Seriously, my fellow lefties...

[muon2]

If I do decide to cast a completely supererogatory vote for Clinton, it certainly won't be because people I sort-of-know on the internet guilt-tripped me into it.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gv2idE5Aa3Q

Vote against Hitler, you delicate flower and feel good about. What is so difficult about this decision? What's worse about this whole thing is that you're proud to be a Christian. Trump is an abomination. He's arguably one of the most ungodly men to ever walk the Earth. He's basically an Antichrist, a false prophet and you can't vote against that?

He lives in MA. It is one of the most certain states in this election. What better place to make a statement about other choices than in a state like MA?

[muon2]

It's pretty much yet another thing I dislike about the electoral collage system. "I live in a safe state, so I don't have to make a difficult choice." All right, no sane person would claim it would enable Trump to carry Massachusetts or Clinton to carry Oklahoma, but there are many less solid states that people take for granted already. Yes, one single vote won't decide the election, but a number of such single votes can. I think the expression "death by a thousand of paper cuts" fits here very well. I'm not trying to be hyperbolic here, but history is full of races that were considered safe and that's why it turned the other way.

Tactical voting in single member districts happens in many countries. It's not just about the EC and WTA states. Depending on the specific election laws there can be different goals for a tactical vote. For example, in IL there is a 5% threshold test for parties to have easier ballot access. If a person wants to promote a minor party in future elections, and the outcome of the race in their jurisdiction isn't in doubt, then a minor party vote can be quite meaningful. The Greens have maintained major party status in some jurisdictions (like IL-05 and IL-12) by continuing to break 5% there. If Stein got over 5% statewide the Greens would have ballot access in all races in 2018.

[muon2]

It's pretty much yet another thing I dislike about the electoral collage system. "I live in a safe state, so I don't have to make a difficult choice." All right, no sane person would claim it would enable Trump to carry Massachusetts or Clinton to carry Oklahoma, but there are many less solid states that people take for granted already. Yes, one single vote won't decide the election, but a number of such single votes can. I think the expression "death by a thousand of paper cuts" fits here very well. I'm not trying to be hyperbolic here, but history is full of races that were considered safe and that's why it turned the other way.

Tactical voting in single member districts happens in many countries. It's not just about the EC and WTA states. Depending on the specific election laws there can be different goals for a tactical vote. For example, in IL there is a 5% threshold test for parties to have easier ballot access. If a person wants to promote a minor party in future elections, and the outcome of the race in their jurisdiction isn't in doubt, then a minor party vote can be quite meaningful. The Greens have maintained major party status in some jurisdictions (like IL-05 and IL-12) by continuing to break 5% there. If Stein got over 5% statewide the Greens would have ballot access in all races in 2018.

Did you just admit that you are voting for Stein?

I'm just giving an example based on my experience in 2008 after the Greens got 10% for Gov in 2006. If I choose to make a tactical vote it will be based on my assessment of the likely outcomes as we get nearer to Nov 8.

[muon2]

I just imagine how dumb any of this reasoning would look in the future. I'm sure there were people who voted for Hitler because Hindenburg had health issues or the Social Democrats had the wrong tax policy or their faith prevented them from voting for a Catholic party or whatever.

But in retrospect that was dumb and so is any reason you come up with for not voting Clinton.

I'm not sure which post this responds to. If it was mine, are you saying that tactical voting should not be pursued in any situation?

[muon2]

I think I’m going to start shaming Massachusetts voters into donating more of their paychecks to the search for near Earth asteroids.  Sure, the chances that a given contribution will make any difference is minuscule, but we’re talking about the survival of the planet here.  Even a 0.000000000000000000000000001% chance that your contribution makes a difference is worthwhile when we’re talking about such high stakes.

^^^^^^

Any argument that anyone for voting in a certain way based on consequentialist logic is bound to fail.

But isn't tactical voting inherently consequentialist? If so, are you saying that any argument for tactical voting is bound to fail?

[muon2]

I think I’m going to start shaming Massachusetts voters into donating more of their paychecks to the search for near Earth asteroids.  Sure, the chances that a given contribution will make any difference is minuscule, but we’re talking about the survival of the planet here.  Even a 0.000000000000000000000000001% chance that your contribution makes a difference is worthwhile when we’re talking about such high stakes.

^^^^^^

Any argument that anyone for voting in a certain way based on consequentialist logic is bound to fail.

