Bulgarian presidential election - November 6, 2016

[Grand Wizard Lizard of the Klan]

Will Borisov call for early elections seriously if Tsacheva will lose or it was just a bullsh**t for the campaign needs?

The wording of his pledge was vague enough to allow him to walk it back if she finished second (he pledged he would resign if she lost the first round). On the other hand, some have speculated that he chose such an awful candidate because he wanted to lose and have the opportunity to call for early elections at an advantageous moment.

Wouldn't loosing in presidential elections cause ending of that advantageous moment? Is it possible that after such compromitation GERB would lose early elections. Although I know that they are still leading in polls I wonder if society is able to do such rapid change.

[GMantis]

Will Borisov call for early elections seriously if Tsacheva will lose or it was just a bullsh**t for the campaign needs?

The wording of his pledge was vague enough to allow him to walk it back if she finished second (he pledged he would resign if she lost the first round). On the other hand, some have speculated that he chose such an awful candidate because he wanted to lose and have the opportunity to call for early elections at an advantageous moment.

Wouldn't loosing in presidential elections cause ending of that advantageous moment? Is it possible that after such compromitation GERB would lose early elections. Although I know that they are still leading in polls I wonder if society is able to do such rapid change.

Perhaps to some extent, but presidential elections are to a large extent dependent on the personal quality of the candidates, unlikely parliamentary elections (and in the case where they have an effect, it's in GERB's favor due to Borisov's personal popularity). GERB is much more popular than Tsacheva and BSP is much less popular than Radev.

[GMantis]

An excellent analysis, Beagle and quite fair from my point of view, considering the obvious differences in our political views. Though I do have some quibles...

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Vote fraud can however have effects in local elections, where the electorate is smaller. GERB in particular was particularly egregious in 2011 and to a lesser extent in 2015, where I suppose their coalition partner restrained them to an extent.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Judging by the initial results, DPS has not been seriously weakened by Mestan's defection, so there is little hope there for GERB.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

The claim that Parvanov won because of DPS is dubious, considering that as you pointed out Indzhova who DPS supported in the first round won only 140 thousand. In addition, DPS won only 340 thousand votes in the 2001 parliamentary elections and turnout was notably lower during the presidential election in the provinces with a large Turkish population. In my opinion, Parvanov might have lost if DPS had backed Stoyanov (though narrowly), but would have still won if they did not issue an endorsement.
As for 2011, DPS probably contributed as many as 350 thousand voters for Kalfin in 2011. I think it would be somewhat unlikely that they would have been able to supply another 260 thousand.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

This assumes that they will remain 2000 (which is unlikely considering likely future immigration, plus chain immigration if they become legal residents). There is also the fact that there is no screening and that Germany would likely keep the best immigrants for themselves and out-load the rest to other EU countries.
And of course, there is the principle that we shouldn't be the dumping ground for people who were invited in the EU by another country.

are employing far-right rhetoric against the refugees, vote for extreme left candidates.

This seems unlikely, considering that BSP's supporters have never been the kind of people who would look kindly upon the emigration of Muslim Mid-Easterners  that are so common in European left parties. You can find more of these among the supporters of the RB.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

This was actually disputed, since the constitution states that the president may be re-elected once. Since Parvanov is not running for re-election, it could be argued that he is eligible. Of course it's the Constitutional court who decides the correct interpretation and considering who appointed the current court, it's unlikely that they would support such an interpretation.

I think 'chinless wonder' might be the right expression to describe the public image Traykov has. He was given (somewhat against his will) the unenviable task of trying to unite the various factions of the RB behind his candidacy and also to peel off pro-Western GERB supporters who may be wavering in light of the Tsacheva candidacy and some... interesting recent observations by Boyko Borisov (for instance: "The Occidental countries must stop exporting democracy and apologize for the bombs and missiles they've dropped over Libya and Syria"). Obviously Traykov can't do that, but he'll have to get 200k votes, otherwise one more of the RB parties has promised to leave the government.

