Colombia General Discussion

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Although I'm sure that I'm the only one here who cares so deeply about Colombia and topics related to it, I figure a general discussion thread about this great country could be interesting and would provide me with an opportunity to sperg about my favourite topics. Regardless, Colombia is going through a very interesting period - a peace deal of some kind with the FARC now has a set date in March 2016, there are likely going to be peace talks with the ELN sometime soon, Álvaro Uribe is presumably going nuts as his world collapses around him, new municipal administrations are taking over in the New Year (and this will be interesting especially in Bogotá) while politicians are already preparing themselves for the 2018 presidential elections so it's going to be every man for himself from now on. I can also sperg about other topics related to Colombian politics, history, geography, cities, regions, culture and stuff.

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To begin with, the 'Red Colombiana de Ciudades Cómo Vamos' has released its comparative study of citizens' perception of their cities, which has some very interesting stuff.

The full study is here: http://redcomovamos.org/descarga-la-presentacion-de-la-encuesta-comparada-2015-miciudadcomparada/

Satisfied with their city as a place to live - reported in the media as 'best cities to live in'
1. Manizales 92%
2. Pereira 85%
3. Medellín 81%
4. Barranquilla 76%
5. Ibagué 75%
6. Bucaramanga 73%
7. Cali 68%
8. Yumbo 61%
9. Bogotá 44%
10. Cartagena 42%

Things are on the right track
1. Manizales 85%
2. Medellín 80%
3. Barranquilla 61%
3. Yumbo 61%
5. Bucaramanga 59%
6. Yumbo 58%
7. Cali 50%
8. Cartagena 45%
9. Ibagué 37%
10. Bogotá 27%

Proud of their city
1. Manizales 91%
2. Pereira 84%
3. Medellín 80%
3. Barranquilla 80%
5. Bucaramanga 79%
6. Cartagena 67%
7. Cali 63%
7. Yumbo 63%
9. Ibagué 61%
10. Bogotá 50%

Very pleased to see the lovely city of Manizales topping the rankings, and a good spot for Medellín. Shut-outs to my two favourite cities.

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A few days late, but the Chamber, last Thursday, adopted the statutory law for the 'plebiscite for peace' (see also: El Tiempo article), in its final debate, the last hurdle before conciliation of the two houses and revision by the Constitutional Court.

This law basically sets the rules for the organization of a 'plebiscite for peace' - i.e., a popular vote on the approval of the Havana peace talks with the FARC, which could be held before June 2016. If there is to be a peace deal in March between the government and the FARC in Cuba, then it must be 'approved' by Colombians in one way or another, and this is the government's proposal, which has not been accepted by the FARC. The plebiscite will only be held if both parties agree on it as the best mechanism.

The main points of this law:

• The President may, with the countersignature of all ministers, submit the final peace accord to a plebiscite. He will inform Congress of his intention to do so and the date on which the vote will take place, which must be within one to four months (but no less than one month) of his informing Congress. Congress has one month to pronounce itself on the president's decision, and absent any rejection of the president's decision by a simple majority vote of Congress within this period, the president may officially call for the plebiscite. This is the existing legal procedure for plebiscites in Colombia (Ley 1757 de 2015)
• Approval of the plebiscite requires a simple majority for the Sí over No, and support equivalent to 13% of the registered electorate (at least 4,396,625 votes). This is not the normal legal requirement for approval of a plebiscite - a normal plebiscite has a very high quorum (50% of the registered electorate). The result, regardless of the outcome, would be binding.
• Guarantees for an equal and impartial campaign for both sides, although there should be no state financing of the campaigns, save through access to the state media. Public servants will be allowed to campaign and debate freely, but the use of state resources or public funds is naturally banned.
• The government will be obliged to release, publish and disseminate the full contents of the accord 30 days before the vote.

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Tonight, Bogotá's Santa Fe football club won the final of the 2015 Copa Sudamericana, the first victory for a Colombian team since the tournament began in 2002. Two Colombian teams won the more prestigious elite Copa Libertadores - Medellín's Atlético Nacional in 1989 and Manizales' Once Caldas in 2004.

