Civil War in Syria

[Beet]

This is beginning to really remind me of the Chinese Civil War. On the one side, a morally bankrupt dictator with overwhelming conventional military power concentrated in the big cities. On the other side, a mostly rural group of rebels with greater popular support and rapidly growing numbers and weaponry despite still being massively outgunned.

[Beet]

They'd much rather do it on their own.

[Beet]

I've been analyzing this a bit and I agree with Mr. Morden. The regime is toast in the long run because as time passes, it is losing material and support faster than it can replenish them, while the rebels are slowly but steadily gaining strength. At some point the balance will tip over from the regime's side to the rebels.

In many ways, there are similarities to the Chinese civil war. The regime has much stronger conventional superiority, but it can't use this superiority to finally crush the rebels. The rebels have much more popular support, particularly among the peasants in the countryside, whereas the regime can only effectively control the cities. Hence the unpopular regime will be trapped in urban "islands" that can be cut off and eventually attacked and snuffed out one by one by the rebels, just as in the Chinese civil war. Also, just as in the Chinese civil war, the rebels' strength grows day by day through defections, and capturing the regimes' weapons. Ironically, at some point I believe that all of the artillery and armor Assad possess makes it more likely that he will not survive, because this weaponry can be used against him. If only small arms existed in Syria, then Assad would be able to keep up stalemate indefinitely.

If Assad has 50 helicopters and 100 warplanes, if he loses 1 helicopter and 2 warplanes a week, after a year he has no air force any more. I do not believe the Russians are going to ship him any more jets or helicopters because they Russians are starting to realize he cannot pay for them. Finally, it appears that Jordan has signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia, whereas the latter has agreed to intervene in Jordan in the event of an uprising there, in return Jordan allows Saudi weapons to pass through to the rebels.

The regime's tactical superiority is also a strategic disadvantage, because when their mortars and bombs fall on civilian areas, or their troops commit atrocities (which they will disproportionately do simply as a consequence of their military superiority) it only serves to further alienate the local population. Since, for instance, low-flying aircraft can be shot down with small arms, the regime's jets have to fly higher on bombing runs to take advantage of the rebels' lack of anti-aircraft, but this decreases their accuracy and effectiveness. Hence, while the regime needs to fight this war politically as well as militarily, but when it tries to leverage its military advantage it comes at a political cost.

It is losing the war politically because the peasants and migrant poor know that the regime no longer has the economic means to buy them off. The regime also has to pay its troops, and it has to be careful about how it deploys its Sunni troops. The regime's most valuable supporters were the urban Sunni upper class/business class, but because those that remain in Syria are going to be the top targets of both sides, including kidnappings, most of them have either smartly left the country or been neutralized.

When Assad falls, I doubt it'll be the end of the fighting. The Kurds and the Sunnis will start fighting, or the radical Islamist and non-radical Islamists will start fighting. What's left of the Alawites will be in the mix, too.

The longer this goes on, the better for the radical Islamists, Al Qaeda, etc.

One of the biggest risks after Assad falls is a genocide of the Alawites.

[Beet]

The longer this goes on, the better for the radical Islamists, Al Qaeda, etc.

One of the biggest risks after Assad falls is a genocide of the Alawites.

Are you making an argument for NATO intervention here?    

No, I'm just saying what I think is true. For one thing, there's no support in the West to bear the costs of such an intervention. Secondly, if NATO intervenes and the victors do commit some atrocities or turn out not to be sweet candy, the West could end up looking complicit.

There's also some parallels to the Lebanese civil war.

[Beet]

Doubtful, but it would definitely be a strategic coup for Saudi Arabia and potentially the US and Israel.

[Beet]

Normally, Syria being out of the headlines like this (no posts in this thread for nearly two months) would be an indication the government is quieting things down, but that is not the case here. Assad is slowly, but surely, losing the war (although this report suggests differently: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/syria-live/are-we-seeing-bashar-al-assads-second-wind/article11222855/).

If it can be confirmed that Assad will certainly lose (which is far from certain), that strengthens the Saudi Arabian position.

[Beet]

Both sides in this 'war' disgust me.

[Beet]

I'm reposting a comment here found in The Economist by a man by the name or pseudonym of 'Mark Dowe' (p.s. I have explored this person's online footprint and he is one of the most knowledgeable people I have ever encountered on the Internet)

Jabhat al-Nusra has been steadily winning battles and gaining popular support since its inception in January 2012. Last month, its leader was forced to publicly clarify the group’s relationship with al-Qaeda. In a YouTube video posted on April 10, Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani said: ‘The sons of al-Nusra pledge allegiance to Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri’, Osama bin Laden’s right-hand man and the acting head of al-Qaeda.

With that declaration, Jawlani heightened suspicions in the West that significant elements of the Syrian opposition are ideologically and tactically aligned with al-Qaeda. Nusra is now deemed a ‘terrorist’ organisation by the United States.

Jabhat al-Nusra has attracted radical fighters, including those that fought battles in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. The organisation is considered one of the most effective groups battling the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The group’s roots can also be traced back to the activities of deceased al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the early 2000s. Fighting US forces in Iraq, Zarqawi is believed to have amassed fighters, sending some to Syria and Lebanon to establish branches of his network – so called ‘guesthouses’ to train and funnel fighters to Iraq. When it became clear the Syrian uprising of 2011 evolved into a full and bloodied civil war, many of those experienced fighters in Iraq detoured to Syria, with the goal of removing Assad in the hope of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the Levant.

