Could Sleswick-Holstein have remained Danish?

[politicus]

After 1814-16 the Kingdom of Denmark and the duchies of Sleswick and Holstein constituted a conglomerate state called Helstaten (the whole or entire state). In 1864 the the Danish king lost the duchies comprising about 40% of his former subjects to Prussia and Austria (who lost their share to Prussia in 1866) and the conglomerate state was thereby absolved and the small Danish nation state emerged. Was this unavoidable? And what would have been the likely faith of such a country?

Joking aside OTL border while not perfect, was not a bad choice, yes I personal think that Denmark should have adopted an Eider border after WWII (without expelling the Germans and it should respect their right to their own language) where we could have gotten away with it. But with hindsight it was no disaster that it didn't happen.

In fact, there was quite a movement after WW II to also have Holstein returning to Denmark, along the lines of "What has becoming part of Germany brought us - two World Wars and economic hardship afterwards". The movement was rather short-lived and died out with the German "Wirtschaftswunder", but as I have mentioned elsewhere, there were definitely worse places to live in than 18th century Schleswig-Holstein under Danish rule. Had Denmark not allied with Napoleon, and refrained from the stupid "Danisation policies" after 1848, the border would probably still be on the Elbe (and you speaking German as well as you speak Danish, or we both speaking some kind of "Platt"). Note also this:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altonaer_Freiheit

Disagree with the bolded parts and will return to those when I get the time.

[Franknburger]

Originally posted here
https://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=188070.msg4069196#msg4069196
but replicated for reference reasons. The post cited by politicus above has been deleted from the a/m thread:


For all those enjoying to draw new borders, here another case: Schleswig, the northern part of which was returned to Denmark after WW I. To enhance the fun, you get several maps:


1838 linguistic map (large PDF here). Blue=German, Red=Danish, Yellow=Frisian, Light Greeen: German prevailing, Dark Purple: Danish prevailing, Dark Green: German as church language.




1867 election map (Constitutional Assembly of the North German Federation) for the Danish Party.


Danish mother tongue as per the 1905 census


Outcome of the 1920 plebiscite (a masterpiece in gerrymandering, btw., conveniently ignoring county borders). I have seen other, smaller maps showing the northernmost tip of the island of Sylt voting >75% Danish.


.. and how the Danish (blue) and German (red) governments felt the results should be interpreted.

Frisian independence wasn't a ballot option, btw.

[politicus]

Okay, Ill give it a go:

1. It was hardly possible for Denmark to stay out of the Napoleonic Wars, we tried by joining an armed neutrality federation with Russia and Sweden but was attacked by the British in 1801 and again in 1807 where we lost our navy, cutting off communication lines to Norway and leaving those across Denmark highly vulnerable.

Denmark might have done more to ensure that French cargo wasn't transported on Danish ships, thereby breaking the British blockade of continental harbours, but the real reason for the attack on Copenhagen in 1807 was that the Admiralty didn't want to risk that the Danish navy - the second largest in Europe and considered a high quality force - ended up on the French side under any circumstances - whether they be occupation or alliance.
To avoid the Bombardement of Copenhagen Denmark and theft of the navy Denmark should have joined the British side, which would have meant French occupation of the Jutland peninsula sooner or later and was therefore unacceptable.

After the loss of the navy Denmark could have gone back to neutrality, but without a navy that would likely have meant a French occupation of the duchies, Jutland and Fionia and British occupation of the eastern Islands. As the gateway to the Baltic Sea Denmark was too strategically important to remain a defenseless power vacuum. Joining Britain would have been very humiliating and Britian didn't have the capacity to defend the Jutland peninsula, so again you get a carved up Denmark.
So staying out of the war wasn't really an option, but there are two other outcomes, which potentially changes the outcome of the Sleswick-Holstein question.

A. Bernadotte doesn't become Swedish crown prince. The election of marshall Bernadotte as Swedish Crown Prince in 1810 was a highly unlikely outcome with great consequences. The idea started among junior officers in the Swedish army hoping that the famous marshall could lead Sweden to victory over the Russians and regaining the lost (1809) Finland. The plan only succeeded because Frederick 6. of Denmark blocked the duke of Augustenborg (his own vassal in Sleswick) from accepting the position after his brother the former crown prince (and also the governor general in Norway), who had died after a fall from his horse during a parade. Frederick hoped to reinvigorate the old medieval Kalmar Union and become king of a united Scandinavia, but this idea (which had been suggested before under a previous 18th century vacancy of the Swedish throne) was unacceptable to all Swedish estates except the peasantry, so it was a no go.
Instead the delay gave the Bernadotte idea  time to mature and gain popularity and he ended up being elected crown prince and quickly becoming in charge of Swedens foreign policy. He ditched the "lets reconquer Finland" dream (he was offered Finland by Napoleon, but thought Finland would soon be lost to the ascending Russia)  for the idea of gaining Norway from Denmark and uniting the Scandinavian peninsula under his rule.

