Worst SCOTUS cases

[politicallefty]

Two things:

-There is no public use clause.  "Public use" is just explaining the type of situation where just compensation is going to be required. Amendment doesn't say: Private property may only be taken for a public use, but not a private use. 

-There's no way for a judge to make a clear line between what's a private and public purpose.  That's inherently a political decision.  There may be some nightmare scenario with eminent domain but, it's either going to be averted by the just compensation requirement or perhaps substantive due process or some rational basis challenge.

I do not agree. "Public use" is clearly meant to constrain the government's taking power. The issue in Kelo is whether or not the taking of private property for economic development satisfies the Fifth Amendment. I would agree with the dissent that it does not. To follow the Court's Kelo decision to its logical conclusion is one where the government can take private property for any use where the benefit to the public may only be merely incidental (e.g. increased tax revenue for the government). And, as the dissent further notes, almost any taking can result in incidental benefits to the public. If "public use" is to mean anything in constraining eminent domain, there must be judicial standards in place. With respect to your second point, I must quote Justice O'Connor's dissent:

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Her dissent does much more justice to the Fifth Amendment in keeping a reasonable balance between eminent domain and private property rights.

[BluegrassBlueVote]

I think the second half of the ruling pertaining to the Missouri compromise is the product of Buchanan's meddling and his desire to "settle the issue" in this manner. We can establish that he was deeply involved in the case, to the extent that no President should ever be involved in the jurisprudence on the part of Supreme Court Justices, we know he corresponded with Taney and other Justices on the matter, that he directly swayed the opinions of at least one northern Democratic justice who was on the fence so that it wouldn't be a bunch of Southerners and a token Northerner forming the opinion, and his inaugural address even stated something to the effect of "The issue of slavery will soon be forever put to rest by the Supreme Court".  

Wow, I didn't know that.

I think Buchanan now automatically rockets up to "number one worst President ever".  Not that he was anywhere but safely ensconced in the  Bottom 5 already, but this makes it so, so unambiguous.

I think Buchanan was always the worst in most historian rankings.

I've read about his correspondence with the justices as well... wasn't he trying to sway a fellow Pennsylvanian? The name escapes me.

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

I think the second half of the ruling pertaining to the Missouri compromise is the product of Buchanan's meddling and his desire to "settle the issue" in this manner. We can establish that he was deeply involved in the case, to the extent that no President should ever be involved in the jurisprudence on the part of Supreme Court Justices, we know he corresponded with Taney and other Justices on the matter, that he directly swayed the opinions of at least one northern Democratic justice who was on the fence so that it wouldn't be a bunch of Southerners and a token Northerner forming the opinion, and his inaugural address even stated something to the effect of "The issue of slavery will soon be forever put to rest by the Supreme Court".  

Wow, I didn't know that.

I think Buchanan now automatically rockets up to "number one worst President ever".  Not that he was anywhere but safely ensconced in the  Bottom 5 already, but this makes it so, so unambiguous.

I think Buchanan was always the worst in most historian rankings.

I've read about his correspondence with the justices as well... wasn't he trying to sway a fellow Pennsylvanian? The name escapes me.

Yes, there were four supreme court justices from the North, but because the Whig Presidents always seem to die in office and one of the VPs wasn't even really a Whig (Tyler), only one of them was not a Democrat, Justice Curtis of Massachusetts. Another lesson of the ruling is the impact of what the danger of a lopsided court in nominal politics can mean for putting the court at risk of undo political influence. The other dissenter was Justice McLean of Ohio, who was a Democrat at the time of his appointment but would become a Republican, a transition I don't think he had yet made in 1857 if memory serves. I am not familiar with the details of his dissent. Edit: While both agree to a large extent, Curtis is a good read on the issue of whether or not blacks were considered citizens, as opposed to McLean who just said "states allowed them as citizens by virtue of allowing them to vote", as opposed to detailing which ones and why like Curtis does. On the other hand, McLean delves more into the state sovereignty issue, and how prior precedent had upheld the doctrine of "once free, always free" and had given recognition to the laws of other states and goes into detail about how the MO Supreme Court overturned that as well as 30 years of precedent to reach the rulling that it did in Dred Scott v. Emerson. Both complement each other on the merits of the ruling regarding the MO Compromise.