This might be a factor, but Tsacheva is a particularly unpleasant candidate for highly educated voters who are disproportionately represented in RB.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

I don't think that Trifonov for all his faults was as much as a Mafia man or would have gone as far in subverting democracy as Borisov. More than likely he would have gotten bored in fairly short order and probably not last a full term.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

It says a lot (and nothing good) about the framers of the constitution that they considered the number of parliamentary deputies more important than the way they would be elected, considering that there is nothing about the later in the constitution.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

It is also likely that it will be struck down by the Constitutional court, since the Constitution strictly defines who is barred from voting (prisoners and those judged mentally incompetent) and banning anyone else from voting is an obvious violation.

My first round vote for president is obviously Traykov. Even if he wasn't the only unabashedly pro EU/US candidate in the race, and even if he didn't support the judicial reform that I find vitally important, he'd still have my vote as a fellow bookish dweeb. Plus he's warning against state capture and he refers to the Donald as a 'post-truth politician', so he's reading the same books I am.

With all respect to your political positions, I find this statement somewhat strange, considering that both Tsacheva and Radev support Bulgaria's continued EU and NATO membership. And both GERB and BSP lead a staunchly pro-EU/US foreign policy when they're in power, regardless of their public rhetoric. Unless Traykov intends to move his office to the US embassy, I hardly see how he can significantly surpass them in this aspect.

[GMantis]

You must be logged in to read this quote.

I think this is putting it too strongly. Last name with the same root as the first name might be considered somewhat provincial, but alterations don't have such a reputation.

It should be noted that Tsacheva does have a name problem since her first name is one that seems quite old fashioned and rustic, as well as somewhat childish.

[Beagle]

Official results with 85.7% of the vote in:

Rumen Radev (independent, supported by the BSP) - 25.8 %
Tsetska Tsacheva (GERB) - 22 %
Krassimir Karakachanov ('United Patriots' - PF + Ataka) - 15 %
Vesselin Mareshki (independent) - 10.8 %
Plamen Oresharski (indpendent, supported by the DPS) - 6.3 %
Traycho Traykov (RB) - 6.1 %
None of the above - 5.6 %
Ivaylo Kalfin (ABV) - 3.4 %
Tatyana Doncheva (,movement 21 + NDSV) - 1.9 %
Georges Ganchev - 0.7%

Given what's still out, Radev can go down by up to 0.5%, Tsacheva should rise a bit, and there should be movement here and there, but the order of finishing should be final.

...In the past 3 days the pollsters have produced their final predictions, which for the most part are remarkably similar. Virtually all see Tsacheva holding steady, Radev and Karakachanov inching upwards, Mareshki and Oresharski surging (relatively) and Kalfin and Doncheva leaking support to the 'official left' candidate.

I have aggregated the poll results collected at the Bulgarian wiki, taking the liberty to exclude 3 'fake' agencies, to redistribute the 'undecided' voters where reported, assuming that those who make up their minds in the last days will mostly go for the frontrunners, and to round up a bit....

YUGE mistake on my part. I assumed that the less frequent voters who would turn out because of the mandatory voting or the referendum would not want to 'waste their vote'. As it turned out Tsacheva did not attract absolutely anyone outside the core GERB support. Radev probably collected a non-negligible number of voters who want the current government gone and voted for him to push Tsacheva into second place. However almost all the 'unlikely' voters seem to have gone for candidates outside the top 2. The majority of the voters have gone for somebody who is not in the run-off, which is unprecedented.

The wording of his pledge was vague enough to allow him to walk it back if she finished second (he pledged he would resign if she lost the first round). On the other hand, some have speculated that he chose such an awful candidate because he wanted to lose and have the opportunity to call for early elections at an advantageous moment.