With the relatively Danish friendly, unimpressive and conservative Duke as Swedish Crown Prince there is no Swedish claim to Norway and since the British didn't have any deep desire to dismantle Denmark-Norway and the Russians favoured status quo Denmark-Norway survives the war poor, but territorially intact (except Helgoland). Once the Oldenborg dynasty dies out in 1863 the Augustenburgs are the obvious successors in this scenario (their claim to the throne was in many ways just as good as the Glücksburgs and as Swedish Kings I doubt the Augustenborgs would have joined the rebels in 1848, since it would have been much too risky a move with comparatively little to gain). A united Scandinvaia would have been a much harder and less appealing opponent for Bismarck and had he tried to conquer Slewick-holstein in this scenario it would have triggered some British and Russian intervention to prevent a major war in the Baltic region. So its possible that Sleswick-Holstein remains atached to a united Scandinavia.
With their family history the Augustenborgs would have secured a constitutional solution that would have been attractive to the Sleswick-Holsteiners, but not totally unacceptable to the Danes, probably a division of Sleswick (likely north of Tonder and south of Flensborg, which would have been the fair dividing line at the time) and (Southern) Sleswick-Holstein forming a separate country in the Scandinavian Federation.


B. Switching side after Napoleons retreat from Moscow in 1812 as championed by Foreign Secretary Niels Rosenkrnatz, but stubbornly rejected by the King. Since Bernadotte had already been promised Norway by the Zar this kingdom would have been lost, but it would likely have been possible to keep Holstein (annexed in 1806 after the break up of the Holy Roman Empire) out of the new German Federation, thereby losing the possibility of Sleswick-Holsteiners appealing to the Diet in Frankfurt and the legal excuse for Prussia and Austria to interfere in the duchies relations to Denmark. This framework is much more beneficial for some joint constitution between the three entities, but its still far from certain.

[politicus]

2. While the Regenburg prescripts trying to re-Danify the northern part of the area there Danish dialects had been replaced by Low German in the 1800-1840 language change obviously gave a lot of ammunition to the Sleswick-Holstein separatists (and backfired in making the population of Middle Sleswick more anti-Danish) their importance is generally greatly exaggerated. Basically the 30s and 40s national mobilization on both sides and the 1848-1851 civil war between the two nationalities in the realm had created a situation in which any pretext of Danish "repression" could have been used by the Sleswick-Holsteinian side to appeal to their German brethren for help. The Regensburg prescript made it easier, but wrere by no means necessary.

And since the Prussian establishment needed a war to justify their enormous increases in military spending and test their military machine they would have found a casus belli somehow.

A civil war ending with a grat power enforced shot gun marriage between two sides that don't want to share a common country is a hopeless background for a common state.

3. The idea of a common language developing is very far fetched. Danish and Low German (Platt) are more different than they appear to be on surface. Even if 30% of the Danish vocabulary was borrowed from Low German in late medieval era it is still a Nordic language in core vocabulary, syntax and grammar and there is no dialect continuum between the two languages to facilitate a common creole dialect as the base for a new language.
Also Danish had the university in Copenhagen and its own intellectual and artistic community eager to protect its linguistic tradition. While the platt speakers used Standard German as their prestigious literary and official language, which acted as a safe guard against any influence of Danish on it.

Only in the case of Danish becoming the language of school and church in Platt speaking areas is there a small chance of a creole occurring, but this would be a low status language without the possibility of becoming a common national standard language.

