Why Do You Believe?
       |           

Welcome, Guest. Please login or register.
Did you miss your activation email?
March 28, 2024, 12:22:26 PM
News: Election Simulator 2.0 Released. Senate/Gubernatorial maps, proportional electoral votes, and more - Read more

  Talk Elections
  General Discussion
  Religion & Philosophy (Moderator: World politics is up Schmitt creek)
  Why Do You Believe?
« previous next »
Pages: 1 [2] 3
Author Topic: Why Do You Believe?  (Read 5266 times)
TJ in Oregon
TJ in Cleve
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 8,952
United States


Political Matrix
E: 0.13, S: 6.96

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #25 on: October 13, 2015, 08:48:23 PM »

I don't believe that something can be created from nothing.  I believe there must be some greater being than I.  Whether or not that is the God I believe in is impossible to say.  It gives me comfort to believe in God and makes me at ease with whatever happens to me in the end.  Thats basically it.

Doesn't it strike you as a little contradictory to claim that "something can't be created from nothing, because that's not consistent with how the world seems to work" and then claim that God was something created from nothing?

I don't think many Christians would claim that God was created for nothing or that God was created at all but that God exists outside of time. That question seems to be attacking a position virtually no one actually holds.
Logged
Alcon
Atlas Superstar
*****
Posts: 30,867
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #26 on: October 13, 2015, 10:29:05 PM »

I don't believe that something can be created from nothing.  I believe there must be some greater being than I.  Whether or not that is the God I believe in is impossible to say.  It gives me comfort to believe in God and makes me at ease with whatever happens to me in the end.  Thats basically it.

Doesn't it strike you as a little contradictory to claim that "something can't be created from nothing, because that's not consistent with how the world seems to work" and then claim that God was something created from nothing?

I don't think many Christians would claim that God was created for nothing or that God was created at all but that God exists outside of time. That question seems to be attacking a position virtually no one actually holds.

Fair point on fact -- and I know that, so I should have phrased differently -- but why does that distinction matter?  The idea of "omnipotent entity existing outside of time" is just as unprecedented as "something created from nothing."

I mean, think about what this argument says logically

"There is no precedent for something being created from nothing.  Therefore, we should assume that it was created by a God that is omnipotent and exists outside of space-time."

How can you hold the former impossible and then endorse the latter claim with certitude as a result of rejecting the former claim?  It makes no sense.
Logged
Green Line
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 7,577
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #27 on: October 13, 2015, 10:38:37 PM »

I don't believe that something can be created from nothing.  I believe there must be some greater being than I.  Whether or not that is the God I believe in is impossible to say.  It gives me comfort to believe in God and makes me at ease with whatever happens to me in the end.  Thats basically it.

Doesn't it strike you as a little contradictory to claim that "something can't be created from nothing, because that's not consistent with how the world seems to work" and then claim that God was something created from nothing?

I don't think many Christians would claim that God was created for nothing or that God was created at all but that God exists outside of time. That question seems to be attacking a position virtually no one actually holds.

Fair point on fact -- and I know that, so I should have phrased differently -- but why does that distinction matter?  The idea of "omnipotent entity existing outside of time" is just as unprecedented as "something created from nothing."

I mean, think about what this argument says logically

"There is no precedent for something being created from nothing.  Therefore, we should assume that it was created by a God that is omnipotent and exists outside of space-time."

How can you hold the former impossible and then endorse the latter claim with certitude as a result of rejecting the former claim?  It makes no sense.

I suppose the truth is you are right, either both are impossible or both are possible.  This is just the answer I choose to believe.  There is no way to prove or disprove it, it is simply faith.

Not really the best answer but it is enough for me.  If I die and nothing happens, I won't be around to know I was wrong anyway, so why not look for the positive
Logged
Alcon
Atlas Superstar
*****
Posts: 30,867
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #28 on: October 13, 2015, 10:45:38 PM »

^

I don't really understand how arbitrarily choosing one answer, even because it's more pleasing, is necessary or meaningful.  Why not just say "this is a confusing question that doesn't seem to square with my current knowledge, and I have no reason to believe that either the simplest or most pleasing answers are true"?  Why not just...you know, not know?  It's not like you have to choose a side with absolute certitude.  

It's not surprising to me that people have intuitions about metaphysical truths.  It's just weird to me that so many people claim certainty about metaphysical truths, when often they don't even have a logically reason it's even likelier than alternative explanations.  Even if I thought one explanation was clearly likelier, I don't understand how I'd hop to believing it with absolute conviction.

"I know my belief might not be reasonable, but I know it's true" is just a baffling idea to me.  It's like arguing we're intellectually limited, but somehow magically, selectively omniscient anyway.
Logged
Green Line
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 7,577
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #29 on: October 13, 2015, 10:53:09 PM »

^

I don't really understand how arbitrarily choosing one answer, even because it's more pleasing, is necessary or meaningful.  Why not just say "this is a confusing question that doesn't seem to square with my current knowledge, and I have no reason to believe that either the simplest or most pleasing answers are true"?  Why not just...you know, not know?  It's not like you have to choose a side with absolute certitude.  

It's not surprising to me that people have intuitions about metaphysical truths.  It's just weird to me that so many people claim certainty about metaphysical truths, when often they don't even have a logically reason it's even likelier than alternative explanations.  Even if I thought one explanation was clearly likelier, I don't understand how I'd hop to believing it with absolute conviction.

"I know my belief might not be reasonable, but I know it's true" is just a baffling idea to me.  It's like arguing we're intellectually limited, but somehow magically, selectively omniscient anyway.

Im not saying I know its true, I'm saying its my belief.
Logged
muon2
Moderators
Atlas Icon
*****
Posts: 16,788


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #30 on: October 13, 2015, 11:00:35 PM »

Our system of rational mathematical and scientific thought is based on hypotheses that can't be proven.