Well, Borisov has now walked the pledge back a bit - as 'no other party candidate has beaten GERB in the first round, GERB still has a mandate', but he's unambiguously committed to triggering new elections should Tsacheva lose in the second round. IMO this pledge makes a Radev victory all but certain, giving credence to the rumors of an intentional loss. Early election would give Borisov an easy out from the 'high demand' coalition partners/expensively bought 'independent' MPs, and more importantly, would give him a chance to reassert control in the party parliamentary grouping, which has formed a separate power center. But given the obvious shock within the party and the disparate and evidently unrehearsed signals coming from them, I doubt this loss was planned.

An excellent analysis, Beagle and quite fair from my point of view, considering the obvious differences in our political views. Though I do have some quibles...

Thanks!

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Absolutely. I should have underlined 'national scale' in my text.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Hm, I personally was surprised to see Izmir (Smyrna) vote for Tsacheva, Bursa close to a 50:50 split and Istanbul having a sizable GERB vote. Even Kardzhali did not produce a majority win for Oresharski, just a plurality. Mestan has already done better than any of the other DPS spin-offs, iirc. But you and I both know that what happens between DPS and DOST is not going to be determined in Bulgaria alone...

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Yeah, no. Check out the Kardzhali run-off in 2011 - turnout of 27%, less than 10 000 vote net for Kalfin. Across all the municipalities in the region, Kalfin netted 20 000 votes. In the meaningless 2006 runoff Parvanov had a margin of 90 000 there. In 2006, Parvanov had a net win of 30 000 in the Razgrad region (excluding the city itself, as it is majority Bulgarian), Kalfin had less than 15 000. The DPS definitely did not contribute 350k votes in 2011 - it's doubtful they could have made up the entire difference, but they could have made it within a point or two.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

You're right. But a) this was hypothetical and b) the BSP has a small influx of young people educated abroad, joining left-wing movements at uni and carrying on at home, who might have been susceptible to a split.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Eh, Messrs. Kirov and Tanchev are pretty much the only one who dispute it. Most of the constitution signers are alive and can and have explained what was the intention behind it. If Parvanov had refused his lifelong state-paid secretary, office and protection by the security service, he might have had a better claim that the word 'President' no longer applies to him.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

With all respect to your political positions, I find this statement somewhat strange, considering that both Tsacheva and Radev support Bulgaria's continued EU and NATO membership. And both GERB and BSP lead a staunchly pro-EU/US foreign policy when they're in power, regardless of their public rhetoric. Unless Traykov intends to move his office to the US embassy, I hardly see how he can significantly surpass them in this aspect. [/quote]
Aw, c'mon. The 'unabashed' modifier is important. I was looking for a candidate who would be closest to Plevneliev in foreign policy matters and I don't think that it can be disputed that Traykov best matches that description from the 21 running. Also, having been an intern on the pardons commission under the VP and having spent a fair bit of time in the Presidency building, I can see a lot of potential benefits to moving the institution to the US embassy.





[/quote]

[Beagle]

So yeah, other events are at the forefront now - even for Bulgarian media. Pity... in more ways than one.

I must mention, though, that the electoral rules referendum pt.2 - electric boogaloo fell just 13 000 votes short of being binding. The major parties have promised to implement it (in some form) nonetheless. There is a lot of pre-second round posturing in this pledge, of course, but compulsory voting will certainly be extended to referendums (referenda?) and the party subsidies will be reduced. From what I gather, the GERB idea is to split the 240 MPs, having half elected proportionally, either through a nationwide list, or more likely in multi-member districts like now, and half - in single member districts. We'll see if they have the time and/or the will to pass it through.

Predictably obnoxiously, Trifonov, the talk show host, who was the driving force behind the referendum, is claiming voter fraud, using an old video of ballot box stuffing from some Polish election and claiming it's from our 2014 parliamentary election

The runoff is on Sunday. There were quite a few interesting developments during the last week of campaigning, but they won't matter one bit. Borisov doubled down on the pledge to resign if Tsacheva is defeated, so it's going to be a pretty straight 'Who runs the country?' 'Not you, mate'
election. Radev should win comfortably, by 10 points or so if pollsters are to be believed.

