DC Voting Rights

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Following cession by Virginia and Maryland of the territory that became the District of Columbia, residents in those areas were permitted to continue to vote in Virginia and Maryland elections, not only for representatives, but for presidential electors, governors, and state legislators.

I presume that was true only for the period 1790-1800, after the cession, but before the District became the seat of government.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

It is absurd to solve one problem, lack of voting rights for DC, by creating another absurdity: making DC a state.

The clear, common sense solution has been suggested previously:

4. Full retrocession to Maryland with the exception of National Monuments, White House, Capital, etc.  Washington would become a regular city in Maryland and all residents would be considered full citizens of Maryland.  DC would lose its EVs.

Or simply give D.C residents voting rights for federal elections in Maryland (as per HR 492).

Shall we also give P.R. residents voting rights for federal elections in New York?  Would make as much sense and be as constitutional.  And before you trot out the example of how the residents of early D.C. voted in Maryland and Virginia elections during the District's first decade, I believe that was before Congress had taken formal possession of the District and moved the government there.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

All the Organic Act of 1801 does is establish the courts and other officials of the district, establish Washington and Alexandria Counties and continue in force the municipal corporations of the cities of Alexandria and Georgetown.  It is silent on the issue of voting.  The operative act here is section 1 of the 1790 Act for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the Government of the United States

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Note the proviso indicates that until the Government moves, Maryland and Virginia will still exercise sole sovereign rights over the as of yet unnamed district.  Hence until the District was accepted and moved into, its inhabitants were still citizens of Maryland and Virginia respectively.

Then there is the case of Reily v. Lamar et al (6 US 344 (1805)) in which it was held:

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Clearly the residents of D.C. are not citizens of Maryland, any more than the residents of Puerto Rico are residents of New York.  Unless the District or a portion thereof is retroceded to Maryland, so that the residents thereof become citizens of Maryland, then it would be unconstitutional for them to count as citizens of Maryland for purposes of apportionment.  Maryland is free if it wishes to give the people of the District a vote, but it doesn't gain an extra  Representative.  Indeed, it effectively loses a Representative, since the District has about enough population of its own that it would effectly control one of the Maryland districts.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

A resident of Paris, France is not a resident of Texas, yet they may vote in Texas.

Because that person is on the basis of a prior residency in Texas accounted as a citizen of Texas, not because Congress decided that all American citizens living in Paris, France shall be considered citizens of Texas.  At most it might have been constitutional to have residents of the district maintain their previous State citizenship for purposes of voting, though that would fly in the face of Reily v. Lamar.  However to do so now would clearly violate the XXIIIrd Amendment, which implicitly establishes that the residents of the district are not residents or citizens of any of the States.  If they were then they'd be counted twice for purposes of apportionment.  (The provisions that would cause such a count to matter require every State to have at least 2 Representatives.)

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The 23rd Amendment doesn't say anything about voting.  It would be fully within the authority of Congress to appoint the 3 electors; or to have them chosen on the basis of the popular vote in the 50 States; or to not appoint them at all as is proposed by HR 492.

It doesn't how the electors are chosen.

The number of electors the district is allocated under the XXIIIrd is dependent on its resident population.  They can't count both for determining the number of electors that a State has and the number of electors that the district is allowed.  Having every person in the District be able to vote in Maryland would have no effect or the number of Representatives or Electors that Maryland is entitled to.  They aren't resident in Maryland, so even if they were enabled to vote in Maryland they don't count as Marylanders for purposes of apportionment.  Effectively, if Congress were able to mandate such a thing they would be disenfranchising the voters of Maryland.  Utah filed suit over this very issue for Census 2000, so as to get Mormon missionaries overseas counted as residents of Utah and they lost.

In any case, if H.R. 492 calls for the Democrats to lose it's 3 guaranteed electors, it won't get passed by this Congress.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

You keep missing the point.  The residents of the district are thanks to the XXIIIrd Amendment required by the constitution to be accounted there and not in any State for purposes of apportionment.  Regardless of the constitutionality of any other provision of H.R. 492, Section 5(a) of that bill which counts the residents of the district as residents of Maryland is clearly unconstitutional as it violates the XXIIIrd amendment.  Furthermore, thanks to the non-severability provisions of section 9 of that bill, the whole bill is rendered moot as a result.  Trying to finesse the issue of D.C. voting rights with an unconstitutional law is not valid.

The only constitutional options to gain for district residents the right to vote for Members of Congress are:
1) A constitutional amendment to give them Representatives and/or Senators.
2) cede the district to Maryland
3) cede the district to Virginia
4) admit the district as a State of its own

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

You keep missing the point.  The residents of the district are thanks to the XXIIIrd Amendment required by the constitution to be accounted there and not in any State for purposes of apportionment.  Regardless of the constitutionality of any other provision of H.R. 492, Section 5(a) of that bill which counts the residents of the district as residents of Maryland is clearly unconstitutional as it violates the XXIIIrd amendment.

