It's a very fine text and the conclusion is excellent (maybe you can only add that "revanchisme" led to humiliation of Germany in 1919, which largely causes the next WW...).
Of course, there are some names which don't appear, but I've understood you must only use the documents provided to the class.
No reference in your documents about Jules Ferry and "the blue line of the Vosges" ?
Another big fact about Ferry was the free and public education for all young French: it was the completion of a centralized and jacobinist country, because, at last, French language became the almost unique one and history was taught in a unified way. So, the Republic and the Nation were deeply intricated in the late 19th century.
The "blue line" was taught to French pupils at school and songs about Alsace and Lorraine were learnt and repeated each day.
And Ferry was also "le Tonkinois", because he overviewed colonization in Indochina. Colonization was another form of French nationalism and, at the time, as Antonio rightly said, nationalism was a leftist affair (the French right was very, very distrustful towards colonization, because they thought it would weaken France and weaken it on the European front, precisely "against" Germany; the French "left" or Republicans were deeply convinced of the "civilizing" role of France in the poor countries of the South - you would be very surprised about a sort of racist tone or what we'd called a racist tone TODAY, including in Ferry's speeches...)
In a way, "revanchisme" and Dreyfus affair were the end of this old trend of nationalism as a leftist theme.
And no reference to the monuments of the dead soldiers in absolutely EVERY town in France ? A great poilitical and cultural symbol of WW1, that deeply influenced minds afterwards (but it'd be useful onyl in your conclusion
)
As for ideas, just some remarks:
1. In 1870-71, the war was a trauma for France, because it was BOTH a military defeat and a political defeat: first, the 2nd Empire sunk in a military defeat and Napoleon III himself was a prisoner. At the same time, it was the birth (or the achievement) of the German Empire, just thanks to the French defeat.
So, the French patriotism was almost automatically nationalist and "revanchard", all the more that the French territory was cut.
It was almost the survival (
) of the nation which was at stake.
In this view, the Commune was widely perceived, in the deep France, the rural and conservative France, as a betrayal and a big danger.
2. During this 1871-1914 era, there were 2 nationalisms in the field of ideas:
Maurice Barrès with a sort of nationalism of the soil, of the land, which merged sometimes with the old anti-Revolutionary trend, but which was mostly conservative and exclusive. The Nation predates the individuals who don't choose it; the Nation exists before and besides individuals, per se.
Ernest Renan was the nationalism of the Reason, of choice. The nation doesn't exist without the will of each individual.
In a way, with colonial and commercial intrests, with conservative reactions towards social instability (remember that unions were deeply divided in France and didn't intervene in the political debate: there wasn't any social-democracy in France, no Bismarck-type compromise, no Labour experiment; so, for the right, social troubles and workers' fights were frightening because they weren't ruled, well-managed), with the international environment (antisemitism was so widespread in these days throughout Europe... and, of course, there was the game of alliances, the arms race, the colonial disputes, etc.), with the inability of the French socialists to unite and make progress, with the quick transformations of Radicals in a party of barons, bigwigs and conservative people,
the Barrès nationalism prevailed over the Renana nationalism.
Poincaré's speech tried to merge the 2, in the extract you quote. Very interesting.
3. As for the mind of soldiers in 1914-18, let's be very careful.
There wasn't any revolutionary trend. Drawing a link with the Commune is very... surprising !
In 1914, there was really a "Union Sacrée", even among some anarchists and of course among many socialists. Many French men left to the front with "la fleur au fusil" (a flower at the barrel of a gun).
Of course, they very quickly became disillusioned about the fact that the war wouldn't be short (that was the only reason why they left "happily" their homes).
Of course, there were mutinies in 1917.
But not so many. And throughout the war, the hate for the Boche remained. Hence the fact that humiliation of Germany was well received in 1919.
What emerged during the "Grande Guerre" was a hate for war itself, but no regret about "revanchisme".
To cover all the period, think about Clemenceau: almost revolutionary at the beginning of the 3rd Republic; a rather reformist ministry at the turn of the 2 centuries; a harsh warlord during WW1 and a man who really crushed Germany at Versailles in 1919.
4. As for Dreyfus affair, it emerged because of deep nationalism, pushed to its extreme: rejection of "aliens" of all sorts, a quest of purity to reinforce the Nation against a more and more powerful Germany (France wasn't so bright economically at the time, still deeply rural).
So being nationalist and using the Army meant condemning Dreyfus AND fighting for Liberty and Justice in 1914. There was no paradox at the time when you were French, at least a conservative one.
BTW, the Drefyus affair was mostly a personal affair of jealousy inside the high staff... It hadn't much an antisemitic side at its very early stage. It was just the political use of it (from both sides) that made it a symbol...
I hope I've been quite clear and not too incoherent.
Do not hesitate to keep on discussing, based on your documents, so that we can see if you've missed some ideas that would appear, even not very clearly, in these papers.