2013 German Federal Election - Hamburg Metro Maps (by precinct)

[Franknburger]

On with something more simple - the SPD's best districts in Hamburg. Steilshoop, Billstedt, Wilhelmsburg, traditional working-class quarters, having the SPD around or above 40%. Oh, wait - these places haven't been in the news over the last thirty years for being working-class, but rather for this:


Steilshoop


Billstedt-Mümmelmannsberg


Wilhelmsburg - Kirchdorf Süd

Looks like a pattern - so probably Hausbruch has a similar SPD share... In fact, it hasn't - it went 37.0 CDU vs. 33.8 SPD.

Hausbruch - Neuwiedenthal

And why did Wilstorf give the SPD their fourth-best result (40.1%, vote-by-mail included)?

Yeah - Wilstorf possesses some 1970s architectural treasures, but also contains parts you would rather expect to vote Green or Linke, than SPD (late 19th century extension of Harburg's city core):


So, the prevailing housing explains at best some of the SPD strength (or weakness). Next theory - remembering what Billstedt and Wilhelmsburg have become infamous for: Elevated shares of immigrants. Actually, not the immigrants per se - that would rather promote voting for AfD and NPD, if we weren't in Hamburg, which already in the 18th century had more than 25% non-German citizens, and is pretty immune to xenophobia. Rather, I was thinking about German citizens with migration background. Tourism entrepreneur Vural Öger joining Hamburg's SPD in the 1980s had boosted the party's standing with naturalized Turks, and Aydan Ozoguz, deputy party chair and since this week Federal Commissioner for Integration, running in the Hamburg-Wandsbek constituency should have helped further with that part of the electorate. Now, guess which district has the third-highest share of citizens with immigration background (42 %) - CDU-leaning Hausbruch. Next theory, please!

There is a good and up-to-data database on socio-economic indicators per Hamburg city district available, linked to an online mapping tool, so I checked out various factors: Single parents? Too small in number (typically 4-8% of all households) to explain the variation. Singles? Lowest share in Lemsahl-Mellingstedt (27.1% SPD), followed by Neu-Allermöhe (35.9% SPD). Ultimately, we are talking about a variety of factors, some of which I have combined in the map below so you can try to put the puzzle together for yourself  (don't forget the age map that I already posted above).



On the Hamburg SPD map, I have used a different colour scheme than in the metro area map in order to make variation among districts more visible. Different from the metro area map, the Hamburg-only map is including vote-by-mail.

On the population density map, note that quite some area is covered by water, so several districts along the Elbe and the Alster lake in the city centre are more dense than the map suggests. There is also substantial terrain covered by transport facilities and industry. Aside from the port area, you may be able to spot Fuhlsbüttel airport's runways in that district's borders (light green, to the north of the city centre), and the runway of the Finkenwerder Airbus assembly plant that has been built into what used to be a much larger bay on the southern bank of the Lower Elbe.

For all the maps and analysis, I myself still don't fully understand the SPD's pattern, e.g. their quite good performance in Bergstedt (the full red circle up north-east, in the posh Walddörfer). Maybe, a more detailed breakdown by precinct, or at least by quarter, could help. OTOH, their top 3 precincts were here (62.5%), here (57.9%), and here (55.0%). No 2 is clear - that's Kirchdorf-Süd (see photo above). 85-90% of the school kids there have migration background, so the SPD must have picked up a substantial part of the naturalised Germans' vote (even at the precinct's low vote participation rate of only 35.6%) But for the other two precincts, I don't have much of a clue. They both look like they should lean SPD. However, just 5 kilometres to the east of no.3, you find a precinct that looks quite similar, but was won 41.5 to 33 by the CDU (Oststeinbek 1, only the part south of the main road).

[minionofmidas]

Percentage of the population who are ethnic Germans over 65 is something to check. Also remember that Deutsche mit Migrationshintergrund does include the Russians and Romania Germans and such.

[Franknburger]

Percentage of the population who are ethnic Germans over 65 is something to check. Also remember that Deutsche mit Migrationshintergrund does include the Russians and Romania Germans and such.

The database does neither include information on ethnicity (just nationality, which we all know may be a quite different thing, especially when it comes to Russian/ Kazakh Germans), nor is nationality fully broken up by age (they just provide the share of under-18 foreigners).

As to Germans with migration background -this is Hamburg, so things get even more complicated:
- Traditionally the largest Chinese community in Central Europe (Tsingtao, Shanghai as sister city, etc.)
- Strong Iranian (& Afghan) community (major carpet trading location, reinforced by late 1970s emigration) - I guess they account for a good part of the Germans with migration background in the posh quarters,
- Quite a number of traders / purchasers with spouses from South-East Asia or Latin America (a friend of mine, daughter to a German father and an Argentine mother, and herself working in import / export, should technically also count as "German with migration background"),
- For historical reasons (Danish triangle trade, shipping goods manufactured in Wandsbek via the port of Altona to Fort Christiansborg / Accra, exchanging them into slaves that were sold on the Virgin Islands to US importers) quite a Ghanaian community - an Ashanti who has lived some time in Europe is referred to as "Burger", guess which city that relates to ...

Plus naturalised refugees from former Yugoslavia, second / third generation Italians, and numerous Dutch, Danes and Swedes with German spouses.

As long as we are talking a clearly delineated area, such as Kirchdorf-Süd, which is Turkish-dominated, "Germans with migration background" may have an explanatory value for election results. As an aggregate indicator, however, it comprises too many subgroups that differ widely in socio-economic status and political beliefs.

[LastVoter]

On with something more simple - the SPD's best districts in Hamburg. Steilshoop, Billstedt, Wilhelmsburg, traditional working-class quarters, having the SPD around or above 40%. Oh, wait - these places haven't been in the news over the last thirty years for being working-class, but rather for this:


Steilshoop

Shouldn't this place vote like 50% SPD and 25% Linke? This about as working class as you can get(in Germany).

[Franknburger]

On with something more simple - the SPD's best districts in Hamburg. Steilshoop, Billstedt, Wilhelmsburg, traditional working-class quarters, having the SPD around or above 40%. Oh, wait - these places haven't been in the news over the last thirty years for being working-class, but rather for this:


Steilshoop

Shouldn't this place vote like 50% SPD and 25% Linke? This about as working class as you can get(in Germany).

Well, it was 43% SPD and 11% Linke, the SPD's best district in Hamburg. Linke is strongest in districts undergoing gentrification (more on that later) - I guess their appeal to voters with migration background is rather limited.