The other two were Northern Democrats, one from Pennsylvania and the other from New York.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dred_Scott_v._Sandford

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[bedstuy]

Two things:

-There is no public use clause.  "Public use" is just explaining the type of situation where just compensation is going to be required. Amendment doesn't say: Private property may only be taken for a public use, but not a private use. 

-There's no way for a judge to make a clear line between what's a private and public purpose.  That's inherently a political decision.  There may be some nightmare scenario with eminent domain but, it's either going to be averted by the just compensation requirement or perhaps substantive due process or some rational basis challenge.

I do not agree. "Public use" is clearly meant to constrain the government's taking power. The issue in Kelo is whether or not the taking of private property for economic development satisfies the Fifth Amendment. I would agree with the dissent that it does not. To follow the Court's Kelo decision to its logical conclusion is one where the government can take private property for any use where the benefit to the public may only be merely incidental (e.g. increased tax revenue for the government). And, as the dissent further notes, almost any taking can result in incidental benefits to the public. If "public use" is to mean anything in constraining eminent domain, there must be judicial standards in place. With respect to your second point, I must quote Justice O'Connor's dissent:

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Her dissent does much more justice to the Fifth Amendment in keeping a reasonable balance between eminent domain and private property rights.

If you read the text of the 5th Amendment that way, that's fine.  It's certainly not clear that it means what you say it does. 

And to Justice O'Connor's point:  I understand where she's coming from.  But, there's no good line to draw between public use and non-public use from the judicial branch.  And didn't Justice O'Connor write the majority in a public use challenge to a Hawaiian land reform?  Land reform seems like a private use.

[HagridOfTheDeep]

What Dred Scott illustrates more then anything with regards to the Court, is the need to preseve its independence from the political whims of the day regardless of which party they originate from (thus no to term limits), from the influences of the executive branch, and the need for the appointment of judges who will adhere as strictly as possible to not only the Constitution and precedents (that are likewise based of an independently analysed assessment of the constitution and prior precedents before it), but also as unbiased an interpretation of original intent as possible.

This was pretty much the exact thrust of the essay I just completed.

I want to point out though that it wasn't just the "four workmen" of the Democratic Party who helped politicize the Court (Douglas, Buchanan, Pierce, and Taney). Tying the Supreme Court to geographic circuits definitely helped ensure that Southern interests would be overrepresented on the bench, but abolitionist hacks did make their way into the Court as well. For example, John McLean basically spent his entire career as a justice campaigning for the presidency. Dred Scott was his last chance to pander to whatever group he thought would support him. The bottom line is that these people were more interested in pursuing their own interests than actually making a reasoned judgment. The scope of Dred Scott did not have to be as large as Taney made it (the Court would have been much better off if it had issued an opinion like Justice Nelson's, which only really dealt in the specifics of Dred Scott's appeal), but Taney wanted to make a political statement. Add to that the fact that Congress was more than willing to offload the slavery question to the Supreme Court, and you've got a situation where America's highest judicial authority descended into politics. I'd agree that Scott v. Sandford was probably the Court's worst decision, but not really because of the racism in Taney's ruling. Dred Scott represented the worst of the Court, in that it was a symbol of how the justices had lost sight of what they were supposed to be doing and who they were supposed to be representing—The People.

[Benj]

Two things:

-There is no public use clause.  "Public use" is just explaining the type of situation where just compensation is going to be required. Amendment doesn't say: Private property may only be taken for a public use, but not a private use.  

-There's no way for a judge to make a clear line between what's a private and public purpose.  That's inherently a political decision.  There may be some nightmare scenario with eminent domain but, it's either going to be averted by the just compensation requirement or perhaps substantive due process or some rational basis challenge.

I do not agree. "Public use" is clearly meant to constrain the government's taking power. The issue in Kelo is whether or not the taking of private property for economic development satisfies the Fifth Amendment. I would agree with the dissent that it does not. To follow the Court's Kelo decision to its logical conclusion is one where the government can take private property for any use where the benefit to the public may only be merely incidental (e.g. increased tax revenue for the government). And, as the dissent further notes, almost any taking can result in incidental benefits to the public. If "public use" is to mean anything in constraining eminent domain, there must be judicial standards in place. With respect to your second point, I must quote Justice O'Connor's dissent:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Her dissent does much more justice to the Fifth Amendment in keeping a reasonable balance between eminent domain and private property rights.

If you read the text of the 5th Amendment that way, that's fine.  It's certainly not clear that it means what you say it does.  