The quick and dirty polling done since the underwhelming first round result for GERB - their lowest share of the vote since the party was founded - indicates that instead of the earlier 30%:15% advantage over the BSP, the lead is now just 6-8%. So of course the BSP have dropped their demand for early elections. For different reasons, a sizable majority of the current parliamentarians do not want to go to the polls soon, so it's possible that the Borisov resignation is rejected by Parliament, or, more likely, that some 'compromise' is worked out, in which the current government holds on at least until Radev is inaugurated. Still, I'm pretty sure there will be a parliamentary election in 2017.

[Famous Mortimer]

Mantis, did you return to the BSP fold this election?

[GMantis]

Mantis, did you return to the BSP fold this election?

Yes. Not so much because of the BSP who I still don't trust after all the sheenanigans they've pulled over the years, but because I feel that Radev is the best candidate running (with the possible exception of Velisar Enchev, but he has no chance of winning).

[GMantis]

Hm, I personally was surprised to see Izmir (Smyrna) vote for Tsacheva, Bursa close to a 50:50 split and Istanbul having a sizable GERB vote. Even Kardzhali did not produce a majority win for Oresharski, just a plurality. Mestan has already done better than any of the other DPS spin-offs, iirc. But you and I both know that what happens between DPS and DOST is not going to be determined in Bulgaria alone...

Exit polls showed that Oresharski still got over 60% of the Turkish vote and only between a half and a third of the rest went to Tsacheva. So Mestan probably did not manage to get more than about a sixth or fifth of DPS voters. Still impressive, especially considering the votes he's likely to gain from Turkey.

I must mention, though, that the electoral rules referendum pt.2 - electric boogaloo fell just 13 000 votes short of being binding. The major parties have promised to implement it (in some form) nonetheless. There is a lot of pre-second round posturing in this pledge, of course, but compulsory voting will certainly be extended to referendums (referenda?) and the party subsidies will be reduced. From what I gather, the GERB idea is to split the 240 MPs, having half elected proportionally, either through a nationwide list, or more likely in multi-member districts like now, and half - in single member districts. We'll see if they have the time and/or the will to pass it through.

This is probably the time to mention that when the President is in the last three months of his term, parliament is not dissolved when a caretaker government is appointed. So there is plenty of time for GERB to introduce single member districts voting and guarantee (looking at the analysis presented earlier) a absolute majority even with a reduced lead against BSP.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

I find this unlikely. DPS would probably want elections earlier before DOST manages to become even stronger, the nationalists might very well want them so they could form a coalition before their hasty unity disappears and BSP would look really ridiculous voting for a GERB government.

[GMantis]

The first exit polls of the run-off have been released and Radev has won in a landslide:

Radev: 58.1-58.5%
Tsacheva: 35.3-35.7%
Against all: 5.8-6.6%

This improves upon the previous record victory margin, Peter Stoyanov's 18% in 1996 (I'm not counting Parvanov's blowout victory in 2006, since he wasn't facing serious opposition).

[GMantis]

While Radev's victory was very likely, it certainly wasn't expected to be by this margin. Of all the major first round candidates only Traikov's supporters supported Tsacheva over Radev (and a surprising percentage of them did vote for him).

[Beagle]

Yup, Radev is our next President. The decade old GERB winning streak is broken. Radev won everywhere and with everyone - pretty sure all 31 regions will be red this time around.
A lot of GERB's wounds are self inflicted, of course, but Radev has proven to be the perfect candidate to take advantage of the situation. We'll have to see what kind of President he will be - I think everyone is projecting their hopes and fears on him right now, but I doubt more than a select few really know where he stands.