In terms of social structure:
- 18.5% over 65 (Hamburg average 18.9%)
- 19.3% non-Germans
- 43.3% of the population / 29.6% of German citizens have migration background
- 8% of households are single parents
- 9,1% unemployment
- 22.4% receiving minimum assistance (SGB II -  "Hartz IV")
- 32.5 m² average housing size per person (Hamburg average: 37.0)
- 33.2% of children attending "Gymnasium" (pre-high school/ high school, Hamburg average is 47.3 %)
- 1.04 crimes per inhabitant/year (Hamburg average 1.30, but that average is blown up by downtown shoplifting. Wandsbek borough, of which Steilshoop is part, has 0.87 as average)
- 0.05 violent crimes per inhabitant/ year - slightly elevated for a district that doesn't have night life.

Definitely one of the socially weakest quarters, though not quite as weak as Billstedt, Wilhemsburg, Jenfeld and Veddel. It is the most centrally located of the 1970s housing estates, in walking/ cycling distance to secondary entertainment districts such as Barmbek and Winterhude, and as such likely to on the medium term face gentrification, once the process is through in Veddel, upper Wilhemsburg, and Dulsberg.

The German "ideal" of  working class is ethnic German blue-collar males (the mechanic / construction worker type), of which you probably find some, but not too many in Steilshoop. When (female) part-time supermarket cashiers, Döner shop helpers from the owner's extended family, free-lance car mechanics preparing used cars for export etc. are subsumed here as well (they are definitely working, 'class' is the term open for arguing) - yeah, this is probably as working class as it can get in Germany.

[palandio]

Some time ago I read an article about the voting behaviour of German citizens with "migration background" (particularly Turkish, Ex-Soviet, Polish, Romanian). I think that Linke support among voters of Turkish background (including of course all minorities living in Turkey) was clearly above average, though you could argue that German-Germans from a similar socio-economic background would vote similarly. On the other hand there are also people that sypathize with the PKK and various Dev-Genç successors, for them the Linke might provide a natural home. And don't forget that naturalized Turkish Germans are only a minority of all people with Turkish background in Germany, probably they are not a representative sample and have different attitudes.

[Franknburger]

Some time ago I read an article about the voting behaviour of German citizens with "migration background" (particularly Turkish, Ex-Soviet, Polish, Romanian). I think that Linke support among voters of Turkish background (including of course all minorities living in Turkey) was clearly above average, though you could argue that German-Germans from a similar socio-economic background would vote similarly.

Do you have a link on the article? Do you remember what it said on the Ex-Soviet Union vote (I always suspected they might lean CDU) ?

Hamburg has a pretty good statistics on persons with migration background, and I have been digging a bit more into their figures:

1. Turkish background: 18 % of all people with migration background, 5.3% of total population. 46% had been naturalised by early 2012. At the current naturalisation rate of 2.5%, it will just take a few more years until more than half of them have become German citizens. For Hamburg as a whole, we are just talking some 2.5% of eligible voters, but in several districts, they make up for more than 10% of the electorate.
If there is a Linke preference among people with Turkish background, it is not yet becoming apparent in Hamburg. Below, I compare the Turkish and Linke shares, respectively, for the Top 5 Linke and Turkish districts:

St. Pauli:          T 10.3   L 22.2
Sternschanze:   T  9.7    L 22.1
Kl. Grasbrook    T  7.0   L 19.5
Altona-Altstadt  T 13.5   L 18.9
Altona-Nord      T 11.4   L 17.8

Veddel              T 24.5  L 16.2
Neuenfelde        T 23.4  L  7.0
Wilhelmsburg    T 22.4  L 12.6
Altona-Altstadt  T 13.5   L 18.9
Cranz               T 12.0  L   6.8

2. Polish background: 13% of all people with migration background, 3.8% of total population. 66.6% naturalised, accounting for some 2.5% of eligible voters. 70-75% of Poles that have become German citizens since 2005 are women, in majority married (and, as a look at the figures makes obvious, mostly not to a Polish husband). They are under-represented in high-income districts, but otherwise far less locally clustered than other migrant groups. I would assume them to not vote much different from ethnic German low to middle income, middle-aged, urban women, i.e. strong SPD (well, the catholic roots might have some influence, nevertheless, socio-demographically they should at least lean SPD).



3. Former Soviet Union (FSU) 14% of all people with migration background, 4.1% of total population. Over 80% naturalised, or Russian/ Kazakh Germans, accounting for slightly more than 3% of eligible voters. Among those that have been naturalised, the female share ranges between 60 % (Russia, Kazakhstan) and above 75% (Lithuania). I guess we have at least two distinct patterns to consider, namely (i) ethnic Eastern Europeans, married to a German partner, reasonably integrated, and living dispersed - similar pattern, presumably also voting behaviour, as people with Polish background; and (ii) Russian/ Kazakh Germans that, in spite of their German roots, tend to form a distinct sub-culture and, especially in the middle age groups, have language problems. The latter appear to cluster in Hausbruch/ Neugraben and Lohbrügge/Bergedorf/ Neu-Allermöhe. In Hausbruch, FSU immigrants account for more than 25% of eligible voters and might be the reason why that district leaned CDU, even though it by all other socio-economic criteria should be an SPD stronghold.
A third sub-group, Eastern European Jews, may be the reason for a relatively high share of FSU migrants in "posh" Rotherbaum - the old Jewish quarter. German Jews are traditionally leaning towards the FDP, but I have no idea whether that also holds true for the community's more recent
reinforcement from Eastern Europe.

4. Afghans: Unfortunately, from here on official statistics only report qualitative statements, but no numbers anymore. Nevertheless, in Hamburg in 2012, Afghans were #4 in terms of migration background, #3 in terms of registered foreigners, and #2 in terms of naturalisations. Their naturalisation rate is far above average at around 10% p.a.,  and one-third of all Afghans that became German citizens in 2012 did so in Hamburg. As a qualified guess, I would put them at around 20,000 (1.2% of the total population) in Hamburg, 40% naturalised Germans. They especially cluster in Rahlstedt, Jenfeld and Billstedt - the three districts to the east of town, where Hamburg forms a bay.

5. Iranians are next in terms of migration background, though only #8 in terms of registered foreigners (but '# 3 when it comes to naturalisations). I assume a  naturalisation of 65-70%, since many Iranians already came to Hamburg after the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s. Those that have been in Hamburg for longer tend to be well integrated and often quite affluent. However, immigration (and naturalisation) is continuing to date, and the newcomers may be socially less advanced, and voting accordingly.

