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True Federalist
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« Reply #150 on: February 17, 2008, 11:21:50 pm »
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Phillips v, Payne does nothing like you suggest, indeed it strengthens my viewpoint.

Let me quote your own words a second time:

The point that you failed to see with regard to the Virginia retrocesssion, is that it constituted of (1) a (retro)cession by one party; (2) an acceptance by a second; (3) contingencies before it became effective; and (4) continuation of the laws of the ceding party until the accepting party could undertake their authority.

(1) Cession by Maryland.
(2) Acceptance by Congress.
(3) George Washington to lay out boundaries.
(4) Maryland laws to remain in effect until Congress could provide laws.

(1) (Retro)cession by Congress.
(2) Acceptance by Virginia.
(3) Plebiscite in Alexandria County.
(4) US laws to remain in effect until Virginia could provide laws.

If we use your model, then the retrocession did not occur until Virginia provided for law within the area.

And lo and behold, when does Phillips v, Payne say Virginia regained Alexandria?

Quote
Thereafter, on the 9th of July, 1846, Congress, in violation of the Constitution, passed an act purporting to authorize a vote to be taken by the people of Alexandria County to determine whether the county should be retroceded to the State of Virginia, and declaring, that, in case a majority of the votes should be cast in favor of retrocession, the county should be retroceded and for ever relinquished in full and absolute right and jurisdiction. A majority of the votes were cast for retrocession: whereupon, without any further action by Congress, the State of Virginia passed an act declaring that the county was reannexed, and formed a part of the State.

Quote
The State of Virginia is de facto in possession of the territory in question. She has been in possession, and her title and possession have been undisputed, since she resumed possession, in 1847, pursuant to the act of Congress of the preceding year.

In other words, the clear implication of Phillips v. Payne is that the retrocession of Alexandria did not occur until Virginia passed the second of its two acts on March 13, 1847 and not as you assert when Polk made his proclamation of the plebiscite results on September 7, 1846.

So once again, I must thank you for bringing to my attention a court case that strengthens my opinion.

Recognizing that I am inviting the same sort of unintended help to the other side, especially since I don't have access to the case itself but just references to it in the Solicitor General's brief on that case, let me point out Alexander v. Mineta, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35 which was folded into the case Adams v. Clinton, 531 U.S. 941 (2000).

Quote from: Solicitor General's brief
The district court next considered appellants' contention that District residents must be allowed to vote for Representatives as "residual" citizens of Maryland. See J.S. App. 40a-58a. The court noted that it was bound by this Court's decision in Albaugh v. Tawes, 379 U.S. 27 (1964) (per curiam), which summarily affirmed a ruling that the District of Columbia is not a part of Maryland for the purpose of electing United States Senators. J.S. App. 40a-42a, 56a-57a. The court also stated, however, that it would reject appellants' argument even if Albaugh were not an impediment because the Maryland citizenship of the District's inhabitants was extinguished upon completion of the transfer of the seat of the national government to the District. Id. at 42a. The court explained that residents of the area that later became the District remained citizens of their original States (and therefore continued to vote for Representatives from those States) after the legislation effecting the cession and before the effective date of the cession. They ceased, however, to be citizens of those States (and to vote for Representatives) thereafter. Id. at 42a-49a.

So as I see it, in Adams v. Clinton, 531 U.S. 941 (2000), the court affirmed (though without issuing a decision of its own) the lower court's opinion that "residents of the area that later became the District remained citizens of their original States (and therefore continued to vote for Representatives from those States) after the legislation effecting the cession and before the effective date of the cession." (emphasis added)

I can't see that quote as anything other than a total refutation of your position that the effective date of the cession was the same as the passage of the legislation that specified what would be the area that became the District.
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« Reply #151 on: February 18, 2008, 06:51:51 am »
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Phillips v, Payne does nothing like you suggest, indeed it strengthens my viewpoint.
How so?

Quote from: Payne v. Phillips
In pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, Virginia, by an act of her legislature of Dec. 3, 1789, ceded to the United States that part of her territory subsequently known as the county of Alexandria.

And lo and behold, when does Phillips v, Payne say Virginia regained Alexandria?

Quote from: Payne v. Phillips
Thereafter, on the 9th of July, 1846, Congress, in violation of the Constitution, passed an act purporting to authorize a vote to be taken by the people of Alexandria County to determine whether the county should be retroceded to the State of Virginia, and declaring, that, in case a majority of the votes should be cast in favor of retrocession, the county should be retroceded and for ever relinquished in full and absolute right and jurisdiction. A majority of the votes were cast for retrocession: whereupon, without any further action by Congress, the State of Virginia passed an act declaring that the county was reannexed, and formed a part of the State.

Quote from:  Virginia's acceptance act of February 3rd, 1846
That so soon as the congress of the United States shall by law re-cede to the commonwealth of Virginia the said county of Alexandria, and relinquish their exclusive jurisdiction, as well of territory as of persons residing or to reside thereon, the same shall be re-annexed to the said commonwealth, and constitute a portion thereof, subject to such reservation and provisions respecting the public property of the United States, as congress may enact in their act of re-cession.

Quote from: Payne v. Phillips
The State of Virginia is de facto in possession of the territory in question. She has been in possession, and her title and possession have been undisputed, since she resumed possession, in 1847, pursuant to the act of Congress of the preceding year.
The plaintiff in Phillips v. Payne had argued that retro-cession by Congress was void because it involved the plebiscate and proclamation by the President.  Rather than examining the de jure issues, the SCOTUS relied on when Virginia took de facto possession by sending in troops and acting as if it were in control, and because the United States did not and had not challenged this takeover.  Of course the reason the United States did not challenge this de facto takeove was because they had already agreed the previous year, subject to a plebiscate whose operation they had delegated to the President.

In other words, the clear implication of Phillips v. Payne is that the retrocession of Alexandria did not occur until Virginia passed the second of its two acts on March 13, 1847 and not as you assert when Polk made his proclamation of the plebiscite results on September 7, 1846.
The court did not determine when retrocession occured.   It determined that it had occured a long time ago.