For example in classical geometry the statement "Given a line and a point not on the line, at most one line can be drawn through the point that is parallel to the given line." cannot be proved or disproved without introducing some other hypothesis that itself cannot be proved. The statement is called the parallel postulate (Playfair's version) and must be accepted as true to derive other aspects of geometry and mathematics.

In physics centuries were spent trying to measure the medium that carried light waves with no success. Einstein hypothesized that the speed of light was the same to all observers in straight line motion. This unproved postulate led to the development of Einstein's relativity and did away with the notion of a medium for light waves. Subsequent measurements of the effects of relativity didn't prove the postulate, but justified scientific belief in the unproven hypothesis.

In fact in the early 20th century Gödel proved that given any system of axioms there must be true statements about the natural numbers that are unprovable in the system. Essentially he delivered a logical proof that there there will always be unprovable hypotheses that are nonetheless true. Thus one must be prepared to believe in some unprovable hypotheses or choose to disbelieve statements that are true.

Yes, but in every one of those cases, there's some extrinsic reason those hypotheses are accepted above other consistent hypotheses.  The fact we accept some unfalsifiable hypotheses does not mean that all unfalsifiable hypotheses are equally valid or reasonable.  Certainly you're not trying to argue that all hypotheses are equally reasonable, so if not that, what?  (I feel like this is bordering on the same exchange we had in the vegan thread, and you never resolved my questions about how far, and to what purpose, you were drawing the bounds of your apparent shrugging subjectivism.)

My response was specifically to the quote I linked, but was dropped in your reply. It suggested that unproven hypotheses should not be believed. I disagree.

I don't think that it can be proven either way and for me that is a reason not to believe.
There are many hypotheses that can't be proven. Why should I believe in any of them?

I believe that the human mind intrinsically lends itself to contradiction. Furthermore that contradiction is not necessarily a concern, since internal contradictions are unavoidable in a complete logical system. 
Logged
TJ in Oregon
TJ in Cleve
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 8,952
United States


Political Matrix
E: 0.13, S: 6.96

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #31 on: October 13, 2015, 11:09:34 PM »

I don't believe that something can be created from nothing.  I believe there must be some greater being than I.  Whether or not that is the God I believe in is impossible to say.  It gives me comfort to believe in God and makes me at ease with whatever happens to me in the end.  Thats basically it.

Doesn't it strike you as a little contradictory to claim that "something can't be created from nothing, because that's not consistent with how the world seems to work" and then claim that God was something created from nothing?

I don't think many Christians would claim that God was created for nothing or that God was created at all but that God exists outside of time. That question seems to be attacking a position virtually no one actually holds.

Fair point on fact -- and I know that, so I should have phrased differently -- but why does that distinction matter?  The idea of "omnipotent entity existing outside of time" is just as unprecedented as "something created from nothing."

I mean, think about what this argument says logically

"There is no precedent for something being created from nothing.  Therefore, we should assume that it was created by a God that is omnipotent and exists outside of space-time."

How can you hold the former impossible and then endorse the latter claim with certitude as a result of rejecting the former claim?  It makes no sense.

The distinction matters because something being created from nothing is not merely something without precedent but rather something inexplicable in principle by our physical laws if one accepts that the universe is in and of itself intelligible (ie. each effect has a cause; if one rejects that idea then the logic stops making sense but that's not generally a view people hold). From there, one does not then conclude with absolute certitude that it was created by a God that is omnipotent outside of space-time but merely that it was caused by something outside of space-time. The God of metaphysics is an abstraction rather than a proof of the Christian God, who cannot be deduced entirely from logic in the absence of revelation, but the two are not inconsistent with each other.
Logged
TJ in Oregon
TJ in Cleve
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 8,952
United States


Political Matrix
E: 0.13, S: 6.96

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #32 on: October 13, 2015, 11:21:55 PM »

I don't really understand how arbitrarily choosing one answer, even because it's more pleasing, is necessary or meaningful.  Why not just say "this is a confusing question that doesn't seem to square with my current knowledge, and I have no reason to believe that either the simplest or most pleasing answers are true"?  Why not just...you know, not know?  It's not like you have to choose a side with absolute certitude.  

It's not surprising to me that people have intuitions about metaphysical truths.  It's just weird to me that so many people claim certainty about metaphysical truths, when often they don't even have a logically reason it's even likelier than alternative explanations.  Even if I thought one explanation was clearly likelier, I don't understand how I'd hop to believing it with absolute conviction.

"I know my belief might not be reasonable, but I know it's true" is just a baffling idea to me.  It's like arguing we're intellectually limited, but somehow magically, selectively omniscient anyway.

Pertaining to the question asked directly at the beginning of this thread, I don't think very many people actually hold their beliefs on this topic as a result of a logical proof. Instead I think they take their experiences and from those use inductive reasoning to formulate religious beliefs. Typically it is not until these beliefs are already formed, before people begin to consider deductive arguments from assumptions about the universe to explain beliefs they are already convinced of as a result of their observations about the world.

Now, as opposed to your last sentence, very few people agree that their beliefs are not reasonable and most think they are consistent with the logical framework induced from squaring logical argument with them. The non-contradiction principle is widely accepted by both believers and nonbelievers alike. One can certainly argue that the reason why people hold their beliefs is unreasonable but that is a different question than whether the beliefs themselves are unreasonable.

That is how the vast majority of people (in my experience at least) think. There are certainly some exceptions who are indifferent until they stumble upon an argument that convinces them of one position or another but they seem to be quite rare.
Logged
Alcon
Atlas Superstar
*****
Posts: 30,867
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #33 on: October 13, 2015, 11:59:34 PM »
« Edited: October 14, 2015, 12:16:13 AM by Grad Students are the Worst »

My response was specifically to the quote I linked, but was dropped in your reply. It suggested that unproven hypotheses should not be believed. I disagree.

(...)

I believe that the human mind intrinsically lends itself to contradiction. Furthermore that contradiction is not necessarily a concern, since internal contradictions are unavoidable in a complete logical system.  

