Tunisian parliamentary (10/26) and presidential (11/23) elections, 2014

[swl]

I talked with some people on IRC last night about this strange "secular-Islamist" framework all Arab elections are now being put into. If there had to be one key issue in this election, it was law and order; Tunisian media has sounded the alarm of domestic terrorists since last summer. Other divides are regional ones between the coast, the interior and the south, or economic collapse in certain communities due to social unrest

Interesting. There is no doubt that we see it through our own Western obsessions.

It reminds me that I recently read an article where the authors were trying to model the political space in several countries. They were able to interpret their findings for countries such as Turkey and Egypt, but what they found for Tunisia did not make sense at all in their eyes. I guess there are important dividing lines within Tunisia that are completely mysterious to foreigners.

[Foucaulf]

and in a sense that his party was a member of the International Conference of Marxist–Leninist Parties and Organizations (Unity & Struggle).

I wasn't using it as a slur.

In my defense I'll note that Hammami's party, formerly called the Worker and Communist Party of Tunisia, voted to remove the "Communist" part from their title out of fear of alienating workers. I should shy away from arguing that there are no communists left in the Tunisian far-left. Instead I'll say that their tactics focus far away from economic management and more on secular nationalism. A label like "Hoxhaist" isn't particularly helpful and suggests you stopped your research after the Wikipedia article.

Interesting. There is no doubt that we see it through our own Western obsessions.

It reminds me that I recently read an article where the authors were trying to model the political space in several countries. They were able to interpret their findings for countries such as Turkey and Egypt, but what they found for Tunisia did not make sense at all in their eyes. I guess there are important dividing lines within Tunisia that are completely mysterious to foreigners.

I also don't want to say that there is no "secular-Islamist" divide being mentioned during the campaign. That word, in Western mind at least, bring up multiculturalism issues like wearing the veil, bans on alcohol, etc. Tunisia has moved far away from these issues. Antipathy between old regime supporters and Ennahda exists, except now it's in terms of "Ennahda is incompetent at governance" and "Ennahda is fostering terrorist cells". (It's hard not to overstate the terrorism issue, especially as young Tunisians are reported to be fighting in Syria)

Keep in mind that, of all the post-colonial Arab states, Tunisia has best mimicked the French bureaucracy and legal regime (maybe next to Morocco). This is how support for the Bourguiba-Ben Ali vision of government extends farther than regime officials, but not so far that the entire country wants the old bureaucracy to be saved. For a Tunisian living in the interior, any central government is the same government; they could want autonomy and representation.

A few newspapers have gotten people studying Tunisian politics to make good posts. I like this one in the WashPo, and this Graun piece is good too.

[Foucaulf]

Government formation is slowly going right now, but it probably wouldn't be settled until after the Presidential elections. After Nidaa's victory in the parliamentary elections, all eyes are on whether Beji Caid Essebsi would get elected as president next month and give Nidaa an unambiguous mandate.

As the presidential campaign begins today, I thought I'm at the point where I may as well annotate a list of all the presidential candidates (yes, all 27). The list is categorized, as you will see.

THE PRE-REVOLUTION OFFICIALS
Beji Caid Essebsi, Bourguiba-era official, leader of Nidaa Tounes
Mustapha Kamel Nabli, Economist and academic, Governor of Central Bank of Tunisia during post-revolution transition
Kamel Morjane, Defense and Foreign Minister under Ben Ali, leader of Al Moubadara
Abderrahim Zouari, RCD secretary general and cabinet member
Mondher Zenaidi, Commerce and Tourism Minister under Ben Ali
Noureddine Hached, Diplomat under Ben Ali, son of Tunisia's first labour leader

THE OPPOSITION FIGURES
Moncef Marzouki, Current President, leader of the Congress for the Republic
Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, Founder, Progressive Democratic Party/Al Joumhouri
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, General Secretary of Ettakol, President of the Consulative Assembly
Mohamed Hamdi, General Secretary of Democratic Alliance (PDP splinter pre-merger with Joumhouri)
Abderraouf Ayadi, Former General Secretary of CPR with Islamist tendencies, leader of "Wafa"
Hamma Hammami, General Secretary of the Tunisian Worker's Party, spokesperson for the Popular Front
Salem Chaibi, Leader of the "Popular Congress Party" (which seems to be a family operation?)