But isn't tactical voting inherently consequentialist? If so, are you saying that any argument for tactical voting is bound to fail?

Not necessarily.

My rationale for sometimes (but not always!) voting tactically is not consequentialist at all. Instead, it's based on a variation on the categorical imperative: rather than asking myself what would happen if everybody voted the way I do (which of course precludes tactical voting), I ask myself what would happen if any group of any potential size (ranging from 2 voters to every voter) voted the way I do. If any of these hypotheticals produces an outcome that I consider morally unacceptable, then I conclude that me voting this way is morally unacceptable. The outcome does matter, but only in relation to a specific understanding of what my duty as a voter is.

For example, if I were Averroes, I'd note that if all the voters who shared my basic left-wing/environmentalist ideals in their broadest form (I'd say there are about 10-20% such voters in the US, of which half to two thirds plan to vote for Hillary) voted for Jill Stein like I'm planning to do, then Drumpf would almost certainly win the election. This, to me, implies that there is something fundamentally wrong with voting for Stein. Of course, there are different degrees of moral acceptability: if a candidate like Romney was the GOP nominee, I still would think that tactical voting is the correct choice, but I would be more willing to accept other motivations. If the GOP candidate was someone relatively harmless (like... idk... Jim Douglas, maybe?) then I might myself go for a third-party candidate.

I'm actually going to vote for someone other than Hollande in the first round in France next year, which means that I accept the responsibility of potentially fostering a Sarkozy/Le Pen runoff. The reasons I think it's not nearly as bad as the American context are a few, but they're just my reasons of course.

I completely understand your reasoning, I just think that the categorical isn't applicable. There is an assumption that everyone could adopt the same thinking and all vote the same way. For me, since that hypothetical is impossible to achieve it is irrelevant. (nb. As a quantum physicist I accept that there are states that can be described but cannot be realized, and those unrealizable states must be excluded from the consideration of choices.)

I see my vote as having marginal utility in the economics sense. I should apply it where the marginal utility is greatest. If there are only the two major party candidates on the ballot, then my choice should always be the one that I most prefer. If there are more than two then there is the possibility that my vote would have more utility going to a candidate other than my first choice. So, if I personally agree with a third party in a swing state, but I see a real difference in the two major candidates I may find more utility voting for the major party candidate I prefer. Alternatively, if I support a major party in a non-swing state but want to see more ballot access for third parties, I may find more utility voting for a third party to boost that party's profile in future elections.

[muon2]

I think I’m going to start shaming Massachusetts voters into donating more of their paychecks to the search for near Earth asteroids.  Sure, the chances that a given contribution will make any difference is minuscule, but we’re talking about the survival of the planet here.  Even a 0.000000000000000000000000001% chance that your contribution makes a difference is worthwhile when we’re talking about such high stakes.

^^^^^^

Any argument that anyone for voting in a certain way based on consequentialist logic is bound to fail.

But isn't tactical voting inherently consequentialist? If so, are you saying that any argument for tactical voting is bound to fail?

Not necessarily.

My rationale for sometimes (but not always!) voting tactically is not consequentialist at all. Instead, it's based on a variation on the categorical imperative: rather than asking myself what would happen if everybody voted the way I do (which of course precludes tactical voting), I ask myself what would happen if any group of any potential size (ranging from 2 voters to every voter) voted the way I do. If any of these hypotheticals produces an outcome that I consider morally unacceptable, then I conclude that me voting this way is morally unacceptable. The outcome does matter, but only in relation to a specific understanding of what my duty as a voter is.

For example, if I were Averroes, I'd note that if all the voters who shared my basic left-wing/environmentalist ideals in their broadest form (I'd say there are about 10-20% such voters in the US, of which half to two thirds plan to vote for Hillary) voted for Jill Stein like I'm planning to do, then Drumpf would almost certainly win the election. This, to me, implies that there is something fundamentally wrong with voting for Stein. Of course, there are different degrees of moral acceptability: if a candidate like Romney was the GOP nominee, I still would think that tactical voting is the correct choice, but I would be more willing to accept other motivations. If the GOP candidate was someone relatively harmless (like... idk... Jim Douglas, maybe?) then I might myself go for a third-party candidate.

I'm actually going to vote for someone other than Hollande in the first round in France next year, which means that I accept the responsibility of potentially fostering a Sarkozy/Le Pen runoff. The reasons I think it's not nearly as bad as the American context are a few, but they're just my reasons of course.

