Taiwanese election, Jan 2016

[jaichind]

As for how swings took place at the Deep Blue to Deep Green levels it would useful to look at the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green votes in 2012 and 2016 in terms of vote share of the total electorate which would take into account turnout drops.

                                                          2012                  2016
                                                   Pan-Blue Vote       Pan-Blue vote            Dropoff
"2016 Deep Blue" townships              48.96%             35.42%                 -13.54%
"2016 Light Blue" townships              42.76%             30.61%                 -12.15%
"2016 Light Green" townships            38.36%             27.28%                -11.08%
"2016 Deep Green" townships           30.65%              21.39%                 -9.26%

On the Pan-Green side we have vote share as a percentage of the entire electorate

                                                          2012                  2016
                                                   Pan-Green Vote       Pan-Blue vote         Growth
"2016 Deep Blue" townships              24.02%             28.30%                  4.28%
"2016 Light Blue" townships              31.52%             35.23%                  3.71%
"2016 Light Green" townships           36.35%              39.34%                 3.00%
"2016 Deep Green" townships           42.61%              43.89%                 1.28%

Of course if we look at it the decline of the Pan-Blue vote and rise of the Pan-Green vote a a percentage of the 2012 Pan-Blue vote we get

                                                       Pan-Blue              Pan-Green
                                                       Decline                   Rise
"2016 Deep Blue" townships            -27.65%               8.74%              
"2016 Light Blue" townships            -28.41%               8.68%                  
"2016 Light Green" townships          -28.88%              7.82%                
"2016 Deep Green" townships          -30.21%              4.18%

Which makes the picture clear.  In  "2016 Deep Blue" "2016 Light Blue" "2016 Light Green" townships around 28% of the 2012 Pan-Blue vote failed to vote Pan-Blue with around 8% of that vote voting Pan-Green and the remaining 20% did not turn out.  In "2016 Deep Green" the swing toward Pan-Greens is smaller at 4% but 26% of the Pan-Blue vote failed to turn out.  Of course this is net swing and does not take into account of the real increase in youth turnout which mostly went to Pan-Greens.  So these implied Blue-Green swing are exaggerated a bit.

[jaichind]

One of the reason why the Pan-Blue turnout fell while the Pan-Green turnout held up other than the obvious disastrous second KMT term of 2012-2016 are the balance of fears on Unification versus Independence.  Back in the late 1990s and early 2000s where were great fear of Pan-Blue voters that a DPP regime will provoke the PRC by a push toward independence. With the rise of economic integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Province since the early 2000s and the fact that DPP has moved away from Taiwan Independence as a platform this fear has gone away.  The fear on the Pan-Green side has risen that Taiwan Province will be absorbed by the PRC has only risen since 2008.  A good example is a recent poll that asked ROC voters BOTH on the issue of Unification versue Independence AND what is likely to take place in the future.

 

It has

Unification           16.1%
Independence      46.4%
Go either way      37.5%

But when asked what is likely to take place in the future it has

Unification          49.7%
Independence     35.9%
Status Quo         14.4%

This poll overall I think overestimates Taiwan Independence support as the long time series by the ROC government Mainland Affairs Council tend to show about a 50/50 split between those that would consider Unification and those that prefer Independence but the relative data is quite illustrative.  In fact almost 40% of those that favor Independence feel Unification is the most likely future.  This fear clearly is driving the Pan-Green turnout from not falling in a non-competitive race and driving youth turnout up for Pan-Greens.   

[jaichind]

Now that the new Tsai/DPP regime has been in power for 4 months now it would be interesting to give an update on where things are.  The best way to describe how the new regime in the  is doing is "bungling to catastrophic."  A series of unforced policy and administrative errors has shown up the DPP as unprepared for total power (the last DPP regime of 2000-2008 was really power sharing as the Pan-Blues had a narrow legislative majority the entire period.)  

If anything this is NOT helping the KMT as much as it should as negative memories of the last KMT administration are fresh in the voter minds so the rapid fall in DPP support has not translated into significant increased party support for the Pan-Blues even as it gives a boost to KMT party approval.  This gives the DPP regime a chance if it can recover lost ground by the end of the year before support start finally increasing for the KMT.