OK, then again: why hold any given belief over any other given belief, ever?  Is it entirely arbitrary and removed from empirical observation, or are there some unfalsifiable hypotheses that are more reasonable to operate on than others?  If so, why?

This isn't a pedantic question.  I recognize what you're saying about the necessity of unfalsifiable hypotheses, but how do we incorporate that without reaching a conclusion that all beliefs and ideas are equally reasonable?  Oftentimes I see this as a defense of believing unfalsifiable religious hypotheses, by why those, but not others?  The answers that apply to the mathematical examples you cited do not, as far as I know, really apply to religious hypotheses, which this thread is about.  I see this invoked to defend religious beliefs frequently, but I've never seen someone seriously explain how this extension doesn't defend all possible beliefs.
Logged
Alcon
Atlas Superstar
*****
Posts: 30,867
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #34 on: October 14, 2015, 12:15:25 AM »
« Edited: October 14, 2015, 02:12:27 AM by Grad Students are the Worst »

The distinction matters because something being created from nothing is not merely something without precedent but rather something inexplicable in principle by our physical laws if one accepts that the universe is in and of itself intelligible (ie. each effect has a cause; if one rejects that idea then the logic stops making sense but that's not generally a view people hold). From there, one does not then conclude with absolute certitude that it was created by a God that is omnipotent outside of space-time but merely that it was caused by something outside of space-time. The God of metaphysics is an abstraction rather than a proof of the Christian God, who cannot be deduced entirely from logic in the absence of revelation, but the two are not inconsistent with each other.

Is existing out of space and time and being omnipotent and omniscient really more explicable based on our current understanding of physical laws?  I don't think "entity existing out of space-time" violates our observations about how the world functions any less than "entity that was not created."  The criticism I was making applies to both to my original misconstruction of this common argument and your accurate correction.

Pertaining to the question asked directly at the beginning of this thread, I don't think very many people actually hold their beliefs on this topic as a result of a logical proof. Instead I think they take their experiences and from those use inductive reasoning to formulate religious beliefs. Typically it is not until these beliefs are already formed, before people begin to consider deductive arguments from assumptions about the universe to explain beliefs they are already convinced of as a result of their observations about the world.

Yes, and the fact that many people do this process and come to completely different conclusions based on deduction -- and yet this doesn't affect the claims of certitude, somehow -- remains totally baffling to me.

Now, as opposed to your last sentence, very few people agree that their beliefs are not reasonable and most think they are consistent with the logical framework induced from squaring logical argument with them. The non-contradiction principle is widely accepted by both believers and nonbelievers alike. One can certainly argue that the reason why people hold their beliefs is unreasonable but that is a different question than whether the beliefs themselves are unreasonable.

The fact that a belief is consistent with observed reality does not make it reasonable.  Imagine if I handed you a deck of cards and you said, "the top card is an ace of spades."  Would that be a reasonable belief?  No.  You have no reason to believe the next card is an ace of spades; there are other, competing possibilities/hypotheses (51 of them) you have no sound reason to reject.  Even if the next card happens to be an ace of spades, that does not make your belief reasonable.

I don't know how to take your last sentence.  Either you are claiming that a belief is reasonable if it's substantially truthful (not necessarily -- like if the card is the ace of spades), or you're claiming that a belief's conclusion can be "reasonable" even if the logic behind the belief isn't reasonable.  I don't think calling the latter a "reasonable" belief makes sense.  Would you consider it "reasonable" if someone believed that avocados are heart-healthy because their astrologist told them that Aquarius is in the third house, and that makes the energy vibrations given off by green objects good for the heart?  That's not a reasonable belief.  That's an insane belief that's probably, coincidentally true.
Logged
muon2
Moderators
Atlas Icon
*****
Posts: 16,788


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #35 on: October 14, 2015, 08:52:10 AM »

My response was specifically to the quote I linked, but was dropped in your reply. It suggested that unproven hypotheses should not be believed. I disagree.

(...)

I believe that the human mind intrinsically lends itself to contradiction. Furthermore that contradiction is not necessarily a concern, since internal contradictions are unavoidable in a complete logical system.  

OK, then again: why hold any given belief over any other given belief, ever?  Is it entirely arbitrary and removed from empirical observation, or are there some unfalsifiable hypotheses that are more reasonable to operate on than others?  If so, why?

This isn't a pedantic question.  I recognize what you're saying about the necessity of unfalsifiable hypotheses, but how do we incorporate that without reaching a conclusion that all beliefs and ideas are equally reasonable?  Oftentimes I see this as a defense of believing unfalsifiable religious hypotheses, by why those, but not others?  The answers that apply to the mathematical examples you cited do not, as far as I know, really apply to religious hypotheses, which this thread is about.  I see this invoked to defend religious beliefs frequently, but I've never seen someone seriously explain how this extension doesn't defend all possible beliefs.

It's an interesting way to phrase the question. I think the answer lies in the paradigm a person operates under, and I'll start with science since I know it best. To me a scientific paradigm includes hypotheses, observations, key pieces of derived knowledge, standard points of discussion and inquiry, and methodology to derive additional knowledge. Taken as a whole the paradigm is logically consistent, including the unfalsifiable hypotheses. Some unproven hypotheses are inconsistent with the paradigm, and these would fall into the category of those which are not believed. So not all beliefs in the field are equally reasonable.

I'm not a sociologist, but I believe there has been work on the application of paradigms to social science as well. I would think that a social paradigm should include relevant religious beliefs as hypotheses within that paradigm. As in the scientific paradigm the rationale for those beliefs would be their consistency with the overall social paradigm. As with science the social paradigm would provide a standard by which not all beliefs are equally reasonable.

As an aside for TJ, the statement that each effect has a cause is highly debatable in the world of quantum mechanics. The dominant view now is that some quantum effects (including some of those that underpin semiconductor electronics) do not have a cause per se, but are based on the probabilities of particular occurrences. The notion of strict causality at the atomic level does not fit into the current paradigm.
Logged
Why
Unbiased
Jr. Member
***
Posts: 612
Australia


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #36 on: October 14, 2015, 09:33:33 AM »

Well it is certainly impossible to prove there is no god.

