Ukraine Crisis

[Middle-aged Europe]

He said he would conform to "a status similar to that of Bavaria in Germany".

An interesting statement considering that Bavaria has no special constitutional status whatsoever compared to other German states. Bavaria's "special autonomy" mainly stems from the fact that the CSU is not a part of the federal CDU. So, the Ukrainian equivalent would be demanding the formation of a (non-separatist) regionalist party in the Donetsk oblast.

[Velasco]

Consider that Ukraine is an unitarian state. You can interpretate that the minimal thing some pro-Russians were willing to accept is a decentralised and federal state and a status for southern and eastern oblasts similar to that of German länder. Perhaps that guy mentioned Bavaria because it's 'singular'.

It's interesting to read what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who stated he's "carefully observing" the events, writes in The Guardian ("It's not Russia that is destabilising Ukraine") regarding to this question:

You must be logged in to read this quote.

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/07/sergei-lavrov-russia-stabilise-ukraine-west

You don't have to believe Lavrov when he says Russia is promoting Ukraine's stabilisation. Anyway he's drawing some red lines. He assures they "are not imposing anything on anyone", but warns: "we just see that if it is not done, Ukraine will continue to spiral into crisis with unpredictable consequences." Extract your own conclusion.

[politicus]

Arrest of 70 "activists" in Luhansk, separatists declaring independence in Donetsk. Hostage taking in Kharkiv. Thinly veiled (or hardly veiled at all) Russian threats of interference. This thing is heating up and it looks like we are entering phase 2 of the conflict. It seems Putin will try his luck in the Eastern oblasts as well after the Crimea success. Thoughts?

[PiMp DaDdy FitzGerald]

Arrest of 70 "activists" in Luhansk, separatists declaring independence in Donetsk. Hostage taking in Kharkiv. Thinly veiled (or hardly veiled at all) Russian threats of interference. This thing is heating up and it looks like we are entering phase 2 of the conflict. It seems Putin will try his luck in the Eastern oblasts as well after the Crimea success. Thoughts?

Will Ukraine really be any worse without them? They seem to be filled with pro-Russian trouble makers and sh*t disturbers.

[politicus]

Arrest of 70 "activists" in Luhansk, separatists declaring independence in Donetsk. Hostage taking in Kharkiv. Thinly veiled (or hardly veiled at all) Russian threats of interference. This thing is heating up and it looks like we are entering phase 2 of the conflict. It seems Putin will try his luck in the Eastern oblasts as well after the Crimea success. Thoughts?

Will Ukraine really be any worse without them? They seem to be filled with pro-Russian trouble makers and sh*t disturbers.

1. A very big chunk of their economic base is in the East

2. While mostly Russian speakers Eastern Ukrainians are Ukrainians too.

3. The troublemakers are - mainly - Russians from Russia.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

Arrest of 70 "activists" in Luhansk, separatists declaring independence in Donetsk. Hostage taking in Kharkiv. Thinly veiled (or hardly veiled at all) Russian threats of interference. This thing is heating up and it looks like we are entering phase 2 of the conflict. It seems Putin will try his luck in the Eastern oblasts as well after the Crimea success. Thoughts?

Putin may not behind this.  In deciding to ride the back of the irredentist tiger, he may well have ended up with a more intense ride than he intended.  That isn't to say that he might be approving of this, just that he might not.  Crimea is a bite of Ukraine that while it would take some time to digest and will cause diplomatic problems for a few years, is something that could be reasonably be expected to be resolved in few years.

The pre-existing autonomous status of Crimea gave a definable endpoint that would enable the restoration of stability.  Going after Eastern Ukraine has the problem of a total lack of a definable endpoint short of gobbling up all of Ukraine.  He might be able to do it, but in doing so, he guarantees that the West will isolate Russia economically.

I don't think Putin wants to make his country into a Chinese economic vassal, but that's what he risks if he goes for Ukraine.  If we do get a Chinese-Russian Axis, Putin will be playing the role of Mussolini, not that of Hitler in such an arrangement, and I think he's smart enough to realize that.

[politicus]

I don't think Putin wants to make his country into a Chinese economic vassal, but that's what he risks if he goes for Ukraine.  If we do get a Chinese-Russian Axis, Putin will be playing the role of Mussolini, not that of Hitler in such an arrangement, and I think he's smart enough to realize that.