As a result the DPP has lost 9 local by-elections in a row since coming to power (6 of them they did not bother nominating a candidate) and won 1 by-election narrowly in deep green township.  Taking into account the pan-Blue bias in local elections these local by-elections seems to imply that Blue/Green support should be at near parity at an all ROC level even if the polls still has KMT still behind.

Pollster TISR which has a slight pro-Green tilt has historical approval rating index for DPP and KMT from 2006.  They added the CCP recently.  The graph is what things look like as the DPP came into power in May 2016



The latest approval rating index is DPP 48 KMT 40 CCP 30.  

If you look at the graph, the disastrous DPP second term of 2004-2008 has driven KMT approval index to the low to md 50s by the 2008 election with DPP at low 30s.  Once the KMT came into power in 2008 the trend reversed as memories of the DPP regime begin to fade plus the pressures of incumbency for KMT.  The 2008 global financial crisis also hurt the KMT as it pushed the economy into deep recession.  So the KMT approval rating index fell to high 40s by 2009 and mid 40s by 2010.  While the DPP rose to mid 30s by 2009 and low 40s by 2010.  Parity was mostly reached by 2011.

Now about being in power for 4 months DPP already fell to 48 which is consistent with the KMT by the end of 2008 but without a world financial crisis and deep recession.  The KMT is already up to low 40s within 4 months of being in the opposition whereas the DPP had to wait 2 years of being in the opposition to get to low 40s in approval index.    The KMT approval index is now the highest since early 2013 when things started to fall apart for the KMT second term of 2012-2016.  The CCP approval index is also record high but that might be just part of increased negativity toward DPP.  

When the Tsai regime came into power I certain she would win reelection in 2020 although I felt that the KMT recovery at the local and legislative level and given a pan-Blue bias in the way the legislative  districts  are drawn the Pan-Blues would get near parity with Pan-Greens in 2020 in the legislature.  Now if Tsai does not turn things around very soon I would say Tsai's chance of reelection is even money now with the Pan-Blues having a solid chance at recapturing legislative majority in 2020.

[jaichind]

A ROC version of the RCP average of Prez Tsai approval rating.  This average has too many pro-Green pollster so the real average would be somewhat worse than this.    But the trend is clear.  Obama, in comparison, did not reach parity in approval-disapproval until 2010, almost 1.5 years after coming into office. 





Of course most of the unforced errors mostly came from the Cabinet so the approval for PM Lin has collapsed to 32/47.  An that is an average that has a pro-Green bias.

 

Now, Lin is pro-Green but fairly moderate and not a member of the DPP so DPP and for sure Deep Green voter have very little loyalty to him.    Based on these numbers Lin's will most likely go soon, mostly likely early 2017.  But if he is replace with someone with a Deep Green background then Tsai might be conceding political middle ground to the KMT.  

[2952-0-0]

Since Tsai won the election, the commies have been trolling her almost non-stop.

They got other countries to deport Taiwanese telemarketing fraudsters to Commieland, thus putting her in a lose-lose situation.

Taiwan's tourism sector has crashed due to the chill from its largest natural market.

The commies invited mayors of counties/cities which voted KMT for a conference, and announced their areas won't be economically penalized. They implied if the deep green southern counties elect KMT mayors, their fruit exporters will benefit.

Taiwan wasn't invited to this year's ICAO conference, with the commies openly admitting it's because Tsai doesn't accept the 1992 consensus.

[jaichind]

Since Tsai won the election, the commies have been trolling her almost non-stop.

They got other countries to deport Taiwanese telemarketing fraudsters to Commieland, thus putting her in a lose-lose situation.

Taiwan's tourism sector has crashed due to the chill from its largest natural market.

The commies invited mayors of counties/cities which voted KMT for a conference, and announced their areas won't be economically penalized. They implied if the deep green southern counties elect KMT mayors, their fruit exporters will benefit.

Taiwan wasn't invited to this year's ICAO conference, with the commies openly admitting it's because Tsai doesn't accept the 1992 consensus.