(regarding the Danish vocabulary of Low German origin those words have been "Nordizied" over the centuries and also quite often have different meanings from the Low German words they originated from)

[Franknburger]

Thank you for your interesting and detailed statements, politicus. While preparing an answer, I came across the memoirs of  Hamburg-born Danish diplomat, Johann Georg Rist , which provides some fascinating, but also quite lengthy insight on the Napoleonic period, possibly also subsequent development:
https://ia600305.us.archive.org/14/items/lebenserinnerung02ristuoft/lebenserinnerung02ristuoft.pdf

I am still in the middle of reading (currently summer 1813), but have of course already realised that Rist - Danish Ambassador to Britain in 1807, and 1808-1813 Danish Chargé d' Affaires in Hamburg, as such first dealing with Bernadotte, and afterwards with Davout - had his own agenda in the memoirs....

Anyway, to cut a long story short - I will come back on your posts, but ask you for a bit of patience. In the meantime, this compilation might be interesting to you:
http://star.dcbib.dk/publikationer/065_Zwischen_Grenzkonflikt_und_Grenzfrieden.pdf
[It should also be available in Danish somewhere, but I have so far only been able to retrieve the German version.] 

[politicus]

Its a shorter and apparently "tighter" version of "Sydslesvigs danske historie" (the Danish history of Southern Sleswick) from 2009, which was on 356 p.

I have read it at some point.

Looking forward to your answer. Especially if you can come up with a credible contrafactual way to construct such a state.

My main point was that you need to go back before the 1848-51 civil war and change some factors if you want to construct a D-S-H state. I don't see it happening after that point.

Nationalism erupted all over Western and Central Europe in the 1830s and 1840s and it would be difficult to butterfly away the national mobilization on both sides in that era and the conflict over the area of Sleswick that had recently changed its language.

Luxembourg stayed under a Dutch monarch until 1890, but their identity is also more different from the general German (however you define that..)  than Holstein. Still, it may be a parallel to be considered.

A few Holsteinian soldiers (around 1500 if I remember correctly) fought on the Danish side in 1864 singing songs like "Ich bin ein Däne, ich will ein Däne sind", so there were some pro-Danish sentiments left in parts of the Holstein peasant population, but by and large I see the civil war and the preceding national mobilization in Sleswick as too divisive events. And then you got the iron will of Bismarck. The odds are hard!

[Franknburger]

Funny that you mentioned Luxemburg - for  a change, I just checked a bit on the German Federation (Deutscher Bund) and came across the Luxemburg and Limburg cases that bear obvious parallels to Holstein and Schleswig. Luxemburg refused to join the German Empire, but remained part of the Customs Union (Zollverein) until 1919. With its coal and iron resources, it could have been an equally, if not more attractive target to Bismarck's expansionism. For a number of reasons (lack of a casus belli, family bonds between the Prussian and Dutch kingdoms, etc.), it was spared - but those reasons may deserve some more in-depth checking. In any case, being "un-German" seems to be among the less plausible aspects, considering that four German Emperors came from the House of Luxemburg.

As I am anyway writing now, here a few, still partly unchecked observations / hypotheses:

1. Nationalism is of course a key. As far as German nationalism is concerned, it started in the Napoleonic Wars, and, the more I am reading, the more I think that actually 1808-1818 is the period that decided Schleswig-Holstein's fate.

2. Rist didn't have a problem to be a Danish patriot and a German nationalist at the same time. There is also evidence of a strong Danish patriotic mood in Holstein after the first British bombardment in 1801. The town of Wilster, e.g., collected donations for rebuilding the Danish navy, and transferred them to Copenhagen. In a similar way, Pomeranians don't seem to have had problems reconciling German identity with being subjects of the Swedish crown.  

3. I don't know whether the 1807 alliance with France was in general unavoidable. If at all, clever Danish diplomacy around 1800/ 1801 could have made a change, but I agree that by 1806/07, the alliance was unavoidable. French occupation of Lübeck in 1806, which was the last act of a series of breaking the city's neutrality by first Sweden, then Prussia, and ultimately France, was a clear sign that none of the war parties had any respect for declared neutrality. British bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807 was a further point in case. It might be theoretically interesting to discuss whether Denmark - Schleswig-Holstein would have ultimately been better served by allying with Britain instead of France, but after the 1807 Copenhagen bombardment, an alliance with Britain had become politically unthinkable, so allying with France was the only option left.