So as I see it, in Adams v. Clinton, 531 U.S. 941 (2000), the court affirmed (though without issuing a decision of its own) the lower court's opinion that "residents of the area that later became the District remained citizens of their original States (and therefore continued to vote for Representatives from those States) after the legislation effecting the cession and before the effective date of the cession." (emphasis added)

I can't see that quote as anything other than a total refutation of your position that the effective date of the cession was the same as the passage of the legislation that specified what would be the area that became the District.
The lower court's opinion was based on Albaugh v. Tawes, which was in turn based on Reily v. Lamar.

I have never argued that Columbians have a constitutional right to vote, but rather that it is a political decision by Congress.  If Congress had the power to deny the right to vote by passage of the organic act in 1801, they have the authority to restore that right in 2008.

The following is pretty interesting:

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« Reply #152 on: February 19, 2008, 12:42:56 am »
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The following is pretty interesting:

http://www.dcvote.org/pdfs/mdrretro062004.pdf

(Fixed your link.)

I had seen that before.  If, as you assert, it were the view in the 1790's  that the District had already been ceded and that when the Organic Act was passed in 1801 it deprived the citizens of Columbia of privileges to vote in Maryland and Virginia elections that they had possessed for a decade while not being part of Maryland or Virginia, then I find it passing strange that apparently no one in the 19th century debates over retrocession of the district in part or whole ever suggested returning the District to that status you assert it held in the 1790's.
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« Reply #153 on: February 19, 2008, 01:07:22 pm »
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If, as you assert, it were the view in the 1790's  that the District had already been ceded and that when the Organic Act was passed in 1801 it deprived the citizens of Columbia of privileges to vote in Maryland and Virginia elections that they had possessed for a decade while not being part of Maryland or Virginia, then I find it passing strange that apparently no one in the 19th century debates over retrocession of the district in part or whole ever suggested returning the District to that status you assert it held in the 1790's.
Why so?  People  in Alexandria and Georgetown wanted retrocession for economic reasons.  States were more interested in economic development.  To the extent that Congress had an interest it would toward their districts and States, not some place they visit for a few months a year.
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« Reply #154 on: February 19, 2008, 02:28:24 pm »
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It is clear that both political and economic concerns were addressed in those debates.  Witness the repeated suggestions in the first few decades of the Union that the Constitution be amended to allow the District representation in Congress.  Yet they never considered doing as you suggest they had done prior to the passage of the Organic Act.  I can understand why such a solution may not have been the favored solution of most Alexandrians or Georgetowners, but for them to not consider returning their political status to what you assert it was prior to the passage of the Organic Act, strongly suggests that was not how the issue was viewed then.
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« Reply #155 on: February 20, 2008, 09:52:15 pm »
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It is clear that both political and economic concerns were addressed in those debates.  Witness the repeated suggestions in the first few decades of the Union that the Constitution be amended to allow the District representation in Congress.  Yet they never considered doing as you suggest they had done prior to the passage of the Organic Act.  I can understand why such a solution may not have been the favored solution of most Alexandrians or Georgetowners, but for them to not consider returning their political status to what you assert it was prior to the passage of the Organic Act, strongly suggests that was not how the issue was viewed then.
Between 1791-1801 Columbia had much the same status as it would have had the capital not been moved at all.  Of course at the time of the debate over the Organic Act it was considered continuing the status quo.  Remember that Reily v Lamar had been appealed from a court established by the Organic Act.  Had that court not existed, the case would have been tried in Virginia or Maryland courts, and probably never come to the attention of the US Supreme Court.

But to return to that status (after Columbia had been ceded, but before the Congress had moved from New York, and the Philadelphia) could imply that the capital could or should be moved.   During the next 24 years, the President was from Virginia, who would have preferred the capital not be moved. 

So an argument to return to 1791-1801 status, would be to argue for a return to like things were when Congress met in Philadelphia or elsewhere.  After slavery heated up as in issue it would not have been politically possible to return Washington proper to Maryland law. 

But it was feasible to consider removing areas that were remote from the capital through full retrocession.  In 1791, Congress had forbidden buildings south of the Potomac, and Alexandria is in the extreme southern corner of Washington's square boundaries (about 1/2 of modern Alexandria is outside the square).  And it might have been feasible to retrocede Georgetown and the rest of the area west of Rock Creek, and the rural area east of the Anacosta River (Eastern Branch of the Potomac), and perhaps rural areas to the northeast of Washington as well.
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« Reply #156 on: February 20, 2008, 10:41:15 pm »
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All excellent reasons why such a proposal, if it had been made, would have failed.  However they fail to address my point that no such proposal seems to have been made.  Lack of any chance of success politically has never been a barrier to a proposal being made.  If it were, it wouldn't be being made now.
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« Reply #157 on: February 22, 2008, 01:31:10 pm »
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All excellent reasons why such a proposal, if it had been made, would have failed.  However they fail to address my point that no such proposal seems to have been made.  Lack of any chance of success politically has never been a barrier to a proposal being made.  If it were, it wouldn't be being made now.
We don't know whether a particular idea was put forward or not in an informal manner.  Given the clear superiority of the alternatives to the situation at the time, they would have been discarded before ever becoming choate in the form of petitions or legislation.

The location of the district was Washington's choice.  Congress even had to amend the 1790 legislation so that his preferred location would be contained in its limits.  Congress itself may have preferred the tri-state site at Connogochegue.  Given the high regard or even reverance for Washington, there would be reluctance to change the district.  As mentioned before, Virginians would hold the presidency for the next 24 years.

If the district were to return to the status it had after cession but before the capital had been moved to Washington, it would bring into question the permanence of the capital.  "How about making the district like it was when Congress met in Philadelphia?", would immediately lead to the suggestion of moving the capital to some location on the Ohio or Mississippi.

But retroceding parts that were not needed for the capital, and had their own separate economic interests did make sense.

