress provided for the governance of the district.  Let me know if you want to sell your home under those equivalent conditions.  Of course it'll be quite a while before I finally pay the $100,000.  More than ten years in fact, since why should I pay since the house is by your logic, already mine.

The cession was not contingent on the other conditions.  The other conditions were contingent on the cession.  It is like if you buy my house, but won't be ready to move in until your current job contract (in another city - New York or Philadelphia) is completed.   Meanwhile, my brother-in-law has his trailer parked in my (now your) driveway.  He is using electricity from the house, and is using the shower and toilet.  We agree that he can continue to live in his trailer, and pay the electricity and water bill and real estate taxes until you are actually ready to move in.  You own the house during that interim period.

When you actually do move in, you could choose to continue the arrangement with my brother-in-law.  It is your choice.

The 23rd Amendment simply gives the authority for Congress to choose a method of appointing 3 electors.  Congress is quite free to appoint those electors on the basis of elections held in Vermont.  Were Congress to grant Columbians the right to vote in Maryland federal elections, while choosing not to appoint 3 electors, or appointing them on the basis of the national popular vote, I am quite certain that the SCOTUS would have no problems with that.

Congress does not have the authority to grant Columbians the right to vote in Maryland federal elections because the 23rd amendment logically requires that the residents of the federal district not be a resident of any of the fifty individual States and thus not a citizen of any of them under the 14th amendment.  This is regardless of how Congress chooses to have the electors alloted to the District be elected, or even if it refuses to have the Electors be chosen.
[/quote]
If the Rohrbacher bill becomes law, it will be challenged in court.

When the SCOTUS makes their ruling, it will not having anything to do with the 23rd amendment.

The 23rd amendment does not require the Congress to act logically.  But not appointing Columbia electors is consistent with Columbia residents participating in federal elections.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Howard v. Commissioners (...) was decided on hyper-technical issues as to whether Louisville could annex the territory of a federal enclave

And that particular issue settled whether that enclave was still in Kentucky.

As noted, 4 USC 115 even permits Tennessee to impose taxes on income from a federal enclave in Kentucky.

You've completely misinterpreted 4 USC 115.  There's a good reason why that section is titled "Limitation on State authority to tax compensation paid to individuals performing services at Fort Campbell, Kentucky".  All employees on all Federal enclaves are already subject to income tax levied by their State of residence thanks to 4 USC 106.  In the absence of 4 USC 115, 4 USC 106 would also allow the employees of Fort Campbell to have their income for services rendered there to be taxed by the State that Fort Campbell is located in, regardless of whether they live in that State.  However, which State is Fort Campbell in?  Fort Campbell may have its postal address in Kentucky, but the territory of that enclave straddles the Kentucky-Tennessee border and thus it cannot easily be said in which State a person who works there does the work.

Hence for Fort Campbell (as well as some other Federal facilities covered by 4 USC 111 (b), (c)) Congress has chosen to revoke the grant of authority to States under 4 USC 106 to collect income taxes for services done in a federal enclave because it was performed in that State and leave only the authority to tax income on the basis of residency.  Presumably this was done so as to avoid having persons working at those facilities having to pay income tax to both States for the work done there without requiring the Federal Government having to undertake extra effort to figure out where the work was done, especially in the case of employees whose job at those facilities requires them to do some work in each State.  It would be nice if instead of writing specific exceptions for each facility, that Congress had instead made it a blanket rule that covered all multi-State Federal enclaves, but I suppose that that would be too much logic for Congress to do that as they couldn't even put all the exceptions in the same section of the U.S. Code despite having all been added at the same time by section 1075 of PL 105-261.

In short 4 USC 115 has no bearing on the issue we've been debating.

[jimrtex]

Howard v. Commissioners (...) was decided on hyper-technical issues as to whether Louisville could annex the territory of a federal enclave

And that particular issue settled whether that enclave was still in Kentucky.

Not particularly important unless there was a challenge to the Buck Act itself.  It would be fully within the power of Congress to determine that federal enclaves are not part of any political subdivision of a state; or to make a specific exclusion.  If Congress had wanted to, they could have said, sure the Ordnance Plant is in Louisville, but you may not impose your city income taxes (just as they can not impose city property taxes).

