Iran presidential election

[CARLHAYDEN]

I think that the ayatollahs, by banning real reformist candidates are, to borrow a phrase from John F. Kennedy, making revolution inevitable, as they have made peaceful change impossible.

[WMS]

I'm quite sure these elections were less than clean.

We agree on one thing - Rafsanjani ain't no moderate.

Yep. When all the candidates aren't even allowed to run, you do not have a clean election.

That's not even what I meant...that system Iran is using there is obviously very open to abuses - and has been abused from time to time, see the last parliamentary election - but its original purpose, and still its main function, is the same as the types of laws requiring deposits, signatures etc to get onto the ballots in western countries. I agree in principle, though.

Yeah, the structure itself, minus the Ayatollah influence, is kind of a constitutional republic. But the Ayatollah influence trumps everything else.

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More like the more pragmatic of two conservatives (you can replace that last word with something more suitable if you object to it, btw)
[/quote]

Wingnuts?

Yes, M, I enjoyed your pun on Dr. Seuss.

And I agree with Carl that the forcible stifling of the reformists will only lead to a greater internal upheaval.

[Beet]

What crushed the nascent revolutionary movement was the recognition that it was not a revolutionary movement, at least not to the vast majority of its followers.

That's not exactly the counterrevolutionary movement I was talking about, that was only a sign of it. As far as it would overturn the (second) Iranian revolution, it, much like the fall of the U.S.S.R., would be counter- revolutionary in nature, to be precise.

No...that's not what most reformist voters wanted, never has been.

Again, you got the wrong idea. You are talking about the national government, establishment elements and their supporters. I am not. Can it only be two or three years since the student movement there? Seems we have forgotten already.

[Filuwaúrdjan]

Ahmadinejad has won by a landslide; 61/35

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

Hopefully this pushes toward another revolution then. Kind of kills the argument that invading Iraq is somehow going to moderate the whole Middle East though (not that I ever got the logic there). I woudn't be too suprised if this was a response to Iraq in fact.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

This appears to be a backlash against Bush, since they felt threatened by him.

[Beet]

In 2001 reform-minded Khatami won 77% of the vote-- NOT all from pro-establishment voters. Most probably substantially anti-establishment in fact.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

This appears to be a backlash against Bush, since they felt threatened by him.

In truth, jfern, was the other guy pro-Bush? I don't care much for President Bush either but I don't see how either of these two possible outcomes could have been a "Bush victory".

They had a far more pro-western President before this election. Bush's threats, combined with his attacking of Iraq for no good reason have made Iranians scared. I bet almost every Iranian supports their nuclear weapons program. Moral of the story, only countries that don't really have WMD get attacked.

[minionofmidas]

What crushed the nascent revolutionary movement was the recognition that it was not a revolutionary movement, at least not to the vast majority of its followers.

That's not exactly the counterrevolutionary movement I was talking about, that was only a sign of it. As far as it would overturn the (second) Iranian revolution, it, much like the fall of the U.S.S.R., would be counter- revolutionary in nature, to be precise.

No...that's not what most reformist voters wanted, never has been.

Again, you got the wrong idea. You are talking about the national government, establishment elements and their supporters. I am not. Can it only be two or three years since the student movement there? Seems we have forgotten already.

No...you're without perspective due to biased reporting, that's all.

[minionofmidas]

This appears to be a backlash against Bush, since they felt threatened by him.

In truth, jfern, was the other guy pro-Bush?

No. But he wasn't exactly a good receptacle of anti-Bush protest votes either...unlike Ahmadinejad.

[minionofmidas]

This appears to be a backlash against Bush, since they felt threatened by him.

In truth, jfern, was the other guy pro-Bush? I don't care much for President Bush either but I don't see how either of these two possible outcomes could have been a "Bush victory".

They had a far more pro-western President before this election. Bush's threats, combined with his attacking of Iraq for no good reason have made Iranians scared. I bet almost every Iranian supports their nuclear weapons program. Moral of the story, only countries that don't really have WMD get attacked.

Way too simplistic. It may have played a role but it wasn't one of the main issues.

[WMS]

Well, let's see if the sh!t hits the fan now...

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

in all fairness it's very likely not much will change especially since President of Iran is essentially a figurehead position anwyay. opebo could become Iranian President and nothing would change.

[WMS]

in all fairness it's very likely not much will change especially since President of Iran is essentially a figurehead position anwyay. opebo could become Iranian President and nothing would change.

Shi'ism allows temporary marriages for the purposes of short-term affairs - opebo'd like that, I suppose.

[I spent the winter writing songs about getting better]

Does it allow you to pay a woman to be your wife for 2 hours?

[WMS]

Does it allow you to pay a woman to be your wife for 2 hours?

It might, actually, although I think one day's the smallest time allowed. I'm not kidding about this, either; it's an odd little bit of religious law from the shari'a.

[minionofmidas]

That's right...Islam bans extramarital sex of all types but has very liberal divorce and remarriage laws that might theoretically be exploited in such a fashion.

