What took place in Mexico 1988

[jaichind]

Because of the recent midterm elections I have been reading about Mexico more recently and I wanted to ask a question I have been asking myself on and off for a couple of decades with respect to the 1988 Mexico elections.  The CW is that the PRI stole the election from then PRI rebel Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas after early results (mostly from DF) came in against PRI and then "the system shut down."   The PRI went on to win with around 51% of the vote.   

No doubt the PRI were up to all sort of stuff during this election.  The PRI president at the time, Miguel de la Madrid, pretty much said in his memoirs that there were various "activities" to make sure PRI won.    On the flip side there were many facts about this election and the elections afterward which does not totally jive with this story.

1)  If Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas really won in 1988, then why did he end up coming in 3rd with around 17% of the vote in 1994 when he ran again.   I think everyone would agree that the 1994 election was a lot more fraud free than 1988 (I may be wrong about that.)   In the aftermath of 1988 election where the PRI was viewed as stolen the PRI had to open up a bit to maintain the legitimacy.  In fact in 1989 the PAN was finally allowed to win the governorship of Baja California.  But if that is the case then should not Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas have won in 1994 or at least come in a very close second if all things equal 1994 had a fraud free system?

2) Part of the answer to 1) is turnout which leads to more questions.  Turnout in 1988 was less than 50%.  Turnout in 1982 was 75% and turnout in 1994 was 77%.  This one time drop off in turn off is massive.  In fact the number of votes Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas won in 1988 was about the same as 1994 but in 1988 that amounted to 31% of the vote but by 1994 was only 17% of the vote.  Why was there such a collapse in turnout?  Did the PRI machine collapse ? But if it did the machine then came together again in 1991 when PRI won a midterm election with 61% of the vote and with a turnout of well over 60% which is reasonable if general election turnout are in the 70%s.

I remember in summer of 1994 when I was working at the university I was attending, I did meet several graduate students from Mexico.  We talked a lot of about Mexican history (Santa Anna etc etc) but then we did talk about the 1988 election.  They were all convinced that the PRI stole the 1988 election and that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas won.  Since this was right after the 1994 election, I asked then "Wait, if  Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas really won in 1988 but managed 31% of the vote despite PRI cheating then how come he came in third in 1994 with 17% of the vote.  Did PRI get better at cheating since 1988 ? Did PAN cheat ?"  None of them had an answer to this. 

The only narrative I can come up with is: The 1985 Mexico City earthquake destroyed the PRI brand.   Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas rebelled against the rightward drift of the PRI and ran for president taking enough of the PRI machine with him to at least destroy on the short run the PRI turnout machine in 1988 leading to a collapse in voter turnout.  While PRI did cheat Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas most likely did not really win but came closer to it.  In fact PRI cheating might have been more directed at PAN.  The fact that the PRI win manage to hold on the the presidency in 1988 meant that they were able to rebuild their organization as part of the PRI machine that went with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas  came back leading to the recovery in 1991 even as the level of cheating had to be toned down given the issues of legitimacy as a result of 1988.  In 1994 the PRI could not cheat as much as before so the result more matches what the real strength of the 3 parties were (PRI PAN and PRD) even as PRI benefited from the sympathy vote as a result of the 1994 assassination of the PRI candidate Colosio.  Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas got the PRI left rebel vote in 1988 and got the same vote in 1994.   

[ag]

1. In short: Colosio murder. It created a lot of sympathy towards PRI. Furthermore, Colosio was viewed as a relative leftist: so it was a return to the PRI traditions. Which took the ideological rug from underneath Cardenas somewhat. And nobody knew anything about Zedillo. And, of course Even Zedillo would later call his own election "legitimate but not equitable" - the government was ready this time. Finally, the PAN candidate ("Jefe Diego") was much stronger this time, so the anti-PRI vote concentrated on him. In fact, after his performance in the debates he was considered so much of a threat that he was somehow "persuaded" to effectively disappear till the election.

2. Yes, machine had been damaged in 1988 - in part because Cardenas had the loyalty of a chunk of it. Futhermore, they simply did not expect the disaster - and had to improvise on the spot. The reported results of 1988 are, pretty much, fake, anyway. And pretty openly so. They had not prepared for it, so it was done at the last moment - and, furthermore, the official results were as much an outcome of negotiation (they had to negotiate to avoid a popular explosion), as of actual vote count and fraud.

There are many things involved here. But, basically, the 1988 election was an ambush that hit PRI unexpectedly - so they goofed up the cheating. PRD, once created, was much weaker than when it still was part of PRI - and could rely on a chunk of its machine. Finally, Cardenas himself is both not very smart - and far too honest (he is a prince, and princes do not steal). He was unable to really inherit the chunk of the machine that venerated his father and his name - and that was unhappy with the rightward turn of PRI: he is a bad machine politician. And he is an equally bad democratic politician: he is dour, far too serious, not very charismatic. And, we have to come back to it, not very bright. None of this mattered in 1988 - it was a sudden spasm, and he was a CARDENAS who went against the regime. It did start to matter thereafter.