I am of course not proposing a return to 1791-1801, but simply pointing out that Congress has broad latitutude in the manner in which it exercises its exclusive legislative jurisdiction.
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« Reply #158 on: February 22, 2008, 05:48:01 pm »
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Broad latitude, but not absolute.  Even if your interpretation of what happened in the 1790's were correct, the XIVth Amendment with its definition of State citizenship stands in the way of Congress giving the residents of Columbia voting privileges in Maryland today without a retrocession to Maryland. Unlike as it may choose to do with the federal enclaves, relaxation of Congressional control is not by itself sufficient to rejoin Washington County with Maryland politically.
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« Reply #159 on: February 23, 2008, 01:59:23 pm »
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Broad latitude, but not absolute.  Even if your interpretation of what happened in the 1790's were correct, the XIVth Amendment with its definition of State citizenship stands in the way of Congress giving the residents of Columbia voting privileges in Maryland today without a retrocession to Maryland. Unlike as it may choose to do with the federal enclaves, relaxation of Congressional control is not by itself sufficient to rejoin Washington County with Maryland politically.
Under the 'Uniform Federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act' (UOCAVA) Congress has provided that US citizens residing outside the United States may vote in federal elections in the state where they were formerly domiciled.  Clearly a person who does not reside in the United States is not a resident of a State, and is thus not a State citizen as defined by the 14th Amendment.  Yet States are required to permit such persons to vote as if they were residents of a State.

Under the Votings Rights Act, Congress provided that States may not prevent certain former residents from voting in the elections of their former state of residency, even though those former residents may now reside in States where they are fully qualified to register and vote.

Under the Voting Rights Act, Congress provided that States may not prevent 18 year-old voters from voting in federal elections, even though they were not qualified to vote for members of the larger house of the legislature.

In 1791, Congress provided that residents of the District of Columbia would be treated for all purposes as if they were residents of Maryland or Virginia, depending on which side of the Potomac they resided on.

Congress may provide that residents of the District of Columbia may vote in federal elections in Maryland, or any other State(s) for that matter. 
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« Reply #160 on: February 23, 2008, 03:50:09 pm »
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UOCAVA acts under the premise that citizens of the United States who sojourn temporarily outside the United States retain any State citizenship they had previously acquired. However, the residents of Columbia are not outside the United States nor are they in possession of a previously attained State citizenship, so UOCAVA and the principles under which it was enacted do not apply.

As for the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which you bring up, I think that Oregon v. Mitchell was wrongly decided and that Harlan, as usual for that period of the court, had the correct opinion.  Still, even if one accepts Oregon v. Mitchell as correctly decided, I fail to see how asserting that Congress can make decisions concerning how long a residency is required to establish State citizenship and the circumstances under which an absence disestablishes State citizenship establishes that Congress has the power to make persons who have never been State citizens or residents into citizens of a State.



The Federal and State acts that provided in 1790 and 1791 for the eventual cession of Columbia made no explicit provision for the continuation of the right to vote in Virginia and Maryland elections.  The Organic Act of 1801 made no explicit provision for the removal of the right to vote in Virginia and Maryland elections.  Yet you agree that the passage of the Organic Act stripped the residents of Columbia of their right to vote in State elections.  I explain that loss of suffrage as a consequence of the cession taking place upon the passage of the Organic Act.  How do you explain that happening? What provision of the Organic Act do you hold as having caused that change in status?
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« Reply #161 on: February 24, 2008, 11:45:36 pm »
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UOCAVA acts under the premise that citizens of the United States who sojourn temporarily outside the United States retain any State citizenship they had previously acquired. However, the residents of Columbia are not outside the United States nor are they in possession of a previously attained State citizenship, so UOCAVA and the principles under which it was enacted do not apply.
The language of UOCAVA is quite clear.  It applies to those who reside outside the United States,  not just those who "sojourn temporarily".  Since you have previously claimed that the 14th Amendment restricts State citizenship to residents of a State, and UOCAVA applies only to those who do not reside in United States, how do you square UOCAVA with your understanding of the Constitution?

If UOCAVA confers a continuation of State citizenship, why does it not apply to state elections, particularly to those electing the members of the legislative body with more members?   And why don't UOCAVA voters (indeed all persons, including aliens) remain under the jurisdiction of their former State of residence if they remove themselves outside the United States.

In Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001), the court ruled that Congress had the discretion to make a distinction between (former?) New York citizens who sojourned in San Juan, Puerto Rico and those who resided in Rome, Italy.  But a 2-1 majority of the court also offered the suggestion that it was in congressional authority to provide a way for US Citizens in Puerto Rico to participate in elections for President regardless whether they formerly resided in one of the 51 jurisdictions that choose presidential electors.

As for the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which you bring up, I think that Oregon v. Mitchell was wrongly decided and that Harlan, as usual for that period of the court, had the correct opinion.  Still, even if one accepts Oregon v. Mitchell as correctly decided, I fail to see how asserting that Congress can make decisions concerning how long a residency is required to establish State citizenship and the circumstances under which an absence disestablishes State citizenship establishes that Congress has the power to make persons who have never been State citizens or residents into citizens of a State.
On the issue of residency requirements, Oregon v. Mitchell was an 8-1 decision.  The VRA does not suggest that someone who has moved to a different State remains a citizen of their former State for some period of time.  If you read the Stewart opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell you will see that it was acceptable to the court for reasons of preserving the right to vote in national elections by United States citizens, and not that of citizens of the several States.


[quote author=Lamont Zemyna Vai×gantas link=topic=1407.msg1459947#msg1459947
The Federal and State acts that provided in 1790 and 1791 for the eventual cession of Columbia made no explicit provision for the continuation of the right to vote in Virginia and Maryland elections.  The Organic Act of 1801 made no explicit provision for the removal of the right to vote in Virginia and Maryland elections.  Yet you agree that the passage of the Organic Act stripped the residents of Columbia of their right to vote in State elections.  I explain that loss of suffrage as a consequence of the cession taking place upon the passage of the Organic Act.  How do you explain that happening? What provision of the Organic Act do you hold as having caused that change in status?
[/quote]
Under the 1791 legislation accepting cession of Columbia, Congress apparently felt no need to make explicit provision for continuation of the right to vote in Virginia and Maryland elections.  And indeed, there was no need to do so, since residents of the district continued to vote in federal and state elections.  In 1800, Maryland stopped providing government for the district, and Congress acquiesced.  Under the Organic Act, Congress froze Maryland law as of February 27, 1801 which would preclude Maryland from making provisions for future elections.  For example, Maryland changed its electoral districts for presidential elections for the 1804 election, the first held after passage of the Organic Act.