Next on the list are Serbia (including Kosovo, and that appears to be the main source), Ghana, Portugal, Italy, and Greece. Except for Ghana, the a/m countries also rank high in terms of registered foreigners, which leads me to assume a rather low naturalisation rate (though naturalisation of Greeks has been picking up more recently). For Ghanaians, however, we may talk about a naturalisation rate in the range of 50% or more. Ghanaians, as well as Serbians/ Kosovarians, are particularly frequent in Billstedt. The Portuguese community is strong in Wilhelmsburg.

Rather under-represented in comparison to other parts of Germany are Romanians and North Africans. Among the latter, only Egyptians are shown separately in the statistics on registered foreigners (rank 30).  Romania lies behind China, both in terms of registered foreigners, and of naturalisations (when it comes to naturalisation, Togo, Nigeria, Vietnam, India, and Pakistan also beat Romania),

[palandio]

First of all I wanted to say that I highly appreciate your extensive coverage of all details and related issues regarding voting behaviour in the Hamburg metro. :-)

Sadly I did not download the article at the time I read it. Some of the numbers I remember seem to be presented here:
http://www.bpb.de/lernen/unterrichten/grafstat/145165/mb-03-06-wahlverhalten-von-waehlerinnen-und-waehlern-mit-migrationshintergrund

Other studies show lower Linke percentages:
https://mediendienst-integration.de/index.php?id=22&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=71
http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp46-politische-einstellungen-und-partizipation-migranten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.343344.de/09-47.pdf

Take a look at Andreas Wüst's studies and the 2009 GLES by GESIS.

Generally we should be careful with interpretations because
* sample sizes may be very small
* samples may be not representative (e.g. Kurdish over-/undersampling, generational issues)
* voting behaviour may change over the time

[minionofmidas]

Some time ago I read an article about the voting behaviour of German citizens with "migration background" (particularly Turkish, Ex-Soviet, Polish, Romanian). I think that Linke support among voters of Turkish background (including of course all minorities living in Turkey) was clearly above average, though you could argue that German-Germans from a similar socio-economic background would vote similarly.

Do you have a link on the article? Do you remember what it said on the Ex-Soviet Union vote (I always suspected they might lean CDU) ?

Compared to most other immigrant groups, it does. Compared to the electorate at large... it did in 1998 and that created a media cliche that's hard to get away from. I'm reasonably certain that it didn't do anything remotely of the kind in 2002 and 2005, though since then it's harder to tell. It also suffers from ridiculously low turnout rates except for those who came as children, but that's what you get when you get naturalized as part of a package deal right upon arrival when you can't speak the language.

[palandio]

Some of the often cited studies are indeed rather old. In 1998 it seems that over 60% of Germans with Ex-Soviet or Romanian background voted CDU/CSU. Since then these numbers have probably decreased, in particular with the younger generations.

I found another interesting study about voting behaviour of Jewish immigrants from Ukraine:
http://gradcon.huji.ac.il/docs/19.pdf
Edit: Some words on voting behaviour on page 22. Not sure how reliable, anecdotal evidence shows at least some FDP voting.
(When speaking about Jewish immigrants in Germany keep in mind that many of them (maybe the majority) are not affilated to the Jewish Community and that some are not Jewish in the sense of the Halacha.)

[Franknburger]

Thanks for the links, palandio! My assessment was based on 'gut feeling' and stuff I have heard from my children about their classmates with (partly Jewish) CIS roots, which is of course anything but representative. However, in general the studies appear to confirm my gut feeling.

Let me point out a few things:
1. The Hamburg SPD has made a deliberate attempt to reach out to voters with Turkish background. I can imagine several other regional SPD chapters, e.g. on the Ruhr (many people with Turkish roots working in the car industry and being union members) doing the same, but I am not sure whether the SPD as a whole has realised the potential significance of 2nd/ 3rd generation Turkish immigrants (especially also the female half). As such, when it comes to naturalised Turks, observations from Hamburg may not be representative for Germany as a whole.

2. The traditional Russian/ Kazakh German immigrant, coming with the whole family,  is increasingly getting replaced by individual CIS immigrants - young, pre-dominantly female, typically from an urban background. Both groups should differ considerably in their voting behaviour, and what might at first view look like a shift in Russian/ Kazakh Germans' political attitudes, may in fact relate to that new generation of CIS immigrants. OTOH, there is the small industrial town of Trappenkamp, half-way between Bad Segeberg and Neumunster, often referred to by locals as "Little Almaty", which swung from CDU to SPD this year. Kazakh Germans are quite demanded for their metalworking skills - after a few years in such jobs, they might just vote as other metalworkers, i.e. lean SPD.


Trappenkamp (pop. 4.600), emerged from a WWII ammunition depot in the forest, and a pretty weird place - kind of a Hamburg suburb implanted into rural Holstein.

3. I have noted with interest from the studies cited that immigrants from former Yugoslavia are the most left-leaning immigrant group, with the largest preference for Die Linke. Makes sense to me - Yugoslavian communism was a special breed - and answers one of my open questions.

Now the tricky questions: Any idea how people with Afghan roots may vote ? My guess - strong abstention rate, otherwise similar to naturalised Turks.
Ghanaians (and other West Africans - Togo, Nigeria, Cameroon)? I'd say they over proportion lean Green, but that's wild guessing again... 

[palandio]

1. The federal SPD has been relatively successful in reaching out to 1st generation Turkish immigrants because
* most of them came as "guest workers" into industrial sectors with relatively strong unions and Arbeiterwohlfahrt, they are voting just like their German-German collegues.
* the SPD (and Greens) have been perceived as more immigrant-friendly than the CDU/CSU.
* the Greens did not exist yet when most guest workers came to Germany and maybe they are perceived as too bourgeois and socially liberal by many.

The 2nd/3rd generation will most likely not vote >50% SPD because
* their field of occupation is broader
* Sarrazin has damaged the SPD brand with many.
* there is a broad spectrum of views on society and economy among immigrants (social conservatism, "self-made-men" believing that everyone can make it, social liberalism, leftist ideas), many will vote accordingly.

2. Similarly for Russian Germans. By the way, I think that the numbers about voting behaviour of people of CIS background are and will be dominated by Spätaussiedler, just because they are far over 2 million people. I think that the 40-65 generation is slowly moving away from "be grateful to the chancellor that admitted us". Most of them are socially rather conservative but on the other hand might be inclined to vote for the SPD (see Trappenkamp). The voting behaviour of the younger generation will likely converge to the German mainstream. Keep also in mind that many of them are not recognisable as Russian Germans: They look like Germans, have German surnames, German (often old-fashioned) names and are perfectly integrated into the society. It's a minority of not-so-well integrated young people that influences our picture of "the Russians".

On Afghans: I would not necessarily expect them to vote like 1st generation Turkish Germans, because (as far as I know) they did not come as "guest workers" and probably a fair number of them came for political and related reasons. I would guess that the SPD share is lower.