And to Justice O'Connor's point:  I understand where she's coming from.  But, there's no good line to draw between public use and non-public use from the judicial branch.  And didn't Justice O'Connor write the majority in a public use challenge to a Hawaiian land reform?  Land reform seems like a private use.

Yes, Midkiff was way, way more radical than Kelo, so it was pretty dishonest of O'Connor to come back around and say Kelo was not okay but Midkiff, where she wrote the (unanimous!) majority, was. Of course, the beneficiaries of eminent domain in Midkiff (poor Hawaiians) were certainly more sympathetic than the beneficiaries in Kelo (some pharmaceutical company, I think?), but that shouldn't change the jurisprudence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawaii_Housing_Authority_v._Midkiff

(Of course, I think both cases were unquestionably rightly decided, both from a policy and a legal standpoint.)

[Southern Senator North Carolina Yankee]

What Dred Scott illustrates more then anything with regards to the Court, is the need to preseve its independence from the political whims of the day regardless of which party they originate from (thus no to term limits), from the influences of the executive branch, and the need for the appointment of judges who will adhere as strictly as possible to not only the Constitution and precedents (that are likewise based of an independently analysed assessment of the constitution and prior precedents before it), but also as unbiased an interpretation of original intent as possible.

This was pretty much the exact thrust of the essay I just completed.

I want to point out though that it wasn't just the "four workmen" of the Democratic Party who helped politicize the Court (Douglas, Buchanan, Pierce, and Taney). Tying the Supreme Court to geographic circuits definitely helped ensure that Southern interests would be overrepresented on the bench, but abolitionist hacks did make their way into the Court as well. For example, John McLean basically spent his entire career as a justice campaigning for the presidency. Dred Scott was his last chance to pander to whatever group he thought would support him. The bottom line is that these people were more interested in pursuing their own interests than actually making a reasoned judgment. The scope of Dred Scott did not have to be as large as Taney made it (the Court would have been much better off if it had issued an opinion like Justice Nelson's, which only really dealt in the specifics of Dred Scott's appeal), but Taney wanted to make a political statement. Add to that the fact that Congress was more than willing to offload the slavery question to the Supreme Court, and you've got a situation where America's highest judicial authority descended into politics. I'd agree that Scott v. Sandford was probably the Court's worst decision, but not really because of the racism in Taney's ruling. Dred Scott represented the worst of the Court, in that it was a symbol of how the justices had lost sight of what they were supposed to be doing and who they were supposed to be representing—The People.

As eggregious as McLean's behavior was, it is rather useless to point to his biases, when his opinion wasn't the opinion of the court and thus had the force of law. Be that as it may, he certainly was guilty of using the bench for political purposes; however, there are no consequences to speak of (at least in terms of this case save for perhaps ironically a more sound legal opinon then the majorities).

I never stated it was the worst based on racism in the opinion. It was the 1850's, everbody was racist. Even the abolitionists wanted to "civilize" the slaves. It is the worst ruling, because it was in conflict with the Constitution and precedent in many different aspects of the ruling, a discrepancy which was motivated by sectional and political bias (which in this case happened to be racist), the consequences of which were rather devasting to the country and to the standing of the court.

[pbrower2a]

To those that support Kelo, I strongly disagree that it was the correct decision based on the Fifth Amendment. The Court has effectively wiped out the Public Use Clause with its overly broad interpretation of government taking authority. The idea that the Constitution permits takings for the sake of economic development is a broad and dangerous expansion of power. As Justice O'Connor's dissent notes, the distinction between private and public use is of vital importance. I think her dissent would have been the proper result in the case, keeping in line with a more appropriate interpretation of what "public use" actual means. The Court's decision does not take seriously the "public use" limitation on eminent domain.

Nothing in the Fifth Amendment ever said that a private person is required to sell property to a private interest.  The only imaginable exceptions are for easements for public utilities which are heavily regulated or the condemnation of nuisance properties. The idea that the state might seek to bulldoze houses so that a shopping mall can be built instead  because the shopping mall will generate more tax revenue ignores the contention that governments are not legitimately in business to maximize tax revenues.

[BluegrassBlueVote]

Just noticed that US v. EC Knight went without a mention in here.

[politicallefty]

If you read the text of the 5th Amendment that way, that's fine.  It's certainly not clear that it means what you say it does.

And to Justice O'Connor's point:  I understand where she's coming from.  But, there's no good line to draw between public use and non-public use from the judicial branch.  And didn't Justice O'Connor write the majority in a public use challenge to a Hawaiian land reform?  Land reform seems like a private use.