The denial of the right to vote was not an act of deliberation, but rather one of carelessness and omission.
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« Reply #162 on: February 25, 2008, 02:31:49 am »
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UOCAVA acts under the premise that citizens of the United States who sojourn temporarily outside the United States retain any State citizenship they had previously acquired. However, the residents of Columbia are not outside the United States nor are they in possession of a previously attained State citizenship, so UOCAVA and the principles under which it was enacted do not apply.
The language of UOCAVA is quite clear.  It applies to those who reside outside the United States,  not just those who "sojourn temporarily".  Since you have previously claimed that the 14th Amendment restricts State citizenship to residents of a State, and UOCAVA applies only to those who do not reside in United States, how do you square UOCAVA with your understanding of the Constitution?

Since they haven't renounced their U.S. citizenship, their sojourn overseas is considered only temporary.  It might be a long temporary, but it is still temporary even if it lasts years.

If UOCAVA confers a continuation of State citizenship, why does it not apply to state elections, particularly to those electing the members of the legislative body with more members?   And why don't UOCAVA voters (indeed all persons, including aliens) remain under the jurisdiction of their former State of residence if they remove themselves outside the United States.

States are free to do so, and some do but are not required to by UOCAVA.  I imagine that the reason that no Federal mandate was required was primarily because providing for the various offices that States choose to have elected, even if one restricted the Federal mandate to just statewide offices, would make the Federal write-in absentee ballot required by UOCAVA to be accepted by all States as the primary means of compliance an unwieldy mess.

In Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001), the court ruled that Congress had the discretion to make a distinction between (former?) New York citizens who sojourned in San Juan, Puerto Rico and those who resided in Rome, Italy.  But a 2-1 majority of the court also offered the suggestion that it was in congressional authority to provide a way for US Citizens in Puerto Rico to participate in elections for President regardless whether they formerly resided in one of the 51 jurisdictions that choose presidential electors.

That's not the case.  Leval made his suggestion by himself, with Walker strongly opposed while Oakes was silent on the case.  In any case it had no bearing on the decision, and Leval's suggestion is pure obiter dictum.

As for the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which you bring up, I think that Oregon v. Mitchell was wrongly decided and that Harlan, as usual for that period of the court, had the correct opinion.  Still, even if one accepts Oregon v. Mitchell as correctly decided, I fail to see how asserting that Congress can make decisions concerning how long a residency is required to establish State citizenship and the circumstances under which an absence disestablishes State citizenship establishes that Congress has the power to make persons who have never been State citizens or residents into citizens of a State.
On the issue of residency requirements, Oregon v. Mitchell was an 8-1 decision.  The VRA does not suggest that someone who has moved to a different State remains a citizen of their former State for some period of time.  If you read the Stewart opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell you will see that it was acceptable to the court for reasons of preserving the right to vote in national elections by United States citizens, and not that of citizens of the several States.

And in doing so, Stewart expressed the opinion that it was precisely because Congress had the authority to preserve the right to vote in national elections by United States citizens who already had that right had they not moved that Congress could restrict the period of residency State laws required to effect a change in State citizenship and thereby of voting rights in that State, as well as the state they had moved out of if the move occurred too close to election day.  Indeed, Stewart stated that "The power that Congress has exercised in enacting ž 202 is not a general power to prescribe qualifications for voters in either federal or state elections. It is confined to federal action against a particular problem clearly within the purview of congressional authority."

Not only that, but the opinions of Douglas and Brennan, in so far as they pertain to residency requirements, cite the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, again making reference thereby to State citizenship as the core issue.  Indeed, of the nine justices in Oregon v. Mitchell, only Black based his argument concerning the residency requirements in Federal elections on an broad power of Congress to set the qualifications of voters in Federal elections.  The other eight justices rejected that argument, and it is that broad power that was rejected 8-1 in Oregon v. Mitchell that would be needed for Congress to require that States allow persons who have no connection to a State the right to vote in elections conducted by that State, as would be the case if Congress were to require that Columbia residents with no prior Maryland connection be allowed to vote in Federal elections as if they were Maryland residents.



The denial of the right to vote was not an act of deliberation, but rather one of carelessness and omission.

Carelessness and omission?  It is quite apparent from the historical record that the impact of Congress taking jurisdiction upon the voting rights of those living in the District was well understood and indeed, it was used as an argument against Congress taking jurisdiction.  Clearly they understood what they were doing then and they did it with deliberation.
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« Reply #163 on: February 28, 2008, 10:37:51 am »
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UOCAVA acts under the premise that citizens of the United States who sojourn temporarily outside the United States retain any State citizenship they had previously acquired. However, the residents of Columbia are not outside the United States nor are they in possession of a previously attained State citizenship, so UOCAVA and the principles under which it was enacted do not apply.
The language of UOCAVA is quite clear.  It applies to those who reside outside the United States,  not just those who "sojourn temporarily".  Since you have previously claimed that the 14th Amendment restricts State citizenship to residents of a State, and UOCAVA applies only to those who do not reside in United States, how do you square UOCAVA with your understanding of the Constitution?
Since they haven't renounced their U.S. citizenship, their sojourn overseas is considered only temporary.  It might be a long temporary, but it is still temporary even if it lasts years.
Who claimed that it applied to those who had renounced their US citizenship?  Strawman.

"sojourn" is defined as residing briefly or temporarily.  Congress could have set a time period, and they could have inquired as intent to return to the former State of residence.  They did neither.  Therefore, a United States citizen who "does not reside in the United States" does not reside in any State, and is not a State citizen under the 14th Amendment.  No inference can be made about their intent to move to the United States, whether to a former State of residence, and different State, Columbia, or some other territory of the United States.

Since the persons are not State citizens, then the only reason that they can vote in federal elections for a State is by virtue of their United States citizenship, and a political decision by Congress to permit them to vote.

If UOCAVA confers a continuation of State citizenship, why does it not apply to state elections, particularly to those electing the members of the legislative body with more members?   And why don't UOCAVA voters (indeed all persons, including aliens) remain under the jurisdiction of their former State of residence if they remove themselves outside the United States.
States are free to do so, and some do but are not required to by UOCAVA.  I imagine that the reason that no Federal mandate was required was primarily because providing for the various offices that States choose to have elected, even if one restricted the Federal mandate to just statewide offices, would make the Federal write-in absentee ballot required by UOCAVA to be accepted by all States as the primary means of compliance an unwieldy mess.
States are free to exclude some of their citizens from voting in their legislative elections based on where that person resides?  Or may they only exclude United States citizens who were former residents on the basis that they do not reside in the State, and are therefore not citizens of the State?

In Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001), the court ruled that Congress had the discretion to make a distinction between (former?) New York citizens who sojourned in San Juan, Puerto Rico and those who resided in Rome, Italy.  But a 2-1 majority of the court also offered the suggestion that it was in congressional authority to provide a way for US Citizens in Puerto Rico to participate in elections for President regardless whether they formerly resided in one of the 51 jurisdictions that choose presidential electors.
That's not the case.  Leval made his suggestion by himself, with Walker strongly opposed while Oakes was silent on the case.  In any case it had no bearing on the decision, and Leval's suggestion is pure obiter dictum.
How come Leval wrote the court's opinion.  Since Walker was the chief judge and disagree vigorously with Leval, why not have Oakes write the courts opinion, and he and Walker write their own concurring opinions.

In any case, it is clear that Leval saw no impediment to Congress extending voting rights in at least presidential elections to all United States citizens.  IIUC, it was only due to the technical logistics of his particular scheme, that it would not be feasible for congressional elections.

On the issue of residency requirements, Oregon v. Mitchell was an 8-1 decision.  The VRA does not suggest that someone who has moved to a different State remains a citizen of their former State for some period of time.  If you read the Stewart opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell you will see that it was acceptable to the court for reasons of preserving the right to vote in national elections by United States citizens, and not that of citizens of the several States.
And in doing so, Stewart expressed the opinion that it was precisely because Congress had the authority to preserve the right to vote in national elections by United States citizens who already had that right had they not moved that Congress could restrict the period of residency State laws required to effect a change in State citizenship and thereby of voting rights in that State, as well as the state they had moved out of if the move occurred too close to election day.  Indeed, Stewart stated that "The power that Congress has exercised in enacting ž 202 is not a general power to prescribe qualifications for voters in either federal or state elections. It is confined to federal action against a particular problem clearly within the purview of congressional authority."

Not only that, but the opinions of Douglas and Brennan, in so far as they pertain to residency requirements, cite the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, again making reference thereby to State citizenship as the core issue.  Indeed, of the nine justices in Oregon v. Mitchell, only Black based his argument concerning the residency requirements in Federal elections on an broad power of Congress to set the qualifications of voters in Federal elections.  The other eight justices rejected that argument, and it is that broad power that was rejected 8-1 in Oregon v. Mitchell that would be needed for Congress to require that States allow persons who have no connection to a State the right to vote in elections conducted by that State, as would be the case if Congress were to require that Columbia residents with no prior Maryland connection be allowed to vote in Federal elections as if they were Maryland residents.
This is the syllabus for Douglas's opinion:

4. The right to vote in national elections is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship and the congressional judgment to ban durational residency requirements in presidential and vice-presidential elections is a manifestly permissible means of enforcing that privilege and immunity under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I see the reference to State citizenship where?

And here is Brennan's:

4. There is adequate constitutional basis for the residency provisions of the Act in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as there is ample justification for the congressional findings that durational residence requirements abridge the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests.

This doesn't sound like someone who would reject a Congressional grant of Maryland political citizenship to Columbia residents.


The denial of the right to vote was not an act of deliberation, but rather one of carelessness and omission.
Carelessness and omission?  It is quite apparent from the historical record that the impact of Congress taking jurisdiction upon the voting rights of those living in the District was well understood and indeed, it was used as an argument against Congress taking jurisdiction.  Clearly they understood what they were doing then and they did it with deliberation.
They debated it for a while, when the Federalist took a break from plotting the election of Aaron Burr or passing the Alien & Sedition Acts.  They understood that they were denying Maryland jurisdiction over the District.  They were careless whether it had an impact on citizens who resided within the district.
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« Reply #164 on: February 28, 2008, 02:25:53 pm »
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Who claimed that it applied to those who had renounced their US citizenship?  Strawman.

"sojourn" is defined as residing briefly or temporarily.  Congress could have set a time period, and they could have inquired as intent to return to the former State of residence.  They did neither.  Therefore, a United States citizen who "does not reside in the United States" does not reside in any State, and is not a State citizen under the 14th Amendment.  No inference can be made about their intent to move to the United States, whether to a former State of residence, and different State, Columbia, or some other territory of the United States.

Since the persons are not State citizens, then the only reason that they can vote in federal elections for a State is by virtue of their United States citizenship, and a political decision by Congress to permit them to vote.
Why do you claim that it applies to those who had renounced their State citizenship?

For persons who have not established residence in another State, the Constitution is silent as to whether such citizenship is lost.  However under the principles of Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) and Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) it is clear that loss of State citizenship requires a positive act by that person and that under the 14th Amendment, the only positive Acts mentioned there are renouncing United States citizenship or establishing residence in another State.  The political decision that Congress has taken here to has been to rule that establishing residence in a territory of the United States is a positive act that removes State citizenship while establishing residence outside the United States does not.

If UOCAVA confers a continuation of State citizenship, why does it not apply to state elections, particularly to those electing the members of the legislative body with more members?   And why don't UOCAVA voters (indeed all persons, including aliens) remain under the jurisdiction of their former State of residence if they remove themselves outside the United States.
States are free to do so, and some do but are not required to by UOCAVA.  I imagine that the reason that no Federal mandate was required was primarily because providing for the various offices that States choose to have elected, even if one restricted the Federal mandate to just statewide offices, would make the Federal write-in absentee ballot required by UOCAVA to be accepted by all States as the primary means of compliance an unwieldy mess.
States are free to exclude some of their citizens from voting in their legislative elections based on where that person resides?  Or may they only exclude United States citizens who were former residents on the basis that they do not reside in the State, and are therefore not citizens of the State?
Absentee balloting, especially overseas absentee balloting requires extra effort on the part of the body conducting the election.  Congress has made the political decision that the level accommodation it requires States to provide to its overseas citizens under UOCAVA under the circumstances is appropriate.  It would be within the power of Congress under the 14th Amendment to require less or more of the States with respect to absentee voting provisions of State citizens.

In Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001), the court ruled that Congress had the discretion to make a distinction between (former?) New York citizens who sojourned in San Juan, Puerto Rico and those who resided in Rome, Italy.  But a 2-1 majority of the court also offered the suggestion that it was in congressional authority to provide a way for US Citizens in Puerto Rico to participate in elections for President regardless whether they formerly resided in one of the 51 jurisdictions that choose presidential electors.
That's not the case.  Leval made his suggestion by himself, with Walker strongly opposed while Oakes was silent on the case.  In any case it had no bearing on the decision, and Leval's suggestion is pure obiter dictum.
How come Leval wrote the court's opinion.  Since Walker was the chief judge and disagree vigorously with Leval, why not have Oakes write the courts opinion, and he and Walker write their own concurring opinions.
I can only suppose, but a likely possibility is that Leval was assigned to write the opinion, which Walker concurred with, but that when it was delivered, Walker discovered that Leval had added some ober dictum which he disagreed with.  Rather than rewrite a new opinion himself, he simply chose to point out what he disagreed with. 

Quote from: Walker
I fully concur in Judge Leval's opinion for the court, but I write separately to take issue with his suggestion

On the issue of residency requirements, Oregon v. Mitchell was an 8-1 decision.  The VRA does not suggest that someone who has moved to a different State remains a citizen of their former State for some period of time.  If you read the Stewart opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell you will see that it was acceptable to the court for reasons of preserving the right to vote in national elections by United States citizens, and not that of citizens of the several States.
And in doing so, Stewart expressed the opinion that it was precisely because Congress had the authority to preserve the right to vote in national elections by United States citizens who already had that right had they not moved that Congress could restrict the period of residency State laws required to effect a change in State citizenship and thereby of voting rights in that State, as well as the state they had moved out of if the move occurred too close to election day.  Indeed, Stewart stated that "The power that Congress has exercised in enacting ž 202 is not a general power to prescribe qualifications for voters in either federal or state elections. It is confined to federal action against a particular problem clearly within the purview of congressional authority."

Not only that, but the opinions of Douglas and Brennan, in so far as they pertain to residency requirements, cite the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, again making reference thereby to State citizenship as the core issue.  Indeed, of the nine justices in Oregon v. Mitchell, only Black based his argument concerning the residency requirements in Federal elections on an broad power of Congress to set the qualifications of voters in Federal elections.  The other eight justices rejected that argument, and it is that broad power that was rejected 8-1 in Oregon v. Mitchell that would be needed for Congress to require that States allow persons who have no connection to a State the right to vote in elections conducted by that State, as would be the case if Congress were to require that Columbia residents with no prior Maryland connection be allowed to vote in Federal elections as if they were Maryland residents.
This is the syllabus for Douglas's opinion:

4. The right to vote in national elections is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship and the congressional judgment to ban durational residency requirements in presidential and vice-presidential elections is a manifestly permissible means of enforcing that privilege and immunity under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I see the reference to State citizenship where?

And here is Brennan's:

4. There is adequate constitutional basis for the residency provisions of the Act in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as there is ample justification for the congressional findings that durational residence requirements abridge the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests.

This doesn't sound like someone who would reject a Congressional grant of Maryland political citizenship to Columbia residents.

The whole of the Fourteen Amendment deals with citizenship both State and United States.  On further review, I'll concede that Douglas went with an opinion based on U.S. citizenship, so make that a 7-2 to a 8-1 opinion against your position.  Brennan's opinion is that durational residency requirements for establishing State citizenship violate the abridge the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests. so my point there still stands.
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« Reply #165 on: February 29, 2008, 09:44:35 pm »
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Who claimed that it applied to those who had renounced their US citizenship?  Strawman.

"sojourn" is defined as residing briefly or temporarily.  Congress could have set a time period, and they could have inquired as intent to return to the former State of residence.  They did neither.  Therefore, a United States citizen who "does not reside in the United States" does not reside in any State, and is not a State citizen under the 14th Amendment.  No inference can be made about their intent to move to the United States, whether to a former State of residence, and different State, Columbia, or some other territory of the United States.

Since the persons are not State citizens, then the only reason that they can vote in federal elections for a State is by virtue of their United States citizenship, and a political decision by Congress to permit them to vote.
Why do you claim that it applies to those who had renounced their State citizenship?

You were the one who introduced the strawman argument of renunciation of United States citizenship.
So the question should be why you introduced a strawman argument?

You are are the one who is claiming that by virtue of the 14th Amendment, a person who is a State citizen loses that State citizenship by changing his residence to a location outside the State.

For persons who have not established residence in another State, the Constitution is silent as to whether such citizenship is lost.  However under the principles of Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) and Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) it is clear that loss of State citizenship requires a positive act by that person and that under the 14th Amendment, the only positive Acts mentioned there are renouncing United States citizenship or establishing residence in another State.  The political decision that Congress has taken here to has been to rule that establishing residence in a territory of the United States is a positive act that removes State citizenship while establishing residence outside the United States does not.
If we were going to apply the principles of Afryom v Rusk or Vance v. Terrazas, then someone who moves from Maryland to Columbia could retain Maryland citizenship while acquiring Columbia citizenship.  The 14th Amendment says that a US citizen who is resident of Indiana is a Indiana citizen.  It does not say that he is not an Illinois citizen.

If UOCAVA confers a continuation of State citizenship, why does it not apply to state elections, particularly to those electing the members of the legislative body with more members?   And why don't UOCAVA voters (indeed all persons, including aliens) remain under the jurisdiction of their former State of residence if they remove themselves outside the United States.
States are free to do so, and some do but are not required to by UOCAVA.  I imagine that the reason that no Federal mandate was required was primarily because providing for the various offices that States choose to have elected, even if one restricted the Federal mandate to just statewide offices, would make the Federal write-in absentee ballot required by UOCAVA to be accepted by all States as the primary means of compliance an unwieldy mess.
States are free to exclude some of their citizens from voting in their legislative elections based on where that person resides?  Or may they only exclude United States citizens who were former residents on the basis that they do not reside in the State, and are therefore not citizens of the State?
Absentee balloting, especially overseas absentee balloting requires extra effort on the part of the body conducting the election.  Congress has made the political decision that the level accommodation it requires States to provide to its overseas citizens under UOCAVA under the circumstances is appropriate.  It would be within the power of Congress under the 14th Amendment to require less or more of the States with respect to absentee voting provisions of State citizens.
So now you are are claiming that UOCAVA is acting on the basis of United States citizenship, and not on the basis of State citizenship?  Or perhaps that only Congress has the authority to enforce the 14th Amendment?  Or that Congress can make non-residents of a State a citizen of a State, but in this case State citizenship does not confer a right to equal protection?