Few atheists would outright endorse the claim "it is certain there is no god"; most religious people, by most accounts I've seen, endorse the claim "it is certain there is a god."  Most atheists would instead endorse the claim "it is not reasonable to be certain there is a god."  In any case, "you can't prove this isn't true" isn't a particularly coherent reason to affirmatively believe something.

Of course, just because something cannot be proven to be false is no reason in itself to believe it be true without there being anything to indicate that it might be true.
Logged
Alcon
Atlas Superstar
*****
Posts: 30,867
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #37 on: October 14, 2015, 01:27:51 PM »

My response was specifically to the quote I linked, but was dropped in your reply. It suggested that unproven hypotheses should not be believed. I disagree.

(...)

I believe that the human mind intrinsically lends itself to contradiction. Furthermore that contradiction is not necessarily a concern, since internal contradictions are unavoidable in a complete logical system.  

OK, then again: why hold any given belief over any other given belief, ever?  Is it entirely arbitrary and removed from empirical observation, or are there some unfalsifiable hypotheses that are more reasonable to operate on than others?  If so, why?

This isn't a pedantic question.  I recognize what you're saying about the necessity of unfalsifiable hypotheses, but how do we incorporate that without reaching a conclusion that all beliefs and ideas are equally reasonable?  Oftentimes I see this as a defense of believing unfalsifiable religious hypotheses, by why those, but not others?  The answers that apply to the mathematical examples you cited do not, as far as I know, really apply to religious hypotheses, which this thread is about.  I see this invoked to defend religious beliefs frequently, but I've never seen someone seriously explain how this extension doesn't defend all possible beliefs.

It's an interesting way to phrase the question. I think the answer lies in the paradigm a person operates under, and I'll start with science since I know it best. To me a scientific paradigm includes hypotheses, observations, key pieces of derived knowledge, standard points of discussion and inquiry, and methodology to derive additional knowledge. Taken as a whole the paradigm is logically consistent, including the unfalsifiable hypotheses. Some unproven hypotheses are inconsistent with the paradigm, and these would fall into the category of those which are not believed. So not all beliefs in the field are equally reasonable.

I'm not a sociologist, but I believe there has been work on the application of paradigms to social science as well. I would think that a social paradigm should include relevant religious beliefs as hypotheses within that paradigm. As in the scientific paradigm the rationale for those beliefs would be their consistency with the overall social paradigm. As with science the social paradigm would provide a standard by which not all beliefs are equally reasonable.

As an aside for TJ, the statement that each effect has a cause is highly debatable in the world of quantum mechanics. The dominant view now is that some quantum effects (including some of those that underpin semiconductor electronics) do not have a cause per se, but are based on the probabilities of particular occurrences. The notion of strict causality at the atomic level does not fit into the current paradigm.

This is really interesting.  Can you elaborate a bit on how the social paradigm could provide such a standard?  I understand how the scientific paradigm might -- consistency with other observed phenomena -- but how would such a standard work in the social paradigm?
Logged
TJ in Oregon
TJ in Cleve
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 8,952
United States


Political Matrix
E: 0.13, S: 6.96

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #38 on: October 15, 2015, 12:08:52 AM »

Is existing out of space and time and being omnipotent and omniscient really more explicable based on our current understanding of physical laws?  I don't think "entity existing out of space-time" violates our observations about how the world functions any less than "entity that was not created."  The criticism I was making applies to both to my original misconstruction of this common argument and your accurate correction.

The point in appealing to something outside of our space-time is not that is better matches our understanding of physical laws but as a statement that our physical laws are not in principle capable of answering the "uncaused cause" question. The argument rests on the idea that the physical laws are incapable of answering the question (ie. where did the universe come from) not because the laws are incomplete but they cannot in principle answer that question (incompleteness being another variety of 'God of the Gaps') because the problem at hand is to explain an uncaused cause whereas causality is one of the assumptions we use to determine the physical laws. People have postulated partial solutions to this problem (the origin of the universe) with multiverses and quantum fields in a vacuum but these partial solutions simply move the problem back another step and we're left, at best, with an infinite regress. (Which is the key difference between the misconstruction of the argument for God's existence from causation and the corrected one is that the corrected one avoids the infinite regress.)

Quote
You must be logged in to read this quote.

Level of certitude is an extremely difficult thing for people to grasp about something as simple as a prediction for who will win a sporting event and that typically has a predictable nature to its outcome from prior games. If we try to apply a probabilistic analysis to something like religion, we would be basically making up numbers or at best making very dubious assumptions about the likelihood of a particular belief being correct. Again, the vast majority of people simply don't think that way. They have experiences that they link to beliefs and tend to be very convinced they accurately perceived the experience and accurately interpreted it. Given the number of people and the nature of the induction process it's not at all surprising that we come to different conclusions (you meant induction not deduction here, right?)

Quote
You must be logged in to read this quote.

This example is distinct from religious belief because it contains a falsifiable hypothesis with probabilities that are known whereas religious beliefs contain unfalsifiable hypotheses. It also depends somewhat on how you define 'reasonable', which turns into a semantic game. For instance believing the next card is the ace of spades is certainly more reasonable than believing it is the 17 of spades. A better analogy to religion would be a person giving their belief on what the next card is when that person thinks someone they think they know has stacked it. The situation has a lot more contingencies but more information to it than simply picking a card at random.

Quote
You must be logged in to read this quote.

I don't think we're really disagreeing on substance here; I was merely pointing out the same distinction you are with this example.
Logged
TJ in Oregon
TJ in Cleve
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 8,952
United States


Political Matrix
E: 0.13, S: 6.96

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #39 on: October 15, 2015, 12:15:37 AM »

As an aside for TJ, the statement that each effect has a cause is highly debatable in the world of quantum mechanics. The dominant view now is that some quantum effects (including some of those that underpin semiconductor electronics) do not have a cause per se, but are based on the probabilities of particular occurrences. The notion of strict causality at the atomic level does not fit into the current paradigm.

