Turkish Presidential Election: August 10, 2014

[swl]

Is there any word on who will replace Erdogan as PM?

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It's coming from this blog that I have been reading for some time when I am looking for information about Turkey : http://www.jamesinturkey.com/what-is-next/

[Velasco]

I lurked in that blog of James in Turkey the other day. I feel somewhat disappointed because little has been said on my favourite candidate (Demirtas). The Kurdish opposition is clearly better than AKP and the Kemalists.

[Famous Mortimer]

Couple of interesting facts about the map:

The one landlocked province that the opposition won was Eskişehir, home to two universities and a military base.

Erdoğan's worst province and the only one where he came in third was the Kurdish province of Dersim. Dersim is also the only province where Alevis outnumber Sunnis.

[swl]

I lurked in that blog of James in Turkey the other day. I feel somewhat disappointed because little has been said on my favourite candidate (Demirtas). The Kurdish opposition is clearly better than AKP and the Kemalists.

I don't know much about Turkish politics, but it seems to me that a CHP-HDP alliance would make sense in the future.

[Famous Mortimer]

I lurked in that blog of James in Turkey the other day. I feel somewhat disappointed because little has been said on my favourite candidate (Demirtas). The Kurdish opposition is clearly better than AKP and the Kemalists.

I don't know much about Turkish politics, but it seems to me that a CHP-HDP would make sense in the future.

The CHP, being Kemalist, opposes federalization or special autonomous status for any region. That's what prevents an alliance with the Kurds.

[Tender Branson]

Also note how the touristy areas on the South-West coasts voted against Erdogan, while the more backwardish hinterland voted strongly for him.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

[Sol]

Why didn't the opposition win Istanbul? It seems like a natural target.

Also, what would a competitive opposition look like in today's environment?

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Because the realities of Turkish politics are quite different to the assumptions of Western journalists.

[Sol]

Because the realities of Turkish politics are quite different to the assumptions of Western journalists.

How so?

[Tetro Kornbluth]

Question to those who know these things:

Why did the MHP back Ihsanoglu? Is Kemalism really that transparently a defense of elite groups that the fascists prefer it to Erdogan?

Also can anyone explain Demirtas' pattern in the west of the country? Urban areas?

[Filuwaúrdjan]

How so?

Observe:



As for Istanbul specifically, while middle class 'Westernised' neighbourhoods like Besiktas voted overwhelmingly for Ihsanoglu, most working class districts (which are generally less 'Westernised') voted solidly for Erdogan.

[Famous Mortimer]

Erdoğan was the mayor of Istanbul, after all.

[Famous Mortimer]

Question to those who know these things:

Why did the MHP back Ihsanoglu? Is Kemalism really that transparently a defense of elite groups that the fascists prefer it to Erdogan?

Also can anyone explain Demirtas' pattern in the west of the country? Urban areas?

1) The MHP is a secular party.

2) The MHP, for all its horrible history, is not really that ideological beyond being secular. In the late 90s/early 2000s, they took part in a coalition government with the Democratic Left Party, the party they were bombing in the 70s.

3) That coalition I spoke of, like the one that existed this year, was basically an anti-Islamist one. There is historical precedent.

4) The MHP is not that far removed from Kemalism themselves. They might be official Kemalist for all I know.

However, it should be pointed out that regardless Ihsanoglu did not run a Kemalist campaign. He was basically just "not Erdoğan".

[EPG]

Also, what would a competitive opposition look like in today's environment?

More Islamic. It would also help if it could win Istanbul.

But, let's not neglect the extent to which AKP benefits from overseeing Turkey's strong economic performance.

[palandio]

[...]

How so?

As for Istanbul specifically, while middle class 'Westernised' neighbourhoods like Besiktas voted overwhelmingly for Ihsanoglu, most working class districts (which are generally less 'Westernised') voted solidly for Erdogan.

You may also look on it the other way round. Many of Istanbul's working class districts are 'Anatolianized' in the sense that often most inhabitants in one neighborhood stem from the same village in Anatolia, they still identify with their ancestral village and its (e.g. religious) traditions, they travel there every summer for several weeks. In many senses they are rural folks displaced to the suburbs of a mega-city. They live in Istanbul, but they vote like their cousins 500 miles away.

[swl]

I lurked in that blog of James in Turkey the other day. I feel somewhat disappointed because little has been said on my favourite candidate (Demirtas). The Kurdish opposition is clearly better than AKP and the Kemalists.