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Dec. 2015 Cifras y Conceptos 'Polimétrica' poll:

Politicians favourability

Álvaro Uribe 50/46/4 (fav -4)
Juan Manuel Santos 38/60/2 (fav -2)
Germán Vargas Lleras 41/45/15 (fav +2)

Top 5 cabinet ministers
1. Gina Parody (Education) 36/44/20
2. Lucho Garzón (Labour) 34/41/26
3. Luis Carlos Villegas (Defence) 30/36/34
4. María Ángela Holguín (Foreign Relations) 28/32/40
5. Juan Fernando Cristo (Interior) 26/32/42

Violence
Which type of violence are you most preoccupied by?
Street delinquency 33%
Guerrillas 15%
Violence against women 11%
Bacrim 9%
Other 8%
Intrafamily 8%
Narcos 7%
Paras 5%

Armed struggle against the FARC - best solution
Promoting demobilization of their members 34% (+5)
Negotiated settlement 32% (-6)
Military defeat 27% (+1)
DK 7%

Punishment for demobilized groups
Jail 52%
Reduced sentences in return for truth and reparations 31%
Freedom on condition of truth and reparations 17%

Opinion on major points of the FARC-government accords
Demining 82/18
Surrender of weapons 80/20
Truth commission 68/32
Illicit crop substitution programs 66/34
Special tribunal to try major crimes 64/36
Differentiated sentences for those who recognize responsibility and those who don't 57/43
Integral rural reform 56/44
Guarantees of political participation 38/62

Opinion on potential additional points of the accords
If the cost of peace was accepting the following points, which would you accept?
Plebiscite 61/39
Constituent assembly 44/56
Inclusion of demobilized men within public forces 28/72
Electoral participation of FARC leaders 23/77
Unelected congressional seats for FARC leaders 17/83

Plebiscite
Would you vote?
Yes 59%
No 36%
DK 5%

How would you vote?
Yes 61%
No 11%
DK 28%

[MaxQue]

Bacrim?

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Bacrim?

Bandas criminales emergentes, or criminal bands, are basically ex-paramilitary gangs who did not demobilize during Álvaro Uribe's paramilitary demobilization process in 2005-2006, and instead remained active in the criminal underworld, specifically in drug trafficking (but also illegal mining, extortion, contraband, human trafficking and other illegal activities). They are the top level in the 'hierarchy' of Colombian organized crime, involved in the most serious criminal activities, with the largest geographic presence and the most likely to have penetrated some sectors of the government/authorities. Sometimes referred to as paramilitaries or neo-paramilitaries, particularly by the left, which is not entirely inaccurate but at the same time doesn't quite get the real differences between organizations like the former AUC and the modern Bacrim. The Bacrim were at their strongest in the 5-6 years following the demobilization process, but military operations against their leaders and organizations have been fairly effective in recent years (a number of top Bacrim leaders have been killed in the past few years), although the Bacrim remain some of the most dangerous and violent criminal organizations in Colombia.

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Major news development in Colombia, with another historic step towards peace today in the peace negotiations between the government and the FARC in Havana. Both parties have reached an agreement on another of the issues on the agenda: victims. It builds on the historic deal of September 23 on the 'special jurisdiction for peace' (JEP), which set out how those responsible for major crimes against humanity not eligible for a blanket amnesty will be tried.

The agreement creates an 'integral system for justice, truth, reparation and non-repetition' which has the following objectives:

• Satisfaction of victims' rights through judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms (JEP)
• Accountability through the establishment of direct or indirect responsibility for all parties in the conflict
• Non-repetition
• Differential focus (enfoque diferencial), through special differentiated attention for specific territories and populations (ethnic minorities, political and social movements, the poorest, farmers, LGBT and especially women and children) most affected by the conflict
• Legal security (JEP)
• Coexistence and reconciliation
• Legitimacy

This system will be made up of an extrajudicial 'truth, coexistence and non-repetition commission' to clarify the truth, explain the conflict and recognize victims and responsibilities; a special search unit for disappeared persons; the JEP; individual and collective reparation measures and guarantees of non-repetition.

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An interesting article from Semana about the major progressive steps taken in rights matters this year in Colombia (mostly thanks to the courts): gay adoption, regulation of death with dignity/euthanasia (technically legalized in 1997 but in legal limbo due to unregulation) and the end of aerial fumigation.

http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/2015-colombia-admitio-eutanasia-adopcion-gay-marihuana/454097-3

A review of Santos' ups-and-downs year of 2015: http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/presidente-santos-paz-politica-diplomacia-en-2015/454155-3

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Another positive step forward towards peace, as the government and the Farc release a communiqué stating that they will request from the UN Security Council a mission to verify the eventual ceasefire and surrender of weapons. As La Silla Vacía says, it's another step which makes the process more and more irreversible.

As usual, excellent analysis on La Silla: http://lasillavacia.com/historia/con-la-onu-comienza-el-fin-del-fin-de-la-guerra-52828

The official communiqué: http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/proceso-de-paz-con-las-farc-ep/documentos-y-comunicados-conjuntos/Documents/19-01-2016-comunicado-conjunto-65-19-enero-2016.pdf

I wonder what kind of excessive hyperbole Uribe will use this time.