That's a fair point and one I completely glossed over with my simple language about cause and effect. I would say for the relevant purposes here that "causation" is not necessarily limited to strict causality but rather that there is matter, field, or law constraining what is happening, ie. the probability is coming from somewhere and is not entirely arbitrary. For example, if we used the analogy of a coin flip where I got 'tails' (assuming it were truly random), the 'tails' result would not be strictly caused by something that could not also have caused 'heads' but is still caused by the fact that I have a coin with a 'heads' side and a 'tails' side.
Logged
Alcon
Atlas Superstar
*****
Posts: 30,867
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #40 on: October 15, 2015, 05:32:41 AM »
« Edited: October 15, 2015, 05:47:06 AM by Grad Students are the Worst »

Doing my best to sort this by topic to try to keep this contained.  Hopefully I didn't botch the ordering in the process.

***

The point in appealing to something outside of our space-time is not that is better matches our understanding of physical laws but as a statement that our physical laws are not in principle capable of answering the "uncaused cause" question. The argument rests on the idea that the physical laws are incapable of answering the question (ie. where did the universe come from) not because the laws are incomplete but they cannot in principle answer that question (incompleteness being another variety of 'God of the Gaps') because the problem at hand is to explain an uncaused cause whereas causality is one of the assumptions we use to determine the physical laws. People have postulated partial solutions to this problem (the origin of the universe) with multiverses and quantum fields in a vacuum but these partial solutions simply move the problem back another step and we're left, at best, with an infinite regress. (Which is the key difference between the misconstruction of the argument for God's existence from causation and the corrected one is that the corrected one avoids the infinite regress.)

But my point was that avoiding the infinite regress isn't necessary.  You can simply declare that, in the case of God, the infinite regress doesn't apply.  It is true that we operate under the assumption that everything has a cause -- but we also operate under the assumption that entities exist within space-time.  My point was that it's unsound to argue that all things must have a cause, because that fits our observations of how things work, and then to use that to argue that God must be an entity that exists out of space-time.  That inference requires asserting that, because one possibility (something without a cause) does not match our observations about how the world works, we should infer some other possibility (something out of space-time) that also doesn't.

(I don't want to overcomplicate things, but I recognize there's a distinction between "everything has a cause" -- which is 'substantiated' by our observations -- and "nothing exists out of space-time" -- which is instead 'substantiated' by our lack of observations.  However, the correct parallel is between the claims "nothing lacks a cause" and "nothing exists out of space-time."  If you think that distinction is important, I can explain why I think the correct parallel matters.)

***

It also depends somewhat on how you define 'reasonable', which turns into a semantic game. For instance believing the next card is the ace of spades is certainly more reasonable than believing it is the 17 of spades.

...

I don't think we're really disagreeing on substance here; I was merely pointing out the same distinction you are with this example.

It gets semantic at a certain point, but not at the point I was describing.  I think we can logically say the cut-off line for "reasonable belief' starts somewhere above a 50% probability that the belief is true.  It makes absolutely no sense to believe something is true, if the probability it's true is less than 50%, or less than or equal to the probability that some competing claim is true.

***

This example is distinct from religious belief because it contains a falsifiable hypothesis with probabilities that are known whereas religious beliefs contain unfalsifiable hypotheses.

...

A better analogy to religion would be a person giving their belief on what the next card is when that person thinks someone they think they know has stacked it. The situation has a lot more contingencies but more information to it than simply picking a card at random.

...

Level of certitude is an extremely difficult thing for people to grasp about something as simple as a prediction for who will win a sporting event and that typically has a predictable nature to its outcome from prior games. If we try to apply a probabilistic analysis to something like religion, we would be basically making up numbers or at best making very dubious assumptions about the likelihood of a particular belief being correct. Again, the vast majority of people simply don't think that way. They have experiences that they link to beliefs and tend to be very convinced they accurately perceived the experience and accurately interpreted it. Given the number of people and the nature of the induction process it's not at all surprising that we come to different conclusions (you meant induction not deduction here, right?)

I actually meant "deduction."  I just forgot how I was going to finish that sentence Tongue

Anyway, I must not have been clear, because you're reading my analogy (and overall claim) as being about probability.  Not really.  The point of the card analogy is merely that just because something is true does not mean believing it is reasonable.  Whether it's knowable (the distinction you point out) is not relevant to the analogy.  The point is that a belief can be non-contradictory with presented facts, and even turn out to be true (if it's knowable), and yet that belief can be totally unreasonable.  Why?  If you can't even explain why the belief is more compelling than all other hypotheses (as in the card analogy), it is not reasonable to believe it.  That's the case in the card analogy.  And that's all the card analogy was meant to demonstrate.

I hope it's clearer now that my analogy was not implying that I think all religious claims are equally compelling, which seems to be how you've taken it.  Like I said above, I don't think it's unreasonable to find a given religious claim more compelling than others.  However, most people's religious convictions go way, way, way beyond "I intuitively and subjectively find this metaphysical explanation of the world more compelling than other competing explanations."  And that's not because people don't know the difference between intuition-driven operating assumptions, and certitude.

Here's why it's really weird to me that certitude is so common.  You are right that most people assume that they accurately perceive and interpret experiences.  However, I also assume that other people reasonably believe they accurately perceive and interpret experiences, as well.  I don't think that others are secretly crazy or dishonest, and I doubt you do either.  It is not surprising, of course, that people come to different inductive conclusions.  Because experiences and processes vary, you'd expect even a few reasonable people exposed to the same stimuli to come to conclusions that are "outliers" in the larger group.  Like, if a big group of people observes a fight in public, a small number of people are probably going to completely misinterpret the events that occurred.  It's not surprising to me that perceptions and interpretations can vary.  It's surprising to me that perceptions and interpretations can vary so much, and yet certitude remain so widespread.