The whole of the Fourteen Amendment deals with citizenship both State and United States.  On further review, I'll concede that Douglas went with an opinion based on U.S. citizenship, so make that a 7-2 to a 8-1 opinion against your position.  Brennan's opinion is that durational residency requirements for establishing State citizenship violate the abridge the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests. so my point there still stands.
The important issue with regard to Columbia is not the durational residency requirements for establishing voting rights, but rather the continued provision of voting privileges in a State of former residence.

As soon as one establishes a new residence in a State, one becomes a State citizen of that State.  Curbing durational residency requirement is simply protecting one's right to change their State citizenship freely through migration.

But in the case of retention of voting priveleges in State A after one has already established residence in State B, must be on the basis of United States citizenship.
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« Reply #166 on: March 01, 2008, 03:24:44 pm »
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Who claimed that it applied to those who had renounced their US citizenship?  Strawman.

"sojourn" is defined as residing briefly or temporarily.  Congress could have set a time period, and they could have inquired as intent to return to the former State of residence.  They did neither.  Therefore, a United States citizen who "does not reside in the United States" does not reside in any State, and is not a State citizen under the 14th Amendment.  No inference can be made about their intent to move to the United States, whether to a former State of residence, and different State, Columbia, or some other territory of the United States.

Since the persons are not State citizens, then the only reason that they can vote in federal elections for a State is by virtue of their United States citizenship, and a political decision by Congress to permit them to vote.
Why do you claim that it applies to those who had renounced their State citizenship?

You were the one who introduced the strawman argument of renunciation of United States citizenship.
So the question should be why you introduced a strawman argument?

You are are the one who is claiming that by virtue of the 14th Amendment, a person who is a State citizen loses that State citizenship by changing his residence to a location outside the State.

No that is not what I have claimed.  It is what you claim I have claimed. I mentioned United States citizenship because of its analogy to the issue of State citizenship.

What I have claimed that by virtue of the 14th Amendment, a person who is not a State citizen gains that State citizenship by changing his residence to a location inside the State.

While for persons who move from one State to another State, the effect of both what I claim and what you claim I have claimed is the same, because dual citizenship at the State level has not been recognized as a right.  However for persons who move outside the United States, it is not.

For persons who have not established residence in another State, the Constitution is silent as to whether such citizenship is lost.  However under the principles of Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) and Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) it is clear that loss of State citizenship requires a positive act by that person and that under the 14th Amendment, the only positive Acts mentioned there are renouncing United States citizenship or establishing residence in another State.  The political decision that Congress has taken here to has been to rule that establishing residence in a territory of the United States is a positive act that removes State citizenship while establishing residence outside the United States does not.
If we were going to apply the principles of Afryom v Rusk or Vance v. Terrazas, then someone who moves from Maryland to Columbia could retain Maryland citizenship while acquiring Columbia citizenship.  The 14th Amendment says that a US citizen who is a resident of Indiana is a Indiana citizen.  It does not say that he is not an Illinois citizen.

Illinois could choose to grant an Indiana resident dual citizenship, but nothing in the 14th Amendment compels it to grant that Indiana resident dual citizenship, nor does Congress have the power to compel Illinois to so grant because both Illinois and Indiana are States.  Congress could choose to require that a State citizen who takes residence in the District or some other territory be allowed to maintain their State citizenship, but instead it has chosen to provide Territorial citizenship, which it holds as having equivalent status to State citizenship.

Since no one is required to live in the District or in a Territory, I don't see any denial of equal protection here.

So now you are are claiming that UOCAVA is acting on the basis of United States citizenship, and not on the basis of State citizenship?  Or perhaps that only Congress has the authority to enforce the 14th Amendment?  Or that Congress can make non-residents of a State a citizen of a State, but in this case State citizenship does not confer a right to equal protection?

No, that as is often the case when conflicting interests arise, a judgment must be made as to which interests are more important.  In this case, Congress, as its right under the 14th amendment, has judged which accommodations States must provide to those of its citizens who are temporarily outside the State and thus would suffer inconvenience if they were to have to return to that State to vote.

The whole of the Fourteen Amendment deals with citizenship both State and United States.  On further review, I'll concede that Douglas went with an opinion based on U.S. citizenship, so make that a 7-2 to a 8-1 opinion against your position.  Brennan's opinion is that durational residency requirements for establishing State citizenship violate the abridge the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests. so my point there still stands.
The important issue with regard to Columbia is not the durational residency requirements for establishing voting rights, but rather the continued provision of voting privileges in a State of former residence.

As soon as one establishes a new residence in a State, one becomes a State citizen of that State.  Curbing durational residency requirement is simply protecting one's right to change their State citizenship freely through migration.

But in the case of retention of voting privileges in State A after one has already established residence in State B, must be on the basis of United States citizenship.

And how long a residence must occur in another location for that residence to be established and thereby a new State citizenship to be established?  The Fourteenth Amendment is silent on that durational issue.  Congress has chosen to make 30 days a uniform cutoff.
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« Reply #167 on: March 02, 2008, 01:06:40 pm »
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While for persons who move from one State to another State, the effect of both what I claim and what you claim I have claimed is the same, because dual citizenship at the State level has not been recognized as a right.  However for persons who move outside the United States, it is not.
So United States citizens who reside in Maryland and are therefore Maryland citizens, remain Maryland citizens if they move to the District of Columbia?