As to the more pressing issue on the government crisis - Borisov is submitting his resignation tomorrow. Parliament can vote on it as soon as Wednesday - after Borisov's statement, there is no chance it gets rejected. After that the current president needs to offer the mandate to GERB, BSP and a party of his choice. My reading of the constitution is that the president can postpone starting this procedure, but once it starts, it has to finish in 3 weeks at the most. And for many reasons it's unlikely for Plevneliev to stall for 3 months so that Radev gets to appoint a caretaker government of his own. Probably the likeliest scenario is for Plevneliev and Radev to settle on a mutually acceptable caretaker prime minister and key ministers, but, of course, Radev is free to dismiss the Plevneliev cabinet and appoint a caretaker government of his own after he is inaugurated.

This is probably the time to mention that when the President is in the last three months of his term, parliament is not dissolved when a caretaker government is appointed. So there is plenty of time for GERB to introduce single member districts voting and guarantee (looking at the analysis presented earlier) a absolute majority even with a reduced lead against BSP.

Borisov's gamble - presumably to change the conversation from the comprehensive defeat of GERB - is that he will propose calling elections for a Grand National Assembly, amending/replacing the 1990 Constitution. To do that, the current Parliament must formulate a constitutional proposal and approve it by a 2/3 majority (ie 160 out of 240 deputies). IMO it's unlikely that such a majority can be found, but it's far from impossible. The single members districts, however, can pass on the strength of the GERB/DPS/ABV unholy alliance that has already formed a few times in this parliament.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

As if looking ridiculous ever stopped the BSP I'm currently listening to them berating Borisov for resigning. I can't think of any other example of a main opposition party demanding that the sitting government stay in power.

[GMantis]

As to the more pressing issue on the government crisis - Borisov is submitting his resignation tomorrow. Parliament can vote on it as soon as Wednesday - after Borisov's statement, there is no chance it gets rejected. After that the current president needs to offer the mandate to GERB, BSP and a party of his choice. My reading of the constitution is that the president can postpone starting this procedure, but once it starts, it has to finish in 3 weeks at the most. And for many reasons it's unlikely for Plevneliev to stall for 3 months so that Radev gets to appoint a caretaker government of his own. Probably the likeliest scenario is for Plevneliev and Radev to settle on a mutually acceptable caretaker prime minister and key ministers, but, of course, Radev is free to dismiss the Plevneliev cabinet and appoint a caretaker government of his own after he is inaugurated.

There is apparently further complication - if this reading of the constitution is to be believed - the president can't actually set a new date for the elections without dissolving parliament and since Plevneliev currently is unable to dissolve parliament the very date of the election will not be known until Radev comes into office and dissolves parliament.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Why would ABV agree to such an obviously suicidal move? Of course there are plenty of independent deputies which can be bribed, so GERB probably doesn't need them.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

As if looking ridiculous ever stopped the BSP I'm currently listening to them berating Borisov for resigning. I can't think of any other example of a main opposition party demanding that the sitting government stay in power.
[/quote]
There is nothing ridiculous in berating Borisov for resigning. First, there is the fact that Borisov irresponsibly caused the fall of the government at the worst possible time (no budget has been passed, the referendum results must be considered within three months, complicated formation of a caretaker government due to President's term running out) for perfectly petty reasons - his unwillingness to face his first defeat in an sensible manner and insistence to turn it into national drama. The second is that he somehow is attempting to blame the opposition for his resignation and subsequent early elections.

[Beagle]

I've just spent an hour looking at the detailed results: Radev's blowout is complete and total. Tsacheva has probably only won 5 (five!) out of the 265 municipalities:  Simitli, Rakovski, Bansko, Dospat, and Primorsko - a feudal fiefdom, the only Catholic majority municipality and 3 touristy places.

I can say with certainty that the DPS machine was not in operation for the second round. Radev has indeed won everywhere the DPS controls - but by 15-20% and on a turnout of 25-40%. Had the DPS made an effort to turn out the vote for him, he could have won by more than 2:1. Probably a good thing that he's not beholden to them.

