Using County Clusters in LA

[muon2]

Why does chopping a minority county cluster generate a chop if there is not otherwise a 50% BVAP CD in play?  I guess I missed that nuance. What counties are in the Baton Rouge MCC, but not in the UCC? The pink circles on your map Muon2 are not a model of clarity to me.

There's no VRA for urban areas, but we found UCCs to be a useful construct that forms a proxy for a CoI that extends beyond a single county. When we discussed AL this last summer, you raised the concern that perhaps an extended set of contiguous counties with rural minorities should have the same status as a dense urban population. The contiguity requirement protected against leaps across white areas to force a minority CD. The result was the identification of MCCs as a CoI on a par with UCCs. It seemed that this was independent of whether the VRA would require a district in AL. As I have had 3 months to think about MCCs, it seems that recognition of the MCC CoI also helps defend a plan against a charge of undue dilution of minority votes, since cracking is just as bad as packing.

With AL we were left uncertain as to whether a 50% CD would be required, but we all duly observed the number of chops of the Black Belt UCC. Even if VRA didn't require a 50% BVAP district, we acted like the MCC was a construct that should be used in mapping. If the rules are consistently applied then they should apply in LA as well, even though none of the contiguous clusters reach 50% BVAP for a whole CD.

[muon2]

Some of the maps I've seen earlier in this thread bring to light a concern I've had with the UCC approach from the very beginning- that it can be used to justify drawing problematic districts under the umbrella of a UCC. For instance, upthread there we several maps proposing a district based in Orleans and St. Tammany Counties*. Under an approach that emphasizes UCCs exclusively, that looks great- it's an easy connection, compared to something that snakes around Lake Ponchartrain or splits Orleans. But as a CoI, it's absolutely terrible. It seems like, when it comes to fair maps, the big pitfalls of a UCC-based approach are rural minority areas (which train pointed out earlier- I'm not convinced MCCs really deal with this) and metro areas that are quite diverse in terms of CoI- this is an issue in NC as well.

IMO, the UCC approach needs to have room for local interests.

The UCC approach definitely includes local interest. The idea is to get a set of plans that are equally good based on a set of rational criteria. Then a local body would select a preferred option from that set of plans. A purely whole-county approach was shown to lead to optimal plans that carved up small metros (my Lansing chop was a good example) or permitted gerrymanders that caused urban areas to spoke out into rural areas more than necessary. The UCC provided a structure larger than a county to filter out those types of maps.

The rule set is designed to feature measures that can be defined objectively. CoIs have a habit of being defined after the fact by mapmakers to justify a particular grouping, and that lends them to their use in gerrymandering. This resolution is a good example of a post hoc justification for a politically gerrymandered map. However, some CoI criteria can be useful. UCCs and one example, and MCCs are just another multi-county construct that recognizes an objectively measureable CoI.

Does that make these perfect measures of the actual CoI? No, but that's why we explore their effect. Do such criteria improve overall the districts and decrease the likelihood of gerrymandering, even as they will clearly miss some cases?

[Torie]

Why does chopping a minority county cluster generate a chop if there is not otherwise a 50% BVAP CD in play?  I guess I missed that nuance. What counties are in the Baton Rouge MCC, but not in the UCC? The pink circles on your map Muon2 are not a model of clarity to me.

There's no VRA for urban areas, but we found UCCs to be a useful construct that forms a proxy for a CoI that extends beyond a single county. When we discussed AL this last summer, you raised the concern that perhaps an extended set of contiguous counties with rural minorities should have the same status as a dense urban population. The contiguity requirement protected against leaps across white areas to force a minority CD. The result was the identification of MCCs as a CoI on a par with UCCs. It seemed that this was independent of whether the VRA would require a district in AL. As I have had 3 months to think about MCCs, it seems that recognition of the MCC CoI also helps defend a plan against a charge of undue dilution of minority votes, since cracking is just as bad as packing.

With AL we were left uncertain as to whether a 50% CD would be required, but we all duly observed the number of chops of the Black Belt UCC. Even if VRA didn't require a 50% BVAP district, we acted like the MCC was a construct that should be used in mapping. If the rules are consistently applied then they should apply in LA as well, even though none of the contiguous clusters reach 50% BVAP for a whole CD.

I don't think a concern about splitting contiguous 40% black counties where a 50% BVAP CD is not in play is a legitimate concern. It generates erosity, etc., for no legitimate reason. The concern only arises when the VRA arises. I dissent, unless I am missing something, and I don't think I ever assented did I? If I did, I was out of it at the time.