There is a significant amount of non-Western and non-Chinese economic actors in this World today (including most of Asia, all of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa), so I don't think its as simple as that.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I don't think Putin wants to make his country into a Chinese economic vassal, but that's what he risks if he goes for Ukraine.  If we do get a Chinese-Russian Axis, Putin will be playing the role of Mussolini, not that of Hitler in such an arrangement, and I think he's smart enough to realize that.

There is a significant amount of non-Western and non-Chinese economic actors in this World today (including most of Asia, all of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa), so I don't think its as simple as that.

Russia has developed its economy primarily by being a provider of raw resources. Europe and China are not only the most convenient markets for Russia geographically, they also are the ones that have the greatest demand for what Russia is set up to produce for export.

[Famous Mortimer]

Stupid obvious question I'm ashamed not to know and I should have asked early but probably a lot of other people were afraid to ask as well.

Is there actually a difference between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians? Beyond language, it's pretty much entirely self identification, isn't it?

[ag]

Stupid obvious question I'm ashamed not to know and I should have asked early but probably a lot of other people were afraid to ask as well.

Is there actually a difference between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians? Beyond language, it's pretty much entirely self identification, isn't it?

What difference, other than language and self-identification, do you want? All Europeans, broadly, look the same

Language, names, history, traditions, religion all vary somewhat - though, of course, they also all vary within each country as well. The differences are quite serious between, say, Moscow and Kiev (and still more so between Vologda and Lviv), but, of course, they are rather slight between Belgorod and Kharkiv (the Russian and the Ukrainian cities 40 minutes apart by car). The same would be the comparison between the Ukrainians and Poles, for that matter. Or the Germans and the Dutch, if you prefer that.

[ag]

I don't think Putin wants to make his country into a Chinese economic vassal, but that's what he risks if he goes for Ukraine.  If we do get a Chinese-Russian Axis, Putin will be playing the role of Mussolini, not that of Hitler in such an arrangement, and I think he's smart enough to realize that.

There is a significant amount of non-Western and non-Chinese economic actors in this World today (including most of Asia, all of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa), so I don't think its as simple as that.

Russia sells, mostly, oil and gas. It charges particularly high prices for gas, because Europe is a captive market for the moment. It would not be able to charge any such premium elsewhere.

Who are major Russian trade partners outside the West and China? Well, the ex-Soviets, of course. And elsewhere? Turkey, I guess - but that one is also in NATO. There is a reason for that.

What is Russia going to trade with Venezuela? Oil?

[Famous Mortimer]

Stupid obvious question I'm ashamed not to know and I should have asked early but probably a lot of other people were afraid to ask as well.

Is there actually a difference between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians? Beyond language, it's pretty much entirely self identification, isn't it?

What difference, other than language and self-identification, do you want? All Europeans, broadly, look the same

Language, names, history, traditions, religion all vary somewhat - though, of course, they also all vary within each country as well. The differences are quite serious between, say, Moscow and Kiev (and still more so between Vologda and Lviv), but, of course, they are rather slight between Belgorod and Kharkiv (the Russian and the Ukrainian cities 40 minutes apart by car). The same would be the comparison between the Ukrainians and Poles, for that matter. Or the Germans and the Dutch, if you prefer that.

Yeah, but at least Poles have been calling themselves Poles for centuries. I was reading somewhere that in 1990, a third of Ukrainians just called themselves "Slavs"

[ag]

Stupid obvious question I'm ashamed not to know and I should have asked early but probably a lot of other people were afraid to ask as well.

Is there actually a difference between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians? Beyond language, it's pretty much entirely self identification, isn't it?

What difference, other than language and self-identification, do you want? All Europeans, broadly, look the same

Language, names, history, traditions, religion all vary somewhat - though, of course, they also all vary within each country as well. The differences are quite serious between, say, Moscow and Kiev (and still more so between Vologda and Lviv), but, of course, they are rather slight between Belgorod and Kharkiv (the Russian and the Ukrainian cities 40 minutes apart by car). The same would be the comparison between the Ukrainians and Poles, for that matter. Or the Germans and the Dutch, if you prefer that.

