Is political violence inherently wrong?

[Redalgo]

Actions are not inherently right or wrong so the same applies to political violence. If you want to rephrase this question so as to allow for subjective interpretations the answers posted would be more interesting, I imagine.

[Redalgo]

I'm sorry, I guess I didn't realize it's impossible to be a constructivist and have a moral compass at the same time?

[Redalgo]

You're a Soviet artist from the 1920s?

It is also a concept used in the social sciences describing the creation and sharing of intersubjective perceptions of reality, with impressions people have about what is real being passed off as knowledge. This is in contrast to the more common stance of believing knowledge is a solid, objective grasp of fact that can be derived from sensory input and studies of natural phenomena. Very few claims about truth may be proved or disproved beyond all doubt without falling back on faith, however, so far as I can tell.

I'd recommend looking into the works of Ernst von Glaserfeld, in particular, if your curiosity is piqued.

Going back to morality, my position is good and evil do not exist outside the mind. And even then it only exists for us as a side-effect of adaptations in our species such as to nurture offspring, form cohesive bands, rally group members to dispose of troublesome oppressors, etc. giving rise to feelings about what is right or wrong. In most members of our species these impulses appear to provide the framework upon which theories of ethics are constructed as tools for making sense of our subjective moral impulses. Some folks, like sociopaths, do not function in quite the same way and as a result operate within a different set of restraints on desires to advance their own, best perceived interests.

I have very strong opinions about when political violence is and is not justified. But my point is no matter how passionately I feel and to how great of lengths I go to rationalize the merits of those views as being superior to alternatives, they will still amount to nothing more than opinions. You see, moral relativism is not a rejection of moral orders. It is an acknowledgement of people being able to temper feelings with reason and experience to build up shared understandings of what is good and bad for practical purposes. Having to invent moral standards does not make them any less useful.

So when I or someone else takes offense to an armed robbery it is genes and socialization at work - not an indication of insight into principles of inherently beneficial behaviour.

[Redalgo]

The normative question remains: does the fact that most societies today and in the past have condemned political violence/robberies not sway you in any way? Or are you just too lazy to refine your condition for admissible political violence?

What prevents there from being total chaos in the extent to which moral views differ between cultures is that genetic predispositions cause ethical dilemmas to trigger a limited range of moral sentiments. There seems to be more diversity in how we react to our feelings, that is to say, than in what those feelings are in the first place. This affords humanity the potential to cultivate a near-consensus around at least the most basic of "universal" moral standards.

A right to self-defense could be one, to offer an example, which in turn would lend legitimacy to at least some forms of political violence in response to others. What makes this so difficult is how conflicts often involve several factions that are each convinced of having moral justification to push on with campaigns that could seem vicious or "savage" to opponents. Even in the case of robberies I can think of scenarios where the thieves could be considered right and wrong at the same time. Moral dilemmas are often more complicated than is apparent to observers who lack a complete picture of all pertinent information or else have it but nonetheless err in their analyses for want of empathy.

If asked what forms of political violence I believe should be condoned the answer would be that violence is acceptable when used to save sentient beings at imminent risk of suffering potentially-lethal harm from an aggressor who cannot reasonably be expected to cease, given limitations of time and peaceful alternatives at hand. Authoritarianism merits violent reactions once the state uses force quash dissent, too, provided only armed personnel who refuse to surrender and properties used by them to execute their functions at the behest of the state are designated as fair targets. Risking collateral damage is immoral.

Basically, people should not harm, cheat, or domineer each other without informed, non-coerced consent.

Where it becomes more controversial is in applying those limits to interspecies interactions.