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The government and the FARC have announced that they have reached an historic agreement on the ceasefire, cessation of hostilities, surrender of weapons, and security guarantees to be announced tomorrow (June 23). President Juan Manuel Santos will travel to Havana tomorrow, with the attendance of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, John Kerry, President Bachelet (Chile), President Raúl Castro (Cuba), President Tweety Bird 'Maduro' (Venezuela), President Salvador Sánchez (El Salvador), President Danilo Medina (D.R.) and the US and EU's special delegates to the Colombian peace process (Bernie Aronson and Eamon Gilmore).

This agreement is truly groundbreaking and historic since it brings the peace process even closer to a final agreement, and resolves some of the most complicated issues. The announcement will include details about the final definite ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. Very important will be how the FARC will surrender the weapons - we know that there will be 'concentration zones' (zonas de concentración) but tomorrow may provide details about the number, location, management and monitoring of such zones. Tomorrow may also tell us if the weapons will be destroyed or kept. Finally, there will also be an agreement on 'security guarantees' - guarantees for the fight against criminal organizations responsible for homicide and massacres of human rights activists, social and political movements, and paramilitary successor groups are explicitly cited in today's communiqué.

El Tiempo and El Espectador have basic articles about tomorrow's agreement, La Silla Vacía has an in-depth look at what has been agreed upon thus far and what's left to go.

[Velasco]

This is very wonderful news. According to León Valencia (Director of the Foundation for Peace and Reconciliation), the agreement is a passage from the XX to the XXI century. Now there's a key implementation phase (postconflict and reconstruction). Mr Valencia talks briefly about the challenges of this process in the video linked below:

http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/06/22/colombia/1466560925_376190.html

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Details:

Bilateral and definite ceasefire and cessation of hostilities: This is basically as it says on the tin, straight-forward stuff. The catch here is that there is no date set, although everything else in the agreement would imply that it will begin after the signature of the final agreement, since that is when the guerrilla units will begin moving to the concentration zones.
Monitoring and verification mechanism: This will be a tripartite mechanism with representatives from the government, the FARC and an international component of unarmed political observers from the UN (largely made up of observers from CELAC member states). The international component will preside the overall mechanism and be in charge of resolving controversies, presenting recommendations and reports on the ceasefire and surrender of weapons.
Surrender of weapons - Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización and campamentos For the surrender of weapons and reintegration of guerrillas to civilian life, there will be 23 Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización (a vereda is a Colombian rural settlement or hamlet within a municipality) and 8 encampments. The exact locations are undefined, but the government has released the municipalities where the 23 zones and 8 encampments will be, and La Silla Vacía has an excellent feature about them (with explanations for each municipality about the presence of illegal armed groups and illegal economic/resource extraction activities). Most of them are located in conflict zones with a strong FARC influence (either now or historically) and the presence of illegal activities (cocaine, illegal mining). The number is a compromise between the FARC (which wanted 65-67) and the government (7-10). Within each zone, there will be guerrilla encampments without civilian populations, and FARC guerrillas will not be able to leave these encampments with weapons or uniforms. Around each encampment there will be a 1km wide security zone, off limits to both soldiers and guerrillas.  There will be no limits to the normal functioning of the elected civilian governments in these municipalities, unlike what happened with Pastrana's zona de distensión (where the FARC basically replaced civilian authorities as the governing power). The monitoring and verification teams will monitor and verify compliance with the terms, and coordinate the entrance of the police if required.
Surrender of weapons - timeline: Within the encampments, the UN mission will collect and store all weapons received from the FARC and the weapons will be used to build 3 monuments (one at the UN HQ in NYC, one in Cuba and one in Colombia). The FARC will surrender all their weapons in three phases within 6 months (180 days) from the signature of the final agreement. The FARC will also contribute by participating in demining activities (a pilot project has already begun). The UN mission will certify the surrender of weapons. The short time frame is considered to be a victory for the government, since it does not give the FARC the time to begin proselytizing or engaging in political activities from their encampments.
Security guarantees: The second part of the agreement were security guarantees, especially for social movements, communities, human rights groups, political parties and movements (especially the political movement to be created by the FARC in their reintegration to civilian life). The text of the agreement is mostly fluffy without hard details, with stuff like intensifying actions against criminal organizations (>Bacrim, ie neo-paramilitary) with a presidential-led national commission on security guarantees and special investigation unit within the Fiscalía. Symbolically, both sides agree to a 'national political pact' with political parties, unions and civil society to guarantee that never again are weapons used in politics or violent organizations are promoted. In addition, the previous agreement on political participation includes an 'integral security system for political participation', which should be a mixed body (FARC and government) to protect demobilized FARC guerrilla in their new political activities.
BONUS - Plebiscite: The FARC explicitly agree to the government's plebiscite for peace as the ratification mechanism for the agreement. The FARC had insisted until recently that they wanted a constituent assembly to entrench the final agreement. The law for the plebiscite is currently being reviewed by the Constitutional Court.