If a large group of reasonable, intelligent people saw an event and had an array of wildly different perceptions of what occurred, I wouldn't expect them to all maintain their interpretation with certitude.  Thinking that their interpretation was the most likely interpretation?  Sure.  Operating under the assumption that their interpretation was accurate, for lack of a more compelling interpretation?  Quite possibly.  Widespread certitude, in the face of many wildly different observations and interpretations from apparently reasonable, honest people?  Like I said, that would be baffling to me.
Logged
afleitch
Moderators
Atlas Star
*****
Posts: 29,834


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #41 on: October 15, 2015, 06:05:26 AM »

Good discussion so far Alcon.

I think to expand a little on your argument, if the theistic god is placed ‘outside of space-time’ that doesn’t deal with the fact that according to theists, god acts within space-time. That’s what makes it ‘god like.’; impacting on universal events, human events, giving revelation etc. So not only are assumptions being made about things outside of space-time, assumptions are being made about how this domain interacts with things inside of space-time. How can it be ascertained that things outside of space-time (if things can have residence in such an place) can influence events in this universe?

If we endow things outside of space-time with god like assumptions because we assume it must have different properties (or has no need to follow any properties at all) to our own universe, perhaps things out side of space-time consider things inside of space-time to be godlike to them because we have different properties or are not similarly constrained. Perhaps the immaterial are in awe of the material. Just a thought.
Logged
muon2
Moderators
Atlas Icon
*****
Posts: 16,788


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #42 on: October 15, 2015, 07:52:42 AM »

As an aside for TJ, the statement that each effect has a cause is highly debatable in the world of quantum mechanics. The dominant view now is that some quantum effects (including some of those that underpin semiconductor electronics) do not have a cause per se, but are based on the probabilities of particular occurrences. The notion of strict causality at the atomic level does not fit into the current paradigm.

That's a fair point and one I completely glossed over with my simple language about cause and effect. I would say for the relevant purposes here that "causation" is not necessarily limited to strict causality but rather that there is matter, field, or law constraining what is happening, ie. the probability is coming from somewhere and is not entirely arbitrary. For example, if we used the analogy of a coin flip where I got 'tails' (assuming it were truly random), the 'tails' result would not be strictly caused by something that could not also have caused 'heads' but is still caused by the fact that I have a coin with a 'heads' side and a 'tails' side.

Your reply highlights an example of conflicting paradigms. I expect that most people would agree with your assertion that "the probability is coming from somewhere and is not entirely arbitrary." Most physicists would not agree with that in the context of the modern paradigm of measurement and quantum mechanics. Einstein and others tried to assert that there were "hidden variables" that created cause and effect for quantum processes, but their models were unsatisfying to physicists as a community, and we are left with the belief that there are truly random processes that are entirely arbitrary.

Even beyond the quantum level there are events that hinge on measurements that intrinsically can not be made with sufficient precision, and would require a computer with more atoms than in the universe to project an effect from the cause. upon seeing an effect one might philosophically claim these "chaotic" events have a cause, but if that cause cannot be discerned by any physical means does that sense of cause have meaning?

This is really interesting.  Can you elaborate a bit on how the social paradigm could provide such a standard?  I understand how the scientific paradigm might -- consistency with other observed phenomena -- but how would such a standard work in the social paradigm?

I'm doing a little bit of thinking on this while I'm grading qualifying exams. I want to make sure we are on the same page about paradigms. A paradigm is more than just a consistent set of hypotheses, observations, and knowledge derived from them. It also importantly includes a framework for thought that specifies the types of questions one might reasonably ask and proper methods for discerning the answers to those questions. For example it is grammatically correct to ask "How many centimeters are in a pound?", but that is a nonsense question to a scientist, because there is no framework in our scientific paradigm to compare a measurement of length to one of weight.

From what I've read the famous question about the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin is a similar example that seems nonsensical to modern western thought. Yet it meant something entirely different in the paradigm of the medieval scholar. We would view it as something that should be answered with a physical counting. The ancient scholar would not have thought about it that way, but instead would look at the question as a way to understand the nature of the immaterial world of the divine.
Logged
Torie
Moderators
Atlas Legend
*****
Posts: 46,057
Ukraine


Political Matrix
E: -3.48, S: -4.70

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #43 on: October 15, 2015, 09:15:49 AM »

Muon2 has waxed most eloquent in the above, but in the end, to me, what he said just makes common sense. It is sort of the way a lawyer thinks really. Everything is about context and ways of approaching and thinking about a problem, carefully categorizing things to create some degree or order and predictability, but often never really fully accomplishing that, and realizing that some things cannot be predicted or known, because there are random events out there.
Logged
TJ in Oregon
TJ in Cleve
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 8,952
United States


Political Matrix
E: 0.13, S: 6.96

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #44 on: October 15, 2015, 10:54:15 AM »

As an aside for TJ, the statement that each effect has a cause is highly debatable in the world of quantum mechanics. The dominant view now is that some quantum effects (including some of those that underpin semiconductor electronics) do not have a cause per se, but are based on the probabilities of particular occurrences. The notion of strict causality at the atomic level does not fit into the current paradigm.

That's a fair point and one I completely glossed over with my simple language about cause and effect. I would say for the relevant purposes here that "causation" is not necessarily limited to strict causality but rather that there is matter, field, or law constraining what is happening, ie. the probability is coming from somewhere and is not entirely arbitrary. For example, if we used the analogy of a coin flip where I got 'tails' (assuming it were truly random), the 'tails' result would not be strictly caused by something that could not also have caused 'heads' but is still caused by the fact that I have a coin with a 'heads' side and a 'tails' side.