Where is this "accounting" mentioned?

The 23rd Amendment has nothing to do with the apportionment of representatives.  It provides a formula for calculating the number of presidential electors for the District.

Congress and the Census Bureau haven't bothered to do the math for apportioning the district since the requirement that the district have no more than the least populous State has limited the district to 3 Electors ever since the XXIIIrd has been passed.  By the way, without that final limiting clause, DC would have had 4 electors in the 1964 to 1980 elections.  (It would have had either 4 or 5 in 1952-1960 had the XXIIIrd been in effect then.  I'd need to go and do the math myself to figure which as DC was in population between Maine with 5 and Rhode Island with 4 in the 1950 apportionment.)

Let's leave aside the fact that the prior voting you refer to occurred after the territory that would become the district had been chosen, but before Congress assumed sovereign control of it.  The XXIIIrd Amendment which was passed well after the time the people living in Washington County lost the right to vote in Maryland elections is a stronger bar.

As for that amendment, it definitely affects the apportionment of Electors.
Electors for States are based on the number of Representatives and Senators that a State has.

The XXIIIrd Amendment sets the number of electors the district is entitled to as: "A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State."

While the XXIIIrd Amendment does not grant the district any actual Representatives, it does apportion it a number of implicit Representatives for the purpose of determining the number of Electors the district has.  It does not matter that these Representatives do not exist except as accounting gimmick, or that they have then been later reduced to 1 implicit Representative by the requirement that the district have no more Electors than the least populous State.  The residents of the district are apportioned there and not to any State for the purpose of determining the number of Electors.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Let's leave aside the fact that the prior voting you refer to occurred after the territory that would become the district had been chosen, but before Congress assumed sovereign control of it.  The XXIIIrd Amendment which was passed well after the time the people living in Washington County lost the right to vote in Maryland elections is a stronger bar.

The United States assumed jurisdiction in 1791.  Article II, Section 8 is clear that exclusive jurisdiction begins at the time of cession by the States and its acceptance by the Congress, not at the time it became the seat of government.  What you are missing is that the Congress in 1791 enacted legislation that recognized that Maryland law would continue to be in force.  Voting by other non-residents of States and apportionment of population is occurring right now in 2007.

Those non-residents you speak of are outside the United States.  The residents of the district are inside the incorporated territory of the United States.  The paltry number of people residing in the territory that would become Washington County, D.C. during the 1790 census would not have affected the number of Representatives that Maryland was entitled to under that census, regardless of whether the status of the district in the period 1791-1801 was merely a planned entity as I argue or an actual entity as you argue.

As an additional argument against your position, let me point out that the date that the residents of Washington County lost their status as citizens of Maryland was brought up in the case of Reily v. Lamar that I mentioned earlier.  There was a dispute as to whether it was the first Monday of December 1800, the date set in the 1791 act for the formal acceptance of the district by Congress, or the 27th of February 1801, the date the Organic Act was passed.  The court chose not to rule on the question of which of those two dates it was since it decided that it was not relevant to the case because a deed for the property in question had been filed after both those dates, but clearly no one back then thought that those residents stopped being Marylanders in 1791.

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Electors are not apportioned.  Representative are apportioned.  If the District of Columbia were a State, then North Carolina would have 12 representatives and 14 electors.  But because the 23rd Amendment has no affect on the apportionment of representatives, North Carolina continues to have 13 representatives and 15 electors.
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The number of Representatives is not set in the Constitution at 435.  If the district were a State, there was no XXIIIrd Amendment, and there were 436 Representatives, then we'd have 538 Electors, apportioned exactly as they are now.  Just because Congress doesn't bother to make provisions for the implicit Representative used to determine the number of Electors the district is entitled to in its apportionment of the actual Representatives doesn't affect things in the slightest.

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Yes, it defines the number of electors that the district has.  This has zero impact on the apportionment of representatives.

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The 23rd Amendment does not apportion any representatives, implicit or actual.  It simply prescribes a calculation to determine the number of electors assigned to the District of Columbia (and not to the residents thereof).  That the calculation is somewhat consonant with the apportionment of representatives has no effect.
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But it does mean that H.R. 492 would count the residents of the district twice for the purposes of apportioning Electors, once for Maryland and once for the district.  That H.R. 492 would have Congress refuse to appoint those apportioned Electors does not change that fact, because the apportionment of Electors to the district is mandated by the Constitution and not a mere Act of Congress.

I despair of convincing you that you are wrong, but I do hope though that you do recognize that politically speaking at least, H.R. 492 has zero chance of being passed by this or any other Congress.  Rohrabacher hasn't even gotten any other Republican to cosponsor it and it is bogged down in three separate committees that apparently haven't done anything with it except that one committee sent it down to a subcommittee for deeper burial.

