What would happen if the North Korean regime crumbles?

[Atlas Has Shrugged]

I am a avid follower of North Korea. Its a strangely interesting place, for a thousand differant reasons, but I always have one question in my mind: What would happen if, for whatever reason, if the North Korean military launched a coup against Kim Jong ill? If he is not executed immediately, where does he go? Would anyone even want to take him? Who would take over in the event of a coup?

I have heard that he has a massive stash of money saved in reserve in Luxembourg and Swiss banks.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/7442188/Kim-Jong-il-keeps-4bn-emergency-fund-in-European-banks.html

[King]

According to Wikileaks, China would take over control of an interim puppet regime with South Korea annexing it peacefully in 10 years.

[Stranger in a strange land]

I have heard that he has a massive stash of money saved in reserve in Luxembourg and Swiss banks.

Given that he leads an impoverished developing country with a command economy and high defense spending, that he has a known penchant for luxury items, and that the economy is propped up by Chinese aid, I find it very doubtful that he has a "massive" stash of money anywhere.

[Dereich]

According to Wikileaks, China would take over control of an interim puppet regime with South Korea annexing it peacefully in 10 years.

Why would the Chinese allow reunification? I thought their whole justification for supporting the Ils was to keep a US-aligned non-ally off its borders.

[memphis]

The same thing that happens whenever an entrenched dictatorship falls. There's a fight for power.

[seanobr]

It's important to remember that Kim Jong-il, before the death of his father and the extended period of mourning that led to Jong-il's total accumulation of power, both actively competed with other individuals for the role of successor and was forced to undergo a prolonged education in party and military governance, which allowed his influence to be gradually introduced throughout the state.  The North Korean media only referred to Kim Jong-il using the arcane term 'party center' until his unveiling at the 6th Party Congress in 1980 -- the final one ever held -- when he was 39, and it took another decade before he was formally given control of the country's military in 1991.  When Kim Il-sung went on his grandiose tour of Moscow in 1984, Kim Jong-il was notably absent, and despite the fact that Kim Il-sung declared that it would be his last foreign sojourn and thereafter Kim Jong-il would represent him abroad, such a transition did not immediately occur.  Kim Jong-il's rise was not preordained; although it was rigidly choreographed and stage managed after Kim Il-sung chose him, Jong-il was required to demonstrate he had the ambition and sagacity to succeed in his father's place, and that gave him the opportunity to create his own identity outside of Kim Il-sung's orbit, just as Kim Jong-eun is attempting to do with his assertion of supremacy over the NSA.

Kim Jong-il earned the confidence of the military before Kim Il-sung's death, then enhanced its role to the point that the party and traditional architecture of the state were rendered almost completely irrelevant as the Songun strategy was implemented.  During the last decade, the military was endowed with an importance that will never be replicated under any alternative regime, becoming the primary manifestation of institutional authority within the country and preying on North Korea's population with impunity.  For the military to have a rationale to launch an insurrection against Kim Jong-il, the current internal balance of power must somehow be harming or constraining its self-interest; in fact, the exact opposite is true.  Furthermore, while the farcical currency re-denomination did more to tarnish the government's image than anyone could have expected, the legitimacy of the Kim family is still an compelling quality inside the country, and the military is not going to challenge that as long as Jong-il, with his direct connection to Kim Il-sung, is in control.  Although he has never been the political or ideological equal of his father, Jong-il can at least claim to be advancing the revolution and juche belief set, and replacing him with overt military rule would fundamentally alter the character of the state and probably bring the entire edifice down.

As I wrote here last year, despite his fragile physical health, the question has never been Kim Jong-il's capacity to exert authority, but whether or not he has created a system which can support the type of dynastic succession he is attempting to pursue.  If Jong-il's death were to occur in the immediate term, Jong-eun understandably wouldn't have autonomy as leader, and most expect Jang Song-thaek to act as a sort of regent and his wife Kim Kyong-hui to also play an influential role.  But for Jong-eun to technically acquire his father's power and eventually be able to exercise it unimpeded, he must present himself as an embodiment of the family lineage and ensure that the military establishment is willing to respect his position.  Meeting the first criteria will be far simpler than the second, and we may not know how successful Jong-il and Jong-eun have been in orchestrating the succession until it must be put into practice.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

According to Wikileaks, China would take over control of an interim puppet regime with South Korea annexing it peacefully in 10 years.

Why would the Chinese allow reunification? I thought their whole justification for supporting the Ils was to keep a US-aligned non-ally off its borders.

The Chinese may think that absent the threat of North Korea, a reunited Korea will return to being a Chinese client state as it historically was.  I don't think it will.

[Хahar 🤔]

Your posts are always appreciated, seanobr. You should come around here more often.

[TheDeadFlagBlues]

Relations between South Korea and the US have been shaky over the past decade and they're moving towards being more non-aligned (at least from what I've read this is the case, I could be wrong).

[dead0man]

Relations between South Korea and the US have been shaky over the past decade and they're moving towards being more non-aligned (at least from what I've read this is the case, I could be wrong).