As noted, 4 USC 115 even permits Tennessee to impose taxes on income from a federal enclave in Kentucky.

You've completely misinterpreted 4 USC 115.  There's a good reason why that section is titled "Limitation on State authority to tax compensation paid to individuals performing services at Fort Campbell, Kentucky".  All employees on all Federal enclaves are already subject to income tax levied by their State of residence thanks to 4 USC 106.

4 USC 106 covers two cases:

   (1) Residents of Federal enclaves, who may or may not be employeed in the enclave.
   (2) Persons who have income from employment within the a federal enclave.

4 USC 106 clearly permits taxation of income from within an enclave, even from non-residents of the State containing the enclave.

State income taxes are levied based both on the place of residence; and the place of employment.  Since the HQ of Fort Campbell is in Kentucky, employees would be considered to be employeed in Kentucky, unless they could show that the normal place of work is in the Tennessee portion of the base.  But a large share of the non-base population lives in Tennessee, particularly Clarksville.

Tennessee does not tax wage income.  So I suspect that the reason for 4 USC 115 is to keep Kentucky from imposing its taxes on civilians who live in Tennessee but work at Fort Campbell.

If you check HR 865, HR 1368, and S613 (for 105th Congress), noting the sponsors, you will see this is the case.  Also see the counter legislation proposed by Sen. Ford of Kentucky, S2618.  The Fort Campbell provisions were folded into HR 1953 which includes the federal dam provisions as well, and passed the House.

It would be nice if instead of writing specific exceptions for each facility, that Congress had instead made it a blanket rule that covered all multi-State Federal enclaves, but I suppose that that would be too much logic for Congress to do that as they couldn't even put all the exceptions in the same section of the U.S. Code despite having all been added at the same time by section 1075 of PL 105-261.

PL 105-261 was the 1999 DOD appropriations bill.  Rather than try to get HR 1953 through the Senate, the DOD bill was amended.

In short 4 USC 115 has no bearing on the issue we've been debating.

It demonstrates the extent of authority granted to Congress to exercise its exclusive legislation authority.

Nothing compells Congress to permit imposition of state taxes in federal enclaves, but nothing prevents them from doing so.  Nothing compells Congress to permit residents of federal enclaves to vote in State elections, but nothing prevents them from doing so.  Nothing compels Congress to permit residents of Columbia to vote in Maryland federal elections, but nothing prevents them from doing so.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

You keep ignoring the essential point.  These Federal enclaves for which Congress has "like authority" remain part of the State they are located in.  Hence when Congress relaxes the degree of authority that it chooses to exert, they revert to State authority.  Conversely, Columbia is not part of Maryland or any other State. If Congress chose to relax its authority there, it would revert to the status of unorganized territory. Congress does not have the ability to compel Maryland to accept either the territory or residents of Columbia for any purpose whatsoever.  If it did it would be able alter the boundaries of a State without its consent, and that is explicitly prohibited by the Constitution.

[jimrtex]

The Constitution is not really clear how Congress should exercise its authority over the capital district and federal enclaves.   It really isn't necessary given its exclusive legislative authority.  Since the States were represented in the Senate, and the House was elected by the people of the States, Congress would have felt more constrained that the do today with regard to ANWR where they totally disregard the views of Alaskans.  But if Congress had set up sign posts around each post office, customs house, and fort saying: "Now Leaving _________,
Entering Territory of the United States", we would accept that as the way it was, and the only way it could be.

Congress has compelled Maryland to accept persons who are not Maryland residents as voters.  It has compelled Maryland to accept persons who were not qualified to vote for members of the more numerous house of the legislature as voters in elections for US Representative and Senator, and these actions have been upheld by the courts.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

It has been able to do so because of the latitude that a broad interpretation of the Constitution gives Congress in determining whether residents of federal enclaves are indeed residents of the State that the enclave is located in.  (A narrow interpretation would make them residents of the State no matter what Congress decided, but then you'd run afoul of the problems dealt with in Marbury v. Madison.)  However, that authority is not that Congress can make residents of the federal enclaves residents of the State each enclave is in.  Rather it is the reverse, Congress can choose to exert its power over the enclaves and make the residents of the enclaves not be residents of the State the enclave is located in and thus make those residents not subject to State power or taxation.