As to the point of public and non-public use, I agree with my prior O'Connor quote that deference to the legislature requires a judicial check. If you leave the definition of "public use" completely to the political branches, it loses any power of constraint on the government. I'm not anymore comfortable letting the government have sole determination as to what constitutes "public use" than I am with any other clause in the Bill of Rights.

Yes, Midkiff was way, way more radical than Kelo, so it was pretty dishonest of O'Connor to come back around and say Kelo was not okay but Midkiff, where she wrote the (unanimous!) majority, was. Of course, the beneficiaries of eminent domain in Midkiff (poor Hawaiians) were certainly more sympathetic than the beneficiaries in Kelo (some pharmaceutical company, I think?), but that shouldn't change the jurisprudence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawaii_Housing_Authority_v._Midkiff

(Of course, I think both cases were unquestionably rightly decided, both from a policy and a legal standpoint.)

I don't agree that Midkiff was more radical than Kelo in terms of its legal implications. There were extraordinary circumstances in that case, as Justice O'Connor's dissent notes:

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Justice O'Connor's unanimous opinion in Midkiff and her dissent in Kelo are not in opposition to one another. I could say more, but I feel her dissent already does an excellent job summing up my thoughts:

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Nothing in the Fifth Amendment ever said that a private person is required to sell property to a private interest.  The only imaginable exceptions are for easements for public utilities which are heavily regulated or the condemnation of nuisance properties. The idea that the state might seek to bulldoze houses so that a shopping mall can be built instead  because the shopping mall will generate more tax revenue ignores the contention that governments are not legitimately in business to maximize tax revenues.

I would completely agree with your first sentence. However, the issue is whether or not the government can take private property from one owner and transfer it to another in order to support economic development.

As for what I bolded in your quote, are you arguing that takings for private use that benefit the public only through additional tax revenues satisfy the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment? I don't even think Kelo went that far in terms of its reasoning, although that may be the logical conclusion of its decision unless it is scaled back in a future ruling. If the Court did go that far, nearly the worst of the dissent's fears would have been realized. There would be virtually no limit on the government's taking power if it could be justified solely on the basis of additional tax revenue.

(I also want to make a point that I am not at all making policy arguments here. This debate seems to have been mostly settled among the states, with the vast majority of states having already restricted eminent domain in their respective jurisdictions. Most discussion on this topic is just academic at this point. I'm arguing the constitutional issue with regards to the Fifth Amendment.)

[Antonio the Sixth]

If you read the text of the 5th Amendment that way, that's fine.  It's certainly not clear that it means what you say it does.

And to Justice O'Connor's point:  I understand where she's coming from.  But, there's no good line to draw between public use and non-public use from the judicial branch.  And didn't Justice O'Connor write the majority in a public use challenge to a Hawaiian land reform?  Land reform seems like a private use.

As to the point of public and non-public use, I agree with my prior O'Connor quote that deference to the legislature requires a judicial check. If you leave the definition of "public use" completely to the political branches, it loses any power of constraint on the government. I'm not anymore comfortable letting the government have sole determination as to what constitutes "public use" than I am with any other clause in the Bill of Rights.

Isn't Kennedy's test satisfactory in that regard? Since he was the decisive vote in that case, one could consider his view effectively prevailed.

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[politicallefty]

Isn't Kennedy's test satisfactory in that regard? Since he was the decisive vote in that case, one could consider his view effectively prevailed.

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Justice Kennedy's concurrence isn't controlling. He still joined the majority opinion. I'll give him some credit for at least envisioning some limits, but I still think his reasoning is far too deferential to the government. My argument is that economic development does not satisfy the restrictions placed upon the government by the Fifth Amendment. The "public use" requirement needs more than an economic development justification. In order for that clause to have meaning, it must have real and substantial limits. Secondary (or perceived secondary) public benefits are simply not enough to justify takings.

[traininthedistance]

Isn't Kennedy's test satisfactory in that regard? Since he was the decisive vote in that case, one could consider his view effectively prevailed.

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Justice Kennedy's concurrence isn't controlling. He still joined the majority opinion. I'll give him some credit for at least envisioning some limits, but I still think his reasoning is far too deferential to the government. My argument is that economic development does not satisfy the restrictions placed upon the government by the Fifth Amendment. The "public use" requirement needs more than an economic development justification. In order for that clause to have meaning, it must have real and substantial limits. Secondary (or perceived secondary) public benefits are simply not enough to justify takings.

