Coalition For Condorcet Voting

[Brandon H]

During the current election, there have been complaints about the current preferential voting system, also known as Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). Some have suggested moving to a First Past the Post system which many have pointed out could lead to a candidate winning the election with 20% of the vote or even less.

The CFCV believes that the best solution would be Condorcet Voting. To the voters, there would be no difference compared to the current form of preferential voting. Those couting the votes would have extra work to do, but we have confidence in their ability to do handle this extra task.

While IRV eliminates voters with the fewest amount of first place votes, Condorcet Voting compares each candidate in a series of one-on-one races. If a candidate is undefeated against all other candidates, that candidate wins. If not, the lowest margin of victory is eliminated until one candidate is undefeated.

More information can be found here:
http://www.electionmethods.org/

[7,052,770]

Wow, I like this Condorcet voting.  It's really not that complicated at all.  The Excel file I set up on my comp is actually in this format, but I didn't realize it.  Cool.

[Bono]

Im in.

[ilikeverin]

Can I be a part of both this and the IRV thing?  I'd like either of the systems

Edit: Actually, I think I have a better idea:

Link

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

I join

[Brandon H]

I have no problem if you want to join the Coalition for Preferential voting as well. I did see you started Coalition for Ranked Voting. It could be beneficial for both groups to work together as we share some common goals. I think the biggest problem would be dispelling the myth that Condorcet is too complicated.

[Emsworth]

I'm afraid Condorcet suffers from many of the same theoretical flaws as IRV. It is possible for someone to rank A over B and thereby change the winner from A to B. One can hurt a candidate by voting for him, and help a candidate by voting against him. Thus, it is susceptible to tactical voting just like preferential voting.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

I'm afraid Condorcet suffers from many of the same theoretical flaws as IRV. It is possible for someone to rank A over B and thereby change the winner from A to B. One can hurt a candidate by voting for him, and help a candidate by voting against him. Thus, it is susceptible to tactical voting just like preferential voting.

Can you give an example?

[Emsworth]

I'm afraid Condorcet suffers from many of the same theoretical flaws as IRV. It is possible for someone to rank A over B and thereby change the winner from A to B. One can hurt a candidate by voting for him, and help a candidate by voting against him. Thus, it is susceptible to tactical voting just like preferential voting.

Can you give an example?

I'll try to come up with one tomorrow. From the research of voting systems I've done for school, I believe that the example involves who goes into the Schwartz set.

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

I'm afraid Condorcet suffers from many of the same theoretical flaws as IRV. It is possible for someone to rank A over B and thereby change the winner from A to B. One can hurt a candidate by voting for him, and help a candidate by voting against him. Thus, it is susceptible to tactical voting just like preferential voting.

Can you give an example?

I'll try to come up with one tomorrow. From the research of voting systems I've done for school, I believe that the example involves who goes into the Schwartz set.

If there's a Condorcet solution, you shouldn't have any problems. Now, there are multiple ways to decide what to do if there's not a Condorcet solution.

[Emsworth]

Alright, here's an example (numbers are based on another source - they're not my own):

The pairwise rankings are:
Supersoulty-Harry: 20-20
Supersoulty-Siege: 30-30
Supersoulty-JFK: 30-30
Supersoulty-King: 30-30
Supersoulty-Phil: 24-36

Harry-Siege: 34-26
Harry-JFK: 30-30
Harry-King: 30-30
Harry-Phil: 38-22

Siege-JFK: 36-24
Siege-King: 22-38
Siege-Phil: 30-30

JFK-King: 42-18
JFK-Phil: 30-30

King-Phil: 32-28

In this hypothetical, Supersoulty is the winner.

Suppose that three voters who support JFK tactically vote: Supersoulty, King, Phil, Siege, Harry, JFK. Although they preferenced JFK last, they've just made him the winner over Supersoulty.

[Joe Republic]

I'm sorry, but this system is just far too confusing - much moreso than the current system already in place.  It would scare away newbies and put counting votes into the hands of the forum members who are math geniuses.  That's not fun at all.

[Emsworth]

It would scare away newbies and put counting votes into the hands of the forum members who are math geniuses. 

Shhhh... The math geniuses are the ones who make up the Forum Elite...

[○∙◄☻¥tπ[╪AV┼cVê└]

Alright, here's an example (numbers are based on another source - they're not my own):

The pairwise rankings are:
Supersoulty-Harry: 20-20
Supersoulty-Siege: 30-30
Supersoulty-JFK: 30-30
Supersoulty-King: 30-30
Supersoulty-Phil: 24-36

Harry-Siege: 34-26
Harry-JFK: 30-30
Harry-King: 30-30
Harry-Phil: 38-22

Siege-JFK: 36-24
Siege-King: 22-38
Siege-Phil: 30-30

JFK-King: 42-18
JFK-Phil: 30-30

King-Phil: 32-28

In this hypothetical, Supersoulty is the winner.

Suppose that three voters who support JFK tactically vote: Supersoulty, King, Phil, Siege, Harry, JFK. Although they preferenced JFK last, they've just made him the winner over Supersoulty.

It's not Condorcet, and so relies on exactly what type of Condorcet voting you use.

[Emsworth]

It's not Condorcet, and so relies on exactly what type of Condorcet voting you use.

I know that there is no Condorcet winner - Supersoulty wins the hypothetical because he has the appropriate beatpaths.

[King]

Results are too confusing.  Approval w/ Runoff is much better.

[John Dibble]

Results are too confusing.  Approval w/ Runoff is much better.

^^

[7,052,770]

They're not that confusing, I dont think.  And its the most fair way.