That power cannot be used to make the residents of Columbia residents of a State, because Columbia is not in any State and thus there is no inherent State residency that would be operative if Congress chose to not use its power to withdraw the residents of a federal enclave from being subject to the power of a State.

What happened in the case of the NIH enclave is not as you assert that Congress compelled Maryland to accept the people there as Maryland citizens.  Instead, Congress chose to not withdraw the residents of the NIH enclave from Maryland authority and thus Maryland under the fourteenth amendment had to give those citizens of Maryland the same voting rights as its other citizens.  Had Congress chosen to exempt the NIH enclave from Maryland law then by its action it would have severed any claim to Maryland residency based on residency in the NIH enclave.

In summation, Congress caused the residents of the NIH enclave to be residents of Maryland not by exerting Congressional power, but by choosing to not use it.

[jimrtex]

Under what authority did Congress create Washington and Alexandria counties and establish a local court system in 1801?  Could they have chosen to do so in 1800 or 1796 or 1793?  Of course, because they had exclusive legislative authority from 1791 after the acts of cession and acceptance were passed by the legislatures of the United States, Maryland, and Virginia.

How did they construct the Capitol and White House before 1800?  Were these needful public buildings erected with the consent of the Maryland legislature?  Not at all.  They were buildings erected in territory under their exclusive jurisdiction.

And yet, Maryland collected taxes and permitted the residents of Columbia to vote, even electing a resident as one of Maryland's representatives in Congress.  The House of Representatives apparently found his election to be in order, and seated him.

That is, Congress made a political decision to permit Maryland to exercise certain authority in Columbia from 1791-1801, just as later did in NIH and the Ordnance Plant in Louisville.

Congress need not make the residents of Columbia, residents of Maryland for them to vote in Maryland.  They were not residents from 1791-1801 and yet demonstrably they did vote.  And Congress has also required that certain persons who are clearly not residents of Maryland be allowed to vote in Maryland federal elections.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Please stop begging the question.  You keep assuming that Columbia was ceded in 1791 to prove that it was ceded in 1791.

How did they construct the Capitol and White House before 1800?  Were these needful public buildings erected with the consent of the Maryland legislature?  Not at all.  They were buildings erected in territory under their exclusive jurisdiction.

You seem to have forgotten the law Maryland passed in 1791, which you quoted earlier in our discussion. The Federal Commissioners who built the City of Washington were authorized by the Maryland legislature to do so.

12. And be it enacted, That the Commissioners aforesaid for the time being, or any two of them, shall from time to time, until Congress shall exercise the jurisdiction and government within the said Territory, have power to license the building of wharves in the waters of the Potomac and the Eastern Branch, adjoining the said city, of the materials, in the manner and of the extent they may judge durable, convenient, and agreeing with the general order; but no license shall be granted to one to build a wharf before the land of another, nor shall any wharf be built in the waters without license as aforesaid; and if any wharf shall be built without such license, or different therefrom, the same is hereby declared a common nuisance. They may also, from time to time, make regulations for the discharge and laying of ballast from ships or vessels lying in the Potomac River above the lower line of the said Territory and Georgetown, and from ships and vessels lying in the Eastern Branch. They may also, from time to time, make regulations for landing and laying materials for building the said city, for disposing and laying earth which may be dug out of the wells, cellars, and foundations and for ascertaining the thickness of the walls of houses, and to enforce the observance of all such regulations by appointing penalties for the breach of any one of them not exceeding ten pounds current money, which may be recovered in the name of the said commissioners, by warrant, before a justice of the peace, as in case of small debts, and disposed of as a donation for the purpose of the said act of Congress. And the said Commissioners, or any two of them, may grant licenses for retailing distilled spirits within the limits of the said city, and suspend or declare the same void. And if any person shall retail or sell any distilled spirits, mixed or unmixed, in less than ten gallons to the same person, or at the same time actually delivered, he or she shall forfeit for every such sale three pounds, to be recovered and applied as aforesaid.