Take a look at a place like Flint, Michigan.  Take a look at not just the (nonexistent) tax base of the city, which is supposed to fund (inadequate) public services, but also take a look at the lack of opportunities for employment and commerce.  In extreme cases like this, economic development is a public use, full stop- both because it becomes a prerequisite for the effective provision of any other public services, and because it provides important benefits to residents in its own right that "the market" is not going to get around to without intervention.

Now, obviously, it's important to have an open, fair, and thorough process here: cities have to have real community input, where they can ideally choose from a number of proposals, and then bring them to the public before any decision is made.  And, there rather then the courts, is where it is appropriate to fight takings that overreach.  The best outcomes do not come when we circumscribe important planning activities out of fear that our governmental institutions are rotten, but rather when we work positively to ensure that our governmental institutions are robust and responsive instead.

[Peter]

The Slaughterhouse Cases

Literally reduced the Privilege or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment to be nothing more than a smudge upon the Constitution. It ignored both the plain textual meaning, and the intent clearly expressed as the language was discussed by Congress. It gave necessity to bring back substantive due process to incorporate the Bill of Rights, which is somewhat contrived when this gives something of a straightforward option. Only now is it beginning to have new live breathed into it, though there was also an attempt by Hugo Black in the 40s.

It is without question one of the worst decisions still in force.

[politicallefty]

Take a look at a place like Flint, Michigan.  Take a look at not just the (nonexistent) tax base of the city, which is supposed to fund (inadequate) public services, but also take a look at the lack of opportunities for employment and commerce.  In extreme cases like this, economic development is a public use, full stop- both because it becomes a prerequisite for the effective provision of any other public services, and because it provides important benefits to residents in its own right that "the market" is not going to get around to without intervention.

Now, obviously, it's important to have an open, fair, and thorough process here: cities have to have real community input, where they can ideally choose from a number of proposals, and then bring them to the public before any decision is made.  And, there rather then the courts, is where it is appropriate to fight takings that overreach.  The best outcomes do not come when we circumscribe important planning activities out of fear that our governmental institutions are rotten, but rather when we work positively to ensure that our governmental institutions are robust and responsive instead.

I'm not saying there couldn't be extreme circumstances where eminent domain can be used. Midkiff was such an example. However, it would need to be crafted in such a manner that goes beyond just economic development. I do not think simply increasing the tax base is enough to justify a taking, which is essentially the basis of using the economic development justification. The problem with Kelo is that it gives carte blance authority to the government on eminent domain. Justice O'Connor's dissent maintains a proper balance between takings for public use and limitations on that very power. On the other hand, I don't go as far as Justice Thomas does in his dissent. I would say that eminent domain should probably be subject to heightened scrutiny or perhaps even strict scrutiny.

[bedstuy]

I'm not saying there couldn't be extreme circumstances where eminent domain can be used. Midkiff was such an example. However, it would need to be crafted in such a manner that goes beyond just economic development. I do not think simply increasing the tax base is enough to justify a taking, which is essentially the basis of using the economic development justification. The problem with Kelo is that it gives carte blance authority to the government on eminent domain. Justice O'Connor's dissent maintains a proper balance between takings for public use and limitations on that very power. On the other hand, I don't go as far as Justice Thomas does in his dissent. I would say that eminent domain should probably be subject to heightened scrutiny or perhaps even strict scrutiny.

Here's your problem:  If I'm a city, I can easily get around Justice O'Connor's rule.  Any smart person can conceptualize a economic development program into a program to abate a public welfare problem like the blighted part of DC in the Berman case.  The city just needs to do a series of studies that find that some public nuisance in a particular area and making legislative findings on the record for a trial court judge to see.  And then, what have you accomplished?  A city has spent more money creating studies and reports, a trial court has a ridiculously difficult factual inquiry and you probably end up with the same result for the landowner in 99% of the cases. 

[osideguy92]

Dred Scot v. Sanford (1857)
Slaughter-House Cases (1873)
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
Lochner v. New York (1905)
Buck v. Bell (1927)
Korematsu v. United States (1943)
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
Bush v. Gore (2000)
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010)

[krazen1211]

The correct answer is Miranda v Arizona.

[Antonio the Sixth]

The correct answer is Miranda v Arizona.

lolkrazenlol

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

The correct answer is Miranda v Arizona.