Btw, Bukovlak has gone for Radev - and pretty emphatically too - but turnout has dropped by 60%. In general, there seems to have been little to none vote buying - with the 10 am exit polls being within 2% of the final result, everyone must have concluded that there is no point.

There is apparently further complication - if this reading of the constitution is to be believed - the president can't actually set a new date for the elections without dissolving parliament and since Plevneliev currently is unable to dissolve parliament the very date of the election will not be known until Radev comes into office and dissolves parliament.

Yeah, the constitutional procedure means that the country will be without a proper government for the remainder of Plevneliev's term and for two months at the beginning of Radev's. Because it will apparently be a catastrophe for the caretaker government to be in place for a month longer than usual, Plevneliev will now go to the constitutional court to ask if he may set a date after the third party lays down the mandate and new elections become inevitable, even though the parliament is not dissolved. In my reading, he can't. But the constitutional court judges may find differently - I'm still aghast at the 2009 constitutional court decision which struck down the raised threshold for coalitions, but affirmed the single member districts.

I didn't mention this last night, but another possibility is for Plevneliev to appoint the Borisov cabinet as caretakers. This would ensure continuity - things will continue pretty much as they are until the new president gets into power, and then the normal procedure will apply. Of course, there will be shameless pandering for the duration of this period and who knows what abominations the lame duck parliament will pass, but, hey, 'stability'!

You must be logged in to read this quote.

Parvanov has a weird fetish-like obsession with 'majoritarian' elections and single member districts - he was the driving force behind the 2009 introduction of region-wide FPTP elections. More importantly, a two-round system may be the only chance for ABV to retain some representation in the next parliament.

Also, with DOST and Peevski out, the math doesn't work out - at least reliably - for GERB and DPS to pass the change on the strength of the independents alone.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

I get what you're saying, but to be consistent, Ninova would need to support the GERB-proposed budget. Parliament rejecting the budget would lead to the same result we have now - early elections with all these unresolved questions. Karakachanov's post-election posturing certainly seems to suggest that the nationalists will vote against the budget.

[Beagle]

After a month of endless bickering and gridlock - and some rather obvious charades, such as the totally serious attempts by two or three of the RB parties with a total of 9 (nine) MPs to form a minority government - today Plevneliev, the outgoing president, was supposed to name a caretaker government. Except he didn't, because, as he said, it makes no sense to have a caretaker government that will serve for a month until Radev gets sworn in. Plevneliev asked Radev to name a caretaker cabinet, but as the president-elect refused, the current government will stay, not as caretakers - until Radev either gives Plevneliev a list of names or comes into office, when he will have to name a cabinet anyway. It is a move of very dubious constitutionality, but there is no time for impeachment.

PM Borisov is petulantly* insisting that the outgoing parliament pass the referendum proposals before it is dissolved - or rather just one of the referendum proposals, because there's been no effort to make voting in referendums compulsory and parliament has rejected reducing the party subsidy. The current configuration in parliament should produce a majority for single member districts, one of the (many) problems is that nobody has any clue what the single member districts will look like. Today the referendum proponents produced a map. More in hope than expectation that it will generate a discussion, here is the 231 proposed district boundaries (the remaining 9 seats would be distributed among the diaspora).

EDIT: As it was slowing down the page, the image is available here

* it may sound weird, but he's almost literally saying "the people deserve to get what they voted for good and hard".

[DavidB.]

Amazing analysis, Beagle, thank you so much. Going on an unexpected trip to Sofia in two weeks, so might as well read up on your country's politics! A question: could you tell me something more about the breakdown of the vote in the various parts of Sofia (and why these parts vote that way), both in the presidential election and more generally in the parliamentary elections in past decade or so?

[Beagle]

Amazing analysis, Beagle, thank you so much. Going on an unexpected
trip to Sofia in two weeks, so might as well read up on your country's
politics! A question: could you tell me something more about the
breakdown of the vote in the various parts of Sofia (and why these
parts vote that way), both in the presidential election and more
generally in the parliamentary elections in past decade or so?