I realize that the above section deals only with secondary issues, but since the primary issues of the United States buying land from the existing private owners and constructing buildings thereon are dealt with under ordinary property rights and do not require Congress to have any jurisdiction, let alone exclusive jurisdiction, I don't see any lack of authority to construct the Federal buildings of Washington City before Congress began to exercise the jurisdiction and government in 1801 and thereby fulfilled the terms for the cession to occur.

[jimrtex]

Please stop begging the question.  You keep assuming that Columbia was ceded in 1791 to prove that it was ceded in 1791.

The Constitution provides a straightforward definition of how cession occurs:

  "by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress"

Maryland and Virginia ceded.  Congress accepted.  Columbia came under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction.  It is the cession/acceptance that triggered the jurisdiction change.  You are confused because Congress did not initially exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that post-Civil War and New Deal and WWII we now take for granted.  It happened in 1791.  At that time, the States would not have said, if you want the immigration laws enforced, send federal agents in.  They would have been aghast at the idea of federal agents running around their territory as a second police force.

Your construct is: Residents of Columbia are not Maryland residents and therefore can not vote in Maryland federal elections.  Since between 1791 and 1801, residents of Columbia did vote in Maryland federal elections, they must have not have been Columbia residents.

You are ignoring the Constitution and the 1790/1791 legislation, simply because Congress initially exercised its authority in a manner that is in numerous facets is as if the authority did not exist at all.

How did they construct the Capitol and White House before 1800?  Were these needful public buildings erected with the consent of the Maryland legislature?  Not at all.  They were buildings erected in territory under their exclusive jurisdiction.

You seem to have forgotten the law Maryland passed in 1791, which you quoted earlier in our discussion. The Federal Commissioners who built the City of Washington were authorized by the Maryland legislature to do so.

Section 12 for example provides that the federal commissioners may approve construction of private wharves and issue liquor licenses, etc.

Authority had been tranferred to the US, which in turn let Maryland to continue to function as if the transfer had not occured, and then Maryland authorized certain persons who were federal officials to execute certain government functions.

The same thing could happen today.  Let's say that there is a public highway across a military facility.  The federal government could permit the state to enforce its traffic laws.  The state could in turn authorize military police to stop speeders.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Please stop begging the question.  You keep assuming that Columbia was ceded in 1791 to prove that it was ceded in 1791.

The Constitution provides a straightforward definition of how cession occurs:

  "by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress"

And until the conditions set by those States for the cession were met, there was no cession.  Hence there was no cession by the States until 1801.

You are confused because Congress did not initially exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that post-Civil War and New Deal and WWII we now take for granted.  It happened in 1791.  At that time, the States would not have said, if you want the immigration laws enforced, send federal agents in.  They would have been aghast at the idea of federal agents running around their territory as a second police force.

You mean like the inspectors authorized under the Act of March 3, 1791 to collect and enforce the tax on the distilled spirits?  I'll grant that they certainly proved unpopular, as can be seen from the Whiskey Rebellion, but they were hardly unthinkable, even in 1791.

If you are going to invoke 18th century opinion to back your opinion as to when cession took place, could you please provide an example of such 18th century opinion instead of simply stating without any evidence what you think they would have thought?

Reily v. Lamar provides what I consider clear evidence that people then held that until Congress assumed governance, the people resident in what would be Columbia remained residents of their State.  The difference in opinion on this matter between the plaintiff and the defendant in that case was whether "the jurisdiction of Maryland and Virginia over the ceded territory ceased on the first Monday of December, 1800" as was held by the court from which the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, or whether it was as the plaintiff alleged that it was February 27, 1801 when it passed the law establishing the governance of the District.

Note that the lower court ruled that the jurisdiction of Maryland and Virginia ceased when Congress took charge, not as you contend that the administration by Maryland and Virginia ceased.

The same thing could happen today.  Let's say that there is a public highway across a military facility.  The federal government could permit the state to enforce its traffic laws.  The state could in turn authorize military police to stop speeders.

Arguing that something could have happened a certain way, does not in any way establish that it must have occurred in that manner and no other.

Could Congress have done something as convoluted as you allege?  Yes, but I fail to see where it had.  The straightforward and simplest construction is that the District of Columbia did not come into existence as a legal entity until February 27, 1801 when Congress provided for its governance.