Details:
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/documentos-y-comunicados-conjuntos/Paginas/Comunicado-Conjunto-Acuerdo-sobre-Cese-al-fuego-y-de-hostilidades-bilateral-y-Definitivo-y-Dejacion-de-Armas.aspx
http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.gov.co/acuerdos/Documents/acuerdo-fin-conflicto-cese-fuego-hostilidades-bilateral-definitivo-dejacion-armas.pdf
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Paginas/Preguntas-y-respuestas-Acuerdo-punto-3-Fin-del-Conflicto.aspx
http://lasillavacia.com/historia/las-preguntas-que-resolvieron-santos-y-timochenko-hoy-y-las-que-no-56239

[MaxQue]

Will the Uribists will try to derail the whole thing and, if yes, can they do it?

[Famous Mortimer]

The FARC is going to be totally disarmed, yes or no?

What does FARC get out of this? Just limited immunity basically? Why couldn't they agree to that 25 years ago?

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Will the Uribists will try to derail the whole thing and, if yes, can they do it?

Uribe is currently leading a resistencia civil to the agreement, a term which, in Colombia, has a long and illustrious history of meaning whatever you want it to mean. So far, his resistencia civil has been trying to hobble the legislative progress of various laws and constitutional reforms related to the peace agreement, street protests and his usual claims that the sky is falling and that Colombia will become a 'narcostate' or whatever. At the same time, he claims that he is not against peace per se, but just against the peace as it is currently negotiated (his new term now appears to be 'wounded peace'); in reality, Uribe's demands for peace his way are completely unrealistic (peace with the FARC's leadership all sent to jail and barred from political participation) so it doesn't amount to anything more than baseless political talking points.

Uribe and his people have also been gathering signatures for something called por la paz que queremos (for the peace we want), a 10-point laundry list of qualms with the agreement (excessive impunity for crimes against humanity and drug trafficking, constitutional entrenchment of the agreement, 'threats' to the current economic model or agrarian policy). It's somewhat unclear exactly what Uribe intends to do with this petition of sorts, besides proving his weight and backing up legal challenges against the acto legislativo para la paz.

His criticisms of the peace agreement are not without merit, but his flaming hypocrisy basically invalidates his arguments as far as I'm concerned. For example, while he has a point about excessive impunity for FARC leaders and the lax sentences they will face, one must realize that (a) there will be uncomfortable immunity, or impunity, in any peace agreement anywhere in the world, especially one seeking to seal a decades-old conflict in which both sides have committed unspeakable atrocities, but this immunity/impunity is sine qua non for peace, (b) the September 2015 agreement on special judicial prosecution offers significantly less impunity for heinous crimes than any other peace agreements in Colombian history (certainly it is much better than Uribe's own justicia y paz law of 2005), (c) a certain senator Álvaro Uribe pushed very hard for complete impunity for M-19 guerrilla leaders in 1992 including for those who participated in the seizure of the Palacio de Justicia. Besides, Uribe's opposition to the peace process is not even entirely genuine - his whole 'no negotiations until complete defeat' act is largely a public facade, since his record as president wasn't quite that black and white when it came to dealing with the FARC/ELN.

The most realistic way for Uribe and his supporters to derail an agreement would be the plebiscite. With the FARC officially on board, the ball is in the Constitutional Court's hands now on this one - it needs to give a legal green light to the law passed in December 2015 setting the special terms for the 'plebiscite for peace', which will be held after the signature of the final agreement (within one to four months of the President informing Congress of his intention to hold the plebiscite). The two main sticking points are the special threshold (the winning option must win the equivalent of 13% of registered electorate; according to Colombian law, in national plebiscites there is a 50% turnout quorum) and that there will only be a simple yes-no vote on the entire agreement rather than article-by-article. I am guessing that the Court will give green light to the law and allow the plebiscite to go forward - I'm not an expert in constitutional law here, but the constitution doesn't say anything about turnout quorums for plebiscite (it is set by a law) and having separate votes on every single part would be a nightmare and is very silly.

