Hitler dies in 1938...how is he remembered/what changes?

[The Mikado]

The second half of the question is less important than the first here.

This hypothetical presumes Adolf Hitler's death in April 1938, a month after German annexation of Austria. Death of natural causes, perhaps in a car crash. How does the NSDAP respond to the sudden leadership crisis? Are plans for Czechoslovak expansion put on hold? Does history remember Hitler in a much more positive light and elide over the destruction of Jewish rights and multiparty democracy?

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

At the very least, plans are delayed until the leadership issue is settled. While Hess was Deputy Fuhrer, that post was more akin to Head of the DNC or RNC than anything else. It was a technical post rather than a political one, and Hess had it precisely because he had no potential political base of his own.

Long term, Hitler is probably at worst remembered much as Stalin is today in Russia.  Even if the Nazis eventually go ahead and do the same thing, apologists will claim they misinterpreted Adolf's intent too literally.

[Lincoln Republican]

I would imagine that Reich Marshall Hermann Goering would succeed Hitler as leader of Germany.

I doubt he would take the title of Fuehrer, most likely would become Chancellor.  Fuehrer was a title only for Hitler.

But Goering was as maniacal as Hitler, so I believe he would continue with Hitler's expansionist policies, leading inevitably to war.

[compson III]

World War II was a political and economic necessity for the Nazi Party.  It needed wartime crisis to erase the large economic imbalances within the country.  If the war hadn't happened the debt bubble would have collapsed leading to the disintegration of the Nazi coalition.  I'm not sure if even the war would have been fought substantially different; they would have still been obliged to attack the Soviet Union I think.  Perhaps they could have kept the peace with the U.S. however (i.e. breaking the alliance with the Japanese).

[OSR stands with Israel]

The second half of the question is less important than the first here.

This hypothetical presumes Adolf Hitler's death in April 1938, a month after German annexation of Austria. Death of natural causes, perhaps in a car crash. How does the NSDAP respond to the sudden leadership crisis? Are plans for Czechoslovak expansion put on hold? Does history remember Hitler in a much more positive light and elide over the destruction of Jewish rights and multiparty democracy?

Nothing in changes , Nazism was the main  not just Hitler

[All Along The Watchtower]

Did the Nazis ever have plans for succession in the event that Hitler died? I'm not sure that they ever did. It was pretty much a moot point by April/May 1945.

Perhaps there would have been a power struggle between Goering, Himmler, and others at that point. Maybe whomever emerged out of that power struggle would have portrayed himself as fulfilling Hitler's goals, and they would have started the war anyway - but the war would have ended earlier, since none of the successors had either the leadership skills (certainly, not the political skills) or the strategic vision of Hitler.

In regard to the first part of the question: IMO, the Nazi regime would likely have lost much of its legitimacy among the German population, and would have likely disintegrated or be severely weakened, had Hitler died in 1938. It's not like people didn't know that Hitler was a potentially murderous megalomaniac by that point (Mein Kampf laid out a lot of what he intended to do, and certainly, by 1938, Hitlers murderous streak was already established e.g.The Night of the Long Knives).

I could see, however, there being a divide within Germany (and even within the NSDAP) over whether Hitler's legacy was more positive or negative-at least, initially. The long-term historical ramifications of this, assuming that there's no WWII, no Holocaust, etc. - or at the very least, not nearly as many people killed, in a war that would likely have been shorter, if it had occurred at all, had Hitler died - are difficult to predict (of course ) but if anything, Germany might have actually been less democratic for a somewhat longer period of time. I say that, because the Nazis would still be around, even though they would have lost a lot of power. Other parties would likely arise, but it becomes difficult to establish a unified vision of what the political system should even look like at the most basic level.

There are other things to consider here, as well. What happens if Nazi Germany disintegrated but there's' no Marshall Plan or Nuremberg Trials? And what of the USSR - would Stalin have seized the opportunity to expand his sphere of influence at an earlier stage? I really can't say.

Those are just some of my thoughts for now.

[The Mikado]

The second half of the question is less important than the first here.