[muon2]

Why does chopping a minority county cluster generate a chop if there is not otherwise a 50% BVAP CD in play?  I guess I missed that nuance. What counties are in the Baton Rouge MCC, but not in the UCC? The pink circles on your map Muon2 are not a model of clarity to me.

There's no VRA for urban areas, but we found UCCs to be a useful construct that forms a proxy for a CoI that extends beyond a single county. When we discussed AL this last summer, you raised the concern that perhaps an extended set of contiguous counties with rural minorities should have the same status as a dense urban population. The contiguity requirement protected against leaps across white areas to force a minority CD. The result was the identification of MCCs as a CoI on a par with UCCs. It seemed that this was independent of whether the VRA would require a district in AL. As I have had 3 months to think about MCCs, it seems that recognition of the MCC CoI also helps defend a plan against a charge of undue dilution of minority votes, since cracking is just as bad as packing.

With AL we were left uncertain as to whether a 50% CD would be required, but we all duly observed the number of chops of the Black Belt UCC. Even if VRA didn't require a 50% BVAP district, we acted like the MCC was a construct that should be used in mapping. If the rules are consistently applied then they should apply in LA as well, even though none of the contiguous clusters reach 50% BVAP for a whole CD.

I don't think a concern about splitting contiguous 40% black counties where a 50% BVAP CD is not in play is a legitimate concern. It generates erosity, etc., for no legitimate reason. The concern only arises when the VRA arises. I dissent, unless I am missing something, and I don't think I ever assented did I? If I did, I was out of it at the time.

But in LA a 50% CD is in play. It requires an erose connection between NO and BR, but such a district can be drawn, and as you have opined would likely be a legal district. The question for our rules is whether they, by their design have a discriminatory effect. One measure of discriminatory effect is vote dilution, and I suspect that a plan that did not have a 50% BVAP CD in LA would be the subject of a suit claiming vote dilution. The challenge for the rules is to ward off such suits and show that they have no discriminatory effect.

DoJ suits on minority vote dilution typically allege that there are one or more geographically compact regions of minority voting strength that are negatively impacted by electoral rules. When you made your suggestion that led to the AL MCC, that seemed like a good way to develop a rule that would address that type of allegation. The MCCs would show that the rules had identified those areas of geographically compact minority voting strength, and made reasonable accommodations to avoid vote dilution. A rule penalizing chops of MCCs in states with a significant minority population might increase erosity somewhat, but nowhere near as much as an unfettered attempt to force a 50%+ minority CD that links disconnected population centers.

[Torie]

If we assume that dilution is not illegal under the VRA given what SCOTUS did to Section 5, do you agree with my position, Mike? We might as well find out if all that is in play between us vis vis this little spat, is the scope and reach of the VRA. If that is the case, then of course, the finesse, is take your fork in the highway if legal advisors say that it is up to some odds (or just litigate and find out), and take my fork if it is not.

[muon2]

If we assume that dilution is not illegal under the VRA given what SCOTUS did to Section 5, do you agree with my position, Mike? We might as well find out if all that is in play between us vis vis this little spat, is the scope and reach of the VRA. If that is the case, then of course, the finesse, is take your fork in the highway if legal advisors say that it is up to some odds (or just litigate and find out), and take my fork if it is not.

I believe the vote dilution is as illegal as ever, it's just that it must be addressed under section 2. There are a number of DoJ complaints filed in the 2000's that targeted non-section 5 jurisdictions and alleged vote dilution. I see no reason to think that Shelby County v Holder would change the DoJ attitude on that score. Perhaps one of these post-Shelby County cases will provide a better sense of the odds on rules surviving section 2 challenges.

[Torie]

If we assume that dilution is not illegal under the VRA given what SCOTUS did to Section 5, do you agree with my position, Mike? We might as well find out if all that is in play between us vis vis this little spat, is the scope and reach of the VRA. If that is the case, then of course, the finesse, is take your fork in the highway if legal advisors say that it is up to some odds (or just litigate and find out), and take my fork if it is not.

I believe the vote dilution is as illegal as ever, it's just that it must be addressed under section 2. There are a number of DoJ complaints filed in the 2000's that targeted non-section 5 jurisdictions and alleged vote dilution. I see no reason to think that Shelby County v Holder would change the DoJ attitude on that score. Perhaps one of these post-Shelby County cases will provide a better sense of the odds on rules surviving section 2 challenges.

So I take it that you agree with my statement?