Your reply highlights an example of conflicting paradigms. I expect that most people would agree with your assertion that "the probability is coming from somewhere and is not entirely arbitrary." Most physicists would not agree with that in the context of the modern paradigm of measurement and quantum mechanics. Einstein and others tried to assert that there were "hidden variables" that created cause and effect for quantum processes, but their models were unsatisfying to physicists as a community, and we are left with the belief that there are truly random processes that are entirely arbitrary.

Even beyond the quantum level there are events that hinge on measurements that intrinsically can not be made with sufficient precision, and would require a computer with more atoms than in the universe to project an effect from the cause. upon seeing an effect one might philosophically claim these "chaotic" events have a cause, but if that cause cannot be discerned by any physical means does that sense of cause have meaning?

I am aware of the notion of hidden variables and that most of modern physics has rejected the notion but I am a little confused by your response. Are you saying that the probability itself of an event is arbitrary (not the outcome but the probability)? Aren't the probabilities of events contingent upon variables such as the existence of particles, positions, and fields? Sorry for being obtuse, I recognize here that my knowledge of quantum mechanics is only at the undergrad physical chemistry level.
Logged
Torie
Moderators
Atlas Legend
*****
Posts: 46,057
Ukraine


Political Matrix
E: -3.48, S: -4.70

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #45 on: October 15, 2015, 12:02:31 PM »

Does quantum mechanics posit precise probabilities?
Logged
muon2
Moderators
Atlas Icon
*****
Posts: 16,788


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #46 on: October 15, 2015, 01:27:02 PM »
« Edited: October 15, 2015, 01:33:11 PM by muon2 »

As an aside for TJ, the statement that each effect has a cause is highly debatable in the world of quantum mechanics. The dominant view now is that some quantum effects (including some of those that underpin semiconductor electronics) do not have a cause per se, but are based on the probabilities of particular occurrences. The notion of strict causality at the atomic level does not fit into the current paradigm.

That's a fair point and one I completely glossed over with my simple language about cause and effect. I would say for the relevant purposes here that "causation" is not necessarily limited to strict causality but rather that there is matter, field, or law constraining what is happening, ie. the probability is coming from somewhere and is not entirely arbitrary. For example, if we used the analogy of a coin flip where I got 'tails' (assuming it were truly random), the 'tails' result would not be strictly caused by something that could not also have caused 'heads' but is still caused by the fact that I have a coin with a 'heads' side and a 'tails' side.

Your reply highlights an example of conflicting paradigms. I expect that most people would agree with your assertion that "the probability is coming from somewhere and is not entirely arbitrary." Most physicists would not agree with that in the context of the modern paradigm of measurement and quantum mechanics. Einstein and others tried to assert that there were "hidden variables" that created cause and effect for quantum processes, but their models were unsatisfying to physicists as a community, and we are left with the belief that there are truly random processes that are entirely arbitrary.

Even beyond the quantum level there are events that hinge on measurements that intrinsically can not be made with sufficient precision, and would require a computer with more atoms than in the universe to project an effect from the cause. upon seeing an effect one might philosophically claim these "chaotic" events have a cause, but if that cause cannot be discerned by any physical means does that sense of cause have meaning?

I am aware of the notion of hidden variables and that most of modern physics has rejected the notion but I am a little confused by your response. Are you saying that the probability itself of an event is arbitrary (not the outcome but the probability)? Aren't the probabilities of events contingent upon variables such as the existence of particles, positions, and fields? Sorry for being obtuse, I recognize here that my knowledge of quantum mechanics is only at the undergrad physical chemistry level.

It is true that if I knew the exact state of a system and the type of measurement that was performed, I could precisely calculate the probability of a particular value for the measurement. Ironically the same quantum mechanics tells us we cannot know with absolute precision all the variables of the state of the system, so my calculation would be something other than ideal. However, when we have very large numbers of very small quantum particles, my lack of knowledge can be a help. In the limit of large statistics the probabilities become more certain, much as a casino counts on a large number of players to guarantee their long term winnings.

However, I do think most people would ascribe a cause not to the calculation of the probability, but to the realization of an event that depends on the probability. In the famous thought experiment about Schrodinger's cat, the random decay of an unstable atom triggers the poison that would kill the cat. There is a natural tendency for people to say we don't know when the atom will decay, but some unknown factors are causing it to decay at the moment that it does. That tendency is essentially the hidden variable view of quantum mechanics.

I think this takes care of Torie's question, too.
Logged
Torie
Moderators
Atlas Legend
*****
Posts: 46,057
Ukraine


Political Matrix
E: -3.48, S: -4.70

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #47 on: October 15, 2015, 04:59:13 PM »

Do we know much about how these small quantum particles behave vis a vis each other, beyond empirically noticing that there are probabilities that one outcome or the other will occur? Does that question make any sense?  Smiley
Logged
Alcon
Atlas Superstar
*****
Posts: 30,867
United States


Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #48 on: October 15, 2015, 06:08:04 PM »

I'm doing a little bit of thinking on this while I'm grading qualifying exams. I want to make sure we are on the same page about paradigms. A paradigm is more than just a consistent set of hypotheses, observations, and knowledge derived from them. It also importantly includes a framework for thought that specifies the types of questions one might reasonably ask and proper methods for discerning the answers to those questions. For example it is grammatically correct to ask "How many centimeters are in a pound?", but that is a nonsense question to a scientist, because there is no framework in our scientific paradigm to compare a measurement of length to one of weight.

From what I've read the famous question about the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin is a similar example that seems nonsensical to modern western thought. Yet it meant something entirely different in the paradigm of the medieval scholar. We would view it as something that should be answered with a physical counting. The ancient scholar would not have thought about it that way, but instead would look at the question as a way to understand the nature of the immaterial world of the divine.