If we were going to apply the principles of Afryom v Rusk or Vance v. Terrazas, then someone who moves from Maryland to Columbia could retain Maryland citizenship while acquiring Columbia citizenship.  The 14th Amendment says that a US citizen who is a resident of Indiana is a Indiana citizen.  It does not say that he is not an Illinois citizen.
Illinois could choose to grant an Indiana resident dual citizenship, but nothing in the 14th Amendment compels it to grant that Indiana resident dual citizenship, nor does Congress have the power to compel Illinois to so grant because both Illinois and Indiana are States.  Congress could choose to require that a State citizen who takes residence in the District or some other territory be allowed to maintain their State citizenship, but instead it has chosen to provide Territorial citizenship, which it holds as having equivalent status to State citizenship.

Since no one is required to live in the District or in a Territory, I don't see any denial of equal protection here.
So it is prerogative of Congress to grant "Territorial citizenship" or "State citizenship" to US Citizens who reside outside a State?

So now you are are claiming that UOCAVA is acting on the basis of United States citizenship, and not on the basis of State citizenship?  Or perhaps that only Congress has the authority to enforce the 14th Amendment?  Or that Congress can make non-residents of a State a citizen of a State, but in this case State citizenship does not confer a right to equal protection?
No, that as is often the case when conflicting interests arise, a judgment must be made as to which interests are more important.  In this case, Congress, as its right under the 14th amendment, has judged which accommodations States must provide to those of its citizens who are temporarily outside the State and thus would suffer inconvenience if they were to have to return to that State to vote.
If someone moves from Maryland to Virginia, they are not temporarily outside Maryland, but inside Virginia.  This is true even if they work in Maryland, shop in Maryland, and spend a majority of their time in Maryland.  And the same is true if they were to reside in France.

The rule that Congress chose (where one would be qualified to vote but for extra-USA residence) is simply one that they have chosen.  They could have chosen the closest State, so that most US Citizens resident in Europe might vote in Maine, those in Canada would vote in the State to the south, etc.  Or they might have let the US Citizen choose their State for voting purposes.

The important issue with regard to Columbia is not the durational residency requirements for establishing voting rights, but rather the continued provision of voting privileges in a State of former residence.

But in the case of retention of voting privileges in State A after one has already established residence in State B, must be on the basis of United States citizenship.
And how long a residence must occur in another location for that residence to be established and thereby a new State citizenship to be established?  The Fourteenth Amendment is silent on that durational issue.  Congress has chosen to make 30 days a uniform cutoff.
Since from the perspective of their former State of residence, they are temporarily sojourners in their new State of residence, couldn't Congress make the cutoff indefinite?
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« Reply #168 on: March 02, 2008, 03:11:55 pm »
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While for persons who move from one State to another State, the effect of both what I claim and what you claim I have claimed is the same, because dual citizenship at the State level has not been recognized as a right.  However for persons who move outside the United States, it is not.
So United States citizens who reside in Maryland and are therefore Maryland citizens, remain Maryland citizens if they move to the District of Columbia?

The constitution makes no absolute statements on the issue, thereby leaving it to Congress to adjudicate on the basis of its fourteen Amendment powers.

If we were going to apply the principles of Afryom v Rusk or Vance v. Terrazas, then someone who moves from Maryland to Columbia could retain Maryland citizenship while acquiring Columbia citizenship.  The 14th Amendment says that a US citizen who is a resident of Indiana is a Indiana citizen.  It does not say that he is not an Illinois citizen.
Illinois could choose to grant an Indiana resident dual citizenship, but nothing in the 14th Amendment compels it to grant that Indiana resident dual citizenship, nor does Congress have the power to compel Illinois to so grant because both Illinois and Indiana are States.  Congress could choose to require that a State citizen who takes residence in the District or some other territory be allowed to maintain their State citizenship, but instead it has chosen to provide Territorial citizenship, which it holds as having equivalent status to State citizenship.

Since no one is required to live in the District or in a Territory, I don't see any denial of equal protection here.
So it is prerogative of Congress to grant "Territorial citizenship" or "State citizenship" to US Citizens who reside outside a State?

In establishing Territorial self-rule, Congress has created Territorial citizenship which is its prerogative under Article IV Section 3.  Having done so, I do not see any mechanism under the Constitution by which Congress could force States to accept dual citizenship of ex-residents who accept Territorial citizenship.

So now you are are claiming that UOCAVA is acting on the basis of United States citizenship, and not on the basis of State citizenship?  Or perhaps that only Congress has the authority to enforce the 14th Amendment?  Or that Congress can make non-residents of a State a citizen of a State, but in this case State citizenship does not confer a right to equal protection?
No, that as is often the case when conflicting interests arise, a judgment must be made as to which interests are more important.  In this case, Congress, as its right under the 14th amendment, has judged which accommodations States must provide to those of its citizens who are temporarily outside the State and thus would suffer inconvenience if they were to have to return to that State to vote.
If someone moves from Maryland to Virginia, they are not temporarily outside Maryland, but inside Virginia.  This is true even if they work in Maryland, shop in Maryland, and spend a majority of their time in Maryland.  And the same is true if they were to reside in France.

The rule that Congress chose (where one would be qualified to vote but for extra-USA residence) is simply one that they have chosen.  They could have chosen the closest State, so that most US Citizens resident in Europe might vote in Maine, those in Canada would vote in the State to the south, etc.  Or they might have let the US Citizen choose their State for voting purposes.

I'll have to strongly disagree with that.  If Congress were to have such a power to create a State citizenship where no prior State citizenship existed, it could be used to influence elections, assuming that as a group overseas citizens of the United States differ from the political demographics of a particular State.

The important issue with regard to Columbia is not the durational residency requirements for establishing voting rights, but rather the continued provision of voting privileges in a State of former residence.

But in the case of retention of voting privileges in State A after one has already established residence in State B, must be on the basis of United States citizenship.
And how long a residence must occur in another location for that residence to be established and thereby a new State citizenship to be established?  The Fourteenth Amendment is silent on that durational issue.  Congress has chosen to make 30 days a uniform cutoff.
Since from the perspective of their former State of residence, they are temporarily sojourners in their new State of residence, couldn't Congress make the cutoff indefinite?

They could, provided that Congress did not establish a maximum time by which a residency in a State establishes State citizenship.  I see nothing under the Constitution that would enable Congress to require that States accept dual State citizenships.  Once a person establishes a new State citizenship, the State in which he formerly resided is under no obligation to continue to recognize him as a citizen of that State.
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