Chinese gov't becomes even more repressive

[Beet]

The key 3 paragraphs:

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http://time.com/3750389/china-feminists-international-womens-day-wu-rongrong-wei-tingting-wang-man-zheng-churan-li-tingting/

[politicus]

So why do they feel so threatened now that this is necessary? Solely the Hongkong protest or something more?

[Simfan34]

This is not important. The real crackdown, the real story, is the one within the government. The bureaucracy has slowly ground to a halt since officials are increasingly paralysed by fear over their future, and the futures of their superiors. It's hard to work if you think you're going to be purged- and it's perhaps even harder to work if you think your boss is going to be purged. Xi seems determined to go after ever-greater targets: next in line might be former Vice-President Zeng Qinghong, as suggested by an article on a corrupt Qing prince inexplicably published by the anti-corruption commission last month. Another name supposedly in the crosshairs is Jiang Mianheng, son of none other than the well-known billionaire Jiang Zemin, who also used to be President.

If those seeing deeper meaning in the historical non sequitur are right (and the CPC loves its historical metaphors), Zeng is to Jiang as Prince Qing was to the Dowager Empress Cixi. Which is one of the more insulting comparisons one can make in China. It all makes sense if looked at in context- the "purism" espoused by the "Princelings" such as Xi would regard the corruption of Jiang and his pro-business free-wheeling Shanghai clique with deep revulsion.

Xi probably sincerely believes in pursuing some kind of "socialism with Chinese characteristics", which is why he goes around quoting Legalist scholars and condemning the evils of Western books. And it is his responsibility, as an inheritor of the of legacy of the revolution (in his blood), to fight against corruption, deviationism, elitism, etc., etc. It's Marxism, yes, but of a very paternalist and Chinese sort. But see, that doesn't jibe with Bo Xilai-style populism, either, even though both men are considered "princelings". Nor, it is said, does it with the militarism of General Liu Yuan, the PLA political chief and son of Deng's partner-in-crime, Liu Shaoqi.

So it's not as if there are just two or three opposed factions- there are a multiplicity of them. And Xi, it seems, it trying to take them all on at once. Which could quite possibly end badly for him; or transform him from a leader of an authoritarian state into an authoritarian leader in his own right. Either way, "collective leadership" is a dead letter. That's the more interesting story here.

[politicus]

This is not important.

Of course it is, it involves a lot of ordinary people and the possibilty of building a civil society and maintaining a social dialogue. All the little things that may change attitudes in the long run and promote social change.

[Simfan34]

Perhaps, but why this is happening is a function of the conflict I described. This is merely derivative, and to linger on it would be to miss the broader picture and overlook the actual loci of political change.

[Beet]

It's hard to say what's the broader picture. Senior level CPC power struggles are important if they are about things that will actually matter to people, and we know what those things are. I'm not sure both of those things are true in this case, however. The Jiang faction is known to be conservative, but so is the Xi administration. If anything, the Xi administration is even more conservative than the Jiang faction. But ultimately, it's what it all means in terms of policy for the average person - to say nothing of the outside world - which matters.