Yeah, but at least Poles have been calling themselves Poles for centuries. I was reading somewhere that in 1990, a third of Ukrainians just called themselves "Slavs"

No, not in 1990.  In 1990 there would be lot of people calling themselves "Soviet", but that would include many non-Slavs As for ethnicity, everybody had to choose Russian, Ukrainian, etc. - "Slavic" was not an option. The "fifth point" - ethnic identity - was present in every document that a Soviet citizen had to fill out since the pre-WWII years, at least. It was on the birth certificate and on the domestic ID. Nobody would be confused in 1990 - or for a few generations previous, at the very least.

But it was not a mere Soviet documentary creation.  Whatever the ethnic definitions of the government, Ukrainian - anti-Soviet - national movement had been a huge deal for a long time. It was one of the more coherent ethnic movements in the Soviet Union: and, probably, one of the most radical and violent (at least in the first post-war years). They fought the Russians till the mid 1950s in the Western districts (hence the current Russian obsession with "banderovtsy" - followers of Bandera, one of the Ukrainian nationalist leaders; these did, indeed, at one point in time kill many Russians - and other non-Ukrainians, such as Poles; for them the WWII was not over in 1945). And even later, when the violent resistance was suppressed, Soviet camps would overflow with Ukrainian prisoners, whose main guilt was insisting on Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian independence. People would spend 30 years incarcerated for this thing - it was not anything confused and undefined. It was only confusing to the Russians, most of whom still find it impossible to reconcile themselves with the separate Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian states. Most Ukrainians have no doubts whatsoever.

In a sense, Ukrainians called themselves "Russian" before the Russians did At least, this is most definitely true of the language. Up until the 16th century both Moscow and Kiev were operating in a peculiar form of "diglossia" - dual language use. That is, there was the "holy" language - the Church Slavonic, a Southern Slavic language, which was used for all things relating to the Church and had some other defined applications (this language was common for both cities - as well as for much of the rest of the Orthodox world). And there was the local Eastern Slavic dialect which in each place was being used for more mundane purposes, including almost the entirety of oral communication - but which also included running the public bureaucracy (another Eastern Slavic dialect was at the time used to administer the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - it later became Belorussian; there was also the very distinct dialect in Novgorod - but Moscow conquest, eventually, led to that one mostly dying out, though contributing somewhat to modern Russian).  However, across the Eastern Slavic world the two languages: the Church and the mundane - were perceived as a single "Slavic" tongue (which just happened to have different stylistic "registers", used in different settings). It was in Kiev that the Greek-influenced grammarians first noted that both grammatically and lexically these were different languages and started designating the Church language as "Slavonic" or "Slavic" and the local language as "Russian". In Moscow this distinction took another generation or two to make an impact - under the influence from Kiev. In fact, the first grammar books making the distinctions were reprints from Kiev, and their examples of "Russian" speech were distinctly Ukrainian, to the hilarity of the opponents of the newfangled notions (the archpriest Avvakum, one of the leading clerics of the Old Belief, derided the reformers as "nekhaishchiki" - playing off the Ukrainian word "nekhai" (roughly, "so be"), which to Muscovites sounds - and, probably, did sound at the time - somewhat hilarious).

Anyways, over the centuries the different parts of historic "Rus" got distinct designations. The area around Kiev, much of it under Polish domination, became "Lesser <i.e., core> Russia" (compare with the "Lesser Poland" around Warsaw). The lands under Lithuanian control became "White Russia" (today's Belarus). Moscow and thereabouts were talked of as "Greater Russia" (originally, probably, meaning the part outside of the core - compare with "Greater Poland" around Poznan), but with time, and due to its political independence and non-colonial identity, the "Greater" started being thought of the "Great",  while the "Lesser" got the unmistakable - and with time, increasingly, somewhat pejorative - meaning of "Little".  All three major areas had their own local dialects, and all three areas started developing their own written standards. It is true, that the East Slavic language and Orthodox (or, later, Eastern Rite, in parts of the territory) religion provided for some common identity.  But these were already quite noticeably different by the 16th century, at the least, and unmistakable in the 18th. Unsurprisingly, of all the Easter Slavs, other than the "Greater" Russians, the ones who clung to the "Russian" identity longest were the Rusyns - speakers of the transitional dialects from Eastern to Western Slavic. As they were Orthodox/Greek Catholic, and thus distinct from Poles/Slovaks, who lived nearby, it was this distinction they stressed. Likewise, for many of them it was important to distinguish themselves from "proper" Ukrainians, with whom the are frequently lumped. "Greater" Russians were far away (in fact, that area was never within Moscow sphere of influence before WWII), so the word similar to "Russian" seemed to give a properly distinct identity.