4. The 1807-1812 period but obvious hardships on Holstein, but presumably also on other parts of the realm. Smuggling colonial and British goods appears to have been a quite lucrative business for some time, but massively distorted economic structures. Until 1810 (i.e. as long as Bernadotte had the command along the border), French customs were quite corrupt, and local Danish authorities quickly followed the example, so "big business" remained relatively unharmed, while the "have-nots" could gain some income from petty smuggling. Small business, however, suffered considerably, fishing was severely contained in order to (symbolically) curb down on smuggling. After 1810, the blockade was enforced more rigorously, which lead to the fall of several large trading houses. The ports of Tönning and Husum were officially closed in 1811. Restrictions to trade across the Elbe cut into traditional local trade patterns (e.g. breweries in Holstein sourcing hops from Luneburg). Moreover, to contain smuggling, three customs / traffic inspection lines were installed across Holstein (Neustadt-Segeberg-Itzehoe-Brunsbüttel being the southernmost), which heavily affected local trade, and provided additional opportunities for extracting bribes. Last but not least, the port of Lübeck, after having been incorporated into the French Empire, lost virtually all traffic to Mecklenburg ports (presumably an attractive alternative smuggling destination from Copenhagen / southern Sweden), which of course affected negatively on its periphery. As I have said - other parts of the realm were probably also hit quite hard, but - asides from Norway - it seems Holstein and the lower Schleswig west coast were hit hardest.

5. The next act was the 1813 state bankruptcy, which stem from the decline in formal business activity and, accordingly, tax revenue. It lead to the creation of the National Bank in Copenhagen, and currency reform. In the process, the previously independent Bank of the Duchies in Altona, and the stable and well-recognised Holsteinische Courant were abolished. As the latter had been pegged to the Hamburger Mark and Lübsche Mark, this affected negatively on local trade. The new currency was never gaining acceptance with the population in Holstein, which switched to using the Hamburger Mark instead. In 1841, almost thirty years after the currency reform, the Danish National Bank reintroduced the old currency again by issuing coins bearing both denominations.
Simultaneously to currency reform, all landowners were submitted to a 6% property tax, payable in hard cash only (i.e. not in banknotes and government bonds) - a burden many farmers as well as larger landowners could not shoulder.  While in Denmark proper, the tax on smaller estates was shortly afterwards reduced to 1%, farmers in the Duchies had to pay the full 6%. Moreover, to compensate for the revenue loss resulting from the tax reduction in Denmark proper, the Duchies had to raise another 5 million Rijksdaler from other taxes. This caused numerous bankruptcies and foreclosure sales of farms.

In essence: The common man in Holstein (possibly also in Schleswig, but I haven't found sources describing the situation there) saw its government unable to maintain economic stability, but instead increasingly overregulating business and getting corrupted. Government bonds get worthless, a stable local currency is replaced by a new one that isn't accepted abroad (i.e. in Hamburg and Lübeck), and confiscatory taxes are introduced and collected stringently, in obvious discrimination against landowners in Denmark proper. And, ultimately, all this hardship isn't helping to keep war away from the territory (at least not away from Holstein, Denmark managed to make peace when the enemy had reached the Eider).  Is it any wonder that Holstein's loyalty suffered? Today, we would call this a "failed state".

[Franknburger]

So staying out of the war wasn't really an option, but there are two other outcomes, which potentially changes the outcome of the Sleswick-Holstein question.

A. Bernadotte doesn't become Swedish crown prince.

With the relatively Danish friendly, unimpressive and conservative Duke as Swedish Crown Prince there is no Swedish claim to Norway and since the British didn't have any deep desire to dismantle Denmark-Norway and the Russians favoured status quo Denmark-Norway survives the war poor, but territorially intact (except Helgoland).

That is a very interesting scenario, indeed. From Rist's memoirs, it seems to me that Norway was already on the Swedish "wish list" in 1807,as, after the Copenhagen bombardment,  the British offered Denmark support against that Swedish claim if Denmark, in spite of the bombardment, entered into alliance with Britain. Russia's interest was of course to have Sweden going after other bait than Finland, so they would still have offered support to Sweden in gaining Norway. However, the Duke of Augustenburg on the Swedish throne would have meant the possibility that Sweden could have gone for all of Denmark, which would have it becoming a bit too powerful for Russian taste, so Russia probably would have acted a bit more indirectly. There is also the possibility that without the versed politician Bernadotte, Swedish diplomacy and alliance-building would have been similarly dull as Denmark's, which could have given Denmark a better possibility to join the winning side and leave Sweden out in the cold.