I'm surprised.  I never knew you were an ACLU supporter.  After all, they had argued in that case that a free station-house lawyer should be readily available to the suspect and that instead of being merely advised that they suspects could make use of a lawyer, that they be strongly recommended to make use of one, two positions that the Warren court rejected.

More seriously, I would have thought with your obsession over wasteful spending on public employees, you'd think Gideon v. Wainwright, with its mandate of publicly provided defense attorneys to the indigent in felony cases would be a more serious fault, but perhaps your mania on that subject extends only to public school teachers. (Or maybe I'm confusing you with another poster, in which case I apologize, tho I won't say to whom. )

[krazen1211]

The correct answer is Miranda v Arizona.

I'm surprised.  I never knew you were an ACLU supporter.  After all, they had argued in that case that a free station-house lawyer should be readily available to the suspect and that instead of being merely advised that they suspects could make use of a lawyer, that they be strongly recommended to make use of one, two positions that the Warren court rejected.

More seriously, I would have thought with your obsession over wasteful spending on public employees, you'd think Gideon v. Wainwright, with its mandate of publicly provided defense attorneys to the indigent in felony cases would be a more serious fault, but perhaps your mania on that subject extends only to public school teachers. (Or maybe I'm confusing you with another poster, in which case I apologize, tho I won't say to whom. )

Gideon v Wainwright is a colossal waste of precious and scarce taxpayer resources but at least has some textual basis in the Constitution.

Miranda rights, on top of being foolish and unnecessary, has created a bizarre framework with terrorists. Even this administration attempts to bypass them when necessary in a relatively arbitrary manner. It would be far more logical to simply define the 5th amendment as prohibiting coerced confessions and there would be no such need to bypass anything.


Indeed, the ruling has led to bizarre results such as the 14 day rule enacted a couple years ago. Congress too decided that it did not want it.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

It would be far more logical to simply define the 5th amendment as prohibiting coerced confessions and there would be no such need to bypass anything.

Obviously you have never read anything about the Miranda case other than "OMG, why should we tell defendants they can shut up?" The decision was indeed based upon the 5th amendment prohibition of coerced confessions and the finding that pre-Miranda lawyerless questioning was in general coercive and thus any such confession had reasonable doubt attached to it.

Incidentally, Miranda's case was sent back for a retrial in which the prosecution was able to prove its case without his confession.  Confession is good for the soul, but its usefulness in criminal cases is considerably overrated, both because of the cases in which it isn't needed and the cases in which a false confession has been coerced.  Sadly, the history of criminal investigation in both this country and elsewhere shows how badly Miranda is needed.

Unless we were to go to the extreme of video recording a suspect continuously from the moment of being brought in for questioning through the giving of his confession or at least being given something like the Miranda warning, then I'd have to agree with the presumption that any confession given prior to seeing a lawyer is to be considered coerced.  Even with said recording, there would no doubt be constant disputations over whether the recording shows coercion.

Miranda gives a reasonably solid bright line.  Given how rare non-murky Supreme Court rulings are, Miranda deserves to be celebrated not castigated.  It has also caused police departments to improve themselves and not rely on often unreliable confessions. Justice has been improved by Miranda.

[ilikeverin]

Unless we were to go to the extreme of video recording a suspect continuously from the moment of being brought in for questioning through the giving of his confession or at least being given something like the Miranda warning,

"Extreme"?  Minnesota requires video recording of all custodial interrogations.  Alaska apparently has a similar policy.  I think they're a fantastic idea.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Unless we were to go to the extreme of video recording a suspect continuously from the moment of being brought in for questioning through the giving of his confession or at least being given something like the Miranda warning,

"Extreme"?  Minnesota requires video recording of all custodial interrogations.  Alaska apparently has a similar policy.  I think they're a fantastic idea.

I'm talking about more than that, not just recording when they are officially being interrogated.  I'm talking about a continuous video trail from the moment the suspect is taken in by the cops, including all times that he is "officially" left alone so as to prove that is the case.  I'm talking about not even being allowed a private bathroom break.

[Badger]

With all the other awful decisions listed in the OP, I'm going to put "honorable mention" as Washington vs. Crawford. Mr. "Original Intent" threw out years of Confrontation Clause precedent, ignored reliability guarantees built into the hearsay rules, and destroyed thousands of prosecutions of wife-beaters in the crapper over his fantasy view of the constitution.