The unofficial yes campaign has already been started by the government, which is plastering a dank sí a la paz logo on all its official webpages and Twitter accounts (well, almost all of them - Germán Vargas Lleras is still conspicuously silent on this), and it is quite certain that Santos and the government will be putting all the capital they have left, all the political resources they have at their disposition to ensure both strong turnout and a big victory for the sí. In contrast, it is still not clear if Uribe will be leading a no campaign (his resistencia civil slogans do include a bunch of "NO + [beef with the government]" symbols) or if he will be calling on his people to abstain. The latter would be very easy if the Constitutional Court rules that the 2015 law is invalid and that you need 50% turnout for validity, otherwise the government just needs about 4.4 million votes and that should be fairly easy to get. Polls are usually sh**t in Colombia, but all the polls have been showing strong advantages for the sí, and with enough people saying they'd turn out for it to be valid - even before Thursday's announcements.

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The FARC is going to be totally disarmed, yes or no?

Yes (in theory).

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The final agreement will be very comprehensive, as it will include a fairly thorough program for political and social change going beyond just the end of conflict stuff (ceasefire, disarmament, transitional justice). There have been agreements on political participation, agrarian reform, illegal drugs and victims' rights which, if they are implemented, will have major repercussions on Colombian politics, society and public policy. In some cases, the building blocks for these agreements have already been laid by the Santos government - with the victims' and land restitution law (despite its many problems and obstacles) or its change of tack on drug policy. The FARC seem to see political participation as the most important thing for them, as the agreement will allow their demobilized troops to convert themselves into a political movement. Most public pronouncements by the FARC revolve around the importance of 'changing bullets for ballots' and such stuff, and this time they seem committed to it.

As for why this is happening now and not in the past, well, the answer would really require a book or something quite close to it (and also a deeper understanding of the FARC's internal mentality that nobody - myself nor most Colombian analysts - really seem to grasp). A starting point is that the FARC, unlike in 1998 or 1984, were facing a dead-end (in good part due to Uribe, credit where it's due etc.) and were lucid enough to realize that. Another is that Santos, for all his faults, has managed this peace process very well, better than anyone could have imagined  (in my opinion) and obviously far better than Pastrana, Betancourt etc. handled their peace processes in their times.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

Wow. If there's peace, they might finish the Pan American Highway.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Fantastic news.

[Famous Mortimer]

Can you explain the land restitution law?

Also, what changes are being made in relation to drugs?

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Can you explain the land restitution law?

Congress passed the victims and land restitution law (Law 1448) in June 2011. In the international context of such laws, it already stands out because it lays the bases for a transitional justice system before the end of the conflict.

The law defines victims (for purposes of access to reparations) as those people who have, individually or collectively, suffered harm as a result of violation of human rights or international humanitarian law since 1985 as part of the armed conflict (a Constitutional Court sentenced extended recognition of victimhood to victims of Bacrims). Spouses, partners and first-degree relatives of disappeared or murdered victims are also considered victims. Members of illegal armed groups are not considered victims (this has been criticized by Amnesty International), except any child soldiers who were demobilized before their legal majority. Victims of events which occurred prior to 1985 have the right to the truth, symbolic reparations and guarantees of non-repetition (but not the big stuff like land restitution). Notably, the establishment of perpetrator culpability is no longer necessary to be recognized as a victim - persons need only present a written declaration and supporting evidence of the events and damages suffered. A registered victim is entitled to the measures provided by the legislation including access to social services (healthcare, education), immediate and transitional humanitarian assistance, the right to initiate administrative or legal actions for damages assisted by counsel and reparation measures including preferential rights to housing subsidies, rehabilitation measures (psychological support) relocation support and job training.

The other main aspect of the law concerns land restitution, one of five 'reparation measures'. The legislation provides an extensive right of restitution to owners, possessors or other occupiers of land who were dispossessed of their land or forced to abandon it, either directly or indirectly because of the conflict, since 1991. Dispossession, according to the law, refers to acts that took advantage of violence and may occur legally (a business transaction, an administrative decision, a court decision) or illegally (criminally). The law stipulates material and judicial restitution of land. In cases where material restitution is not possible (for a variety of reasons - location in an area of high natural disaster risk, if the land has been object of multiple dispossessions and has already been returned to another victim, if restitution would result in a risk to the life of the victim or if the land has been fully or partially destroyed), the victim is entitled to an equivalent plot of land with similar characteristics, failing that, then the victim is entitled to monetary compensation for the land. In addition, the law increases access to restitution by altering legal presumptions in the victims' favour. Notably, it 'inverts' the the burden of proof such that the present owner/occupier has the initial burden to prove that he/she acquired the land lawfully (only if this requirement is met is the victim called to present evidence in their favour). It also establishes several other legal assumptions regarding specific situations that surrounded cases of displacement. Finally, the legislation imposes new mechanisms to address corporate purchases of land rights and to hold businesses accountable for contributing to displacement and victimization (it bans sales of restituted land for 2 years and requires judicial authorization of all contracts for use of restituted land; corporations may also be held financially liable for their role in the conflict). Overall, the land restitution measures of the victims law are the most specific, extensive and context-appropriate in Colombian history.