Another question is what would have become of Bernadotte in that case. When approached by Swedish politicians, he had already put down Napoleon's offer to become Governor of Rome, and instead 'privatised' in Paris. As Napoleon wanted to keep him away from the capital, he would probably have offered another prestigious post. Governorship in the annexed Netherlands (which Bernadotte had just defended against a British invasion), or returning to his previous post as Governor of the Hanseatic cities (1807-09) come to mind here.
I know I am getting extremely speculative, but one possible scenario could be Napoleon, instead of annexing the coastal territories and the Hanseatic Cities to France, merging the Duchy of Hannover with the Hanseatic Cities into another Rheinbund state and passing the regency to Bernadotte. Bernadotte had been Governor of Hannover in 1804/05, and negotiations about the Hanseatic Cities joining the Rheinbund were on-going in 1809/1810. Such a scenario would have had far-reaching implications:
- Oldenburg would have remained formally independent, thereby removing a main cause for the Russian War (and providing Napoleon with leverage to influence Russia's policy);
- Denmark wouldn't have become a direct neighbour of France, so Holstein would have suffered far less from France's customs policy cutting into established trade links across the Elbe (and, of course, with Lauenburg). In addition, Bernadotte would probably have been open to a more "liberal" trade policy (as long as it suited his personal finances) than Davout. Both factors would have stabilised Holstein's economic situation, and also Denmark's budget.

B. Switching side after Napoleons retreat from Moscow in 1812[/b] as championed by Foreign Secretary Niels Rosenkrnatz, but stubbornly rejected by the King. Since Bernadotte had already been promised Norway by the Zar this kingdom would have been lost, but it would likely have been possible to keep Holstein (annexed in 1806 after the break up of the Holy Roman Empire) out of the new German Federation, thereby losing the possibility of Sleswick-Holsteiners appealing to the Diet in Frankfurt and the legal excuse for Prussia and Austria to interfere in the duchies relations to Denmark. This framework is much more beneficial for some joint constitution between the three entities, but its still far from certain.

Denmark's foreign policy in Spring 1813 is indeed a text-book case of always taking decisions too late, and not having a clear pro-active strategy. Rist's memoirs point at a number of missed opportunities:

1. By the beginning of 1813, Hamburg had been stripped of almost all French troops. Most of the remaining garrison left towards Magdeburg in early February. Denmark could have used the opportunity to move most of the Army into Holstein (this was actually requested by the French, but refused by Copenhagen), and, at the point deemed most appropriate, switched sides. A combined force of around 20,000 Danish plus 10,000 Hanseatic troops would have been sizeable enough to overcome the few French troops left in Northern Germany, and Hamburg (possibly also part of the Duchy of Hannover) in Danish control would have been a quite powerful argument to promote a favourable settlement with Britain.  Denmark could have at least restored Oldenburg rule in the Holstein part (Eutin area), and (with help from Bremen) made its way into Oldenburg proper. Both actions could have sufficed to side-line Sweden. A more pro-active diplomacy (e,g, sending envoys to Britain already in January 1813, and not just in April when the British-Swedish alliance had already been concluded) would also have helped in this respect.

2. The Hamburg rebellion of 24 February, 1813 effectively ended French control, remaining French troops fled the city on March 12. During this period, Denmark had ample opportunity to take over the city, either as "liberators", or in complying with official French requests to do so. Instead, it left it to Russian major Tettenborn to "liberate" Hamburg on March 18, 1813 with only few hundred soldiers.

3. When it became apparent that the small Russian contingent would be insufficient to defend Hamburg, Denmark started a  disastrous zigzag policy: On April 10, the King ordered occupation of Hamburg and Lübeck (especially to prevent a possible Swedish landing in Lübeck), while officially remaining neutral in the continental war. This just served to increase Russia's distrust, which wasn't prepared (yet)  to give up control on Hamburg. When French troops returned towards Hamburg, Danish troops were in early May officially ordered to defend the city, which, as such defence would have taken place alongside Russian troops, de-facto meant a declaration of war on France (that, however, wasn't backed up by any official alliance with Russia). Danish officials in Holstein played on time, until ultimately, on May 16, the direction was reversed and the King ordered all Danish troops to leave Hamburg and fight alongside French troops, as attempts to make peace with Britain had failed. it took two more weeks, including a short intermezzo of Swedish troops arriving in Hamburg, until ultimately, on May 30, Danish troops entered Hamburg again and subsequently handed it over to Davout.
Rist (himself a key actor in the events) notes in his memoirs:

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In short, there have been numerous missed opportunities to at least keep the war out of Holstein, possibly even keeping Norway, and deepening political and economic ties with the Hanseatic Cities. Rist even mentions Russian diplomats several times offering the Hanseatic Cities, or at least Lübeck, to Denmark if it joined the alliance.
Such outcome would obviously have implied stronger, not less interaction with the German Federation, but ultimately also more Danish leverage to affect the course of discussion.