Yep, this is all par for the course.  The reason Tsai and Lin approval ratings are sinking is stems from the fact that their 2016 election campaign promised economic and diplomatic status quo with the PRC without having to accept the 92 Consensus.   When it turned was obviously not true (like in Mainland China tourist numbers) the DPP regime was trying to cover it out by claiming that there was no fall in tourism which then was just proven wrong.  The way out is for Tsai the run a Deep Green regime much like Chen did after 2002 when he had to turn that way to improve on his poor ratings.  It is a way to make sure of about 40-45% support which is enough to  survive on instead of trying to please everyone and expand the DPP base.   KMT Prez Lee also effectively polarized the electorate against the PRC in 1995 to ensure a landslide re-election in 1996.  Main problem here is the PRC is significantly more powerful than it was in 2002 and dramatically more powerful than it was in 1995.  The diplomatic and more importantly economic blow back could be quite large on ROC.    I figured on the long run this was where the Tsai regime was headed after it was clear it could not create a permanent DPP majority based on the 2016 election victory.  I was just surprised how quickly it took place.  It is a rerun of the Chen regime of 2000-2008 but in fast forward mode.

I think the PRC has been pretty tame so far just hitting Tsai in places where it does not really hurt.  When the PRC runs out of patience with Tsai they might hit the direct flight and trade links that PRC has with ROC which was created based on the 92 Consensus after KMT regime took over in 2008.   Doing so would create significant damage to the ROC economy and most likely send it into a deep recession.

[2952-0-0]

But is the KMT even capable of playing its part in a Third United Front? It doesn't seem particularly united or motivated.

[jaichind]

But is the KMT even capable of playing its part in a Third United Front? It doesn't seem particularly united or motivated.

No, its is unlikely it can play that role.  It is too divided internally between different blocs of interests ranging from anti-DPP political and economic interests but devoid of Chinese national identity to white collar workers that prefer the stability  of KMT rule to anti-CPP Chinese nationalists to pro-CCP Chinese nationalists.  I think the only way out of the PRC-ROC trap is for the PRC regime to evolve into a more pluralistic regime with competitive local elections and along with greater economic interrogation Chinese unification achieved by some sort of Confederate relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan Province.

The alternative is some sort of future military invasion/pressure which leads to the direct control of Taiwan Province by PRC at great diplomatic and perhaps economic cost.  The thing that is getting concerning about the current status is that the PRC regime and increasing the population does not seem to care anymore about the "hearts and minds" of the population of Taiwan Province.   They way they see it is they bent backwards to give diplomatic and economic concessions to ROC under the KMT regime of 2008-2016 and the result was a landslide election victory for a pro-Taiwan Independence party.   They read this as "nice guys finish last."  So fine, they are beginning to reason, there is not need to be nice.  What is not appreciated, I think, by the PRC regime is that while these economic concessions were quiet  significant, given the fact that the PRC economy, at least for advance provinces, have moved up the economic chain quite quickly to directly compete with Taiwan Province, this means that most of the benefits only accrue to certain economic sectors and the top 1% on ROC with much of that wealth often being re-invested right back on Mainland China.  The average middle class Joe on Taiwan Province saw no real net economic benefit from greater economic integration with the Mainland.

  

[2952-0-0]

It's really telling that half of Taiwanese view reunification as inevitable, even if the large majority of them ideally prefer independence. I recall another recent poll which indicated that while the vast majority still have a negative opinion of the CPC, the youngest adults have the highest positive opinions.

Keep your eye on the Vatican. All of the RoC's diplomatic partners are insignificant, except the Holy See. And most of these partners are majority Roman Catholic - if the Holy See switches recognition, all these will quickly switch, and the remaining partners will see no reason to continue relations with the RoC. There have been rumours of an imminent deal regarding the election of Catholic bishops for a while - seeing how <1% of Chinese are Catholic, this could be done without too much fuss.

It's funny how the road to Chinese reunification passes through...Rome.

[jaichind]

Tsai approval ratings falling in to the low 30s high 20s after being in power for 6 months.



DPP approval also falling.



DPP approval index below 50 while KMT approval index closing in on 40.  Relative approval ratings are approaching early 2013 levels.  CCP approval index closing in on 30 at around where DPP was in 2008 when DPP was thrown out of power in a landslide.

Of course the DPP is falling apart too quickly for KMT to take advantage of.  It will be 2-3 years before the anti-KMT negatively from 2012-2016 wears off.   The Trump upset is pushing rumors that pro-Blue Foxconn CEO 郭台銘(Terry Gou) might run as an independent in 2020 with KMT support to oppose Tsai on the premise that KMT support would not be enough to capture the entire anti-Tsai anti-DPP vote.  Recent polls has Guo winning in a landslide 62-24 against Tsai.