H.R.1905, which has been passed by the House, while it avoids any issues with the XXIIIrd amendment by giving the district a Representative of its own, is still just as unconstitutional as only States can have Representatives, and the district is not (yet) a State.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Let me try one more argument going directly from the clause of the Constitution you've been selectively quoting.

"To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States"

That italicized section you've been ignoring makes it quite clear to me that until the Seat of the Government of the United States was moved there on the first Monday of December 1800, Congress had no authority.  At most, it had authority under the second half of  Clause 17 over the lands that it purchased, which made up but an insignificant fraction of the district to be.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The 1791 Maryland law that ceded the territory of the district said, "That the jurisdiction of the laws of the state over the persons and property of individuals residing within the limits of the cession, should not cease or determine until Congress should by law provide for the government thereof under their jurisdiction."  Congress agreed to these terms when it accepted the cession in 1791.  And this is why the date of the act of February 1801 is the significant one, and not the meeting of Congress in December 1800.

Congress therefore legislated in 1791 that residents of the district could vote in Maryland elections.  It doesn't matter that this was a condition of the cession by Maryland.  It was a contract freely entered into by the United States and Maryland, and not under duress.  It continued to operate after Congress had begun meeting at the Capitol and other offices had been moved.  And it was fully within Congress's authority to provide that residents of the district vote in Maryland elections in 1792 or 2007.

Thank you.  You just proved my point.  Under the terms of Maryland's 1791 act that you just quoted, Maryland did not cede the territory that would become Washington County, D.C. until Congress passed the Organic Act.  Until February 27, 1801, the future district was in essentially in escrow, ready to be claimed by Congress at the time of its choosing, but it did not take possession until then.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The 1791 Maryland law that ceded the territory of the district said, "That the jurisdiction of the laws of the state over the persons and property of individuals residing within the limits of the cession, should not cease or determine until Congress should by law provide for the government thereof under their jurisdiction."  Congress agreed to these terms when it accepted the cession in 1791.  And this is why the date of the act of February 1801 is the significant one, and not the meeting of Congress in December 1800.

Congress therefore legislated in 1791 that residents of the district could vote in Maryland elections.  It doesn't matter that this was a condition of the cession by Maryland.  It was a contract freely entered into by the United States and Maryland, and not under duress.  It continued to operate after Congress had begun meeting at the Capitol and other offices had been moved.  And it was fully within Congress's authority to provide that residents of the district vote in Maryland elections in 1792 or 2007.

Thank you.  You just proved my point.  Under the terms of Maryland's 1791 act that you just quoted, Maryland did not cede the territory that would become Washington County, D.C. until Congress passed the Organic Act.  Until February 27, 1801, the future district was in essentially in escrow, ready to be claimed by Congress at the time of its choosing, but it did not take possession until then.

No you misunderstand.  Maryland set a condition on its cession.  Congress accepted that condition.  Congress could have walked on the deal and placed the capital in Pennsylvania, but they didn't.  It is just like if someone sold a piece of property, but included a covenant.  That doesn't mean that the seller still owns the property, it just means that the buyer agrees to certain restrictions on the use of the property that he owns.

You're the one who is clearly misunderstanding here, but lets leave that aside for a moment, since I despair of convincing you of what seems to me to be so self evident.

Let me ask you a different question.  Assuming that you were correct, what, if anything, would prevent Congress from assigning the population of the district to Virginia instead of Maryland?

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

No you misunderstand.  Maryland set a condition on its cession.  Congress accepted that condition.  Congress could have walked on the deal and placed the capital in Pennsylvania, but they didn't.  It is just like if someone sold a piece of property, but included a covenant.  That doesn't mean that the seller still owns the property, it just means that the buyer agrees to certain restrictions on the use of the property that he owns.

You're the one who is clearly misunderstanding here, but lets leave that aside for a moment, since I despair of convincing you of what seems to me to be so self evident.

Check Van Ness v Bank of the United States

The case in controversy began before the date on which Maryland ceded sovereignty over Washington County to Congress, namely February 27, 1801.  That Congress chose to leave such a suit in the Maryland courts hardly weakens my point that until that date that territory was still part of Maryland.

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Nothing.  Congress chose, by accepting the terms of the cession, to have the voters of Maryland vote in Maryland from 1791 to 1801.  That agreement terminated in 1801, at which time the Congress was free to provide for voting rights in another manner.

In the case of forts and other federal enclaves, residents vote in the State which ceded jurisdiction.  I believe that there is Department of Agriculture facility in Suitland, Maryland which has some residents who vote in Maryland elections.
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There is a distinction though.  The forts and other needful buildings are not permanently ceded.  If the property is sold so that the United States no longer owns the property, sovereignty automatically reverts to the State wherein it is located.  In contrast, the territory of the district is under the control of Congress, regardless of whether the United States owns a particular parcel or not.  That is the distinction here, and it is a critical distinction.

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Slightly less obnoxious in that it does not force any State to accept the district's voters for local elections, but still unconstitutional in my opinion.