THE BUSINESSMEN
Hechmi Hamdi, British-Tunisian press mogul, owner of the Mustaquilla/"Independent" satellite TV chain
Slim Riahi, Tunisian-Libyan oil baron, leader of the Free Patriotic Union
Mohamed Frikha, Telecoms investor based in Sfax with Ennahda tendencies
Larbi Nasra, ex-owner of Hannibal TV, major private Tunisian TV network
Yassine Cheroufi, Businessman based in Dubai, former senior customs official under Ben Ali

THE CIVIC LEADERS
Hammouda Ben Slama, Doctor and early Health Minister with Ennahda connections
Abderrazak Kilani, UN ambassador, Chairman of the Tunisian Bar Association
Safi Said, Essayist and political commentator
Ali Chourabi, Judge and activist for the Kairouan Governorate
Abdelkader Labbaoui, Independent government auditor
Kalthoum Kannou, Judge on the Supreme Court, only female candidate
Samir Abdelli, lawyer from Tunis
Mehrez Boussayene, President of Tunisia's National Olympics Committee
Mokhtar Mejri, Tunis-based "human rights activist"?

Why did I write this? I don't know - probably as a record as candidates among groups drop out and congregate. Ennahda is also biding its time on supporting a "consensus candidate" to oppose Essebsi, and maybe they'll choose a candidate not mentioned by the top.

[Foucaulf]

It's been a week since the presidential race have started, and the field is still a mess. It's important to note that the race will follow a French system: the top two candidates will move on to a second round, where the candidate gaining a majority of the votes wins. It is very obvious that, fresh off of a parliamentary win, Beji Caid Essebsi will lead the vote. It is unclear who will get second place.


On the pre-revolution officials side, one candidate (Zouari) has already dropped out. The problem remains that, even if all those officials worked with Bourguiba or Ben Ali, they share no factional similarities. Morjane has gone on record to say that he would support Essebsi in the second round, as would most individuals in this group. Essebsi himself started the campaign in Monastir, Bourguiba's birthplace, and is evoking that name quite a bit in his campaign.


On the political opposition side, Marzouki has started his reelection campaign in stride. Everyone else in the group is disorganized after dramatic defeats for their parties in parliamentary elections. Ben Jaafar has repeatedly called for a unity candidate representing "social democratic forces," or something like the non-Nahda, non-leftist establishment opposition. No one else has taken his offer. (One candidated, Mohamed Hamdi, has dropped out too.)

A bombshell today was Ennahda declaring that the party will not support any candidate for the elections after the party's consulative council (Shura) met on the matter. The party's strategy seems to be targeting a grand coalition with Nidaa first. Apparently Ennahda supporters are rallying behind Marzouki, a rather divisive figure in his tenure due to almost paranoid attitude towards those nostalgic for the old regime.

 
On the businessmen side, several are moving around the interior to try to appeal to the poor. Hamdi is at it again, saying that he will fight for the lower classes and make Kairouan, home of the grandest of Tunisian mosques, the nation's capital (not to mention his built-in advantage in Sidi Bouzid, his birthplace). Riahi is making his way across Tunis and is also a serious contender; after purchasing a popular Tunisian soccer team in 2012, he certainly has had much free publicity.


On the Civic Leaders side, most of them are going on radio or TV stations to be heard. Lacking the infrastructure of political parties, they instead trump up how they are the truly independent candidates of the election. With no candidate backed by Ennahda, it's unclear if any of them have a shot at advancing.


There are still a lot of swing voters to chase down, particularly in the interior and citizens abroad. Clarity can only come from a consolidation of the candidates, which seems now like a long time coming.

[Nhoj]

What would you rate the chances of Essebsi losing the runoff?

[Foucaulf]

What would you rate the chances of Essebsi losing the runoff?

I want to say "<10%" - the best signal, I suppose, is Ennahda elites deciding not to endorse any candidate. There were rumours they would endorse, apart from allies Marzouki and Ben Jaafar, more "independent" candidates like Ben Slama. Going ahead with that strategy would also elicit retaliation from Nidaa, since their future cohesion depends on the charismatic Essebsi playing a prominent state role. If Essebsi wins, Nidaa will blow off any plans of a grand coalition. If Essebsi loses, Nidaa loses cohesion and Ennahda can take its time reinventing itself.

That Ennahda chose not to endorse any candidate, I think, represents a subjective probability that the payoff for endorsing is inferior, one cause of which is low probability of Essebsi losing. And this is conditional on Ennahda support, so imagine how lopsided it will be without that!

(In terms of strong second-round contenders, all I can think of is Marzouki, Hammami, Kamel Nabli and Riahi. Don't underestimate Riahi - he has now claimed the mantle of the successful, incorruptible candidate, and those have a record of doing well.)

[Foucaulf]

The first round of the presidential elections will take place today. While it is too late to take names off the official ballot, here are five candidates who have dropped out:

Mohamed Hamdi, who quit to reduce the number of competing candidates from pre-Revolution parliamentary opposition;
Abderrahim Zouari, preferring to endorse Essebsi instead;
Nourredine Hached, who couldn't deal any longer with the money in Tunisian politics;
Mustapha Kamel Nabli, who bemoaned extreme, polarising rhetoric;
Abderraouf Ayadi, who thinks the old regime has already stolen this election.