As long as they are using western based gear they will be chummy with us and they still are.  They are currently taking bids on a fairly large upgrade to their RADARs on their F16s, both companies bidding are American.  They are going to upgraded their support fighters with in house birds (the pretty good F-50), but they will be taking bids on 7th gen fighters in a few years and AFAIK, it's only western planes they are looking at it.

The Norks have been slightly more annoying than normal lately and with the PRC flexing it's muscle at several different regional players, it's no time for the S.Koreans to be leaving the team.


As for the OP, the PRC would feel the need to be involved somehow....whether they let the S.Koreans (and Americans, Japanese, etc) take the lead or not is unlikely, but they will probably let us "help" a bit.  Or it could lead to WWIII....who knows?

[Јas]

Your posts are always appreciated, seanobr. You should come around here more often.

Indeed so. Glad to a re-appearance.

[seanobr]

It goes without saying that I appreciate everyone's compliments, and I will attempt to make my presence here more regular in the future.

While we can debate the relevance of the country's tradition to the present, throughout its history Korea embraced its place in the Chinese regional hierarchy but remained fiercely protective of its sovereignty.  Upon unifying the peninsula -- save for Balhae -- in 668, King Munmu's first act was to turn against the Tang assistance that had been so crucial to his victory over Goguryeo, leading to a conflict that only concluded upon China's withdrawal.  Many in South Korea remain grateful to America for interceding after the North's invasion, but Korean society also cannot ignore the destructive imprint left by the suppression of the Jeju Uprising and the ensuing Yeosu-Suncheon incident, the Autumn Harvest Uprisings in 1946, Chun Doo-hwan's Gwangju Massacre, or the perception, however uninformed, of unconditional American support for the country's succession of illiberal governments.  Indeed, one in South Korea might even interpret the agreement between Taft and Katsura, however defensible from our position, to be the first in a long line of American betrayals of the country, given the enthusiasm with which it's alleged King Gojong greeted his 1882 treaty with us.  

I appreciate that some here may have a specific view of China that would compel a unified Korea to maintain its current relationship with us, but I think you have to first comprehend the humiliation and depredation that Korea has been subjected to over the last century and then attempt to divine how that legacy will inform a future unified Korea's policy disposition.  The South has been extraordinarily successful economically, but with a permanent American presence, a relatively nascent democracy, and the artificial division of the peninsula, it is not a 'normal' country, a privilege that has been denied it since the outcome of the First Sino-Japanese War.  If given the opportunity to surmount the last remnant of an unpleasant past, even with the prohibitive cost of reunification, Korea may not be as receptive to American dominance as our foreign policy establishment might anticipate.  An assertive or independent Korea would not be an ungrateful or disrespectful one; it would be a country exercising its rights as a sovereign entity that we attempted to affirm for it by force sixty years ago.

[seanobr]

Relations between South Korea and the US have been shaky over the past decade and they're moving towards being more non-aligned (at least from what I've read this is the case, I could be wrong).

I think the Seoul mayoral election is indicative of a broader shift away from the acquisitive and stultifying corporate instinct that the GNP is seen as embodying, but our relationship -- despite the spectacle that followed the Korean ratification of the free trade agreement earlier in the week -- is actually stronger and more vibrant than at any other time in recent memory.  Part of that has to do with Lee Myung-bak's implementation of a policy toward the North that is much more compatible with our failed doctrine of strategic patience than Bush's approach was with the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung or Roh Moo-Hyun.  Furthermore, Japan's inability to maintain a government for any length of time prevented President Obama from developing a rapport with a specific individual, and considering he came to office with the intention of orienting America toward Asia, emphasizing our connection with South Korea was a logical alternative.  However, from what I've read over the past month and the way his October state visit was interpreted back home, I have the feeling that Lee's evident personal affinity for America and expression of it may be detrimental for the alliance over the longer term.  Lee's posture toward the North is best seen as transitional, since he has placed principle and ethical interaction above substantive achievement, so his replacement will come to power with the ability to do almost anything, either tempering Lee's approach while requiring verifiable reciprocity or transforming it entirely.  Irrespective of who is elected, the Korean electorate is going to force Lee's successor to be, at least subjectively, much more moderate in tone, even if Lee has not been at all extreme, and that may produce friction in the relationship, especially if a different administration is elected here.  There is also concern over the effect that Lee's partiality for America has had on his country's interaction with China, and the question implicit in that criticism is to what extent that has influenced China's approach toward the North.

On a more cynical note, I think that Lee's refusal to tangibly retaliate for Yeonpyeong probably ended the viability of his foreign policy.  Escalation could've been catastrophic, as I made clear here when it occurred, and it wouldn't have been in America's interest for Seoul to do something so impulsive.  But after forfeiting whatever benefit might have been obtained from the Sunshine Policy and watching the North's nuclear program inexorably, if sporadically advance, doing nothing in response aside from the demonstration in the Yellow Sea brought the very foundation of his policy into question.  His May 24th answer to the Cheonan incident gave him no room to maneuver -- reprisal or quiescence -- and the second one, while the right decision, proved to be discrediting.  His unification minister probably would've been replaced much earlier than August were it not for the image it would have conveyed to the North.

[Insula Dei]

Oh yes, this must be my lucky day. Seanobr is back.