This hypothetical presumes Adolf Hitler's death in April 1938, a month after German annexation of Austria. Death of natural causes, perhaps in a car crash. How does the NSDAP respond to the sudden leadership crisis? Are plans for Czechoslovak expansion put on hold? Does history remember Hitler in a much more positive light and elide over the destruction of Jewish rights and multiparty democracy?

Nothing in changes , Nazism was the main  not just Hitler

My bigger question is whether Adolf Hitler is portrayed in a positive light in some "respectable" circles as a skilled statesman who annexed Austria and made Germany a great power again while the debacle of losing the war etc would just be blamed on his successor.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

It's not like people didn't know that Hitler was a potentially murderous megalomaniac by that point (Mein Kampf laid out a lot of what he intended to do, and certainly, by 1938, Hitlers murderous streak was already established e.g.The Night of the Long Knives).

From what I've heard the book wasn't particular well written which is why the sequel was never published in his lifetime.  Few read it, and those who did tended to chalk it up as the ravings of a young man without any practical experience in politics.  The Long Knives were viewed as Hitler getting rid of the real radicals in the party and was generally viewed with relief.  So I'll stand by my view that if he dies just after the Anschluss, he'll be remembered in Germany similarly to Stalin in Russia today.

[Cory]

Goering becomes Chancellor and is widely seen as legitimate by the Germany people and Hitler is elevated as a hero of the nation who put Germany on the "right track". Hitler's state funeral is a massive propaganda event for the nation and solidifies the people behind the Nazis.

Goering probably still pushes ahead with the claims on the Sudetenland and gets what he wants but probably doesn't take the rest of Czechoslovakia in 1939. However the Czechs will basically be reduced to a client state and possibly forced to make concessions to Hungary and Poland.

Goering would be much more realpolitik and won't have the political capital Hitler had so I can see a possible anti-Soviet "defensive" alliance with Poland in 1939 in exchange for Danzing and a extra-territorial railroad corridor to East Prussia. Keep in mind that up until Hitler began making demands on Poland they always viewed the Soviets as their main national security threat. This alliance system can be expanded to include Hungary and Romania. The Baltic States may have their independence guaranteed by Germany. The Soviets don't invade Finland.

WWII as we know it in Europe probably doesn't happen. Goering and his Ministers probably begin scaling down the military and reproaching the West for trade and such with their security secured with their alliance system in Eastern Europe and with Italy.

Point of Order: In this case Hitler will be remembered much more fondly then Stalin in Russia. There is no comparison. I don't know why people think that Hitler would be considered as bad as Stalin in this timeline. If Hitler dies in 1938 he will be a saint in comparison.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

There are people in Russia today who consider Stalin a saint.

It's doubtful that the Nazis would have stopped with the Sudetenland. The hyperbolic description of Bohemia and Moravia as a dagger embedded in the bowels of Germany would still be made, and taking full control of that dagger would certainly be done.

Even if the Nazis had been content with just the Sudetenland, it's doubtful that Poland would agree to surrender their rights in Danzig or allow an corridor separating Pomerania from the rest of Poland.  The reason Poland didn't worry about Germany until a couple years before the war is that the German military was a pathetic force until Hitler began rearmament. Had Poland stood with Czechslovakia in 1938, it's likely they would have defeated Germany had the Nazis made good their threat of invasion, even without Franco-British assistance.

Avoiding World War II as we know it requires the Nazis to take actions it is implausible they would take.  They were trapped by their ideology.  Only if an internal struggle prevents them from going any further after the Anschluss is it avoided, but even then that most likely only delays until 1940 the outbreak of war.

[Cory]

It's doubtful that the Nazis would have stopped with the Sudetenland. The hyperbolic description of Bohemia and Moravia as a dagger embedded in the bowels of Germany would still be made, and taking full control of that dagger would certainly be done.

This is an assumption, although my idea is also an assumption. I say Goering was much more realpolitik and economically minded then Hitler and would see the value in stopping there and reproaching with the West to prevent a total economic collapse.