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Yes. Otherwise the residents of all the Territories would be free to claim State citizenship and vote therein.  It would be passing strange that territorial residents would have a privilege to claim citizenship in another political jurisdiction when residents of States do not have that right.  I reside in the State of South Carolina.  So long as that is the case I cannot claim citizenship in Maryland or any other State.  Why should Congress have ever intended that a resident of a territory have the privilege of choosing a State of citizenship denied to the residents of States?

As you can see, the argument you raise for allowing district citizens to vote as if they resided in a State would, if it were valid, apply equally to United States citizens residing in American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  If anything, the case you make for the district is stronger for these other territories, since they are not part of the incorporated territory of the United States.

Individual United States citizens of the district (or the unincorporated territories) who are distressed at their lack of ability to vote for Congressmen have a simple option that doesn't even require any Congressional action, the same one that district citizens had ever since February 27, 1801.  Move.  It's not as if they are barred from living elsewhere in the United States.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

No you misunderstand.  Maryland set a condition on its cession.  Congress accepted that condition.  Congress could have walked on the deal and placed the capital in Pennsylvania, but they didn't.  It is just like if someone sold a piece of property, but included a covenant.  That doesn't mean that the seller still owns the property, it just means that the buyer agrees to certain restrictions on the use of the property that he owns.

You're the one who is clearly misunderstanding here, but lets leave that aside for a moment, since I despair of convincing you of what seems to me to be so self evident.

Check Van Ness v Bank of the United States

The case in controversy began before the date on which Maryland ceded sovereignty over Washington County to Congress, namely February 27, 1801.  That Congress chose to leave such a suit in the Maryland courts hardly weakens my point that until that date that territory was still part of Maryland.

Maryland ceded sovereignty to the United States in 1791.

"The United States accepted the cession made by this law of the state; and the conditions above mentioned, therefore, formed a part of the contract between the parties; and consequently the laws of Maryland, and the jurisdiction of its Courts, continued in full force, until Congress took upon itself the government of the district"
Don't you understand why the court used the word "accepted" - could it because this is the precise language used in the Constitution?  Maryland did not have the authority to override the Constitution.  They did have the authority to enter into an agreement where the Congress would continue to use Maryland laws and Maryland courts to exercise Congress's exclusive jurisdiction.  And remember that even after February 1801, Maryland laws continued to be in force within the district.

We have two distinctly different readings here.  I'm reading it as that the cession did not occur until Congress established the government of the district.  That the laws of Maryland as of the date of cession continued in force after the cession is immaterial.  Rather than write an entire code of laws for the district, Congress copied the laws already in force as of the date of cession.  A bit lazy, but they were not interested in writing a code of laws de novo, as they felt they had better things to attend to than to write new laws just to replace old ones.  (If only Congressmen these days felt the same, but then they have staff and lobbyists to do the writing for them these days.)

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Yes. Otherwise the residents of all the Territories would be free to claim State citizenship and vote therein.  It would be passing strange that territorial residents would have a privilege to claim citizenship in another political jurisdiction when residents of States do not have that right.  I reside in the State of South Carolina.  So long as that is the case I cannot claim citizenship in Maryland or any other State.  Why should Congress have ever intended that a resident of a territory have the privilege of choosing a State of citizenship denied to the residents of States?
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As a federal Union, citizens of the United States derive that citizenship from their State citizenship, and under terms of the 14th Amendment, vice versa.
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Not so.  Definitely not vice versa.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

At most one can say that the 14th Amendment is silent on the issue of where, if anyplace, citizens of the United States not resident in a State have an additional citizenship in addition to that of the United States.  However as it would be an absurdity for residents of the Territories to have a privilege not held by the residents of the States, that of claiming to be the citizen of a State that they are not resident in, all that one can infer from the omission of any provision for the residents of the Territories is that the 14th is silent on the issue of whether there must be such a concept as Territorial citizenship.  Since Congress has authority to change Territorial boundaries and laws however it sees fit, one can logically argue that there is no such concept as Territorial citizenship, save as a revocable courtesy extended by Congress for its own convenience in organizing the government of the Territories.

As for those overseas employees you like to use as an example, what Congress has passed is laws concerning their permanent residence, and thus only indirectly State citizenship.  Those laws give Federal employees who have jobs which require them to move anyplace in the world at the discretion of the Government the privilege to have a continued residency for legal purposes in some fixed location of their choosing within the United States.  To apply similar laws for territorial residents in general would be neither just nor constitutional as they already have a fixed legal residence in the United States which happens to not be in any of the States and thus makes them not citizens of any of the States.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

We have two distinctly different readings here.  I'm reading it as that the cession did not occur until Congress established the government of the district.  That the laws of Maryland as of the date of cession continued in force after the cession is immaterial.  Rather than write an entire code of laws for the district, Congress copied the laws already in force as of the date of cession.  A bit lazy, but they were not interested in writing a code of laws de novo, as they felt they had better things to attend to than to write new laws just to replace old ones.  (If only Congressmen these days felt the same, but then they have staff and lobbyists to do the writing for them these days.)