[Franknburger]

Good remarks, palandio, especially the reminder about Sarrazin (I already had forgotten about him). Except for that temporary issue, however, I am not sure that the voting pattern shift between 1st and 2nd/3rd Turkish generation is very pronounced, if there is one at all:

a. In the 1970s/ 80s, there was a lot of immigration of relatives of the original "guest workers". One may argue they are 2nd generation (children and nephews that initially had remained in Turkey until the original guest workers realised that there stay in Germany was more than just temporarily), but - born and raised in Turkey - I tend to qualify them as 1st generation as well. That wave was more of the "Kreuzberg type" (grocery, Döner, backyard car mechanics etc.), and is, e.g., dominating in Hamburg's  inner city districts (St. Pauli, Altona, St. Georg). [There may also have been a number of "guest workers" (shipbuilding, Airbus, Daimler-Benz assembly) coming to Hamburg, though I am not really aware of them. Maybe they, as their employers,  reside rather south of the Elbe, which has never been my prime terrain.] In any case, the "Kreuzberg type" has already been part of the 1990s Turkish background electorate, which, according to the sources provided by you, heavily leaned towards the SPD.

b. Sarrazin is nothing compared to CDU / CSU hardliners of the Gauweiler type. As such, for all their social conservatism and micro-entrepreneurism, I can't see many people with Turkish background voting CDU. By the turn of the millennium, Eberhard Diepgen thought Berlin's CDU might have a chance with "Kreuzberg type" Turks, but failed bitterly. Of course, for socio-demographic reasons, and people like Cem Özdemir, the Greens have strong appeal to higher educated people with Turkish background. However, unfortunately, people with Turkish background still underperform in the German education system, which should limit the Greens' (and FDP's) outreach. While not completely impossible, I furthermore have problems imagining a grocery or Döner shop owner voting Linke. What does that leave male 2nd/ 3rd generation Turks with? Vote abstention, Islamism, or the SPD.

c. You need to consider the female vote as well. Male, 1st generation guest workers may have overwhelmingly voted SPD. Their spouses (once they had followed their husbands to Germany)? Many of them probably did not vote at all. The daughters and grand-daughters should be quite different - rebelling against rigid social control imposed on them by their fathers (and brothers), possibly subject to arranged marriage, but also having access to means for financial and social emancipation. They should in majority vote SPD, with a substantial part going for the Greens, eventually also Linke.

d. So far on the push factors. Now the pull: Vural Öger, the prototype of the self-made Turkish entrepreneur (and a very successful one), assumes a leading position in the Hamburg SPD. Aydan Özoguz, an emancipated, Turkish-background woman - in a socially accepted way, married and with children -  becomes SPD federal board member, and runs in the Hamburg-Wandsbek constituency.
According to the official election analysis, the SPD's biggest gains were among 25-34 year old men (+8.3%), the sub-group that had the biggest increase in vote participation (+2.7). The second-biggest gain was among 35-44 year old women (+6.5%), the group where the Greens lost most (-5.8%). While there are most likely several other factors in play as well, the pattern is consistent with increased mobilisation of 2nd/ 3rd generation Turks by the SPD.

2. I agree that for their sheer number, Spätaussiedler will for quite some time dominate the CIS-background vote. However, the latest microcensus already records some 370,000 adult German citizens with CIS background that are not Spätaussiedler.

I seriously hope that you are right on the integration of 2nd-generation Spätaussiedler, though looking at the ex-classmates of my children (most of them had to leave school in the meantime) is making me sceptical. Language isn't the problem (having German-speaking grandparents helps), but they nevertheless need to cope with a quite different cultural set-up (plus small-town high-school teachers that are neither experienced with nor sensitive for their specific support needs, and choose the easy way of dumping them into the "Hauptschule").

[Franknburger]

Moving on to the Greens..

Before posting the map, I think it is useful to provide especially the non-German readers with some background on the Wendland:

"Wenden" is the traditional Germanic term for Slavonic people. During the Migration Period, they expanded into Northern Germany, up to a line that approximately runs from Kiel via Bad Segeberg, Bad Oldesloe, Geesthacht, Luneburg and Uelzen into today's border between Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. After centuries of sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent cohabitation (late 8th century Carolingian-Slavonic alliance against the Saxons, Wendish destruction of Haithabu in 1066, etc.), the 1147 Wendish Crusade lead to the West Slav's Christianisation and integration into the Holy Roman Empire. In the consequence, influx of German merchants and settlers resulted in Germanisation - sometimes, e.g. in the case of the island of Rugen, within only 2-3 generations. In areas remote from the major trade routes, however, Slavonic language and traditions remained alive much longer. One of these areas, the lands south-east of Luneburg, where the flood plains of the Elbe inhibit east-west and north-south passage, became known as the "Hanoveranian Wendland". The last native Polabian language speaker died there in 1756, at the age of eighty-eight. Slavonic "Rundlings", circular-shaped villages around a central square, are still characteristic for the region.


Whatever meagre intra-regional infrastructure developed in the traditionally isolated area in the 19th and early 20th century was destroyed again in WWII, and not rebuilt as the Elbe was to form the border between the British and Russian occupation zones, and subsequently become part of the Iron Curtain.

Ruins of the Dömitz railway bridge, once part of the secondary railway line (Berlin->) Wittenberge - Luneburg - Buchholz (-> Bremen/ Bremerhaven)


OTOH - is there a better place for a nuclear waste dump than a sparsely populated, isolated corner, in desperate need for investment and employment opportunities? Even better - should something go wrong, prevailing west winds would carry any fallout towards the East, away from West German territory and into the GDR. So thought Lower Saxony PM Ernst Albrecht (CDU) in the late 1970s, preparing ambitious plans for a nuclear-industrial complex with fuel rod manufacture and recycling, and final storage of nuclear waste in the small Wendland village of Gorleben that sits on top of a salt dome.



Well, locals thought differently. In late March 1979, some 100 farmers loaded their tractors with manure and drove to Hanover in order to show the state government what they thought about the idea. While they were on their 7-days drive through the countryside, the Three-Mile-Island reactor in Harrisburg experienced a nuclear meltdown. The trek developed into a mass demonstration against nuclear energy, ultimately bringing nearly half a million people to the closing rally in Hannover. Consequently, Ernst Albrecht dropped the idea of establishing a nuclear-industrial complex, but the plans for the Gorleben deep final nuclear waste repository were maintained.