I don't know much about Turkish politics, but it seems to me that a CHP-HDP would make sense in the future.

The CHP, being Kemalist, opposes federalization or special autonomous status for any region. That's what prevents an alliance with the Kurds.

I see. I wonder about the young liberals who demonstrated against Erdogan. Despite being Kurd, Demirtas must have some potential among this population right?

[Famous Mortimer]

Also, what would a competitive opposition look like in today's environment?

More Islamic. It would also help if it could win Istanbul.

But, let's not neglect the extent to which AKP benefits from overseeing Turkey's strong economic performance.

Well they tried being more Islamic in this election and that didn't work.

I personally would try to go more left, that's my bias talking though.

The real answer might just be that the opposition can't win under any circumstances.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

You may also look on it the other way round. Many of Istanbul's working class districts are 'Anatolianized' in the sense that often most inhabitants in one neighborhood stem from the same village in Anatolia, they still identify with their ancestral village and its (e.g. religious) traditions, they travel there every summer for several weeks. In many senses they are rural folks displaced to the suburbs of a mega-city. They live in Istanbul, but they vote like their cousins 500 miles away.

You can look at it the other way, but you have to be careful to avoid absurdity when doing so (i.e. it is important to avoid implying - as often seems to happen - that the city really 'belongs' to the educated middle classes). All of those patterns are entirely typical of first generation urbanisation, of course.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Notably hilarious result in Sultanbeyli where Ihsanoglu actually came third, hahaha.

[Velasco]

I wonder about the young liberals who demonstrated against Erdogan. Despite being Kurd, Demirtas must have some potential among this population right?

It's possible. Demirtas got 9.1% in Istanbul, almost doubling the HDP result in the local election held in March (4.8%). If you compare the district results, Demirtas improved remarkably in some 'westernised' areas like Besiktas (HDP 1.7%/ Dem 6.7%), Kadiköy (1.8% to 6%) or Sisli (4.1% to 9.9%). In Beyoglu, where is located the Gezi Park, Demirtas got 13.1% (HDP 7.3% in the local election). Demirtas did better in Esenyurt on the European side (17.2%) and Sultanbeyli on the Asian side (16.2%), both working class. Sultanbeyli was the district where Erdogan did better (69.6%) and the only one where Ihsanoglu came third (14.2%). It's a fast growing suburb (82k in 1990, 298k in 2011) settled by migrants from Bulgaria since 1945, according to Wikipedia. The Turkish version says nothing on the proportion of Kurdish population there, although it gives some interesting historical details.

Notably hilarious result in Sultanbeyli where Ihsanoglu actually came third, hahaha.

To be fair, CHP and MHP did even worse in the local elections coming 5th and 6th behind Felicity Party and HDP. Great map, btw.

[Linus Van Pelt]

Question to those who know these things:

Why did the MHP back Ihsanoglu? Is Kemalism really that transparently a defense of elite groups that the fascists prefer it to Erdogan?

Also can anyone explain Demirtas' pattern in the west of the country? Urban areas?

1) The MHP is a secular party.

2) The MHP, for all its horrible history, is not really that ideological beyond being secular. In the late 90s/early 2000s, they took part in a coalition government with the Democratic Left Party, the party they were bombing in the 70s.

3) That coalition I spoke of, like the one that existed this year, was basically an anti-Islamist one. There is historical precedent.

4) The MHP is not that far removed from Kemalism themselves. They might be official Kemalist for all I know.

However, it should be pointed out that regardless Ihsanoglu did not run a Kemalist campaign. He was basically just "not Erdoğan".

I was talking to a Turkish acquaintance earlier this year about Turkish politics, and he definitely seemed to organize the parties on a spectrum with the CHP and MHP on the same side - nationalist and militantly secular - with one just more extreme than the other. This person, for what it's worth, was secular and anti-Erdogan but also kind of down on the opposition parties.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

[EPG]

Also, what would a competitive opposition look like in today's environment?

More Islamic. It would also help if it could win Istanbul.

But, let's not neglect the extent to which AKP benefits from overseeing Turkey's strong economic performance.

Well they tried being more Islamic in this election and that didn't work.

I personally would try to go more left, that's my bias talking though.

The real answer might just be that the opposition can't win under any circumstances.

Then they need to be more Islamic. Add the non-Kurd share of the third-party vote and you get a pretty good maximum of the vote the left-wing can win in current circumstances, assuming no-one at all switches away. The real answer is, probably, that it is hard to defeat a prime minister overseeing 5 - 6% average GDP growth.