[jaichind]

Thanks so much.  Another thing that stuck me about the 1988 results was that the total PAN votes in 1988 was actually lower than 1982.  Turnout is lower which would obviously affect the total number of votes.  But the Cardenas rebellion must make it clear that PRI was in bigger trouble in 1988 than in 1982 so I do not see why the PAN voter would not turn out.  Of course there could have been tactical voting by the PAN vote for both the more rightest PRI as well as Cardenas to defeat PRI.  Also the PRI cheating could have robbed the PAN of votes on top of whatever they did in 1982.  Of course I am sure it is a combination of all these things.

[ag]

Thanks so much.  Another thing that stuck me about the 1988 results was that the total PAN votes in 1988 was actually lower than 1982.  Turnout is lower which would obviously affect the total number of votes.  But the Cardenas rebellion must make it clear that PRI was in bigger trouble in 1988 than in 1982 so I do not see why the PAN voter would not turn out.  Of course there could have been tactical voting by the PAN vote for both the more rightest PRI as well as Cardenas to defeat PRI.  Also the PRI cheating could have robbed the PAN of votes on top of whatever they did in 1982.  Of course I am sure it is a combination of all these things.

1. Do NOT treat numbers in 1988 as a representation of actual voting. They are not. Even granting the usual fraud of Mexican electoral type events of the time, these are different. Besides everything else, they were subject to negotiation between the regime and (some of the) Cardenas people.

2. Re: 1 - PAN candidate (Clouthier) refused to negotiate.

3. Nobody expected anything remotely like what happened. The result was a big surprize for everybody, including PANistas and those supporting "Frente Democratico". You cannot do tactical voting when nobody knows anything.

4. There was some degree of waive building up for Cardenas, which gave an outlet to the anti-PRI vague leftists. Remember, before 1982 PAN is simply the only legally constituted opposition to the regime. The "leftist" options (like the PPS) are, basically, fake and in cahoots with the regime - and if you are an educated Mexico City voter, you know it. The only real way to show opposition to the regime is to vote PAN - there is simply nothing else out there. In 1982 there are also the Commies, but that was a radical option - and a really marginal one. Suddenly, in 1988, there is a proper, morally sound, non-marginal leftist option available.  Of course quite a few people switch (remember: PAN's stronghold used to be the DF - it is far behind the leftist parties there these days).

At a more marginal level, you could imagine some slight switch from PAN to PRI - the grand old party did turn sharply right on economics between 1982 and 1988. Strongly doubt much of that actually happened though: economics was not what decided whether you voted for PRI vs. PAN that year.

[ag]

BTW, thinking of the "prince" comparison, there does seem to be a lot in common between Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and Prince Charles. They even look alike. Or, at least, scowl alike

[DC Al Fine]

Thanks for this thread. I'm really enjoying learning about Mexican politics.

A couple questions:
1) Ag said the fraud in 1988 was way more than typical. What were the typical shenanigans and fraud that occurred in most elections during this period?

2) PAN and PRD seem like reasonably normal ideological parties and presumably have similar demographics as their counterparts in other countries. What about PRI today? Who votes for them?

[jaichind]

Thanks for this thread. I'm really enjoying learning about Mexican politics.

A couple questions:
1) Ag said the fraud in 1988 was way more than typical. What were the typical shenanigans and fraud that occurred in most elections during this period?

2) PAN and PRD seem like reasonably normal ideological parties and presumably have similar demographics as their counterparts in other countries. What about PRI today? Who votes for them?

For 1) I do not know that much so I have to defer to AG 

For 2) I can point to

http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/pages/personas-con-menor-escolaridad-prefieren-al-pri-pvem.html

which was a poll taken before the midterm elections.  It seems to point out that PRI is the strongest among the older, poorer and uneducated voters.   In the higher income brackets it is the Leftist parties (PRD MORENA) who are the strongest (I think this has a lot to do with Leftist support in DF which has the highest income in all the states of Mexico.)  PAN is the strongest in the high education bracket. 

[jaichind]

1. Do NOT treat numbers in 1988 as a representation of actual voting. They are not. Even granting the usual fraud of Mexican electoral type events of the time, these are different. Besides everything else, they were subject to negotiation between the regime and (some of the) Cardenas people.

That is very interesting.  So before 1988 would PAN and PRI negotiate on what the PAN vote share would be?  When did this system finally break down ?  1991 ? 1994 ?  At which year can we truest that the voting results roughly match what the voter actually intended ?

Even if PRI pretty much rig all the elections, my sense is that until the 1982 economic crisis, the rate of economic development in Mexico was generally steady and as a result PRI as a symbol for economic progress and Mexican nationalism should be enough for PRI to win most elections and all elections that matter in legitimate races.  What took place in 1968 I am sure was a blow and lost PRI support among the educated classes, especially in DF, but PRI should still win handily in a fair vote.  I agree after the severe economic crisis after 1982 which one could argue Mexico never really recovered from this image of steady economic progress under PRI got broke and things will never be the same again.

[ag]

Thanks for this thread. I'm really enjoying learning about Mexican politics.

A couple questions:
1) Ag said the fraud in 1988 was way more than typical. What were the typical shenanigans and fraud that occurred in most elections during this period?