Even if the Nazis had been content with just the Sudetenland, it's doubtful that Poland would agree to surrender their rights in Danzig or allow an corridor separating Pomerania from the rest of Poland.

Even in exchange for Germany guaranteeing their independence and forming a defensive alliance against the Soviets? The UK and France have literally nothing to offer in regard to Poland's security. The Poles are well aware of this. Also it's possible Goering doesn't bother to lay claim on Danzig or the corridor anyways. Danzig is of very limited value anyways and the Poles can likely be convinced to agree to the extra-territorial rail corridor.

The reason Poland didn't worry about Germany until a couple years before the war is that the German military was a pathetic force until Hitler began rearmament.

Times have changed and the Poles know this. They either need to side with Germany or the Soviets, and Germany is the only serious option of these two.

Had Poland stood with Czechslovakia in 1938, it's likely they would have defeated Germany had the Nazis made good their threat of invasion, even without Franco-British assistance.

That's all fine and good, except the Poles were too busy collaborating with Germany to dismember Czechoslovakia to begin with. A fact that is often forgotten.

Avoiding World War II as we know it requires the Nazis to take actions it is implausible they would take.  They were trapped by their ideology.  Only if an internal struggle prevents them from going any further after the Anschluss is it avoided, but even then that most likely only delays until 1940 the outbreak of war.

It's not that simple. Goering is much, much less radical then Hitler/Himmler/Gobbles. Goering's political base will be the military and industrialists, not the SS or the Nazi Party. He will be concerned first and foremost with his personal power and maintaining the German State.

[ag]

Goering was less of a believer. For one, there would not have been a "final solution". Nazi antisemitic propaganda would continue, but it would have lost some of its vehemence, and the implementation would have been less oriented in the direction of massacre.

The question is, would Goering manage to hold power. He was a drug addict, and in periods of addiction he was insufficiently cut-throat and active. It is also hard to see Himmler or Goebbels, or the others having the same sense of loyalty to Goering as they had to Hitler. There would have been an inevitable period of "collective leadership" - and it is not clear who would emerge as the leader by, say, 1941. And, until that would be resolved, hard to see a major war.

[Cory]

The question is, would Goering manage to hold power. He was a drug addict, and in periods of addiction he was insufficiently cut-throat and active.

IIRC he wasn't too bad off until later in the war after he lost credibility in the Battle of Britain.

It is also hard to see Himmler or Goebbels, or the others having the same sense of loyalty to Goering as they had to Hitler. There would have been an inevitable period of "collective leadership" - and it is not clear who would emerge as the leader by, say, 1941. And, until that would be resolved, hard to see a major war.

The thing is in 1938 the SS is a shadow of what it was in 1943/44, or even 1941. Their power is very limited and massively eclipsed by the Army. In 1938 it is not within the capacity of the SS to seize power for the hardliners. Also as for Gobbles although he was a key part of the regime he didn't really wield too much personal power or influence IIRC. He's more of a card then a player if you will.

[ag]

The thing is in 1938 the SS is a shadow of what it was in 1943/44, or even 1941. Their power is very limited and massively eclipsed by the Army. In 1938 it is not within the capacity of the SS to seize power for the hardliners. Also as for Gobbles although he was a key part of the regime he didn't really wield too much personal power or influence IIRC. He's more of a card then a player if you will.

SS had been powerful enough in 1934, hadn't it?

I believe that in 1938 the Army would, actually, support any government it would view as legitimately constituted. Goering's problem would not have been the Army - it would have been the Party. Now, in 1938 Hess is the party No. 2, but, obviously, he is not leader material. Still, he occupies an important enough position to make Goering, at least, count with his presence. Goebbels is the party leader in Berlin (besides being the face of the propaganda), and, as such, controls a not insignificant machinery right where it matters. Well, and Himmler has SS, Gestapo, other police - he is pretty damn powerful. There is als, Luetze in the SA (though, of course, by then dramatically weakened - so much so he might not count) and Ley at the Labor Front. All these are the people Goering would have to deal with - and none of them would consider themselves unconditionally Goering men. In fact, Goering as chancellor would solidify the others' interest in weakening him. It is not obvious that Goering becomes an undisputed leader. Even if he does, he does not become one fast.