[jaichind]

Does it allow you to pay a woman to be your wife for 2 hours?

Absolutely.  But for it to be legal a man must have only three wives at that point in time.  If he were to have four then the act above will be illegal under Islamic law.

[WMS]

That's right...Islam bans extramarital sex of all types but has very liberal divorce and remarriage laws that might theoretically be exploited in such a fashion.

Which Ibn Battuta used to his own advantage in marrying and divorcing a string of women across the Islamic world...

[minionofmidas]

Ibn Saud (the first king of Saudi Arabia) too.

[minionofmidas]

Sorry. Had to post this.
A lot of it should be taken with a pound of salt, but it should be extremely helpful for Americans trying to understand this election. I found it on an Iranian government-owned site (I think), but it seems to be Russian in origin. Most important parts in bold.

Today: Wednesday June 29, 2005
Election in Iran: A landslide that no one could predict Moscow, June 29, IRNA

Mahmood Ahmadinejad's victory in the Iranian presidential election is beyond any reasonable doubt, RIA-Novosti said.

"This was a landslide victory, with the second runner hopelessly lagging behind the winner, that leaves hardly any space for speculations about vote rigging and government meddling. However, the outcome of this unchallenged victory is hard to predict.

"The Iranian landslide was not just a sensation - especially for those who followed the exciting electoral campaign closely enough: The United States and the Western world in general were stunned as a politician they used to label as "scarcely known" unexpectedly left behind all rivals revered as frontrunners, and came first in a victory many commentators would later mark as "a knockdown."
"The first round, however, was a far cry from victory for Ahmadinejad who just reached a certain balance with strongest rival Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, starting a close battle of popular support against unmatched political experience, including national leadership in the 1990s, which gave Mr. Rafsanjani a reputation of a liberal reformist.

At the same time, Mr. Ahmadinejad's first-round victory over liberals Mehdi Karroubi and Mustafa Moin had to ring first alarm bells to the country's incumbent political elites and the U.S.-led West as it showed liberal and reformist president Mohammad Khatami's effective failure to fulfill most of his promises.

Under Khatami, liberal economic reforms barely advanced, and he neither saved Iran from the U.S.-pressured international isolation nor defined the nation's clear position towards its main international critic, the U.S.A. Although on the last count Mr. Khatami should probably share the responsibility with the extremely powerful ayatollahs in the Expediency Discernment Council, where Rafsanjani, by the way, played a leading part. Anyway, in the end of his second presidency, whether deserving that or not, he found himself without grass-root support, which, considering Iran's basically low level of political awareness, was - and still is - a crucial factor.

The undermined liberal political wing was doomed to lose this election, no matter how fiercely Messrs. Karroubi and Moin cast aspersions on Mr. Khatami's policies. In what is possibly a radical change in the popular economic posture, the Iranian people have swung the country in a pendulum-like manner back to a more
government-controlled economy of "Ektesod-e Touhidi", the well-known Iranian slogan of "fair distribution of wealth" - the groundwork of Mr. Nejad's political agenda and the main generator of support for his candidacy. Let the Iranians see for themselves whether this will be for the better or for the worse.

The West and, first of all, the United States, have yet to give an embrace or a thumbs down to the new president who has already clearly outlined his future policies. So far, Washington had made a quick start by dismissing the election as undemocratic and illegitimate even before the voting actually began, while other Western powers preferred to wait for the results and only then air their long-prepared frustration.

American and Western approach to a new Iranian government is likely to become even more pessimistic in the wake of Mr. Nejad's recent confirmation of Iran's "national interests as the power base of the popular government" and promise to revise all energy projects involving Iran "exclusively to the benefit of national companies." Furthermore, the new president firmly reasserted Iran's "unalienable national right" to go on with its nuclear program - so far the most troublesome international dispute around the Islamic Republic - and welcomed its full-fledged development, which could bring about another wave of criticism on Iran's nuclear dossier.

If Iran, after lengthy negotiations with the European Troika, makes the next logical though dangerous step to officially lift the self-imposed ban on uranium enrichment, this will leave hardly anything to prevent the United States from having its sweetest dream come true and putting the Iranian dossier on the table at the UN Security Council. What this move will lead to is totally unpredictable, partly due to low predictability of the current U.S. Administration.
Ah, I loved that line when I first read this.

Possible outcomes might involve everything from calls for tighter international isolation to unilateral use of force - the options the U.S. has considered before.

The U.S. is already planning to introduce new sanctions against companies helping Iran develop its armament programs. Analysts say the relevant bill pending George W. Bush's signature will most likely be signed into law before the G8 summit in Scotland, doubtless in view of the election results. The U.S. has already notified the United Kingdom, Germany and France - members of the Troika, still trying to talk Iran into waiving its nuclear ambitions, - of its plans to do so.