I, btw, hardly see a possibility for Denmark to keep its realm excluded from the German Federation's influence. Lauenburg, which was offered to Denmark as compensation for Norway, would definitely have remained within the Federation - I even assume it to have been the "wedding present" for Holstein joining the Federation. In view of the manifold exclaves of Oldenburg, Hamburg and Lübeck that could only be reached via Danish (Holstein) territory, a certain "superstructure" was definitely required. For Hamburg's possession of Cuxhaven (and for regulating traffic on the Elbe), that superstructure needed to include the Duchy of Hannover as well. A regional set-up (Denmark, Hanseatic Cities, Hannover/Britain, Oldenburg/Russia) would for obvious reasons have been unacceptable to Austria and Prussia, possibly also other states further upstream the Elbe. Last but not least, after the economic hardship suffered from Napoleon closing trade across the Elbe, Holstein itself had a vital interest in being represented in discussion of the German Federation's economic and customs policy, as had the Copenhagen treasury.

[ingemann]

Interesting discussion, I sorry to join the debate this late.

A few thought the loss of Schleswig-Holstein was in my opinion primary caused by a mix of external factors and Danish foreign policy stupidity. Yes some of the Danish domestic policies was counter productive. But if Denmark had a clear succession after Frederik 7, we would likely still have a Danish-Holsteinian union.
If I really have to focus on the point where the solution could have been reached with no war at all, was if Christian 8 had established a limited democracy, which had favoured the old elite and created a strong royal position. In that case there would have no excused for the Holstein uprising later, and we could likely have seen a less messy succession to Frederik 7, of course the result had likely been that the pro-German Frederik Christian August of Schlesvig-Holstein-Sönderburg-Augustenburg had become Danish king in 1863.

[politicus]

To Frankenburger:

Norway was indeed on the Swedish "wish list" from 1807 on and that was the main reason the Governor General of Norway was chosen as heir to the Swedish throne in 1809, as it was believed he could deliver Norway at some point in the future. But it is not before the Russians agree that Bernadotte shall receive Norway as a reward for siding against Napoleon, that the loss of Norway becomes unavoidable which makes it impossible for Rosenkrantz and others to persuade Frederick VI to switch sides.

Prior to the Swedish loss of Finland in 1809, there is no Russian interest in Swedish possesion of Norway. Denmark-Norway was a historical and "natural" ally of Russia through most of the 18th century (with the interval of Gottorps on the Zar throne as an exception) and Russia viewed it as a good counter balance against Sweden.

I dont see Oldenburg as central to the French-Russian war.
The rivaly between Napoleon and the Zar over the domination of Europe, Russian anxiety that Napoleon planned to reestablish Poland and the Russian wish to get rid of the cripling effect of the blockade/ Napoleons irritation over Russians not enforcing the blockade properly - all gives amble reasons for the war even without the French occupying Oldenburg.

I doubt the Augustenburgs would or could have gone for all of Denmark. They where on friendly terms with the Oldenburg dynasty back then + Denmark had a legitimate heir to the throne and the major powers preferred dynastic legitimacy when possible.

Your description of the various opportunities in Northern Germany 1813 is interesting and a lot of it is new to me, but giving the close personal relationship between Bernadotte and the Zar (who even wanted to make him King of France) at this point I still don't think there is any possibility of Denmark keeping Norway, and this was the essential thing for Frederick VI. Sidelining Sweden is also hard to see happening for the same reason.

Launburg was (as you of course know) the meagre trade off for Swedish Pomerania (incl. Rügen), which Denmark had been promised in Kiel, but the Prussians wanted. I agree that it could not have been kept out of the German Confederation, but that is less central regarding S-H. The Danish government dragged its feet about Holstein joining the Confederation as it only happened in 1816, the year after Lauenburg. You are right, that it made sense economically, but I definitely think  they would have wanted a so central part of the realm to be outside of a foreign union. If Denmark had been on the winning side in the war an exchange of various border areas would have solved the enclave problem or made it much less pressing.