In contrast, as Ukrainian territories were gradually absorbed into Russia, the bulk of Ukrainians increasingly identified themselves by distinguishing themselves from Russians as much as from Poles. They sometimes allied with Russians (as hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky did in the 17th century), or allied with others against the Russians (as hetman Mazepa tried to ally with the Swedes).  Anyway, by the second part of the 19th century modern Ukrainian identity was very much developed: much of it in opposition to Russia. By this time Ukrainian literature is really taking off - in a language variety that most Russians struggled to understand then, and find only barely intelligible now.

Interestingly, the Novgorod dialect I mentioned above was, probably,  the most distinct of them all in the Middle Ages. It is well-documented, due, in part, to a large number of birch-bark letters and notes found by the archeologists. And it was spoken over a very large area - most of what is now Northern (European) Russia. It was well on the way to develop into a separate Eastern Slavic language - more distinct, in fact, than the others, and with its own written tradition and widespread literacy to boot. But, first, Moscow conquered the Republic of Novgorod, and then Ivan the Terrible massacred much of the city population, exiling big chunks of whatever survived and replacing it with Moscow settlers. Traces of the dialect survive in some northern villages, but as an urban and literary phenomenon it was destroyed.

As a result, in fact, Russian is fairly homogenous all over the country. True, it is easy to distinguish the northern" "o-ing" and the southern "h-ing", but for a country this size Russia is very linguistically homogenous - that is the old tradition of centralized control for you. Ukrainian, in contrast, is very much split into dialects: while the Eastern speech transitions into Russian, the western is heavily polonized, with a huge variety in between (the contrast is just one of the many things that distinguishes Russians and Ukrainians).

[Famous Mortimer]

There's a significant number of Russian speakers who call themselves Ukrainians though. Isn't that more a political statement than something backed up by genetics?

[Velasco]

Arrest of 70 "activists" in Luhansk, separatists declaring independence in Donetsk. Hostage taking in Kharkiv. Thinly veiled (or hardly veiled at all) Russian threats of interference. This thing is heating up and it looks like we are entering phase 2 of the conflict. It seems Putin will try his luck in the Eastern oblasts as well after the Crimea success. Thoughts?

Putin may not behind this. 

Those actions were simultaneous and coordinated; it's reasonable to put the blame on Putin, although that's not yet proven. What is Putin looking for? Annexation of the East or taking advantage of the Ukrainian chaos before the presidential election to implement his minimum 'programme' for the country? I hope Putin is not planning an incursion and just playing strong in order to put pressure on Kiev government in order to achieve: federalisation of Ukraine; equal status for Russian language; and a neutrality status, consecrated via constitutional reform, to avoid that Ukraine joins NATO. If Putin decides to intervene, consequences can be terrible both for Russia and Europe, needless to say.

Support for integration with Russia is by no means as strong in the East as it was in Crimea. Apparently, pro-Russian people protesting around the government building in Donetsk don't have common goals. Although all protesters ask for the help of Russia and reclaim a referendum on the status of the oblast, some want to join the 'Mother Russia' and others want to stay in a federalised Ukraine. In Kharkiv, PoR candidate Mikhail Dobkin stated that city is an inseparable part of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, two deputies from the far-right Svoboda seized communist leader Petro Symonenko in the parliament, after the latter accused nationalists of "playing into Russia's hands".

http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/apr/08/ukrainian-mps-brawl-parliament-video

[Gustaf]

There's a significant number of Russian speakers who call themselves Ukrainians though. Isn't that more a political statement than something backed up by genetics?

I think you're missing AG's point that nationality in general isn't very well defined by genetics.

[politicus]

I don't think Putin wants to make his country into a Chinese economic vassal, but that's what he risks if he goes for Ukraine.  If we do get a Chinese-Russian Axis, Putin will be playing the role of Mussolini, not that of Hitler in such an arrangement, and I think he's smart enough to realize that.

There is a significant amount of non-Western and non-Chinese economic actors in this World today (including most of Asia, all of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa), so I don't think its as simple as that.