Well, typically the government machine would go into overdrive to generate the "election". Goodies would be massively distributed to the people (in exchange for coming to vote). Opposition would not be able to campaign much (if at all) in a big chunk of the country and would be severely harrassed if it tried. PRI local leadership would get stacks of blank voter ID cards (they had no photos on them) to distribute to whomever it would like. And, of course, ballot officials from the bottom to the top would be PRI functionaries (the head of the electoral commission was ex oficio interior minister). Opposition would be allocated a few seats in Congress to make it appear Mexico was a democracy, but it was not election at all, really.

But in 1988 none of it was enough - perhaps, because they relaxed a bit, not expecting anything bad. Or else, because parts of the machine defected to Cardenas. So, what happened was that they realized that they were loosing during the actual vote count. What was worse, they had promised that they would have live electronic reporting of the results. Of course, they were not naive enough to, actually, do that honestly. They intended to initially just publish favorable results, so that everybody would be convinced that everything is in order, and then finish it off with the usual triumph. However, the early results were awful - there were no favorable results to report. The journalists were getting restless and started roaming the Interior Ministry building. And one of them managed to find the REAL reporting center in the basement. At that point the government simply announced that "the system fell" - they pulled the plug, and that was it. There is no proof that results reported in the morning had any relation whatsoever to anything that was found in the ballot boxes. Perhaps it did, perhaps it did not. But the numbers certainly were severely manipulated.

[ag]

1. Do NOT treat numbers in 1988 as a representation of actual voting. They are not. Even granting the usual fraud of Mexican electoral type events of the time, these are different. Besides everything else, they were subject to negotiation between the regime and (some of the) Cardenas people.

That is very interesting.  So before 1988 would PAN and PRI negotiate on what the PAN vote share would be?  When did this system finally break down ?

No, of course not. PRI would never deign to negotiate with PAN and PAN would never debase itself to negotiate with PRI about these things. In any case, nobody ever asked PAN anything. They were given a few seats in Congress to create an impression that Mexico was an electoral democracy. In fact, this is why they created PR representation - not to have to acknowledge a PAN victory anywhere, while at the same time giving them seats. They also might be allowed to claim victories in a few village mayoral elections. But that was it. And, in any case, it was decided without much PAN participation. And, of course, for the proper PAN men any thought of participating in such a negotiation would be sacrilegious. They went on hunger strikes to defend the victories that were stolen from them - and they meant it.

1988 was different. Because the government was panicking - seriously panicking. They thought there was a real potential for a revolution. They needed to get people off the streets. Cardenas people negotiated. Probably some PAN people did as well, but not Clouthier. In any case, the left agreed to recognize the electoral results - or, at least, to call off the protests. Clouthier did not. In the end, those negotiations did result in the government agreeing to give opposition significant congressional representation immediately, recognize at least some opposition victories in the future (and to certain non-trivial - though insufficient - electoral reforms). And PAN was the main beneficiary of this - getting BC governorship in 1989, Guanajuato in 1991, etc. But Clouthier never lived to see this.

[ag]

2) PAN and PRD seem like reasonably normal ideological parties and presumably have similar demographics as their counterparts in other countries. What about PRI today? Who votes for them?

Well, there is a very strong geographic component to demographics. PRD and the other left parties are barely present in much of the north, and PAN is very weak in many of the southern states. There is also a substantial religious component: PAN is a Catholic party, and it is very strong in the more Catholic states, such as Guanajuato. So, in many places the issue is clear: if you are not for PRI you are for whichever opposition party is stronger locally.

As for PRI electorate.... Well, yes, small town and rural areas and areas with strong clientelist networks is where they do strongest (except for DF, where the old PRI network now belongs to PRD - and, partially, now to MORENA). There are states which never had an opposition party take the governorship - and the networks are largely preserved there. They have the reputation of being the "serious party" that "knows how to govern" - so they get a chunk of the vote that way. They are a big tent party that relies a lot on local allegiances, really.

Anyway, remember that I live in DF. This is the one place where PRI is really weak (even after the recent recovery). Decent people do not acknowledge voting for PRI here I know very few people personally, who do - and, in most cases, it is a very strong family allegiance thing.

[ag]

Even if PRI pretty much rig all the elections, my sense is that until the 1982 economic crisis, the rate of economic development in Mexico was generally steady and as a result PRI as a symbol for economic progress and Mexican nationalism should be enough for PRI to win most elections and all elections that matter in legitimate races.  What took place in 1968 I am sure was a blow and lost PRI support among the educated classes, especially in DF, but PRI should still win handily in a fair vote.  I agree after the severe economic crisis after 1982 which one could argue Mexico never really recovered from this image of steady economic progress under PRI got broke and things will never be the same again.

Discussing this makes as much sense as discussing how Putin would win in an honest election today. Perhaps he would, perhaps he would not, but there ARE no honest elections available. Well, Mexico was not that different. To the extent it had elections, these had an electorate of 1: the president was the Grand Elector, who decided who gets what job. Yes, the count was honest in that round The rest was, really, a charade.