Other reparation measures include compensation (which cannot be in addition to other forms of reparations), symbolic reparations and guarantees of non-repetition.

Back in 2011, Amnesty International criticized several aspects of the law including provisions which may penalize campaigns for land restitution, barriers to identifying stolen land, the government deliberating understating the size of stolen land and inadequate support for victims. In 2014, another Amnesty International report said that the law was "failing the vast majority of people whose lands were stolen" because many had been unable to return home due to ongoing threats of violence and the slowness of the process. Last year, a more balanced article from El Espectador argued that the law had set up an efficient process of registration and attention to victims, underlined the innovative and extensive aspects of the legislation and the government's political will on the issue. It also pointed out the high costs associated with implementation of the victims' law and the demand far exceeding the government's capacity to respond. As a result, over 90% of registered victims are still awaiting reparations. - 503,000 victims have obtained reparations and 85,000 hectares have been restituted to 11,000 victims. It also doesn't really help that you have the Procurador, Ordóñez, who is constitutionally supposed to defend human rights and collective interests but is instead leading a reactionary battle against land restitution.

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Illegal drugs was one of the six points on the initial 2012 agenda of negotiations between the FARC and the government, and a provisional agreement on that point was reached back in May 2014. It includes the voluntary substitution of illicit crops by transforming local conditions in affected areas through the creation of better welfare conditions for communities, a new program of replacement of illicit crops, participatory planning processes (to forge new alliances between communities and governments), a mine clearance program, addressing drug use as a public health issue and a comprehensive plan to strengthen and expand the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking. In other words, both parties agreed to work together to break up drug trafficking networks or at the very least investigation drug trafficking better (the FARC recognized, in timid words, the link between drug trafficking and its financing). There's a good layman's explanation (in Spanish) on the government's official website for the talks and they also link to the text of the actual agreement on that issue.

As the agreement was announced right smack middle of the 2014 election season, it kind of went unnoticed. But its implications are very important.

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Three polls since the Havana announcements - Gallup, Ipsos and Cifras/Conceptos.

Santos approval/favourability:
Gallup: 64 (-8) / 30 (+9)
Ipsos: 69 / 30 (+8)
Ipsos (favourability): 69 / 32 (+7)
CC: 59 (-10) / 38 (+9)

Direction of country:
Gallup: 60 (-14) / 26 (+13)
Ipsos: 57 / 43 (+20)

From Gallup, a look at whether things are improving or worsening on each of these issues:





In the details, Gallup reports a general improvement on the 'improving' numbers for all of these issues, notably 'guerrilla' (47/37 worsening, was 56/25), drug trafficking (48/30 worsening, was 61/19), childhood assistance (48/38 worsening, was 60/28) and reintegration of the demobilized (42/32 improving, was 29/44). All of these numbers suggest that Santos' better image and the increase in general optimism is almost entirely because of the Havana announcements, reflected in numbers for guerrilla and perhaps reintegration of the demobilized. Childhood assistance and narco numbers improvements are 'corrections' after news events reflected in the last poll 'dropped out' of the news cycle (specifically: Wayuu children, school lunches, drug seizure).

A similar question from Ipsos, about the President's management of these issues (less thorough):



Here, literally the only statistically significant improvement for Santos is on 'peace', up from 30% to 44%. Pretty straightforward.

Politicians' favourability numbers from Gallup:


VP Vargas Lleras has his favourable opinions jump 7%. Education minister Gina Parody has her unfavourable numbers jump from 38 to 50, for no apparent reason.

and Ipsos:


Timochenko, the FARC commander, has his favourable opinions increase by 9%, from 4 to 13.

Mayors and governors approvals from Gallup:
Peñalosa (Bogotá): 64 (+2) / 33 (+2)
Gutiérrez (Medellín): 79 (-1) / 15 (+4)
Armitage (Cali): 47 (-7) / 42 (+10)
Char (Barranquilla): 86 / 13
Hernández (Bucaramanga): 81 (+9) / 14 (-11)
Pérez (Antioquia): 73 (+12) / 20 (+1)
Dilian (Valle): 53 (+11) / 28 (-11)
Verano (Atlántico): 71 (+14) / 21 (-9)
Tavera (Santander): 60 (+4) / 23 (-2)

Confidence/trust in institutions from Ipsos:



Opinion of institutions and organizations from Ipsos:



Opinion of institutions, organizations and countries from Gallup



In Gallup, the FARC at 12% favourable opinions are the most popular they've ever been tied with December 2015 (post-transitional justice announcement). Amusingly, they're just as (un)popular now as political parties, and more popular than Venezuela.