When exploratory drilling into the salt dome was to start in Spring 1980, several thousand protesters occupied the drilling site, constructed a protest camp, and declared its independence as "Republik Freies Wendland". The camp evolved into a pivotal point of anti-nuclear protest in northern Germany, and also became a test lab for grass-roots democracy and alternative ways of life (photo gallery-on picture 4 you can see one of my classmates from school). Especially on the weekends, thousands of supporters from Hamburg, Berlin and other urban-academic centres of the emerging green-alternative movement travelled there. After one month. the camp was evicted by the police, and drilling was taken up as planned.


As the nuclear industry wasn't prepared to wait until exploratory drilling for the final repository has been completed (Germany is obliged to take back nuclear waste from re-processing nuclear rods in the French La Hague plant), construction of a temporary repository commenced in Gorleben in early 1981. A first transport of light-to medium radioactive waste took place in 1984. The local anti-nuclear community, in the meantime reinforced by people arriving from Berlin, Hamburg and elsewhere, changed the strategy - (temporarily) blocking the transports should increase the financial and political cost to such an extent that the Gorleben nuclear repository ultimately becomes unfeasible. The initial campaign "Day X - Inhibit nuclear transports into the Wendland" in 1985 was forbidden by local authorities, as it was regarded as a call for illegal actions. However, Green party co-founder Joseph Beuys added hand-written comments and his signature, and the posters had to be left unchallenged as reproductions of pieces of art. This event put the yellow "X" into the catalogue of local protest signs.



When red-green took over in Lower Saxony in 1990, nuclear waste transports were temporarily stopped, until in 1995 Angela Merkel, at that time Federal Minister for the Environment, ordered the Lower Saxony government headed by Gerhard Schroder to take up transports again. Since then, there has been at least one transport every year, regularly met by blockades and fierce local resistance from the Wendland's specific coalition of local farmers and immigrated anti-nuclear activists. Andreas Graf von Bernstorff, largest local land-owner (sociologically a relict of the region's feudal past dating back to German colonialisation) has from the beginning been one of the most outspoken Gorleben opponents.


How that truly unusual coalition has shaped the Wendland over the last 35 years can be seen on the photo below (more photos)


Local musical heroes Madsen (younger cousins of the lead singers of one of my former bands) are an expression of the vivid local cultural scene: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PuziLb9CiU

[Franknburger]

Let's also have a look at the Green's overall performance over the last four elections in relation to their federal result (guess I need to do that for the CDU as well some time later):

Hamburg (whole city):             7.6 - 6.6 - 4.9 - 4.3 (trend -0.6)
Lübeck (constituency):            1.1 - 1.3 - 3.1 - 2.7 (trend -0.4)
Neumünster-Plön (const.):       0.1 - 0.4 - 1.9 - 0.8 (trend -1.1)
Ostholstein-Stormarn N:          1.4 - 1.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 (trend -0.3)
Segeberg-Stormarn Mitte:       0.8 - 0.5 - 1.3 - 0.2 (trend -1.1)
Lauenburg-Stormarn S:           1.2 - 1.1 - 1.8 - 0.7 (trend -1.1)
Pinneberg (constituency):        1.7 - 0.9 - 1.4 - 0.2 (trend -1.2)
Steinburg-Dithmarschen S:      0.9 - 1.6 - 0.4 - 0.8 (trend -0.4)

Luneburg Lüchow/Danneberg   2.1 - 3.9 - 7.4 - 5.9 (trend -1.5)
Celle-Uelzen:                          2.0 - 1.6 - 1.2 - 0.6 (trend 0.6)

Harburg:                                       0.6 - 1.5 - 0.9 (trend -0.6)
Cuxhaven-Stade II                         1.9 - 1.8 - 1.3 (trend  0.5)
Stade I - Rotenburg II                    1.0 - 0.6 - 0.6 (trend  --)
Rotenburg I - Heidekreis                 1.1 - 0.6 - 0.1 (trend 0.7)

Luneburg / Lüchow-Dannenberg (the Wendland) stands out. Even though the Greens lost over proportion there, at 14.3 per cent this was still their second-best constituency across all Germany that isn't 100% urban (the best one containing rural areas was Tubingen, 14.8%). In fact, there was only a handful of cities in Germany (Freiburg, Stuttgart, Münster, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, Frankfurt/ Main) where the Greens did better than in Lüneburg and the Wendland.

Hamburg continues to be a Green stronghold, though to a much lesser extent than ten years ago. It was the Green's best state (12.7), before Berlin (12.3) and Bremen (12.1), but among the larger cities, it is only in the midfield. Darmstadt, Munich, Cologne, Kiel, Hannover, Mainz, Aachen, Bremen proper (w/o Bremerhaven) and Kassel are among the cities where the Greens did better than in Hamburg. The strong Linke showing in Hamburg (their 2nd best city in the West after Bremen) suggests Hamburg's 2008-2011 black-green coalition still impacting the Green's standing there. OTOH, Green 2013 losses in Hamburg were lower than in many other large cities (especially Berlin, Munich and Cologne), which suggests that in Hamburg most of the defection towards the Linke already occurred in 2009.

There is remarkable difference between "commuterland" (Lauenburg/ Stormarn/ Segeberg/ Pinneberg/ Harburg, plus Neumunster-Plön that covers most of Kiel's commuter belt), and the outer counties/ constituencies. In the suburban periphery, the Greens have lost over proportion, but are still slightly stronger than in Germany as a whole. Outside the commuting belt(s), the Green's tend to underperform, but the gap towards the suburban periphery is gradually closing.

The difference between outer Schleswig-Holstein (negative Green trend) and Lower Saxony (positive Green trend) may partly be candidate-induced - Green leader Jürgen Trittin was Vice PM and Minister of Environment of Lower Saxony from 1990-1998. In addition, the southern parts of the Lower Saxon constituencies are already forming part of the Bremen and Hannover commuting belts. They tended to yield relatively stable Green results, especially in and around Rotenburg/Wümme, and in southern Celle county. The same applies to parts of Uelzen county that are bordering the Wendland or are close to Lüneburg, e.g. Bienebüttel and Rosche.

In a couple of  precincts, including Reeßlum, Eversen, Bötersen-Höperhöfen, Sottrum IV, Westerwalsede, Süderwalsede, Hemslingen-Söhlingen, Osterwesede, Visselhövede-Buchholz, Visselhövede-Wehnsen (all Rotenburg I - Heidekreis), Breddorf, Vorwerk, Garrenburg-Augustendorf, Gnarrenburg-Klenkendorf (all Stade I/ Rotenburg II) the Greens even gained compared to 2009. Most of the a/m precincts are located in an area where Exxon-Mobile intends to use fracking for exploiting local natural gas reservoirs.