Preliminary results may come sometime in the afternoon in the U.S. It seems very obvious that the top four candidates will be Essebsi, Marzouki, Riahi and Hammami. Of the latter three, whoever advances comes down to which of them will have the greatest support from youth and interior voters.

[Foucaulf]

Voting has finished in Tunisia about two hours ago. An exit poll by Sigma (which may be Tunisia's only relevant polling firm) shows the following:

Beji Caid Essebsi 42.7%, Moncef Marzouki 32.6%, Hamma Hammami 9.5%, Slim Riahi 6.7%.

EDIT: Another exit poll from 3C Etudes (the other relevant polling firm) shows:

Beji Caid Essebsi 47.8%, Moncef Marzouki 26.9%, Hamma Hammami 10.2%, Slim Riahi 5.4%.

[Foucaulf]

Official first round results were out Tuesday, relatively quickly compared to the parliamentary elections. Full results are even uploaded to Wikipedia now, but the scores that matter are as follows:

Beji Caid Essebsi 39.46%
Moncef Marzouki 33.43%
Hamma Hammami 7.82%
Hechmi Hamdi 5.75%
Slim Riahi 5.55%

Essebsi and Marzouki go to the second round in an obviously tense matchup. ISIE's results are very low-tech, but they do have results by constituency. I wouldn't mind making maps from them (especially to show Hamdi's absurd margins in Sidi Bouzid)

[Foucaulf]

What the hell, a map of the first round results is at the bottom. Quality is pretty bad, but the point comes across.

A slight digression on support during the second round: it looks like this election will be closer than one may think, though the odds remain in Essebsi's favour. The top five candidates hold around 90% of the vote: Hammami voters will plainly never vote for Marzouki, while Riahi/Hamdi plan to make endorsements soon. Endorsements among the other 22 will likely lean Essebsi, so Marzouki will have to fight to make up that 6-point margin.

Marzouki is already challenging Essebsi to a debate, and both sides will stick with accusing the other of being a RCD/Ennahda puppet, respectively. Expect more accusations of violence among the two candidates' supporters soon, on top of the paranoia over terrorism.

[Foucaulf]

The presidential campaign has halted for the moment while ISIE, the national elections agency, hears and decides on fraud and mismanagement accusations. Marzouki has filed a few claims to the agency but was mainly dismissed. The agency will announce the second round's date once investigations are complete. (it should be a Sunday and take place at least before December 28, according to law).

Meanwhile, fun times are taking place in the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, Tunisia's newly convened legislature. Even though a battle was forecasted over who would be elected Assembly Speaker, the process took place rather quickly. Mohamed Ennaceur, official under the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes and number two in Nidaa Tounes, was elected Speaker, with deputy speakers from Ennahda and the UPL. What this really suggests is that Nidaa, Ennahda and the UPL has worked out something between them while also blocking the Popular Front's candidate, the widow of slain politician Mohamed Brahmi. A wild conjecture I've seen is that Ennahda is willing to not complicate Essebsi's run for the presidency in exchange for a place in government.

[politicus]

Beji Caid Essebsi won the presidential election with 55.68 percent versus 44.32 percent for his rival Moncef Marzouki.

[Foucaulf]

Attached is one more map showing the results of the second round. I'm planning to write a longer report on the elections soon, so some other ideas I have include turnout dropoff/gains over rounds and the degree by which each candidate gained votes. For now, this one map will do. (Shout out also to this Tunisian tweeter, who has compiled some very nice spreadsheets and maps on the elections.

Not a blowout victory by Essebsi, but quite close to one- it was higher than any figure predicted by the exit polls. To have a chance at winning Marzouki had to solidify his hold on the interior and Sfax while also making inroads in metro Tunis, which dissipated once Riahi threw his lot in with Essebsi.

Government formation should begin once Essebsi is sworn in. What we may end up with is a "national unity" government made up of Nidaa, Ennahda, UPL and Afek Tounes, all of which will work to push through IMF policy and privatization. But that's a story for another day.

[Foucaulf]

I'm in the middle of writing a more comprehensive report on the elections, as well as any further developments that may happen over the next few days. As a teaser, here is a (first that I know of) map of the first-round presidential results on the Delegation level:

[Foucaulf]

One last post in this thread: over last month I wrote a very, very long recap post on Tunisia's elections, compiling as much as I knew about the topic into one writeup. Hash has uploaded it to his blog, and you can read it here. I honestly should summarize the thing in the future.

If there's any interesting political events in the future, I will post them here. For now Tunisians, perhaps rightly, are focusing on how their national team's doing in the African Cup of Nations.

[swl]

Very long but instructive, thanks!