The Constitution uses specific the specific terms "cession" and "accept", which the Maryland legislature and the Congress used in their 1790&1791 laws.  This was just a few years after the Constitution was written.  Surely they understood the meaning of these words.

You've made this complicated construction that Maryland didn't really cede the territory in 1790, nor that the US didn't really accept the cession, simply because the two parties agreed that Maryland's laws would continue to be used until Congress provided for the government of the District.  This despite the fact that the SCOTUS recognized the terms of the cession and its acceptance as forming part of a contract.  Then in 1800, Congress started meeting in Washington and other government offices moved there and you're left with Maryland's laws being operative in the district.  And then in 1801 when Congress get around to establishing a government the cession actually occurs.

Much simpler is that the cession occured in 1790/1, and under the terms of the cession, Maryland law continued to be in force.  And then in 1801 at the time Congress provided for the government of the district, under the terms of the cession, Maryland law ceased to be in effect - except Congress in the law that provided that government said Maryland laws would be in effect until they got around to change them.

What you are ignoring is that under your interpretation, Maryland continued to enact new laws that affected Washington County after it's supposed cession of that territory under your theory.  That one sovereign would allow another to completely alter the laws applicable to its sovereign territory is at the very least highly unusual, nor is there any language in either the 1790 nor the 1791 Acts to indicate that Congress gave Maryland such authority to enact new laws affecting Washington and Alexandria Counties respectively.  Yet clearly the laws of those States as applicable to the territory of the district continued to be modified until February 27, 1801.  The theory supportable on the plain text of the laws passed by Congress and Maryland is that the actual cession did not occur until that date.

One additional fact that argues against either the date of the 1790 or 1791 laws for the cession is that the until Washington decided what the boundaries were to be, no one would know what would be the eventual boundaries. How can a cession take place for a territory of uncertain location?  You would have people in a settled area be uncertain whether they, their land, and their other property were in Maryland or Columbia.  And that doesn't even take into consideration that exactly where the decided upon boundary was to be was uncertain until well into 1792 when the boundary stones were surveyed and planted on the Maryland side.

Could Congress have claimed Washington County sooner? Yes, but it chose not to and thus the cession did not happen until 1801, when all of the conditions agreed to by both Congress and Maryland were met.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

You are still missing or deliberately ignoring the point.  Congress chose to allow Maryland and Virginia to retain all sovereign authority over the district until it took positive action to take control. If the area were not still part of Maryland and Virginia then the residents could not be considered citizens of those States.  Yet in Reily v. Lamar it was stated:

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None of the parties, nor the judges in that case ever evidenced any idea that the residents of what would be Columbia stopped being citizens of Maryland and Virginia upon the passage of either the 1790 or the 1791 act.  The only two dates mentioned as possibilities were the date that Congress first sat in the district and thus made it the seat of government and the date that Congress established a government for the district.  The residents of Washington County were allowed to vote in Maryland elections because they were still considered Maryland citizens.  They most certainly are not Maryland citizens now, nor is it within the power of Congress to decree that they are.


In any case, having despaired of making you see reason here, let me point out another manner in which H.R. 492 is unconstitutional.

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The residents of Columbia fail the most fundamental qualification requisite for electors for the most numerous branch of the Maryland legislature and thus cannot elect Representatives to the House from the State of Maryland.  Or are you going to argue that Congress can force Maryland to allow residents of the district to vote for the Maryland House of Delegates?

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Read Van Ness again.

I'll go read Van Ness if you go read Reily.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

We read the same law and the same cases and draw exactly the opposite conclusion.  Nothing you have presented has convinced me of your position.  Indeed, the laws and cases you have presented have served to reinforce my original opinion and given it a firmer basis.  I read it as a straightforward contract between Congress and Maryland that provided for a delay in the transfer of sovereignty until Congress established a government for Columbia.  I certainly see no basis under the Constitution why such a delay could not have been agreed to, and every reason to hold that there was such an agreement.

Let me quote from Van Ness, since you think that case serves to buttress your view while I see it as clearly contradicting it:

The Act of Assembly of Maryland of 1791, ch. 45, which ceded the territory to the United States, provided

"That the jurisdiction of the laws of the state over the persons and property of individuals residing within the limits of the cession should not cease or determine until Congress should by law provide for the government thereof under their jurisdiction."

The United States accepted the cession made by this law of the state, and the conditions above mentioned therefore formed a part of the contract between the parties, and consequently the laws of Maryland and the jurisdiction of its courts continued in full force until Congress took upon itself the government of the District, and as it was uncertain at what time the United States would assume the jurisdiction,

In the bolded text above, the opinion of the court is unambiguous that the United States did not take jurisdiction of the District on December 19, 1791 when Maryland passed its act.  It is quite strange to me that you continue to argue that jurisdiction does not equate to sovereignty.  I can't think of a more fundamental definition of what sovereignty means.