[2952-0-0]

Methinks Taiwan will cease to exist as an separate entity sooner rather than later...

[Lord Halifax]

Methinks Taiwan will cease to exist as an separate entity sooner rather than later...

You are a bit too gleeful about this.

[2952-0-0]

Methinks Taiwan will cease to exist as an separate entity sooner rather than later...

You are a bit too gleeful about this.

Not gleeful, just cynical (hence my username). The vast majority of Taiwanese support the "status quo", but the status quo is in itself constantly changing. And not in their favor.

[jaichind]

TVBS just did a bunch of polling in every ROC county/city to survey the approval rating of the local county magistrate/city mayor over a two month period.   It also had vote ID breakdowns for each county/city and as expected the Blue camp is making a comeback relative to its disastrous performance in the Jan 2016 election.  It is interesting to look at where the comeback is taking place.  It seems in traditional pan-Blue urban areas the Blue camp is still polling badly but in rural areas the KMT/Blue support is coming back.  A breakdown below is interesting

                                    Jan 2016                 Nov/Dec 2016
                                Green lead  over          Green lead over
                                    Blue vote                   Blue party ID
City/County
Taidong County               -11%                           -11%    (Deep Blue rural county)
Hualian County               -20%                          -19%    (Deep Blue rural county)  
Yilan County                  +24%                           +3%    (Light Green rural county - trending Blue)
Keelong City                     -4%                            -3%     (Deep Blue urban city)
Taipei City                       +4%                             0%     (Light Blue urban city)
New Taipei City              +10%                           -1%     (Bellwether semi-urban city)
Taoyuan City                   +2%                           +3%    (Light Blue semi-urban city)
Hsintsu City                    +2%                            +1%    (Light Blue urban city)
Hsintsu County              -15%                           -21%    (Deep Blue rural county)
Miaoli County                   -9%                           -12%   (Deep Blue rural county)
Taichung City                 +10%                            0%    (Bellwether semi-urban city - trending Green)
Changhua County          +13%                           +2%   (Bellwether rural county - trending Green)
Nantou County               +4%                            -7%     (Light Blue rural county)
Penghu County               +2%                            -3%    (Light Blue rural county - trending Blue)
Yunlin County               +27%                           +6%    (Deep Green rural county)
Jiayi City                       +20%                           +5%    (Light Green urban city)
Jiayi County                  +30%                         +18%    (Deep Green rural county)
Tainan City                   +35%                         +18%    (Deep Green semi-urban city)
Kaoshiung City             +27%                          +16%    (Deep Green semi-urban city)
Pingdong County          +27%                          +17%    (Deep Green rural county)
Jinmen County             -64%                            -55%    (Very Very Deep Blue rural county)

The places where the KMT/Blues are coming back are not in their traditional urban centers where they seems to be stuck at the same levels as back in Jan 2016.  Same is true for most Deep Blue rural counties.  Instead they are gaining in bellwether, light Green and deep Green rural or semi-urban counties.  I guess the pro-Blue voters in metropole area's disappointment in the second KMT Ma administration have not worn off yet while the bungling of the new Tsai DPP administration are driving away independent and lean Green voters in Green and bellwether regions.  

In many ways this poll might understate the fall of Greens in Deep Green counties since the Deep Green counties were polled back in late Oct and Tsai's fortunes has fallen since then.

These sort of numbers seems to imply that if the election were held today it would be Green/Blue 52/48 versus Green/Blue 56/44 back in Jan 2016.  The 2000-2016 long term trend Green/Blue balance has historically been 45/55.   The KMT recovery will be slow and most likely take a couple of more years to even think about getting back to that sort of level, if ever.  I suspect we are in a era where it is more like 50/50 long term between Green/Blue or at best 48/52 advantage for Blues.

[jaichind]

Tsai approval rating after 1 year of taking office from TVBS poll.  Comparison to Lee Chen and Ma after they were elected and took office after 1 year.