Peace process

Gallup:
Military capable of defeating the guerrilla? 64% yes (-3)
Possible that guerrilla reach power by force? 42% yes (+1) - highest since 2001
Best solution? Dialogue 69% (+17), Military defeat 28% (-14)
Peace negotiations in Havana: Right track 50% (+23), Wrong track 44% (-22) - comparable to December 2015 (52/44 right track), major change from May (66/27 wrong track)
Peace in 2016? Yes 60% (+32), No 37% (-34) - highest numbers yet for 'peace this year'

Ipsos:
Optimism in reaching a final agreement: Pessimist 52% (-14), Optimist 47% (+15) - comparable to October 2015, highest optimist number since September 2012 (start of negotiations) >> question rephrased to mention the recent agreement: optimist 50% pessimist 49%
Jail for FARC leaders? Yes 84% (-6), No 11% (+4)
Political participation for FARC? No 71% (-6), Yes 27% (+7)
Recent agreement: positive 56% negative 38%
Who wins with this agreement? country 49% Farc 35% government 11% nobody 5%
Will the FARC comply? No 59% Yes 37%

How important is peace for you in your personal life, on a scale of 1 to 5: 5 65%, 4 18%, 3 10%, 2 2%, 1 5%

CC:
Recent agreement: positive 57% negative 35%

Plebiscite

Gallup:
Will you vote?
Yes definitely 40% (+8)
Definitely not 22% (+3)
Probably 19% (nc)
Probably not 8% (-5)
Dunno 9% (-4)

Voting intentions among those definitely voting:
YES 70% (+4)
NO 17% (-7)

Ipsos, voting intentions
YES 36% (+3)
Wouldn't vote 36% (-1)
NO 25% (nc)

CC:
Will you vote?
Yes 65% (-2)
No 31% (+1)

Voting intetions:
YES 74% (+13)
NO 19% (-10)

Bonus: Interesting question from Ipsos, interpreted by speculation-hungry media as a 2018 POLL!!!!

The best president to implement a final peace agreement?
Don't know 30%
Germán Vargas Llera 14%
Gustavo Petro 14%
Sergio Fajardo 9%
Humberto de la Calle 8%
Oscar Ivan Zuluaga 8%
Martha Lucia Ramirez 6%
Alejandro Ordonez 6%
Simon Gaviria 2%
Carlos Holmes 1%
Timochenko 1%
Others 1%

[Hash]

The Constitutional Court has ruled in favour of the 'plebiscite for peace', the special mechanism adopted by the government for popular ratification of the Havana agreements with the FARC.

Basically, the Court has cleared the special threshold for approval set by last year's statutory law on the 'plebiscite for peace', which is 13% of registered voters (i.e. the 'yes' vote will need a plurality and support equal to or above 13% or the electoral roll). This is different from the quorum for a regular plebiscite (50% of the registered electorate), but the special quorum is constitutional because the rules for plebiscites are set by law and not by the Constitution.

The decision will be legally binding but only on the President, there will be only a single question (opponents had been wanting for there to be point-by-point approval of the agreement), there will be no blank vote, the campaign could be as short as one month, public officials will be allowed to campaign but campaigns must not promote parties and candidates.

http://lasillavacia.com/historia/esto-fue-lo-que-decidio-la-corte-sobre-el-plebiscito-57118

[Antonio the Sixth]

Looks like the Civil War is truly over. That's really beautiful to see.

[Hash]

Concerning news, folks. Not Good!

The latest Ipsos poll for Semana-RCN shows numbers as poor for everyone as they were pre-June 23 announcements in Havana and has the NO leading the plebiscite by a wide margin.

Direction of country: 71/29 (-14)
Santos favourability: 71/27 (-5)
Santos approval: 73/25 (-5)

President Santos' approvals by issue areas remain negative across the board, only coming close to breaking even on housing and foreign relations (49% approve on each), and lowest (over 80% disapproving) on security, economy, urban security, health and unemployment. On peace, his approval falls 9 points from 44% to 35%.

Santos finished his second year of his second term a few days ago. According to this poll, only 23% say things are better or just as good as a year ago vs. 46% saying that things are worse than a year ago. To give an idea of how unpopular he is, the poll asked how they felt Santos had managed some current events, and 43% said he had not well managed Colombian cyclism in the Tour de France.

Approval of the major institutions remain similar to last time, except the government's approval falls from 31% to 22%. The approval of other organizations, parties and groups similar to last time as well.