That Maryland chose to delegate some of its authority in the district (and not all authority as you seem to infer) to the Federal Commissioners is immaterial.  There are many examples of such cross authority with Federal officials enforcing State laws and vice versa.  Obviously the Commissioners need not have accepted the Maryland offer, but the law you quote gave the commissioners only powers needful to the construction of the future capitol, so they would have been daft to decline.  (And yes, given the prodigious amounts of alcohol ordinarily consumed in those days, regulation of alcohol sales so as to ensure safety at the construction sites and the soundness of construction does fall within the scope of what I would consider needful.)

Finally, I fail to see why you bothered to mention the Virginia retrocession, or the later cessions.  I've never denied the ability for Congress to cede the territory of the District if it should so choose and another State accept.  Indeed, cession of the District to Maryland (or another State) is one of the three Constitutional methods for the residents of the District to obtain Congressional representation, the others being admission of Columbia as a new State and the passage of a Constitutional amendment.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The point that you failed to see with regard to the Virginia retrocesssion, is that it constituted of (1) a (retro)cession by one party; (2) an acceptance by a second; (3) contingencies before it became effective; and (4) continuation of the laws of the ceding party until the accepting party could undertake their authority.

(1) Cession by Maryland.
(2) Acceptance by Congress.
(3) George Washington to lay out boundaries.
(4) Maryland laws to remain in effect until Congress could provide laws.

(1) (Retro)cession by Congress.
(2) Acceptance by Virginia.
(3) Plebiscite in Alexandria County.
(4) US laws to remain in effect until Virginia could provide laws.

If we use your model, then the retrocession did not occur until Virginia provided for law within the area.

Agreed.  The retrocession did not take place until March 13, 1847, when the last of the conditions required by Congress for the cession.  Certainly people at the time held that view.  There was a petition from a number of the leading citizens of Alexandria County (not the city, just the county) sent after the plebiscite urging the Commonwealth to not accept the retrocession.

I bid you take note of the language in the Act of July 9, 1847, specifically section 3 and the last sentence of section 4.

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Rather redundant to mention both jurisdiction and judicial system if all that was meant by jurisdiction was solely jurisdiction of courts as you argue.  Jurisdiction has a number of meanings, but taking a look at the record of the debate over the Organic Act (see below) leaves me in no doubt that what is meant by jurisdiction here as in the Organic Act was "the territorial range of authority or control", not "the right and power to interpret and apply the law".

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Polk's proclamation therefore was simply of the fact that the act was in force and that all that remained for the cession to take place was for Virginia to do what it asked for.

Lastly for now, let's take a look at what was said during the debates of the House version of the Organic Act (a different bill than the Senate version that ultimately passed, in that it provided for a territorial legislature for the district, so that it envisaged giving the district home rule under much the same conditions as exist today) concerning what its passage would mean, and what alternatives that might exist to it:

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Note that the House bill was quite different from the Senate bill that became the Organic Act.  While unfortunately the compete bills and debates of that period were not recorded for us to scrutinize in minutia, there was an amendment defeated in the House debate on their bill to make the territorial legislature unicameral instead of bicameral, so it is clear that they envisaged some degree of home rule in the House bill.

Yet even with home rule, debate occurred on how the residents of the District would be represented in the Federal Government.   One thing is quite clear from the debates as recorded, there was no consideration of any means for the residents to retain the privilege of voting for Representatives, nor any suggestion that their current right to do so was a grant from Congress.  It is quite clear that they held that it would be the action of Congress taking jurisdiction, and hence sovereignty, that would end the suffrage of the residents with respect to Maryland and Virginia elections.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

What happened on March 13, 1847?   Why isn't the retro-cession dated from September 7, 1846 at the time of President Polk's proclamation?   BTW, the US Act was in 1846

I made a typo.  As for March 13, 1847, that is when Virginia passed the act providing for the governance of Alexandria County, Virginia and Alexandria, Virginia.  One of the fears of the people of Alexandria County, D.C. was that they would be joined to Fairfax County, Virginia.

I'm not sure what you consider significant about the last sentence of Section 4.

That Polk did not proclaim the retrocession on September 7, 1846, only that the referendum had passed and thus the Act of July 9, 1846 was in force.  Virginia still had one more thing to do before the cession occurred.

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That section never states the date of the original cession. Indeed, that section would be consistent with either of our interpretations of when the cession occurred.

In a later section, it clarifies that the laws in effect within that territory (which were either passed by Congress, or passed by the Virginia legislature before 1801 and unchanged by Congress) would continue in effect in the territory.