The experience of the al-Nusra fighters as jihadists sets them apart from other groups, such as the ragtag Free Syrian Army. This experience helps Nusra to identify goals and to strategise more effectively, and they often plan in other countries. There tactics are reflective of their training in asymmetric warfare in Iraq – car bombings, suicide missions, and the targeting of security forces.

Nusra is now a well-disciplined and organised group that is gaining more and more ground against the Assad regime. Syrians are increasingly throwing their support behind the rebel groups, in spite of its Islamist ideologies. Previously, too, the United States had decried Jabhat al-Nusra as being the bogeyman of the West. Support – or at least resigned acceptance – comes from many sides now, some unexpected. Some, for example, say that al-Nusra’s Salafist leanings do not pose any risk to the freedom of Syrians or the type of power that will emerge in Syria after the war. Many Syrians believe that al-Nusra can protect the people, rather than exploit them (as has been the case with some other Free Syrian Army brigades). Others, though, such as Abdelbaset Sieda, president of the Syrian National Council, emphasises that al-Nusra’s radical ideology is a complete anathema to Syria’s moderate social environment which thrives on diversity, rather than narrow and literal interpretations of Islamic scripture.

[Beet]

It's clear where this guy's sympathies lie, but he's still pretty funny (as he was during the Arab Spring):

http://angryarab.blogspot.com/

[Beet]

The more Israel attacks Assad, the more credibility it gives to the regime.

[Beet]

To who other than bigots?

Uh, you do realize that most Muslims have an unfavorable opinion of Israel, right? (I may just be understating things a bit )

But politicus is right that few are likely to change sides now.

[Beet]

Qusair finally fell to government forces after two weeks of fighting: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22778310

Bad news for the rebels. Without foreign intervention, it's looking like they will lose.

Nah, they still hold Aleppo, most of the entire north and eastern provinces.

[Beet]

Apparently the chemical weapons were only part of the reason for a decision that was coming anyway. According to Politico,

“The decision was ultimately driven by the discovery Assad used [chemical weapons] but there were a number of other factors in place that were also important,” conceded an administration official with direct knowledge of the deliberations.

“Would we have made [the determination Assad had breached the red line] even if we didn’t have the evidence? Probably.”

This seems more related to the promotion of Susan Rice and John Kerry than anything else. Apparently, Tom Donilon and Chuck Hagel were not as enthusiastic as Rice.

[Beet]

Eh, the problem is, rebels taking up arms against the government don't necessarily have any moral high ground against said government, since they're using the same brutal and murderous methods to achieve ends that may not be any better.

Sure, the peaceful protesters had the high ground over Assad, and him violently cracking down on them is what makes him brutal and murderous, but many of those people were Alawites. Early in the uprising, there was a lot of Alawite unrest, and Latakia participated in the mass protests. It was a protest center; Assad cracked down violently on them too. So who says that Assad owns Alawitism? Why should the Alawites be forced to give up their faith just because it is shared by Assad? Why shouldn't he be the one who has to convert? Is there any evidence that he is even devout?

There is a myth that the same people who were protesting in March 2011 are the ones who later took up arms, but this is mostly false. Most of the protesters were urban, in places like Latakia, and then died down after the civil war began. The people who took up arms were rural conservative elements who still form the backbone of the opposition. In urban areas, the Assad regime has a lot of genuine support, and not just among Alawites.

[Beet]

When BRTD takes a side, he tends to go Berzerker. While I don't agree with him, I kind of understand it...

[Beet]

I suppose Obama isn't going to ask Congress for a formal declaration of war?

[Beet]

The problem for the US is, it looks like a stalemate from afar, but the battle lines are not going to freeze forever. The rebel and regime controlled areas are too geographically dispersed. There is a parallel here with the Chinese civil war. The rebels are like the communists, who control the rural areas, are strong in the north thanks to the country on the northern border, and which have the moral upper hand but whom the US is afraid if because of their radicalism. The government is like Chiang Kai Shek and the nationalists, who started out with overwhelming military superiority but are slowly, steadily losing it through attrition and losing ground for strategic reasons. They control most of the cities and provincial capitals, but the rebels are surrounding one stronghold after another and choking it off. The Syrian army has basically been fighting a series of Stalingrads, trying to keep their bases reapplied through Goering-style "air bridges".

Kudos to Al Qaeda for excellent deployment of guerilla warfare. Simply by forcing Assad into desperately deploying WMD they gave revealed the fundamental desperation of his situation. Like the strategies of Vo Nguyen Giap, the Al Qaeda guerilla strategy in this war should be studied at US war colleges for years to come.

[Beet]

MIT study of Ghouta chemical attack challenges US intelligence

http://rt.com/news/study-challenges-syria-chemical-attack-681/

A new MIT report is challenging the US claim that Assad forces used chemical weapons in an attack last August, highlighting that the range of the improvised rocket was way too short to have been launched from govt controlled areas.

In the report titled “Possible Implications of Faulty US Technical Intelligence,” Richard Lloyd, a former UN weapons inspector, and Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), examined the delivery rocket’s design and calculated possible trajectories based on the payload of the cargo.

The authors concluded that sarin gas “could not possibly have been fired at East Ghouta from the ‘heart’, or from the Eastern edge, of the Syrian government controlled area shown in the intelligence map published by the White House on August 30, 2013.”

[Beet]

Syrian government continues to use chemical weapons despite 2013 deal.

[Beet]

The Turks could have intervened back in '14 or even '15, taken out Assad, and set up a friendly government. Now they have Russian armed forces to their north and south, and a US president less friendly to NATO than the other side. No wonder Erdogan wants to make nice.