[politicus]

One of the main differences between Luxembourg and Sleswick is that there was no language change prior to its (third and final) partition in 1839 following the Belgian revolution. With a stable linguistic border there wasn't much room for national mobilisation around the issue and the fact that this division happened prior to the second wave of nationalism in the 1840s made it even less problematic. The tiny Luxembourg Duchy's capitol and main fortress was garrisoned by Prussia and hence it was under Prussian control making it less of a priority to change its formal status.
In 1865 Bismarck had actually agreed to Napoleon III acquiring Luxembourg from the Dutch King (possibly thinking he would get it back later after defeating France..), but had to change course in 1867 when Napoleon III tried to buy it when this enraged public opinion all over Germnay.

I think the main factor that made it impossible to construct a D-S-H state was the language change happening in central Sleswick 1800-1840. Since Danes could not accept that the areas that had spoken Danish (ie Southern Jutlandic) a generation or two ago was now German it was impossible to agree on a dividing line in Sleswick and this would have been essential for any common state to continue into the modern era as you need a Holstein-Southern Sleswick in union with an enlarged Kingdom of Denmark to satisfy public opinion in Denmark.

While the economic hardships during the Napoleonic Wars undoubtedly played a role in alienating people in Sleswick-Holstein I still view this as less important compared to the language issue.

I don't see any way Denmark could have allied with Britain without being at least partially occupied by France. It would be interesting to hear why you believe that was possible. Regarding  diplomatic possibilities there were in 1800/01 I would also be interested as to what options (I assume thats = options for remainig neutral and getting the Brits to accept that) you are thinking about.

[Franknburger]

@Ingermann: I will later come to your point - the whole issue of constitution/ democracy / representation is very interesting, but I need to do some more reading before commenting in detail. My original hypothesis was that a more liberal development in the Danish realm could actually have made it a champion of German liberals, thereby neutralising the 1848 national-liberal impetus. However, it seems that Holstein was among the most conservative parts of the German Federation and Denmark, respectively, and happy to have the German Federation protecting it from awful developments taking place in Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Baden and elsewhere. I need to do some more reading, but feel free to already comment on the above. [Holstein nobility, which also run a good part of the show in Copenhagen, actually seems to have been quite a disaster in those days]

I think the main factor that made it impossible to construct a D-S-H state was the language change happening in central Sleswick 1800-1840. Since Danes could not accept that the areas that had spoken Danish (ie Southern Jutlandic) a generation or two ago was now German it was impossible to agree on a dividing line in Sleswick and this would have been essential for any common state to continue into the modern era as you need a Holstein-Southern Sleswick in union with an enlarged Kingdom of Denmark to satisfy public opinion in Denmark.

The linguistic perspective is very interesting. From that German translation of  "Sydslesvigs danske historie", I have taken away the message that even in 1864, national identity in Schleswig wasn't exclusively related to language:
1.On one hand, there were a number of Danish patriots in Flensburg who put down their feelings on the war in German language, be it in diary entries or in letters to friends.
2. OTOH, in 1864, several communities in Flensburg and Tondern counties were given the opportunity to vote on the school and church language. All communities voted  in large majority for German as school language, though several of them preferred Danish as church language Page 54 in the German version reads:

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This indicates to me that it would be oversimplifying the issue of German vs. Danish allegiance in Schleswig in 1864 to linguistics. It was much more complex: There were German-speaking royalists who remained true to their King- There were probably also many urban liberals, who saw their case better served by Denmark (Copenhagen) than Bismarck. OTOH, most Danish-speaking locals in rural areas preferred their kids learning German in school - after all, the farm's future depended on the cattle trade to Hamburg.

As such, while recognising Bismarck's militarism and expansionism, I would appreciate your assessment of whether Danish (Copenhagen) nationalist sentiment was really helpful. I should add it this context that my grand-grand mother is from the Flensburg area, and my grand-grand uncle served in the Danish Navy.

[politicus]

it would be oversimplifying the issue of German vs. Danish allegiance in Schleswig in 1864 to linguistics. It was much more complex: There were German-speaking royalists who remained true to their King- There were probably also many urban liberals, who saw their case better served by Denmark (Copenhagen) than Bismarck. OTOH, most Danish-speaking locals in rural areas preferred their kids learning German in school - after all, the farm's future depended on the cattle trade to Hamburg.