You're welcome. Pay attention to the weather forecast when you pack - a few international friends have been duped by the deceptively southern geographic location in the past and got caught out by the continental climate being continental-y. It's getting as low as -17  this weekend and the cold spell is stated to last until the 20th. Hopefully it will be more tolerable when you’re here, but bring something warmer with you just in case.

To answer your question, there’s two things I need to point out first:

- under communism, it was illegal to sell residential properties. Since the population of the city tripled in that time, the majority of Sofia residents had to go through the arduous procedure of getting an apartment in a state-built apartment block (from the 1960s onwards – a panel-built high rise). In general, the blocks were settled at the same time by people of the same generation – usually young families with a toddler or two.
 
- these days Bulgaria is on top  of the chart for private home ownership in Europe and people are not on the move very often. This does not, however, account for social mobility – so while the fortunes of the inhabitants in the block may have differed after 1989, many stayed put, and you’d have families who struggle making ends meet living right next to (or under, or above) affluent middle class neighbors.

While the apartment blocks may be shoddily built, the positive effect is that there is a degree of cohesion and homogeneity which is not very common for the West.  Consequently there isn’t that much of a difference politically between the various parts of Sofia. In every election since 1995, one major and one or two minor center-right pro-European parties have received between 50 and 75% of the Sofia vote between them, with the BSP generally moving progressively downward from the 30s to the lower teens and the remainder mostly going to ‘fad’ parties. For many reasons the nationalists have not found Sofia a fertile ground and DPS has been non-existent here.

* Pedantic note: every single word in the previous paragraph can be disputed, but it is a good enough generalization.

That having been said, behold the two MS Paint maps I made of the 2007 and 2015 direct elections for Sofia district mayors (in 2011 GERB had abolished the direct elections). I know you said parliamentary elections, but since those results get aggregated at the level of the 3 large multi-mandate districts that encompass the city, I’d have to go precinct by precinct to find the result for any individual part of the city, and these are representative enough for the political lay of the land.





Color scheme: Gray – GERB, Red – BSP, Blue – the ‘Old Right' in its various iterations. The darkest colors represent a winning margin of 20%+, the middle – a winning margin between 10% and 20% and the lightest – a winning margin of less than 10%. For the avoidance of doubt, every non-GERB win except for the 1st district is by less than 10%.

The Greater Sofia municipality includes a lot of areas that can be charitably described as ‘exurbs’, but are, for the most part, fairly agricultural villages. For our purposes, the results in districts numbered 20-24 are irrelevant, except it may be worth mentioning that district 24 – the town of Bankya – is where Boyko Borisov is from and where he still resides.

District 17 is at the foothills of Vitosha mountain (it also includes a part of the mountain itself and a couple of villages). The urban part of the district is probably the wealthiest area in the city (and quite possibly - the country), it’s where several gated communities have sprung up and where a substantial part of the residential buildings are single family new builds. The residents here are mostly the ‘winners’ from the post-1989 changes.

The proximity to the mountain, among other things, also makes districts 2, 10 and 9 in the south of the city highly desirable. They saw a construction boom in recent years (multi-family-residentials only) and have suffered for it, as the infrastructure was built with far fewer inhabitants in mind, so they have a lot of gripes with the municipality.

District 8 (and the southwestern part of district 7) are also considered ‘tony’ neighborhoods, however while the districts listed so far are GERB-‘Old Right’ battlegrounds, here the BSP still has a presence. The reason is that this part of the city was the preserve of the ‘Red bourgeoisie’ - it was built up in the 60’s and 70’s as the place where the mid- to higher echelons of the Communist party would reside with their families (and also where most embassies are). However, like everywhere else in Sofia, the BSP has been in decline here.

District 16 is the ‘Student city’ and while student dormitories are no longer the only form of residential construction here, there are not many permanent residents. GERB generally wins pretty comfortably.