I completely understand your reasoning, I just think that the categorical isn't applicable. There is an assumption that everyone could adopt the same thinking and all vote the same way. For me, since that hypothetical is impossible to achieve it is irrelevant. (nb. As a quantum physicist I accept that there are states that can be described but cannot be realized, and those unrealizable states must be excluded from the consideration of choices.)

I see my vote as having marginal utility in the economics sense. I should apply it where the marginal utility is greatest. If there are only the two major party candidates on the ballot, then my choice should always be the one that I most prefer. If there are more than two then there is the possibility that my vote would have more utility going to a candidate other than my first choice. So, if I personally agree with a third party in a swing state, but I see a real difference in the two major candidates I may find more utility voting for the major party candidate I prefer. Alternatively, if I support a major party in a non-swing state but want to see more ballot access for third parties, I may find more utility voting for a third party to boost that party's profile in future elections.

How do you define your "utility" here? If you mean material utility, ie the utility of having your preferred candidate win, then your expected utility from voting will always be almost 0, since the probability that your vote decides who wins is insignificant (there ought to be a combinatorics formula to calculate the likelihood that an election where 100M people vote is determined by a margin of 1, but I don't remember it... point is, it's very low).

If you're talking about the emotional utility that you gain from the act of voting in and of itself, independent of the outcome, then yes, your rationale is valid. Personally, I think that voting exclusively based on one's emotions is morally irresponsible, but it's certainly not "irrational" (at least no more irrational than any other vote).

The utility here is how I'd like to see my government run now and in the future. How the government runs now is based on all the politicians who I'd like to see continue, including the ones on a specific line on the ballot. I've faced a choice where I like a candidate but I don't like the clash between that person and another person on a local board. I've felt my utility could be increased by voting against the conflict and against my otherwise preferred candidate. That can happen when the other party to the undesired conflict isn't on my ballot (staggered terms, different ward, etc.). In the case I'm thinking of I later helped that person successfully run for another office.

How the government runs in the future includes party building and access as well as individuals. There have been rare cases where a vote for a candidate other than my personal top choice does more to improve my party's chances in a future election. I've also noted that IL has ballot access thresholds for third parties and a timely vote for a third party candidate can improve competition in future elections by moving a third party up to major party status.

[muon2]

The utility here is how I'd like to see my government run now and in the future.

But that's the problem right here: your vote almost certainly won't affect your utility in this regard, because the probability that your vote determines the winner of the election is quasi-null (even in a local election with only a few thousand total votes, it's still infinitesimal). Did you read the rest of my post in which I explained that?

Also, if I'm doing a poor job explaining it, here's the relevant wiki article, since obviously I'm not the one who came up with all this stuff: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_voting

I'm familiar with the paradox, which is why I couched my preference as a marginal utility. I perceive a difference in utility between an action which would have an impact 0.001% of the time and one which would have an impact 0.0001% of the time. That percentage increase in the outcome is an increase in my utility and affects the actual margin where one vote might matter. My vote doesn't have to be the precise tipping point vote for this utility of likelihood to matter to me. I also appreciate that the difference between infinitessimal probabilities may have no effect on other people's utility, even though they do for me.

The utility of likelihood is not the only factor to consider of course. It has to be convoluted with my utility in seeing different candidates actually win if I were to determine the utility of of any particular vote. Most of the time the direct utility of having a particular winner dominates as a factor. My point is only that for me I have faced elections where I have thought about these likelihoods before voting.

[muon2]

The utility here is how I'd like to see my government run now and in the future.

But that's the problem right here: your vote almost certainly won't affect your utility in this regard, because the probability that your vote determines the winner of the election is quasi-null (even in a local election with only a few thousand total votes, it's still infinitesimal). Did you read the rest of my post in which I explained that?

Also, if I'm doing a poor job explaining it, here's the relevant wiki article, since obviously I'm not the one who came up with all this stuff: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_voting

I'm familiar with the paradox, which is why I couched my preference as a marginal utility. I perceive a difference in utility between an action which would have an impact 0.001% of the time and one which would have an impact 0.0001% of the time. That percentage increase in the outcome is an increase in my utility and affects the actual margin where one vote might matter. My vote doesn't have to be the precise tipping point vote for this utility of likelihood to matter to me. I also appreciate that the difference between infinitessimal probabilities may have no effect on other people's utility, even though they do for me.