5/2017   Tsai (DPP)   28/56
5/2009   Ma (KMT)    38/41 ->won re-election in 2012 with a 6 point margin despite Pan Blue splinter
5/2001   Chen(DPP)   41/46->won re-election in 2004 with a 1 point margin against united Pan Blues
5/1997   Lee (KMT)    37/48 -> KMT lost power in 2000 due to split of the Pan-Blue vote

Comparison between 2017 and 2009

Is the Ma administration (2009) taking us in the right direction 48/29
Is the Tsai administration (2017) taking us in the right direction 38/36

2009 Partisan breakdown Pan-Blue/Pan-Green   38/15
2017 Partisan breakdown Pan-Blue/Pan-Green   32/33

In theory Tsai should be very vulnerable in 2020.  The current weak and divided state of the KMT and the possibly that the Pan-Blues might have a splinter candidate means Tsai is still a slight favorite to win re-election in 2020 assuming NPP does not run their own candidate in a splinter of the Pan-Green vote.

[peterthlee]

Pan-blue will likely to nominate Wu Denyih (ex-VP and probably next KMT leader) than not and lose by a couple points (around 6-8 points).
Soong is not energetic to run for another election.
In this scenario, KMT will pick up Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu (county with city), Miaoli and Nantou (Wu's home-boy edge), compared to 2016.
If DPP nominate their candidate for 2018 Taipei mayoral election (that candidate is tipped to lose), KMT could actually draft Dr Ko to be their independent presidential candidate.

[peterthlee]

In 2018 KMT will hold onto all their currently controlled administrations, whilst picking up Taipei, Yilan and Chiayi city.

[jaichind]

In 2018 KMT will hold onto all their currently controlled administrations, whilst picking up Taipei, Yilan and Chiayi city.

Sounds about right.  Taipei would really depend on if DPP nominates their own candidate to opposed the pro-DPP Ko to make it a three way race in which case a KMT is a shoe-in.  If it is DPP backed Ko vs the KMT it would depend on the KMT candidate.  Current New Taipei City mayor Chu running here would make the race lean KMT else it is really a tossup if it is Ko vs KMT.

New Taipei City would be a risk for the KMT to lose if they do not come up with a good candidate although the DPP is struggling to come up with a good candidate.  One wildcard for both Taipei City and New Taipei city is if DPP Tainan mayor Lai were to run in either Taipei City or New Taipei City.  Lai is seen as a threat to Tsai and Tsai is trying to push Lai to run in either city in 2018 to make sure he does not challenge Tsai for the 2020 DPP nomination.  The less popular Tsai becomes the less likely Lai will run.

It would awesome if in 2018 Taipei city it becomes Ko (independent) vs Chu (KMT) vs Lai (DPP).  It would be a true clash of titans with all 3 possible future Prez candidates in 2020 or 2024.  It would be just in 2010 Taipei City when we had Chu vs Tsai.

Yilan is slowing trending KMT and will be an open seat so it would be ripe for the KMT to win.

Chiayi city has a first term DPP incumbent that seems unpopular so in a good KMT year the KMT could win.  The same is true for Changhua County which to be fair is trending slowing toward DPP over time.

In theory Taoyuan City, Hsintsu City, Keelong City are pro-Blue cities that could go KMT but with fairly popular first term DPP incumbents the KMT might have to wait until 2022 to recapture them.   Out of these 3 Keelong might be the best shot for the KMT but I still rate it as below 50%

The win-loss for KMT in 2018 comes down to Taipei City and New Taipei City.  If the KMT can win both then it is still in the running in 2020. Else Tsai should be able to win in 2020.

[jaichind]

Pan-blue will likely to nominate Wu Denyih (ex-VP and probably next KMT leader) than not and lose by a couple points (around 6-8 points).
Soong is not energetic to run for another election.
In this scenario, KMT will pick up Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu (county with city), Miaoli and Nantou (Wu's home-boy edge), compared to 2016.
If DPP nominate their candidate for 2018 Taipei mayoral election (that candidate is tipped to lose), KMT could actually draft Dr Ko to be their independent presidential candidate.

Wu has a high floor and but low ceiling.  If it is Tsai vs Wu in 2020 1-on-1 I think right now Tsai wins 52-48.  I agree Soong will most likely not run (which really spells the end for PFP.)  The KMT Chairperson race which the first round is this weekend could lead to a KMT civil war and potentially a rebel KMT candidate that is not Soong in 2020.  Only way out is for Wu to win in a convincing manner (more than 50% of the vote this weekend.) It is for that reason I back Wu in the KMT Chairperson race.