[muon2]

If we assume that dilution is not illegal under the VRA given what SCOTUS did to Section 5, do you agree with my position, Mike? We might as well find out if all that is in play between us vis vis this little spat, is the scope and reach of the VRA. If that is the case, then of course, the finesse, is take your fork in the highway if legal advisors say that it is up to some odds (or just litigate and find out), and take my fork if it is not.

I believe the vote dilution is as illegal as ever, it's just that it must be addressed under section 2. There are a number of DoJ complaints filed in the 2000's that targeted non-section 5 jurisdictions and alleged vote dilution. I see no reason to think that Shelby County v Holder would change the DoJ attitude on that score. Perhaps one of these post-Shelby County cases will provide a better sense of the odds on rules surviving section 2 challenges.

So I take it that you agree with my statement?

I agree that my implementation of your suggestion finesses a potential vulnerability of the rules to a VRA challenge. However, until there is clarifying litigation, I prefer the risk-averse choice of using the MCCs. I'll put together some examples and we can see if the use of MCCs does too much damage.

[muon2]

Here are some examples to chew on showing the impact of regional metrics and UCC/MCC metrics.

Louisiana has 5 regions with the NOLA region served by two CDs. For regional metrics I measure average population deviation from the quota and erosity. Average deviation is used as a simpler but closely correlated measure to jimrtex's population shifts. Erosity is given for both jimrtex's connections and my stricter rule that requires a path of state highways between two counties (parishes) that don't cross into a third county. I also use the rule that a disconnected piece of a county is treated as an independent county for connection purposes. Links that are permitted in jimrtex's metric but not in mine are shown in pink in the map below. Those links are consistent with a policy that allows local jurisdictions to add connections between contiguous counties that don't meet the strict rule, and in any case it has no effect on the relative erosity of these examples.



For district plan metrics I measure chops, erosity, and inequality. UCC chops and MCC chops use the clusters I posted earlier. Chops of counties are made to preserve municipalities and generally follow parish districts where no municipalities are present. The chop score adds county, UCC and MCC chops, but not microchops. County chops and microchops are both used in the erosity score which is based on my set of links from the map above. The inequality is measured with population range to reflect the difference in the voting power between the persons in the most and least populous district.

The first plan is based on jimrtex's region plan posted on Aug 31 before the discussion of MCCs. There are no UCC chops and two chopped MCCs. The region erosity is 36 (or 38 with extra links) and the av dev is 0.50%. To form districts within 0.5% of the quota there is one county chop within the NOLA region and two microchops between regions. The chop of Jefferson is in two fragments to avoid any municipal chops. The chop score is 3, district erosity score is 41 and the inequality score is 10 (range of 5,349 or 0.708%).

[muon2]

In this plan (muon2d) I have maintained all UCCs as intact, but reduced the MCC chops to one. Tangipahoa is the one county chop, and it counts as part of the NOLA region. However, the population shift reflected in the Tangipahoa chop exceeds 5% of the quota and would be disallowed if that were a rule. The region erosity is 33 (36 with the extra links) and the average deviation is 2.96%.

There is a microchop in Jefferson county that picks up two precincts from one municipality. The choice of two precincts here is in Gretna, and Obama narrowly won CD 1 in 2008, but shifting to two Metairie precincts would flip CD 1 to McCain. The chop score is 2, district erosity score is 39, and inequality score is 10 (range of 5434 or 0.719%).

The preservation of the MCC did not hurt the erosity here, though the question of chop size in Tangipahoa is now opened. The erosity is actually lower here than in the previous plan and the score could be reduced one more by using CD 4 from the previous plan at the expense of a microchop.

[muon2]

In this plan (muon2e) I have maintained all MCCs as intact but allowed a chop of the BR UCC. Ascension counts in the BR region and all regional shifts are within 5%. The region erosity is 35 (38 with extra links) and the average deviation is 1.36%.

Now there are two chops, but no microchops. The chop in Jefferson includes all of Kenner and some are south of the river that also splits no munis. The chop in Ascension also avoids muni chops. The chop score is 3, the district erosity score is 38, and the inequality score is 11 (range of 5693 or 0.753%).

The district erosity score is actually the lowest of the three plans I'm comparing here even as it maintains MCCs. It also would rate best on political measures since CD 2 would be a competitive lean D district and CD 6 could be a competitive lean R district. The other two plans have no lean D districts and one competitive lean R district.

This plan also raises another question about UCC chops. The chop of the BR UCC leads to a UCC chop and a county chop. In muon2d, the chop of Tangipahoa only generated a county chop, since we have not counted single county UCCs, which includes Tangipahoa. If they counted as UCCs then the chop score for muon2d would also be 3.