Peace process

Optimism in reaching a final agreement: Pessimist 63% (+11), Optimist 35% (-12)
Jail for FARC leaders? Yes 88% (+4), No 10% (-1)
Political participation for FARC? No 75% (+4), Yes 22% (-5)

Plebiscite

Awareness of plebiscite: Aware 65% Unaware 35%

Will you vote? Yes 59% (-5) No 41% (+5)

Plebiscite voting intentions, among those who will vote:
No 50% (+11)
Yes 39% (-17)
Undecided 11% (+6)

Plebiscite voting intentions by Santos approval:
Approve: 87/6/7
Disapprove: 20/67/13

Plebiscite voting intentions by Uribe image:
Favourable: 20/70/10
Unfavourable: 63/28/9
DK: 5/49/46
 
Favourability of major political figures
Obama: 84 (+5)/9
Uribe: 54/40 (-3)
Vargas Lleras: 43/41 (nc)
Correa: 42 (+6)/39 (+5)
Petro: 53/39 (nc)
Peñalosa (Bogotá only): 71 (-4)/26 (+2) (54/35 nationally)
Timochenko: 79 (+4)/8 (-5)
Maduro: 95 (+2)/3

Best president to implement a final peace agreement
Don't know 28% (-2)
Sergio Fajardo 14% (+5)
Germán Vargas Lleras 13% (-1)
Gustavo Petro 13% (-1)
Humberto de la Calle 8% (nc)
Óscar Iván Zuluaga 6% (-2)
Marta Lucía Ramírez 6% (nc)
Alejandro Ordóñez 4% (-2)
Simón Gaviria 3% (+1)
Carlos Holmes 2% (-1)
Timochenko 1% (nc)
Other 2% (+1)

#analysis

It is no surprise that Santos remains very unpopular, after the June 23 bump wore off. What is more surprising is that peace optimism has collapsed entirely, erasing all the gains made with the announcement of the ceasefire/weapons deal in June, since there have been nothing out of Havana to indicate that the talks are going badly - but there has also basically been nothing out of Havana in general, so that may explain the return to the default pessimism/skepticism regarding these talks which has been true since 2013.

The plebiscite numbers are worrying, although this is an outlier (for now). At risk of seeming like I'm 'unskewing the polls', I posit that this big lead for the No is because the media has only talked about the No for the last few weeks - with the news of Uribe officially deciding for the No and and his campaign of lies and half-truths for the No being the only plebiscite-related news in the mass media as of late - so they probably have the early momentum here. The Yes campaign is basically saying exactly this, adding that they've only been doing 'pedagogy for peace' (educating people about the peace accords) up till now, which is somewhat true. But what should be real cause for concern is that, shockingly enough, people are going to answer the guy asking the question rather than the question itself, and Santos is barely more popular than cancer right now and at this point he will not be an asset for the Yes campaign. Hopefully the Yes is intelligent enough to realize this, and limit the involvement of the government in the public campaign, and seek the active participation of civil society and NGOs as much as possible (of course, I hope the government does activate its patronage machines in the background). The amount of hypocrisy, lies and half-truths Uribe is allowed to get away with is very frustrating, and this campaign is really one where "Win the yes needs the know to win against the no"

The other point regarding this poll that I'd like to make is that it has a base of 1000 respondents distributed in 13 of the 28 largest cities in Colombia, which they claim is equivalent to 67% of the urban population but these 13 cities are equivalent to only 36% of registered voters in October 2015 (going by actual turnout, to 32% of votes cast in October 2015, or 38% of votes cast in the 2014 presidential first round and 36% of the runoff votes). 45% of the sample comes from Bogotá, which is comparable to the percentage of Bogotá registered voters in the total of these 13 cities, but Bogotá was only 16% of registered votes in October 2015 and 14% of votes cast. On the other hand, politically the 'rest of the country' (Colombia minus the poll's 13 cities) voted fairly similar to the actual country in both rounds in 2014, except a tiny bit more for Zuluaga in both rounds and less for Clara López in the first round. The Bogotá sample of the poll was the one which had, obviously, the biggest change in plebiscite and Santos approval numbers.

Adding to that, the plebiscite voting intentions were asked only to the 59% of the sample which had said they would vote in the plebiscite, so only 590 respondents. Given what the poll tells us about these 59%, it is disproportionately male and wealthier (and even more Bogotá-heavy) - only 44% of low socioeconomic level respondents said they'd vote, compared to 67% of medium level and 93% of high level respondents (the total sample was 46% low levels, 45% medium levels and 9% high level).

I may be wrong, but I think the 2014 presidential election polls used different samples than these bimonthly polls for the media, and at any rate, Ipsos ed up the runoff in 2014 (apparently it was the only one using a 'likely voter' model). On the other hand, Ipsos has been around for a long time in Colombia and generally has a decent, unbiased track record.