U.S. sanctions will of course be meant to undermine Russian companies - largely because Russia is Iran's chief nuclear partner, but mainly because Moscow had said it welcomed elections in Iran as a milestone in its political life and would acknowledge the choice of millions of Iranians.

Russian analysts have repeatedly called upon the United States to keep from "exporting democracy" to Iran to change the "unelected ayatollah-dominated regime" against the normal course of history.

History always takes its time, we have said. However, the Bush Administration seems to stick to its usual holier-than-thou stance - a consistency worthy of a better cause.

News sent: 15:34 Wednesday June 29, 2005

[WMS]

Interesting article. Biased as hell, but interesting nonetheless. Considering how much mullah corruption is a cause of Iran's economic problems, we'll see if Ahmad can make a dent in it. Assuming he doesn't drag Iran into a war.

The EDC should receive the lion's share of the blame for the economy, too - they made certain Khatami couldn't do much, really. And for the Russians, who have been cheering Karimov on in Uzbekistan (along with the Chinese, natch) to issue platitudes about democracy to the U.S., err, well, .

I'll be watching the reactions, if any, of the Iranian people...

[minionofmidas]

I actually came across this article when I was searching for provincial results for the runoff. I only found them for the first round (at Psephos, the first place you'd look, inevitably.)

For reference:
. Khorasan has been split in three, apparently, a detail missing in this map.

They're very interesting.

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani appears as the "national candidate" - polling at least third almost everywhere, polling at least 10% everywhere, but even though he narrowly topped the national poll, coming first in only three out of thirty provinces - Kerman (his only true stronghold, at 42%. I think he's from there. Certainly Rafsanjan is a city there.), Gilan and Zanjan.

Ali Larijani and Mohsen Mehralizadeh, who polled 6% and 5% nationally, respectively, were pure favorite son candidates. Mehralizadeh won the three Northwestern, Azeri-dominated provinces (including Ardabil). Larijani won Mazandaran. Elsewhere, more often than not they pulled less than 2%.

Moin and Qalibaf, who polled 14.5% each, both have a strong favourite son element in their vote distribution as well, but have stronger base support elsewhere, with outcrops of stronger support here and there. Moin won Sistan-va-Baluchestan (which despite its large size doesn't have that much population) with over 50% of the vote. Qalibaf won two of the three new Khorasan provinces.

That leaves Karroubi, the (internationally) less well known of the two reform candidates, and Ahmadinejad. Since these two were battling each other for who was to face Rafsanjani in the final (and I think either would have beaten Rafsanjani, who is not popular, never has been), and together they carried 20 out of 30 provinces, they can be used (at a stretch) to create an image of a red state/blue state Iran.
Both had their strongholds, and both had areas where they dipped down to about 6-7%, and to sixth (though never to seventh) place.

Karroubi carried 11 provinces: Kordestan (if a Sunni-majority province doesn't vote for reformers, I don't know what place will. Moin came second here, Rafsanjani third. Together they polled 75%, against 55% nationally), Kermanshah, Hamadan, Lorestan (his strongest result at 56%, probably his home province), Ilam, Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad, Bushehr (where he beat Rafsanjani by a handful of votes), Fars, and Hormuzgan. In other words: The South and West. Oh, plus Golestan (The other province that Moin came second in. Maybe it's another Sunni area?)

Ahmadinejad carried 9 provinces: Tehran (much the largest province. 5mio of the total of 28mio votes were cast here), Semnan, Qazvin, Markazi, Qom (over 50% in this traditional islamist stronghold, and no, he's not from here, he's from the rural parts of Tehran province), Isfahan (also not far off 50%), Chahar Mahal ve Bakhtiari, Yazd, and one of the Khorasans (the smallest one, by population.) In other words: The geographical center, Farsi heartland.

Karroubi's provinces cast 8.21 mio votes.
Ahmadinejad's provinces cast 9.67 mio votes.
All other provinces cast 10.25 mio votes.

If they had a US-style Electoral College, we'd now see the hardliner-dominated (and we all know why) parliament chose between Ahmadinejad and Qalibaf (whose provinces outpolled Rafsanjani's*; they certainly wouldn't pick Karroubi... ) Now wouldn't that be "fun" to watch?

*Yeah, yeah, I know. EVs are distributed by census population, not by votes cast. I'm just too lazy to look them up, but it's possible Rafsanjani would've pulled it out against Qalibaf. It's even possible, assuming low turnout in Azeri country, that Mehralizadeh would make it to the House. His provinces have 2.58 mio votes cast, Rafsanjani's 2.67 mio, Qalibaf's 2.87 mio.

[WMS]

Thanks for the info. Very interesting - the regional breakdown of the vote isn't reported on much.

I wonder what a genuinely free and fair election would look like? I bet there would always be an 'Azeri' candidate (I wonder if the Kurds voted for him?) given the Azeri concentration in the NW, a 'Baluchi' candidate, and so on.

Hmm...

[CARLHAYDEN]

Some new information has emerged about the sociopath elected President of Iran.

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=45075