(Snipped section 3 for length)

It is not merely a clarification, section 3 establishes that one of the conditions of the retrocession was that Virginia "provide, by law, for the extension of her jurisdiction and judicial system over the said territory hereby receded."

Perhaps the clearest distinction can be seen in the original Virginia cession.  Compare sections II and IV.  Section III recognizes continued personal rights including their ownership of their private property.

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Rather redundant to mention both jurisdiction and judicial system if all that was meant by jurisdiction was solely jurisdiction of courts as you argue.  Jurisdiction has a number of meanings, but taking a look at the record of the debate over the Organic Act (see below) leaves me in no doubt that what is meant by jurisdiction here as in the Organic Act was "the territorial range of authority or control", not "the right and power to interpret and apply the law".

Are you also claiming that sections II and IV of Virginia's original cession were redundant?

No.  Section II demarcates what is to be ceded, Section IV establishes a condition for the cession to occur namely that "Congress, having accepted the said cession, shall, by law, provide for the government thereof, under their jurisdiction, in manner provided by the articles of the Constitution before recited."  That requirement was not met until February 27, 1801.

(last sentence of Section 4 nipped for length)

The whole of Section 4 provides for the conduct of the plebiscite.  Part of that conduct of the plebiscite was to declare the results.   The President's proclamation stated that:

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That is, as of September 7, 1846, the territory was retroceded, though United States laws would continue in effect until (and if) the Commonwealth put in place its own laws.

Nowhere does Polk's proclamation mention that the cession had taken place.  It was simply of the fact that the act was in force.  In order for the cession to take place, Virginia had to do what that act required, which was that she "provide, by law, for the extension of her jurisdiction and judicial system over the said territory hereby receded."  That did not occur until March 13, 1847.

Lastly for now, let's take a look at what was said during the debates of the House version of the Organic Act (a different bill than the Senate version that ultimately passed, in that it provided for a territorial legislature for the district, so that it envisaged giving the district home rule under much the same conditions as exist today) concerning what its passage would mean, and what alternatives that might exist to it:

(snipped Rep. Smilie's quotes for length.)

First the debate was during the lame duck session - Rep.Smilie had moved to postpone action until March 3, the end of the terms for the 6th Congress.  The Democrat-Republicans, of which Smilie was one, would be taking control in the 7th Congress.   Remember this was at the time the Federalists were plotting to elect Aaron Burr as President.  It was also suggested in the debate that Smilie, being from Pennsylvania, was trying to undo the move to Washington.  His motion was to postpone debate, yet he was several times told to quit debating the merits of the bill.

But leaving aside the political issues at that the time the debate was being held.  Is it your position that Washington was not the seat of government?   Or that the cession had yet to occur?

Washington was the seat of government, as had before it, Philadelphia and New York.  The cession had not yet occurred, nor was it necessary for Washington to be the seat of government.

Smilie did not argue that Congress could not legislate, but rather that they should not (at that instant anyway).  So had his motion succeeded what would the status of the district been (ignoring that the committee had suggested that Maryland's authority had ended in December of the previous year).

I agree that Smilie did not argue that Congress could not legislate, but he did argue that engaging in such legislation would trigger the cession and remove the district from Maryland and Virginia.  Had the Organic Act not passed, then Georgetown would have still been a city in Maryland; Alexandria a city in Virginia; the boundaries of Fairfax, Montgomery, and Prince George's Counties would have been unchanged, and Washington would only have become a city upon the granting of a charter by the State of Maryland, which Smilie suggested was an alternative course of action.  Had that alternative been taken, then we would not be having a debate about how to enfranchise the residents of Washington, Maryland, and we'd have one less amendment to the Constitution.  Indeed, the capitol may well have moved after being burnt in the War of 1812, probably to some location on the banks of the Ohio, had the cession not taken place.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Sections 1, 2, and 3, were contingent on Section 4 (the plebiscite); but Section 1 is not dependent on Section 3.  The dependency is the other way around.  Were it not for Section 1, there would be no reason for Sections 3.

Strange.  You argue that section 3 does not limit the action of section 1 at the same time that you admit that section 4 did limit the action of section 1.  You're being inconsistent here.  the clear construction is that Section 1 is the core of the bill, delimiting what is to be ceded if the retrocession takes place.  Sections 2, 5, and 6 establish limits on what will happen if the act of cession occurs.  And last but not least, sections 3 and 4 establish conditions for the cession to occur.

Read the verb tenses.  Section II speaks in the present tense.  The cession is happening now.   Section IV uses the past tense, referring to Congress of "having accepted".

If you must resort to grammar, please use a better argument.  In English, the present tense also serves for future and habitual actions.  Indeed, with the shalls floating about in sections II, III, and IV, a stronger grammar based argument can be made for futurity, not instantaneity being the intent.  As for your assertion of past action  being mentioned in section IV, not only is "having accepted the said cession" a dependent clause in this sentence, but "having accepted" is here a perfect gerund, and has nothing to do with any use or implication of a past event.  Rather the sentence is laying out what Congress must do to complete (or to use the grammatical terminology, to perfect) the cession and that is to "provide for the government thereof, under their jurisdiction".  Congress did not do so until February 27, 1801 and thus the cession was not complete until then.