Fracking is also a potential issue in other parts of the southern Hamburg periphery, and may especially have contributed to comparatively strong Green (and comparatively weak SPD) results in Harburg county.

[Franknburger]

Here now the Greens map- Two notes in advance:
1. As the Green vote has strong variation, I needed to use a non-linear scale. Standard steps are 2.5%, but results below 2.5% (of which there have been a handful) are not shown separately. Above 15%, colours change in 5% steps.
2. The Greens performed substantially better in vote-by-mail than at the ballot. The map is just showing ballot results, which tend to be around 0.5% lower than the total Green vote. Figures in the text below, however, relate to total vote shares.



Let's start with the periphery: The Greens' strength in the Wendland, and beyond toward Lüneburg is obvious. In Lüneburg City, the Greens reached 17.7% - 3.7% less than in 2009, but still a remarkable result for a city with just 71,000 inhabitants. Note also the extent to which the area around Luneburg has been greened.
Moving south-west, we reach the small army town of Munster (in between large army training grounds, coloured grey on this map to make them distinguishable), noting that (retired) army personnel is obviously not among the core Green electorate (4.1%).  Further west, where the Bremen communing belt starts, and fracking is an issue, the picture changes. Results in Visselhövede (10.4), Scheeßel (10.9) and especially Rotenburg/ Wümme (12.5) are anything but bad for small-town Germany.
The small towns further up to the north-west, namely Zeven (6.9), Bremervörde (6.1), Bad Bederkesa (7.5) and Otterndorf (7.3) are more in line with typical Green results. "Bad", btw., means spa, and implies a comparatively large health sector including massage, physiotherapists etc. As such professions lean green, not only Bad Bederkesa, but also Bad Segeberg, Bad Oldesloe, Bad Bramstedt and Bad Bevensen are a bit greener than your typical small town (and/or tend to have a few greener villages nearby).

The 1970s development approach for the Lower Elbe was based on cheap energy from nuclear power stations, and energy/ resource-intensive industries, especially chemical industry.  Two of the three nuclear plants (Brunsbüttel and Stade) are gone, only the Brokdorf plant is still in operation. Of course, anti-nuclear activists from Hamburg and elsewhere came to protest, and, as with the Wendland, some decided to stay in the area. See that dark green dot, a bit north of where the Lower Elbe changes its course from Northwest to West? No, it is not Brokdorf (the power plant pays too much local taxes to enrage people living there), it is the village directly to the north of it. The days of the Brokdorf plant are counted, and there hasn't been an annual nuclear waste transport (as in the Wendland) to remind people on the nuclear energy issue. Still, rural Steinburg, and its main cities (Itzehoe 8.8, Glückstadt 9.3) are greener than average. The same applies to the city of Stade (9.0) and nearby Horneburg (8.8 ).
In Brunsbüttel and its surrounding, OTOH, where is little alternative to working in the local chemical plants, the Green's appeal is quite limited. And the west coast always hated the Greens for interfering with fishery, questioning the need for yet another camping site, and, most importantly, not being from the west coast...

On to Hamburg: The densely-populated inner-city districts continue to be a Green stronghold, though less so than a few years ago. Several districts where the Greens were strongest party in 2009 have in 2013 been taken back by the SPD (Eimsbüttel, Ottensen, Altona.Nord, St. Pauli, St. Georg, Hammerbrook), leaving Sternschanze as the only district where the Greens are still in the lead. The inner-city strength also extends into the upscale, CDU-leaning districts around the Alster lake, where the SPD is traditionally rather weak.
Next come the upscale suburbs, especially the "Walddörfer" to the north-east, but also the posh districts along the Lower Elbe, with 10-13% Green shares. In several of these suburbs, Green (+Linke) losses have been significantly higher than SPD gains, imdicating quite a swing from Greens to CDU and/or AfD. Hamburg-Volksdorf, e.g., had the Greens losing 5.8%, but the SPD only gaining 2.8%.
The Greens have traditionally been doing rather poorly in the low-income districts dominated by 1960s /70s housing estates, especially to the east of Hamburg (Jenfeld, Billstedt, Lohbrügge), That didn't change in 2013, though their loss in these areas remained below average (there wasn't that much room to go down anyway). In outer districts characterised by a mix of middle-class individual housing and 3-4 storey blocks, the Greens ranged around 8%, i.e. slightly below their national average.

The patterns set forth into the suburbs: Comparatively weak in dense, 1960s/ 70s blue collar suburbs directly across the state line (Barsbüttel, Glinde, southern Norderstedt, Western Halstenbek/Rellingen, Seevetal-Meckelfeld, Neu-Wulmstorf), average shares in middle-class individual housing areas, and above average in the upscale towns: Ahrensburg / Großhansdorf, and the posh parts near the Sachsenwald forest reserve to the east (South-eastern Reinbek, Wentorf, Wohltorf, Aumühle)  continue to be Green strongholds, in spite of them losing slightly above average there. Check also Wedel - in SPD-leaning Schulau, Greens did rather poorly, while reaching over 10% in CDU-leaning Wedel proper.
Buchholz (Nordheide), is a bit of an exception - this city of 37,000 inhabitants, characterised by middle-class individual housing, but also quite some 3-4 storey blocks, voted 11.2% Green.  The city has traditionally been a green stronghold, and losses against 2009 remained moderate (-2.9).

In exurban commuterland between Hamburg, Lüneburg, Lübeck and Kiel, there is no clear pattern. A village with a green vote below 5% may lie directly next to one where they got over 20%. Some places had the greens losing 6% or more, in others (including mine) they against the national trend gained 2-3%, without any apparent local reason. Aside from a local eco-farming cooperative, here are a number of other factors that could contribute to an elevated green vote:
- "Soft" tourism: In particular the "Holstein Switzerland" (the lake district between Eutin and Kiel), but also parts of the Luneburg Heath, the lakes around Ratzeburg, and the Aukrug nature park west of Neumunster are "greener" than average. Whether that is due to local tourist operators, or because such areas, with small villages, unspoilt nature and yet a decent gastronomic infrastructure, attract a specific type of exurban settlers, is open for discussion.
- Equestrianism: While I haven't checked on it systematically, I noted that the area around Luhmühlen in the eastern Luneburg Heath, and the region north-east of Bad Segeberg, both traditional horse-riding venues, have elevated Green shares (they are, b.t.w., also strongholds of the Animal Protection Party). Note in this respect that a prime dividing factor between the posh Hamburg districts on the Lower Elbe and those to its north-east is that the former rather attracts people that are into sailing, while equestrians prefer the north-east (which is quite a green stronghold).
- Special care institutions: Didn't check on it systematically either, but several places with special care institutions for the physically and/or mentally handicapped are Green strongholds, e.g. Bahrenhof / SE (21.0) and Rosche-Prelip / UE (13.7).  Could also explain why the town of Meldorf is so much greener than the remainder of Dithmarschen - "Stiftung Mensch", running several workshops and homes for handicapped people, is one of the largest local employers.