Think of the Soviets after Lenin and after Stalin. In both cases, for a few years there was a genuine "collective leadership", with various Politburo members juggling chunks of control. In the 1920s they started by ganging up on and eliminating Trotsky. In the 1950s they quickly killed of Beria. Both were, probably, the most obvious successors - definitely, the most powerful men in the hierarchy after the dead leader. And both lost completely. Neither Stalin nor Khrushchev were obvious successors in 1924 and 1953.

[ingemann]

The thing is in 1938 the SS is a shadow of what it was in 1943/44, or even 1941. Their power is very limited and massively eclipsed by the Army. In 1938 it is not within the capacity of the SS to seize power for the hardliners. Also as for Gobbles although he was a key part of the regime he didn't really wield too much personal power or influence IIRC. He's more of a card then a player if you will.

SS had been powerful enough in 1934, hadn't it?

The destruction of SA was something were the German establishment not only looked the other way, they fully supported it, and to extent demanded it.

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I think you bring up some very good point, but the problem is that Himmler and Goebbles simply lacked the legitimacy Hitler had, as he had won the elections which brought the party in power. So if Himmler and Goebbles even had the ability to take power, we would likely see a military coup. Hess while political incompentent and lacking in charisma, do have some legitimacy, but I think his failings will keep him from power. But Goring is really the only man with the connections to the army and the establishment to take power, plus he was also seen as the likely successor to Hitler and when he has become president, kansler or whatever title he want to take, I can't see anyone in the party being able to get rid of him, even if he turn into a junkie. 

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Good point, but the 3rd Reich was not USSR, USSR had three groups which a successor had to deal with; the party, the army and the security service.

Germany had many faction, the party, the army, Gestapo, the nobility, the capitalists, the churches etc. and while some can be ignored, not a single faction can take power on it own, maybe with the exception of the army.


As for the question. I believe Göring would take power, I don't think he would share Hitler's expansionism. Hitler was a megalonical gamble, while Göring was more of a opportunist. So I think he will take Sudentenland, but keep from making the next step. If Poland show weakness at some point he will likely go after the 1914 border, but only after reaching a agreement with the other majorr powers.

Jews will not see a improvement in civil rights, but neither will we see the Final Solution. After a few decades the regime will likely collapse Spanish style and Göring may have reestablished the monarchy.

Today Hitler would likely be seen as a mix of Bismarck and Ataturk, a strong leader which fully united Germany and placed it in its "rightful" place of power, but who also had some unpleasant aspects. Thee modern NSDAP would likely just be somewhat autocratic conservative party with anti-Semitic elements, which regulary won German elections.

[compson III]

No, mutatis mutandis, personalities are irrelevant.  The Nazis would have had to go to war eventually.

An interesting point though is that if those who had petitioned Hitler to wait a couple years for further economic redevelopment would have prevailed.  Roosevelt might not have gotten reelected in 1940 for example.

[Cory]

No, mutatis mutandis, personalities are irrelevant.  The Nazis would have had to go to war eventually.

Patently false.

[All Along The Watchtower]

No, mutatis mutandis, personalities are irrelevant.  The Nazis would have had to go to war eventually.

Patently false.

Especially in the case of the Nazi regime...

[ag]

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I think you bring up some very good point, but the problem is that Himmler and Goebbles simply lacked the legitimacy Hitler had, as he had won the elections which brought the party in power. So if Himmler and Goebbles even had the ability to take power, we would likely see a military coup. Hess while political incompentent and lacking in charisma, do have some legitimacy, but I think his failings will keep him from power. But Goring is really the only man with the connections to the army and the establishment to take power, plus he was also seen as the likely successor to Hitler and when he has become president, kansler or whatever title he want to take, I can't see anyone in the party being able to get rid of him, even if he turn into a junkie.  