So if a mob had approached the Capitol, Congress would dispatch a messenger to Annapolis requesting that the militia be called out?

Other than the fact that they sent such messengers to all the State capitols, isn't that essentially what they did at the start of the Civil War?  Congress has authority "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" independent of having established an area of exclusive jurisdiction.

After 1801, Georgetown remained a city, and did so until 1872 when it was annexed to Washington.

Yet another of your non sequiturs.  Nowhere did I even suggest that Georgetown stopped being a city when the district was ceded.  But in 1801 it did stop being a city in Maryland and instead became one in Columbia.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Sorry about taking so long to respond.

Don't worry about it.  I think we've exhausted this topic.  I don't see any likelihood that either of us will convince the other and I have no interest in repeating or restating my arguments again.  I didn't note any new arguments from you in your last post, just restatements of ones you've made before, and I don't have any of mine own.

As for the side issue of mobs and what Congress could do about them:

[

So if a mob had approached the Capitol, Congress would dispatch a messenger to Annapolis requesting that the militia be called out?

Other than the fact that they sent such messengers to all the State capitols, isn't that essentially what they did at the start of the Civil War?  Congress has authority "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" independent of having established an area of exclusive jurisdiction.

The mob would be domestic violence.   Congress could help out if they had received a request from Annapolis.

Well even if for some reason you don't consider a mob acting to prevent Congress from meeting to rise to the level of being an "Insurrection", I'd like to think that even the most literal of strict constructionists would hold that the Capitol itself falls with the scope of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" and thus Congress could use such measures as it deemed needful to secure the Capitol grounds from an approaching mob, even if it had never assumed jurisdiction of the District.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Well even if for some reason you don't consider a mob acting to prevent Congress from meeting to rise to the level of being an "Insurrection", I'd like to think that even the most literal of strict constructionists would hold that the Capitol itself falls with the scope of "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings" and thus Congress could use such measures as it deemed needful to secure the Capitol grounds from an approaching mob, even if it had never assumed jurisdiction of the District.

Bringing this full circle, Congress has legislated that residents of Forts, etc. be permitted to vote in State elections where the fort is located, even though such residents may not be subject to State jurisdiction, taxation, or other general application of the laws.

Is the jurisdiction that Congress exercises over the District unlike that it exercises over other federal installations?

Yes.

In the case of Columbia it exercises control over territory, the property of which is not owned by the United States.  Furthermore, Columbia is not part of any State.  The residents of Columbia are apportioned separately from the States for purposes of determining Presidential Electors by the XXIIIrd Amendment.  Even compared to the Territories, Congress has slightly more power in the District, as it exercises exclusive Legislation there, but in the the Territories it is required to respect any Claims that a State may have.  (Not that save for any residual claims Hawaii might have inherited from the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi to Midway and Palmyra, would any State have any claims over the current Territories of the United States.)

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

In the case of Columbia it exercises control over territory, the property of which is not owned by the United States.  Furthermore, Columbia is not part of any State.  The residents of Columbia are apportioned separately from the States for purposes of determining Presidential Electors by the XXIIIrd Amendment.  Even compared to the Territories, Congress has slightly more power in the District, as it exercises exclusive Legislation there, but in the the Territories it is required to respect any Claims that a State may have.

"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsover" applies to both the district and federal installations, doesn't it?

Yes, which is why I mentioned it only with respect to the difference between the Territories and the District.

Clearly the shadow-apportionment under the 23rd amendment is not done separately from the States.

I think you misinterpreted what I wrote.  I used "separate" because the residents of the District are separated from those of the States in location, not in time.

  Congress need not include residents of military bases in the apportionment population of the states.  It is a discretionary exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction.

Actually I would argue that in that case it is an exercise of its Amendment XIV Section 5 powers to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.  Persons living on a military base located in a State are clearly resident in that State and hence citizens of that State if they are citizens of the United States.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Neither Evans v. Corman, nor Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624 (1953), which settled the question of whether a federal enclave remains part of the State in which it is located, has any bearing on the voting rights of the District.  Columbia is not an enclave of Maryland.  It was ceded by Maryland to the Federal Government and is no longer a part of the State, a distinction that is not the case for the NIH compound.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Howard v. Commissioners is not as simple as you infer.  It ruled that the enclave in question remained part of the State of Kentucky.  Ever since Congress assumed jurisdiction of Columbia in 1801, Columbia has not been part of the State of Maryland. Under the Constitution, Maryland cannot be forced to accept it back against its wishes, so Maryland can certainly deny the residents of Columbia the right to vote in Federal elections for the simple reason that they aren't residents of Maryland and no law that Congress passes can make them residents.