Districts 1, 4, and the part of 3 where I live form the core of the city center – it’s where virtually all institutions and tourist attractions are located and where most of the buildings pre-date 1960. While wealthier and better educated than most of the rest of the city as a whole – both indicators of higher performance for the RB and its predecessors – what gives the city center its character as the last ‘Old Right’ stronghold are the descendants of the pre-1944 elite, whose houses were nationalized after the Communist takeover and who got them restored due to the laws the UDF passed in the 1990s.

The remainder of district 3, alongside districts 11 and 12, are places where most of the residential construction took place in the 50’s and 60’s, so the residents skew older, which is consistent with the better BSP performance there – but under normal conditions GERB has no problem winning, as they dominate among people aged 30-59.

The remainder of district 7, districts 18, 14, 5 and 13 – in that order – are increasingly industrial, grimy and poor areas, where the residences tend to be high-rises mixed with pre-1960 one or two storey houses. GERB usually romps to victory here, as Borisov’s paternalistic/macho style is quite popular among the residents. However, it’s also where the nationalist and clientelist parties (such as RZS in 2005 and ‘Bulgaria without Censorship’ in 2014) find their best results.

District 15 – Lyulin – is the largest residential complex and a city within the city. It is not possible to put all its quarter of a million residents under one common denominator. As the area with the most ‘first generation Sofians’, it tends to follow the national trends more closely than the rest of the city. GERB usually win here by a huge margin, but that’s because all other parties bunch up around the 10% mark.

District 19 – Mladost – is Lyulin’s counterpart in the southeast of the city and usually the two districts mirror their results. However, protests against the overbuilding of the neighborhood culminated in a landslide victory for an independent candidate (supported by the Greens and one other minor party) in the 2016 by-election for district mayor, after the previous mayor resigned on Borisov’s orders after being implicated in a conflict of interest.

The 2016 presidential election is really not representative – or so most observers think and I hope – as it marked the absolute nadir for GERB, while Radev got far more votes than the BSP can hope for and Karakachanov had the best result in Sofia for the nationalists since democracy began. Looking at a random selection of precinct reports, Radev probably won at least 23 out the 24 districts in the first round (with only the 1st in dispute between him and Traykov) and definitely won everywhere in run-off. Of course, it must be also be said that the first round victory was with a total of 26% to Tsacheva’s 23% , Traykov’s 17% and Karakachanov’s 13% (the best result for the nationalists does not mean a great result).

[DavidB.]

Thank you so much, Beagle. Extremely interesting.

[GMantis]

Here are the Presidential elections results by municipality: first round (above) and second round (below).

[Beagle]

Here are the Presidential elections results by municipality: first round (above) and second round

Thank you so much! Is this the first time that 6 candidates/parties have won municipalities (well, Sofia districts in Traykov's case)?

I can understand Devnya going for Tsacheva in the second round, but Primorsko swinging 40+ percent against the national trend is really difficult to fathom - surely the vote buyers must have realized they were wasting their money by 11:00 at the latest.

Did you make the map including the Sofia districts yourself?

[GMantis]

Here are the Presidential elections results by municipality: first round (above) and second round

Thank you so much! Is this the first time that 6 candidates/parties have won municipalities (well, Sofia districts in Traykov's case)?

No, there was also the 2009 parliamentary election.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

It's good that you mentioned Primorsko, since this is a mistake! It is supposed to be over 40% for GERB in the first round. I have now corrected the map. I hope there are not any other mistakes, though this sometimes happens with the amount of data that has to be entered manually. I did specifically check a few other results that seemed suspicious (for example, whether Boynitsa really became a GERB stronghold or whether Venets really switched from voting to the DPS supported Oresharski to Tsacheva in the second round).

You must be logged in to read this quote.

No, I used this map from Wikipedia. Though I have modified it several times, to add missing municipalities and adjust for border changes.