It would not have to be a coup. Nor would it even have to be immediate ouster of Goering. It is just that chancellor Goering would not have automatic control or loyalty of the institutions of the party and the state. By 1938 Himmler had solidified control over the police: he was no longer merely an SS chief, he was already immensely powerful in terms of control over internal security. While he could not safely take on the army, he did not need to, in order to develop an autonomy from Goering. Likewise, thoug the Länder were largely atrophied by that point, the authority of Gauleiters locally was quite substantial - and independent of the machinery of the State. Technically, they were subordinate to Hess - and that would remain the case even if Goering were to be chancellor. Thus, the local authority, though by no means democratic, would be substantially independent of Goering. Of course, Hess was incapable of maintaining strong control over the Gauleiters - but more than capable of making sure such control would not revert to Goering. Goebbels, as the Gauleiter of Berlin and, simultaneously, a member of the top leadership, would be in a particularly strong position: especially if he could come to an understanding with Himmler.  Etc., etc.

So, Goering would not merely not be a fuehrer in name - he would not be one in practice. He would need an agreement of the other leaders to implement his wishes. And, collectively, they would be able to seriously threathen him. Conversely, if he were to try to consolidate power, this might have been taken by the other leaders as a sufficient threat to gang up on Goering himself. And, if and when they did, they could always dress up the decision to get rid of Goering into a constitutional form acceptable to the military. Reichstag would be duly assembled, informed that the chancellor was asking to retire due to some unspecified sickness (rumors of his drug addiction would be fed to the military and the public: remember, Goebbels had control over that stuff) and that somebody else was to take his place - the nomination that would be unanimously supported by the jubillant "legislature". Alternatively, the increasingly drug-addled Goering would stay in nominal power, but the real decisions would gradually start happening elsewhere - until some point in the future when one of the other leaders would accumulate enough power to impose himself instead.

[ag]

Good point, but the 3rd Reich was not USSR, USSR had three groups which a successor had to deal with; the party, the army and the security service.

Germany had many faction, the party, the army, Gestapo, the nobility, the capitalists, the churches etc. and while some can be ignored, not a single faction can take power on it own, maybe with the exception of the army.

You overestimate the homogeneity of the USSR (especially in 1924) and underestimate how much Germany had been homogenized by 1938.  The party and the security services were pretty much in control by then. State organs were increasingly atrophied. Bureaucracy and business had willingly gone to serve the new system, and the army showed no desire to move into politics - and quite demoralized after the Blomberg-Frisch affair, its leadership effectively overthrown in early 1938. And churches... Who really cared at that point? And, in any case, there is no reason to believe most of these outside forces, to the extent they survived, would have been very friendly to Goering. If anything, it is precisely their multiplicity that would make it possible for the party leaders to maneuvre. It would take, at least, a couple of years (possibly longer) for a sole leader to emerge - by which time he would seem legitimate. And who knows, who that would have been.

[© tweed]

The question is, would Goering manage to hold power. He was a drug addict, and in periods of addiction he was insufficiently cut-throat and active.

hasn't that been true of many of our dear leaders?  the Founding Fathers were, by our standards, alcoholics: George Washington: Boozehound

there are also rumors about Kennedy and painkillers and etc... an addict with a rock-solid supply can run a country.

[ag]

The question is, would Goering manage to hold power. He was a drug addict, and in periods of addiction he was insufficiently cut-throat and active.

hasn't that been true of many of our dear leaders?  the Founding Fathers were, by our standards, alcoholics: George Washington: Boozehound

there are also rumors about Kennedy and painkillers and etc... an addict with a rock-solid supply can run a country.

Whatever you may say about the others, in case of Goering it did noticeably affect his day-to-day performance. When on drugs he was very inert, unwilling to do much, even when activity was crucial to his political goals. Speer remarked in his memoirs how notably more alert he was in Nuremberg - clean and sober (courtesy of Allied medics).

[Blair]

President Ludwig Beck, after a Military Coup in 1939

[Cory]

President Ludwig Beck, after a Military Coup in 1939.

I doubt it. What's the motive for the military to illegally overthrow the Nazi government under Goering, which in this timeline is very popular with the German people? Especially when Goering is the type of person they can very much get along and work with.