Russia sells, mostly, oil and gas. It charges particularly high prices for gas, because Europe is a captive market for the moment. It would not be able to charge any such premium elsewhere.

Who are major Russian trade partners outside the West and China? Well, the ex-Soviets, of course. And elsewhere? Turkey, I guess - but that one is also in NATO. There is a reason for that.

What is Russia going to trade with Venezuela? Oil?

What on earth made you think of Venezuela of all places?

India, South Korea and Japan are more relevant. In general there are plenty of countries willing to buy oil and gas.

EDIT: My answer was in regard to Ernests assertion that Russia would have no choice but to be "a Chinese economic vasal", not whether it would lose income (at least in the short to medium run) by a break with the West, which is a given.

[ag]

There's a significant number of Russian speakers who call themselves Ukrainians though. Isn't that more a political statement than something backed up by genetics?

What does genetics have to donwith it? In any case, as far as I know, there is almost a greater genetic diversity among the Russians than between Ukrainians and and Germans Russians have assimilated a huge Finnic-speaking population - ancestors of most Russians around Moscow and further North were not, really, Slavic. Which does not make them non-Russian, of course. Those in the South are of the same stock as Ukrainians, apparently - which is entirely irrelevant here.

That the self-identification is meaningful is supported by the existence of pro-Ukrainian Russians in Ukraine. Remember that Ukrainian Navy captain, who responded to the Russian order to give up his ship by saying: "Russians do not surrender"? In his view he was An ethnic Russian, but a Ukrainian officer. He had no ambiguity on either count.

[politicus]

What difference, other than language and self-identification, do you want? All Europeans, broadly, look the same

Well, the difference between the common look in the Mediterranean countries and Scandinavia should be quite obvious to anyone without a visual disability.

[ag]

What difference, other than language and self-identification, do you want? All Europeans, broadly, look the same

Well, the difference between the common look in the Mediterranean countries and Scandinavia should be quite obvious to anyone without a visual disability.

Not in Mexico. Anybody, whose hair is not completely black is a blond here.

[politicus]

I don't think Putin wants to make his country into a Chinese economic vassal, but that's what he risks if he goes for Ukraine.  If we do get a Chinese-Russian Axis, Putin will be playing the role of Mussolini, not that of Hitler in such an arrangement, and I think he's smart enough to realize that.

There is a significant amount of non-Western and non-Chinese economic actors in this World today (including most of Asia, all of Latin America, the Middle East and Africa), so I don't think its as simple as that.

Russia has developed its economy primarily by being a provider of raw resources. Europe and China are not only the most convenient markets for Russia geographically, they also are the ones that have the greatest demand for what Russia is set up to produce for export.

While pipelines is indeed an important factor, when we are talking crude oil its a different matter and a large number of countries, especially in Asia, have a huge oil demand and could provide alternative markets.

Besides its not all raw materials. Russia has 27 percent of global arms exports and this is a truly global market with Latin America and the Middle East being areas where Russia has gained market shares recently.

[ag]

Besides its not all raw materials. Russia has 27 percent of global arms exports and this is a truly global market with Latin America and the Middle East being areas where Russia has gained market shares recently.

Oil is a global market, of course. Which means that the price is, more or less, the same across the world. If Russia is not exploiting its European pipeline, it is going to be the same wit gas. These prices will be going down, given the current technological developments. Russia crucially depends on them staying up. However, Russia's actions are spurring the technological advances that are going to accelerate their downward trend.

Weapons, of course, is another Russian export. Though, interestingly, this Russian industry has been quite integrated with... Ukraine So, buyers of certain Russian arms might find that maintenance (never a Russian strong point) is not very readily available, as spare parts were Ukrainian production (now likely to be discontinued). In any case, this industry is not big enough given Russia's size. What else do they export to, say, Latin America?

Anyways, nobody, of course, is taking the sentence about the "Chinese economic vassal" literally (at least, nobody should). But there is a grain of truth in it: there are reasons the broad West and China Russia's dominant trading partners, and they cannot be easily replaced. If Russia cuts itself off the West, it will be, to a much greater extent than now, the resource supplier for China - with whatever else that implies.

[politicus]

Besides its not all raw materials. Russia has 27 percent of global arms exports and this is a truly global market with Latin America and the Middle East being areas where Russia has gained market shares recently.