The utility of likelihood is not the only factor to consider of course. It has to be convoluted with my utility in seeing different candidates actually win if I were to determine the utility of of any particular vote. Most of the time the direct utility of having a particular winner dominates as a factor. My point is only that for me I have faced elections where I have thought about these likelihoods before voting.

I understand your argument regarding how you choose to vote. What I don't understand is what your marginal utility of voting compared to not voting is. Surely, voting takes you some time, you might have to drive and it might screw up your schedule. Those are minor inconveniences, sure, but since the expected utility of the voting outcome is so low, they should still matter.

Good question. It made me think about it for a bit.

After thinking about my motives, I would conclude that the ability to impact the race is a small factor for deciding to vote. It does help that most ballots have a number of contested races, so that the probability of my vote having an impact is greater by the ability to influence many races at once. Nonetheless that's probably not where the utility arises.

When I first voted, I know I got the highest utility from the satisfaction of seeing how the process worked - essentially satisfying my curiosity. That same goal was important when I relocated to grad school and then after grad school. It is still a non-trivial factor when new election technologies came to my polling place. In one election I chose to drive some distance to vote early just to use the technology that was different than in my polling place. I'm a scientist and seeing the process first hand has real value to me.

However I think for most elections I find utility in the knowledge that I'm participating in this public process that exceeds the costs associated with voting. Voting history is public, so it's not just a matter of personal pride, but one of shared pride with others in the community. That would fall into the category of an emotional utility. Also, I have learned that local officials know who the voters are, and are more likely to turn to voters than non-voters for advice and help in the community. That stems in large part from the officials' knowledge that voters have that shared community pride. That's a utility beyond the merely emotional. Of course if one wants to then run for office, having a history of voting turns out to have utility above and beyond that shared community pride.

[muon2]

That makes sense.

Since the very last points that you bring up aren't really relevant to the vast majority people, would you then agree that the reasons why people vote are fundamentally emotional in nature?

This, in turn, preempts any attempt to lecture people about how they ought to vote based on strict consequentialist logic.

I think what I learned from my introspection is that whether or not someone votes for most people is based on an emotional utility such as community pride. However, I think I may have convinced myself that the act of voting is different for most than the act of casting a specific vote once one has determined that one would vote. That seems consistent with polling where after an election many more people claim to have voted than actually did, but they are sure about whom they voted for even though some didn't actually vote. That separation between voting and for whom to vote for makes me think that consequentialist logic might have little effect generating turnout, but it could influence support for candidates among those who did vote.

[muon2]

That makes sense.

Since the very last points that you bring up aren't really relevant to the vast majority people, would you then agree that the reasons why people vote are fundamentally emotional in nature?

This, in turn, preempts any attempt to lecture people about how they ought to vote based on strict consequentialist logic.

I think what I learned from my introspection is that whether or not someone votes for most people is based on an emotional utility such as community pride. However, I think I may have convinced myself that the act of voting is different for most than the act of casting a specific vote once one has determined that one would vote. That seems consistent with polling where after an election many more people claim to have voted than actually did, but they are sure about whom they voted for even though some didn't actually vote. That separation between voting and for whom to vote for makes me think that consequentialist logic might have little effect generating turnout, but it could influence support for candidates among those who did vote.

I'm really not sure how such a process would work. So, voters are first moved by emotional motivations to go vote, but once they reach the polling place, they switch back to assessing the probabilistic consequences of their vote? I mean, some might. I guess that, if you have no emotional stake in any of the candidate, then it makes sense to use consequentialism as a guide. However, I think most people do have a very strong emotional stake in their vote - which could be positive ("I feel good after having voted for this candidate") or negative ("I would hate myself if I voted for that candidate"). Then, if a voter's consequentialist reasoning and their emotional commitment clashes ("I know I should vote for Hillary to make sure Drumpf is defeated, but I really can't stand her, and I really like Johnson/Stein/whoever"), then the emotional component should once again prevail, since the probability of one's vote actually being decisive is so low.

That's where the argument that Hillary's going to win the state anyway and has a 15% lead in the polls. Johnson/Stein are on the bubble to qualify for easier ballot access, so why not help insure more choices for next time. The emotional concern about the actual winner is addressed and the relative utility of the vote can come into play. I'm not saying that it will always work, but it has sometimes.

On the larger question of decoupling, I think that the fact that voting typically involves many separate races comes into play. If there was only one race on the ballot then the act of voting is more coupled to the specific choice. I've seen that reaction to special elections with only one question.