There is no way KMT would draft Ko for its candidate.  If Ko were to lose the 2018 Taipei mayor election it is likely that Ko might run as an independent in 2020 with unpredictable results but mostly to the benefit of the KMT.  This is one reason why despite worsening relationship between Ko and the DPP chances are DPP will not run a candidate in Taipei City in 2018.

The independent that the KMT might nominate in 2020 would be Terry Gou of Foxconn.  It is clear in a 1-on-1 race he would beat Tsai.  Main issue is: will he run and will the KMT be desperate enough to nominate Guo.  If Wu win the KMT chairperson election this weekend in a decisive fashion then KMT will nominate Wu in 2020 assuming 2018 goes reasonably well for the KMT.  If it is Hao that wins the KMT might go with Guo especially Hao has as part of his platform that he will not run in 2020 if he were to win the KMT chairperson race and would instead draft Guo.  If 2018 goes badly for KMT then KMT might have no choice but to draft Guo to give Tsai a real fight.

Of course as much as Tsai is turning off the unification bloc the radical pro-independence bloc are equally unhappy that Tsai is not pushing the Taiwan Independence line when they see time running out before the PRC gets too powerful.  The radical Taiwan Independence bloc might run their own candidate in 2020 if they see Tsai as unpopular and perhaps a lost cause.  

[jaichind]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuomintang_chairmanship_election,_2017

Kuomintang chairmanship election first round is this weekend 5/20.  If no one wins 50% then it moves to a second round with the top two vote winners.

Right it is a 3 way race between Wu (former PM and VP) vs Hung (current Chairperson) vs Hau (former Taipei mayor).  It seems Wu has the upper hand and could just win on the first round.  If radical unification bloc Hung wins then KMT might face a split and rebellion from the KMT moderate faction.  If will be Wu vs Hung or Wu vs Hao in the second round then it really becomes a 50/50 race.  If Wu is to win he has to win on the first round.  I am backing Wu mostly on the premise that he is most likely to be able to united the party despite my own radical pro-unification leanings.

[peterthlee]

Well, here are my wild guesses:
--> Taipei city: Eric Chu is a fairly decent card, but I bet KMT will ultimately nominate ex-MP for Taipei's first congressional district, Ting Shou-chung. He accidentally lost his seat in 2016 due to Tsai's sweeping force territory-wide. In this case Taipei will be pure toss-up, but as Ko slowly has his stance trending away from DPP (he is actually a centrist), the ultra-pro-independence faction of DPP might not fully back him like 2014, and Ting will squeak out by 1 point.
--> New Taipei City: immediately after the 2016 elections, people thought that KMT was guaranteed to lose that seat. However, vice-mayor Hou Youyi smashed all DPP opponents (by >10 points) except William Lai (by -2 to +6). In the end, he might win a couple points (around 2-3 points) even if Lai runs.

[jaichind]

KMT Chairperson election today.

Hau has a low floor but high ceiling but Hung has a high floor but low ceiling.  Wu clearly is ahead and the undecideds are mostly anti-Hung. Wu is calling on the undecided to vote for him to get him over the 50% mark the end the race.  Hau is saying that Wu will not win 50% and those who are voting for Hau in the first round for sure will most likely vote Hung in a Wu vs Hung second round  and the undecided should vote for him to make sure it is the inevitable second round is a Wu vs Hau race.

So it will either be
Wu    50
Hung 30
Hau   15

Or
Wu    35
Hau   30
Hung 30

I think the way the KMT members vote historically is toward a decisive result so the former scenario is much more likely. 

[jaichind]

With half the vote (around 118K counted so far out of roughly 260K votes cast) in for KMT chairperson vote looks like Wu is way ahead and likely to win on the first round

Wu     52.5%
Hong  18.1%
Hau    17.9%
Han      5.3%
Dang    4.5%
Pang     0.8%

[jaichind]

With around 160K out of 280K vote counted Wu is expanding his lead

Wu     53.6%
Hong  18.0%
Hau    16.9%
Han      6.0%
Dang    4.6%
Pang     0.9%

[jaichind]

With around 234K out of 280K vote counted (it might end up being more than 280K) Wu has won for sure

Wu     53.4%
Hong  19.2%
Hau    16.1%
Han      5.9%
Dang    4.6%
Pang     0.9%