Oil is a global market, of course. Which means that the price is, more or less, the same across the world. If Russia is not exploiting its European pipeline, it is going to be the same wit gas. These prices will be going down, given the current technological developments. Russia crucially depends on them staying up. However, Russia's actions are spurring the technological advances that are going to accelerate their downward trend.

Weapons, of course, is another Russian export. Though, interestingly, this Russian industry has been quite integrated with... Ukraine So, buyers of certain Russian arms might find that maintenance (never a Russian strong point) is not very readily available, as spare parts were Ukrainian production (now likely to be discontinued). In any case, this industry is not big enough given Russia's size. What else do they export to, say, Latin America?

Anyways, nobody, of course, is taking the sentence about the "Chinese economic vassal" literally (at least, nobody should). But there is a grain of truth in it: there are reasons the broad West and China Russia's dominant trading partners, and they cannot be easily replaced. If Russia cuts itself off the West, it will be, to a much greater extent than now, the resource supplier for China - with whatever else that implies.

Oil and gas will increasingly become scarce commodities while demand increases keeping prices up.

China is not the only game in town. Why shouldn't Russia be able to cut into the Indian, Brazilian, Japanese and South Korean energy markets?

Anyway, the general trend in Russian economic policies lately seems to be focused on disentangling its economy from the West and gaining a more independent position.

Are the Ukrainian arms industry located mainly in the East or all over the country?

[ag]

Oil and gas will increasingly become scarce commodities while demand increases keeping prices up.

China is not the only game in town. Why shouldn't Russia be able to cut into the Indian, Brazilian, Japanese and South Korean energy markets?

Anyway, the general trend in Russian economic policies lately seems to be focused on disentangling its economy from the West and gaining a more independent position.

Are the Ukrainian arms industry located mainly in the East or all over the country?

The energy market (at least, the oil market - though, in the future, the entire world) is global, so, in a sense, it does not matter whom Russia sells to. In that sense, you are completely missing my point - it is already selling to the entire world, even if it is not   However, up till now, it has been able to exploit the peculiarities of gas distribution to have a peculiar relationship with Europe - that is going to be gone.  With respect to the rest of the world Russia is just another supplier - it will not have market power of its own. It can, of course, build pipelines to China, trying to replace the European relationship - but China will drive a good bargain, so, once again, Russia is unlikely to get any revenues above those of the global market. But Russian production is not as cheap as in the Middle East, so its profits will not be nearly as high.

And no, I do not believe the prices will grow. Every indication we have suggests that future energy prices will be lower than in recent past. The high oil and gas prices did lead to a lot of technological progress, making feasible extraction of a lot of previously unusable energy. Russia´s threat is going to make this change even faster. BTW, even Ukraine is now considered to have substantial (shale) gas reserves (currently estimated to be third largest in Europe): something that was not true until recently. A couple of years of stability, and Ukraine will likely be exporting to Europe, finding the new use for ex-Soviet pipelines.

Russia has very few trade agreements outside of its immediate hinterland. It is not a very attractive trade partner on anything other than oil and gas. It is not going to become more attractive overnight - high transportation costs, difficult trade policies, active use of "sanitary" pretexts to launch de facto embargos, political unpredictability, bad maintenance services, etc., are not going to disappear. Oil and gas is another story - but Russian behavior is ensuring that it is going to be just another player in a globally glutted market.

And, BTW, Japan is as much part of the West as, say, France. And with a serious territorial issue with Russia to boot.

[politicus]

I am not missing your point about Russian profits going down if they are just another player on the global market. My focus here is just different: If we assume (for the sake of argument and to clarify possibilities) that the Russian leadership a) really wants to reincorporate Eastern Ukraine and other areas with a Russian or Russian-speaking population and b) is prepared to risk isolation from the West and a loss of some income how are their options?

It was in this context that Ernest claimed they would have no choice, but to become a Chinese economic vassal and I counter argued.

Technology only takes you so far. At the end of the day oil and gas are nonrenewable resources, so in the long run prices will increase (unless we have a breakthrough on renewable energy) and I am a pessimist on this. We will get a few decades of cheaper energy and then prices will increase again. Demand is just growing too fast.

And, BTW, Japan is as much part of the West as, say, France. And with a serious territorial issue with Russia to boot.

Regarding Japan I don't see the Japanese following a US/EU boycott of Russia. Especially not with the present leadership.