I am in no way trying to allege that allegiance equals language. There is no direct correlation between language and identity in Sleswick in this era (or later for that matter, you have South Jutlandic dialect speakers South of the border identifying as Germans as late as the 1930s - seeing no problem being good Germans while speaking a Danish dialect until the Nazi authorities told them otherwise).

In the mid-1800s you have Platt speaking Flensburg being a Danish stronghold in central Sleswick.

(Having said this there obviously was some correlation.)

The point is that in nationalist ideology such a correlation is supposed to exist and for the Danish National Liberals and the left wing in Friends of the Peasants the nortward march of the German language and culture was something that had to be stopped in order to preserve Danish national culture and create a nation state. This could only be accomplished by establishing a line of demarcation in Sleswick (or preferably between Sleswick and Holstein). Furthermore they could not accept this line of demarcation being further North than Dannevirke -Slien/Schlei which was the linguistic border around 1800. Even tough most National Liberals where for a short while willing to accept a line South of Flensborg at the end of the 1848-1851 First Sleswick War.

My main point is that if the linguistic border had been fairly stable (as in Luxembourg) this feeling of Danish culture and language being endangered would not have been such a powerful factor.

Your remark about the peasants wanting to be taught in German is only valid South of the old School and Church language line (which is roughly 5 km North of the present border). The peasants in Northern Sleswick had no wish to switch to German (even tough they obviously would like their children to learn German).

I would appreciate your assessment of whether Danish (Copenhagen) nationalist sentiment was really helpful.

I am a bit puzzled by this question. Since the aim of Danish nationalists was to get rid of Holstein and incorporate Sleswick they obviously weren't helpful if your goal is retain a unified state.

[politicus]

To Frankenburger;

We have had a lot of balls in the air in this discussion and perhaps its time to simplify and clarify things.

There are three things you need to take care of, if you want to create a D-S-H state and make it last into the present.

1. You need to create an international context in which Prussia will abstain from trying to conquer or otherwise annex Holstein and Sleswick.

2. In Holstein and Southern Sleswick you need to convince German speakers and people attached to German culture that staying in such a state is more attractive than joining a united Germany.

3. In Denmark you need to establish a situation where Holstein is not seen as a liability and a threat towards Danish national interests and culture, but as an asset.

This third criteria might very well be the hardest to meet. Its easy to underestimate how much the dominant German culture was been seen as a threat by Danes. Starting with the Nativity Act (Indfødsretten) in 1773 trying to diminish German influence became a main object for large segments of the Danish elite and Holstein slowly, but invariably, came to be seen as part of the "problem" (sort of a Trojan horse within the realm). The Grundtvigian layman movement among the peasants were anti-German from the start.

As Benedict Anderson has pointed out nationalism without an "other" to define your nation against is like "the sound of one hand clapping". In Germany the French became the other during the Napoleonic Wars, but in Denmark Germans and Germany were the other that Danish nationalism defined itself against. "We are not German, so we must be Danish" is a fundamental part of the development of Danish national consciousness and identity, and its hard to butterfly this aspect away. Even without the Sleswick conflict, you still got  the (provocative) overrepresentation of Germans in the social elite as a rallying point.
In short Danish nationalism was created in opposition to German political and cultural dominance, which makes it hard to preserve a state encompassing a large, self conscious and resourceful German minority. A clear line of demarcation - and one relatively favourable to Danish wishes would be a necessary precondition. And I don't see any way Slewswick-Holsteiners would accept such a demarcation line.

If we go back to the Napoleonic era the odds of getting around this problem increases, but its still very difficult.

[ingemann]

@Ingermann: I will later come to your point - the whole issue of constitution/ democracy / representation is very interesting, but I need to do some more reading before commenting in detail. My original hypothesis was that a more liberal development in the Danish realm could actually have made it a champion of German liberals, thereby neutralising the 1848 national-liberal impetus. However, it seems that Holstein was among the most conservative parts of the German Federation and Denmark, respectively, and happy to have the German Federation protecting it from awful developments taking place in Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Baden and elsewhere. I need to do some more reading, but feel free to already comment on the above. [Holstein nobility, which also run a good part of the show in Copenhagen, actually seems to have been quite a disaster in those days]

I would say that the hypothesis that a more liberal development in Denmark suffer from one problem: Liberalism in the 19th century was closely connected with blood and soil nationalism, while conservatism was more open to transnational states. So the conservatism in Kiel was in fact a potential unifying force in Helstaten, while the liberalism of Copenhagen was the force which made the civil war unavoidable.