[minionofmidas]

Note also the extent to which the area around Luneburg has been greened.

Yes, that quite stands out.

For those not aware of it, the area east of the Elbe with the very light green colors, though historically a part of Hanover and retroceded in the 90s, was part of the GDR. (Sorry if it's been mentioned elsewhere in the thread.)

[Franknburger]

Note also the extent to which the area around Luneburg has been greened.

Yes, that quite stands out.

For those not aware of it, the area east of the Elbe with the very light green colors, though historically a part of Hanover and retroceded in the 90s, was part of the GDR. (Sorry if it's been mentioned elsewhere in the thread.)

No, it hasn't been mentioned so far. I intended to talk about Amt Neuhaus when presenting the  Linke map, because - well, it's not too difficult to guess how that area voted...

[minionofmidas]

Less Leftish than you might think - the current as well as the former boundary would show up pretty clearly on any map (except as confused by the Wendland which does have a Left presence, of course.) Seems like most Neuhausers are not feeling buyers' remorse over the transfer.

[Franknburger]

Less Leftish than you might think - the current as well as the former boundary would show up pretty clearly on any map (except as confused by the Wendland which does have a Left presence, of course.)

Actually, it is just as Leftish as neighbouring Mecklenburg:

Amt Neuhaus   16.7 (incl. vote-by-mail, ballot-box only should be a bit higher)

Lübtheen          17,0
Vielank             17.1
Dömitz             18.8

Would be indistinguishable on a map, as Neuhaus-Tripkau, the southernmost precinct that borders Dömitz, voted 18.4 Linke (ballot-box only).

http://service.mvnet.de/wahlen/2013_bund/JAVA/WahlenAtlas.htm

Btw, you also wouldn't see a difference on the SPD map (its all a bit over 20%).  The border would only show up on the NPD and CDU maps, respectively (Mecklenburg is much browner, though Amt Neuhaus, at 2.6% NPD, is still fairly brown compared to the remainder of the constituency). Moreover, as light green as Amt Neuhaus appears in relation to the Wendland, it is still a bit greener than its Mecklenburg neighbours, especially Dömitz (1,8% Greens).

[Noted another interesting thing when looking at MVP results: The Top Green community in the state is Utecht (14.7), a nice, sleepy village on the eastern shore of the Ratzeburg lake, 15km SE from downtown Lübeck. Most of Lübeck's eastern periphery has green shares in the 5-10% range, values you otherwise only find in Rostock, Schwerin, Greifswald and a handful of their suburbs, plus a few scattered places on Rugen and in the Mecklenburg lake district.]

[Franknburger]

For an illustration, here a look at some of the Green's best precincts:

Hamburg 21206 (Bleickenallee), 33.7%: Part of Ottensen, Altona's 18/19th century crafts & industrial district, where the old factory buildings have in the meantime being converted into concert houses (Fabrik), cinemas & restaurants. The precinct is located at the western end, where it gets a bit less dense, and you find some sports grounds, parks and churchyards, but are still in walking distance to where the action is. Note that the whole precinct measures some 400 X 400 m, so it is still pretty densely populated.

Fischers Allee (eastern end of the precinct) with typical late 19th century working / lower middle class apartment houses.


Hohenzollernring (western end of the precinct) - 1920s housing, with more flair inside (e.g. pitch pine floors) than you would expect from the outside.

Hamburg 30905 / 31005 (Eppendorfer Weg/ Altonaer Str.) 31.2/31.8%:

Directly neighbouring each other, these two precincts are commonly regarded as northernmost part of the "Schanzenviertel", but in fact already part of Eimsbüttel district. Another area built up by late 19th century lower-to-middle class housing, which has extraordinarily well survived WWII bombing, and only contains a handful blocks that were rebuilt in the 1950s. Walking/ cycling distance to Hamburg university.


Note that such late 19th century housing still used social micro-differentiation:
1.) By floor: The best floor is the first floor (Bel ètage). With each floor further upwards, room heights diminish. Often, you have only one apartment covering a house's full first and second floor, but the third, fourth and fifth floors containing two apartments. The worst (& cheapest) apartments are in the sous-terrain, half-way in the basement (while the upwards differentiation in room heights is difficult to see, you can easily spot the sous-terrain apartments on the picture above.)


2. By location: Main road was the best, as it was best illuminated (that appreciation has changed a bit with the evolution of inner-city traffic). Next were side streets, and last came backyard alleys as the one on the photo above, which lies in precinct 30905.

Lübeck 106 (Old Town, St. Aegidius-quarter) 24.2%

While the Greens are strong across all of Lübeck's old town (20.1% in average), their strongest precinct was the St. Aegidius-quarter. The quarter has suffered comparatively little damage from WW II bombing, the name-giving church was the only one that didn't need to have its tower rebuilt.


The quarter contains some medieval merchant houses (note the decreasing floor heights), and its northern boundary is formed by the Hüxstraße - once characterised by small book stores, antique shops and galleries, but increasingly getting "poshed up". However, most characteristic are the small medieval backyard alleys ("Gänge"), often donated by rich merchants as refuges for widows and elderly people, and now quite sought after as a way to live downtown yet quiet.


Lübeck 201/202 (Wakenitz-Peninsula)  23.8 /25.5 %

When Lübeck started to outgrow its fortification (which took comparatively long, as the old town, housing more than 25,000 people in the middle ages, is rather large), this area, directly across the city moat, was among the first to be developed. Classical late 19th century lower-to-middle class apartments, Lübeck style (i.e only 4 floors instead of 5 as in Hamburg, and no sous-terrain for the muddy ground, but otherwise also socially differentiated by floor).

Lüneburg 101 (north-eastern old town) 29.0 %


Luneburg 301 (Rotes Feld) 26.3%

Directly south of the old town, towards the university.

Well, I think, you've got the idea...

