Which country has been facing a bigger existential crisis lately, UK or US?

[afleitch]

I'm no Brexiteer, but to say that leaving the EU would 'question, and strike at, the actual identity of the United Kingdom as a state' strikes me as odd. In any case the answer is still Britain.

What 'Brexiteers' don't fully get is that being part of the EU is a part of modern British identity and in many ways, keeps it together. Our entry to the then EEC happened at the same time the Northern Irish troubles and Scottish Nationalism was politically taking off. The EU promoted economic unity on a wider scale, while industry in the UK was struggling.

[afleitch]

The interesting thing is that Britishness is really a Scottish (and yeah also NORN ION) concept; there was never a question of two identities in England or even Wales, where 'British'* just = as you were plus an extra flag with a bit of blue on it.

_{*As a national-political identity. Obviously all parts of the islands are part of a distinctive cultural region, whether part of the United Kingdom now or in the future or not. And had been so long before the Act of Union.}

That's because England and Wales was the a priori state. So they didn't have to acclimatise. 'Britain' was what you had to define when you added on a political element. Of course there was never an ecclesiastical or legal (as in law) union, and initially those things were more important before the concept of the nation state. Indeed 'Britain' wasn't really defined as a thing until you had to sell it in WW1.

[afleitch]

Oh for sure. But I think this explains a lot of the misunderstandings between Scottish polity and that of the rest of GB, which have resulted in (thus far) 45% of the Scottish electorate voting to break away. Both sides of the political relationship have a very different understanding of what it is and don't really understand that this is the case. The phrase 'the Union' is basically never used south of the Tweed for instance. Or consider the Thatcher government: there was genuinely no awareness at all that making the Scottish Secretary the Government's Man In Scotland (rather than Scotland's Man In The Government) would be seen as breaching a constitutional convention.

Absolutely, politically, the concepts of Britishness/The Union  as 'personal-political' was initially a contrast to 'Irishness', (in that being a unionist was more 'Irish' than being a nationalist) Certainly the migration of Ulster protestants to (or in some cases back) to the Scottish cities in particular at the start of the last century brought that into the Scottish political scene. The imagery, and the rhetoric was easily re-orientated for nationalistic purposes of a different nature during the two wars (and in the National Government)

In Scotland, we got the Unionist Party (in which 'The Union' was interchangeable with the concept of Empire and most importantly with strong industry) Indeed it was a Scotsman's duty to be a Unionist as it promoted 'Scottishness' within the Empire where you could be as Scottish in Australia/New Zealand/Canada etc or in a mine in Yorkshire as you were in Scotland.

As Tories and Unionists became Conservatives they had a well from which to draw in order to establish a concept of Britishness and of 'The Union' out of what was left of the Empire. This was done in many cases to try and take something tangible into Europe. You had to get from Empire (which didn't draw from mid 1800's romantic nationalism) to 'Great Britain' in less than 20 years.

Being in Europe has made Great Britain an entity (flegs, queen, curries, Jessica Ennis) and keeps it that way. This is what those who campaign for Leave can't grasp. British identity doesn't exist without Europe.

There is a sense of the need to be 'interconnected' in Scotland, as it was with the Empire (see emigration) it's now with Europe. It's a genuine 'thing' that really requires more academic study and isn't just an 'oh the Scots like to think they are x' diagnosis that is often made when faced with whether there's a 'Scottish exceptionalism' with respect to the left-right scale, perceived social liberalism/secularism etc.

The Union guaranteed these things. The threat of not being in Europe is the key determiner of what 10% of the Scottish electorate are going to think with respect to their constitutional future.

I don't think the threat to revisit the constitutional question in the near future is an idle one with respect to the outcome of the EU referendum.

[afleitch]

the Government's Man In Scotland (rather than Scotland's Man In The Government)

Could you or afleitch explain the difference, in practical terms? I'm having trouble wrapping my head around it.

Traditionnally, the Secretary of State for Scotland was the one bringing Scottish issues and defending Scottish points of view in the Cabinet. He was representing Scotland in Cabinet.

Under Thatcher, the Secretary of State for Scotland became the guy announcing and applying the government decisions in Scotland.

Went from a representative to a french prefect, sort of.

I guess what I'm asking for is examples (not that I disbelieve it; I'm just curious to know more).

It's a tough one to condense (books have been written about it) but basically the Scottish Office was the first attempt at some form of 'devolution', the Secretary had significant powers and come the welfare state, quite a substantial budget in which to deliver for Scotland. It had power to deliver fisheries policy, agriculture, education, prisons and so forth. It was a post with 'teeth' and the office was politically distant as well as geographically distant. From the 50's to the 70's it was almost patrician.

Under Thatcher (and to be fair, Callaghan before her, though not Wilson) it was perceived Scotland was a testing ground and or dumping ground for public policy before it was 'tried for real' in England. What's curious about this, is that this perception was denied politically and academically until such times as freedom of information released government papers in many ways confirmed that these attitudes had existed.

The most well known example was testing the Poll Tax in Scotland in 1988, two years before it was introduced in England. David Willets in 1986 argued for 'juicy cuts' in Scottish spending as it may prove popular 'the envious north of England might even welcome an attack on the pampered Scots over the border. On the other hand, George Younger (Scottish Secretary) is reported to be very ‘emotional’ on the subject and may well threaten to resign.'

Younger couldn't stop Thatcher's plans to make steel mils in Gartcosh and Ravenscraig obsolete and couldn't protect the budget. He couldn't get the money to plug the cost of changing the local taxation system which had to be borne by local councils.

This was important not because Scotland should have suffered 'less' than elsewhere in the UK, but that Thatcher refused to accept or acknowledge the political clout of the Scottish Office and it's large civil service while at the same time allowing education, prisons etc, which were technically by Act of parliament 'separate' (as was the NHS) to 'drift' while she concentrated on England and Wales. The ship was rudderless. Money was tight but direction in terms of policy was gone. It was harder and harder to get Parliament to consider '(Scotland) Acts'; acts pertaining to strictly Scottish affairs as had been the case since 1707. And if it did, there was nothing particularly 'exceptional' about them. After Younger moved in 1986, she had a succession of Scottish Secretaries who were neutered.

[afleitch]

Thanks for explaining.

I note that part of Thatcher's response to the dispute with Younger was to move him to Defence. Was that seen as a backhanded promotion at the time?

He took over from Heseltine. Perhaps it was replacing like with like. Though he had shadowed the portfolio in the 70's if I remember correctly.