OK, but how do we determine what are reasonable unfalsifiable hypotheses to believe in the social paradigm?  I understand the reason (more or less) why we accept and proceed with unfalsifiable hypotheses in mathematics -- they're necessary for consistency with observable phenomena.  I assume you agree that there are some beliefs, in the social paradigm and elsewhere, that aren't reasonable...or do you think that all beliefs, if unfalsifiable, are equally reasonable to hold?
Logged
TJ in Oregon
TJ in Cleve
Junior Chimp
*****
Posts: 8,952
United States


Political Matrix
E: 0.13, S: 6.96

Show only this user's posts in this thread
« Reply #49 on: October 16, 2015, 12:16:09 AM »

But my point was that avoiding the infinite regress isn't necessary.  You can simply declare that, in the case of God, the infinite regress doesn't apply.  It is true that we operate under the assumption that everything has a cause -- but we also operate under the assumption that entities exist within space-time.  My point was that it's unsound to argue that all things must have a cause, because that fits our observations of how things work, and then to use that to argue that God must be an entity that exists out of space-time.  That inference requires asserting that, because one possibility (something without a cause) does not match our observations about how the world works, we should infer some other possibility (something out of space-time) that also doesn't.

(I don't want to overcomplicate things, but I recognize there's a distinction between "everything has a cause" -- which is 'substantiated' by our observations -- and "nothing exists out of space-time" -- which is instead 'substantiated' by our lack of observations.  However, the correct parallel is between the claims "nothing lacks a cause" and "nothing exists out of space-time."  If you think that distinction is important, I can explain why I think the correct parallel matters.)

I think the key distinction here is not just whether the claim is substantiated by our observations rather than our lack of observations (though the latter would be a less compelling claim all things being equal) but also is in what domain we would expect the laws to apply. We would expect something as fundamental to our understanding of our universe as causality to apply throughout. On the other hand, we would not expect to observe something out of our space-time so the fact that we don't observe it doesn't tell us anything other than it's not a falsifiable hypothesis.

It gets semantic at a certain point, but not at the point I was describing.  I think we can logically say the cut-off line for "reasonable belief' starts somewhere above a 50% probability that the belief is true.  It makes absolutely no sense to believe something is true, if the probability it's true is less than 50%, or less than or equal to the probability that some competing claim is true.

The particular challenge here is that these sorts of claims have probabilities that can't be evaluated in a way that isn't completely arbitrary. I guess we disagree on the definition of "reasonable" here. For instance I wouldn't consider someone's beliefs unreasonable for believing in Hinduism on the basis that I think its odds of being true are less than 50%. I guess I see "reasonable" meaning something along the lines of "plausible".

I actually meant "deduction."  I just forgot how I was going to finish that sentence Tongue

Anyway, I must not have been clear, because you're reading my analogy (and overall claim) as being about probability.  Not really.  The point of the card analogy is merely that just because something is true does not mean believing it is reasonable.  Whether it's knowable (the distinction you point out) is not relevant to the analogy.  The point is that a belief can be non-contradictory with presented facts, and even turn out to be true (if it's knowable), and yet that belief can be totally unreasonable.  Why?  If you can't even explain why the belief is more compelling than all other hypotheses (as in the card analogy), it is not reasonable to believe it.  That's the case in the card analogy.  And that's all the card analogy was meant to demonstrate.

I hope it's clearer now that my analogy was not implying that I think all religious claims are equally compelling, which seems to be how you've taken it.  Like I said above, I don't think it's unreasonable to find a given religious claim more compelling than others.  However, most people's religious convictions go way, way, way beyond "I intuitively and subjectively find this metaphysical explanation of the world more compelling than other competing explanations."  And that's not because people don't know the difference between intuition-driven operating assumptions, and certitude.

Here's why it's really weird to me that certitude is so common.  You are right that most people assume that they accurately perceive and interpret experiences.  However, I also assume that other people reasonably believe they accurately perceive and interpret experiences, as well.  I don't think that others are secretly crazy or dishonest, and I doubt you do either.  It is not surprising, of course, that people come to different inductive conclusions.  Because experiences and processes vary, you'd expect even a few reasonable people exposed to the same stimuli to come to conclusions that are "outliers" in the larger group.  Like, if a big group of people observes a fight in public, a small number of people are probably going to completely misinterpret the events that occurred.  It's not surprising to me that perceptions and interpretations can vary.  It's surprising to me that perceptions and interpretations can vary so much, and yet certitude remain so widespread.

If a large group of reasonable, intelligent people saw an event and had an array of wildly different perceptions of what occurred, I wouldn't expect them to all maintain their interpretation with certitude.  Thinking that their interpretation was the most likely interpretation?  Sure.  Operating under the assumption that their interpretation was accurate, for lack of a more compelling interpretation?  Quite possibly.  Widespread certitude, in the face of many wildly different observations and interpretations from apparently reasonable, honest people?  Like I said, that would be baffling to me.

For why people have a high level of certitude about deductive claims while coming to a wide array of conclusions I have several hypotheses to offer up. I will let you subjectively decide if you think they are reasonable Tongue :

1. Despite believing that others' experiential claims are true, people still believe their own and think others who disagree are merely misinterpreting their own experience. These sorts of ideas are so deeply ingrained in the way we view the universe that we simply can't see how everyone else doesn't agree.

2. A sort of Pascal's Wager comes into play here. (Yes I know there are a lot of philosophical problems with using Pascal's Wager as an argument to actually prove anything.) But the options posed by it still may inform people's decision making process.

3. The inherent assumptions behind the deductive arguments are sufficiently abstract that our view of which are most plausible is mostly determined by our experiential views of the universe. For instance I don't see the universe coming into existence uncaused as a very compelling answer though obviously others disagree. Yet it is abstract enough that I wouldn't at all think they're lying if they say it best matches their experiences.

4. The arguments get very complicated very quickly, so much so that the majority do not actually understand their opponents' views as well as they think they do. Understanding their own much better, they of course see them as the most reasonable.
Logged
Pages: 1 [2] 3  
« previous next »
Jump to:  


Login with username, password and session length

Terms of Service - DMCA Agent and Policy - Privacy Policy and Cookies

Powered by SMF 1.1.21 | SMF © 2015, Simple Machines

Page created in 0.093 seconds with 12 queries.