[Franknburger]

Moving on to Die Linke, here again first a look at their overall performance over the last four elections in relation to their federal result:

Hamburg (whole city):             1.9 - 2.4 - 0.7 - 0.2 (trend +0.9)
Lübeck (constituency):             2.4 - 3.1 - 2.0 - 2.1 (trend -0.1)
Neumünster-Plön (const.):       2.8 - 4.3 - 4.7 - 3.8 (trend +0.9)
Ostholstein-Stormarn N:          3.1 - 4.5 - 4.6 - 4.3 (trend +0.3)
Segeberg-Stormarn Mitte:       2.8 - 4.3 - 3.8 - 3.5 (trend +0,3)
Lauenburg-Stormarn S:           2.9 - 4.3 - 3.9 - 3.7 (trend +0.2)
Pinneberg (constituency):        2.9 - 4.3 - 4.1 - 3.6 (trend +0.5)
Steinburg-Dithmarschen S:      2.9 - 4.5 - 4.1 - 3.6 (trend +0.5)

Luneburg Lüchow/Danneberg   2.5 - 2.7 - 1.8 - 1.7 (trend +0.1)
Celle-Uelzen:                          3.1 - 4.5 - 4.3 - 4.0 (trend +0.3)

Harburg:                                       5.0 - 4.6 - 4.2 (trend +0.4)
Cuxhaven-Stade II                         4.5 - 3.0 - 4.0 (trend  -1,0)
Stade I - Rotenburg II                    3.9 - 4.4 - 4.4 (trend  ---)
Rotenburg I - Heidekreis                 4.7 - 3.8 - 4.0 (trend -0.2)

Hamburg has now become one of the three cities in the West where Linke over-perform their federal result (the other two being Bremen and Saarbrucken). A positive Linke trend (which in fact means Linke losing less than in the East and in the countryside) is visible for most larger cities in the West; especially Cologne, but also Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich have trended even more towards Die Linke than Hamburg.
Lübeck should in principle have undergone the same trend, if the local party section hadn't been paralysed by constant in-fighting a few years ago. Nevertheless, compared to their disastrous 2012 state election result, Linke improved by 3.5% in Lübeck. Note also the Linke trend in Neumunster-Plön.

Aside from Hamburg, Luneburg / Lüchow-Dannenberg (the Wendland) stands out as Linke stronghold. They are quite strong in Luneburg city (7.7%, comparable to their result in Dortmund, trend +0.5), but also in the Green-leaning Wendland. Amt Neuhaus, which was returned from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to Lower Saxony in 1990, is of course a particular Linke stronghold, but, accounting for just 2,2% of the constituency's valid votes, less relevant to their overall performance than a look on the map might suggest.

The Hamburg periphery has been very much moving in sync, with a slightly positive Linke trend. In outlying constituencies, Linke  tend to do around half a percent worse than in those that are bordering Hamburg.
Last but not least, the three westernmost constituencies in Lower Saxony display a negative Linke trend. This may partly be a reversal to the mean (they over proportion swung to Die Linke in 2009). Another plausible explanation is on-going immigration from eastern Germany having caused a positive Linke trend further eastwards, but not reaching these western constituencies.

[Swedish Rainbow Capitalist Cheese]

Beautiful, I wanna live there!

[Franknburger]

Beautiful, I wanna live there!

To me, Luneburg is the most beautiful town in Northern Germany (well, let's say, north of Goslar and Quedlinburg, which are also great). While individual sights are not as impressive as those in Lübeck, Lüneburg has hardly suffered WW II damage, and preserved its medieval core (a quite extended one, the city used to be rich and powerful), which provides for a special atmosphere. To colonise Wendish lands, Flemish settlers were called in, so in layout and architecture Luneburg reminds a bit of Bruges.

If any of you Swedes decides to visit Northern Germany, you should of course not miss historic Wismar, which was part of Sweden from 1648 to 1803, as is still proudly being recalled on the market square.
 

[Franknburger]

Here now the Linke map. First, again, a word of caution: Die Linke has performed substantially better on the ballot box than in vote-by-mail. Typically, their ballot box result was around 0.5% better than their total. In Hamburg, the difference is 0,9% (1.2% in the Hamburg-Altona constituency, which contains many of their strongest districts). As such, the map, which is just ballot-box results, tends to show Die Linke somewhat stronger than they are in reality.



Essentially, we can distinguish two patterns:
1. Die Linke is comparatively strong in many traditionally Green areas: The non-posh part of inner Hamburg, Lübeck's old town (9.8% ballot-box result), Luneburg's old town, the Wendland, Ahrensburg-Wulfsfelde's alternative housing cooperative, and also (to a lesser degree, but still standing out in comparison to similar areas) southern Steinburg including Glückstadt (6.5) and Itzehoe (6.6). Let me add some more examples of Green/Linke correlation, which aren't obvious on the maps since precincts in question are very small (and dense):


Ratzeburg's old town (northern half): Greens 12.7, Linke 10.7
[You may need to open the maps in the gallery, and zoom in to Ratzeburg lake to spot the old town island]


Mölln's old town: Greens 12.9, Linke 8.3
[Another town built in typical Wendish style on a peninsula. When you zoom to the lakes inside the city territory, you will note a small peninsula just south of where the westernmost lake narrows - that's where the old town is]


Lauenburg old town (photo taken during this summers' flooding): Greens 11.3, Linke 10.9

2. When we move out of the inner cities / old towns and anti-nuclear exurbia, however, the correlation breaks. The posher districts and suburbs of Hamburg, where Greens tend to be relatively strong, don't show much enthusiasm for Die Linke. Conversely, Die Linke reaches above 10%, and surpasses the Greens, in SPD strongholds characterised by 1970s housing estates and substantial share of inhabitants with migration background such as Horn, Billstedt, Rothenburgsort, Wilhelmsburg, Wilstorf and Heimfeld. They are also reasonably strong in some SPD-leaning  suburbs such as Geesthacht (7.4% incl. vote-by-mail), Wedel (6.7 incl. vote-by-mail), Schenefled (6.4 incl. vote-by-mail), Elmshorn (6.3 incl. vote-by-mail, close to or above 10% in several precincts), and Kaltenkirchen (6.1, vote-by-mail included). Last but not least, there are a handful of suburbs of Lübeck (Ratekau-Sereetz, Ratekau proper) and Lüneburg (Melbeck) where they surpass 6%. Other than that, they tend to hover around 5% or even below in suburbia.

Interestingly, outside of Hamburg, Lübeck and Luneburg, Die Linke is much less of an urban party than one might expect. Their Neumünster result of 5.5% (vote-by-mail included) is just slightly better than the 4.8% they achieved in the Neumünster/Plön constituency as a whole.
Stade I - Rotenburg II constituency: 4.2 overall, 5.0 in Stade city, 5.4 in Buxtehude, 3.8 in Bremervörde, 3.4 in Zeven.
Rotenburg I - Heidekreis: 4.6 overall - Rotenburg town 4.9, Soltau 4.6, Schneverdingen 5.0
Uelzen county 5.0 - Uelzen city 5.3.
Harburg county 4.4 - Winsen/Luhe 4.7, Buchholz/Nordheide 4.8.