Between Two Majorities | The Cordray Administration

[GlobeSoc]

Right now your timeline seems very bold on wwcs swinging dem. Aside from impeachment, what else itl will make wwcs trend D?

[The_Doctor]

Right now your timeline seems very bold on wwcs swinging dem. Aside from impeachment, what else itl will make wwcs trend D?

The debt/economic crisis what flips them, not impeachment. Neoliberal economics still reigns in the Republican Party despite a collapse in the party's ideological wing. These WWC's are not and never have been neoliberal; in fact they're its biggest victims, aside from minorities. They were hooked into the GOP coalition through populism and social conservatism.

That's what today's article talks about actually (the sixth party system defined).

[GlobeSoc]

Right now your timeline seems very bold on wwcs swinging dem. Aside from impeachment, what else itl will make wwcs trend D?

The debt/economic crisis what flips them, not impeachment. Neoliberal economics still reigns in the Republican Party despite a collapse in the party's ideological wing. These WWC's are not and never have been neoliberal; in fact they're its biggest victims, aside from minorities. They were hooked into the GOP coalition through populism and social conservatism.

That's what today's article talks about actually (the sixth party system defined).

Alright, but what happens to FOX, breitbart, etc.?

[The_Doctor]

Right now your timeline seems very bold on wwcs swinging dem. Aside from impeachment, what else itl will make wwcs trend D?

The debt/economic crisis what flips them, not impeachment. Neoliberal economics still reigns in the Republican Party despite a collapse in the party's ideological wing. These WWC's are not and never have been neoliberal; in fact they're its biggest victims, aside from minorities. They were hooked into the GOP coalition through populism and social conservatism.

That's what today's article talks about actually (the sixth party system defined).

Alright, but what happens to FOX, breitbart, etc.?

After the crisis?

They become mainstream or die out. The next realigning presidency restores faith in institutions which allows the MSM to regain credibility. One of the things President Cordray does is create a new credibility for these institutions which is essential to a republic surviving.

The lack of faith in institutions is why Fox, Breitbart, etc are so popular in the US.

[ShadowRocket]

This past Wednesday, oral arguments were held for the PHH v. CFPB case at the DC Court of Appeals. The relevance being that this case may decide whether or not Trump can fire Cordray at-will.

While one should obviously be careful about reading too much into oral arguments, the court was purportedly skeptical of the anti-CFPB argument:

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-regulation-idUSKBN18K0EI

[Kingpoleon]

Can I ask for your take on what will happen to the area in AR-3?

[GlobeSoc]

Can I ask for your take on what will happen to the area in AR-3?

My guess is that it will be a straight-ticket republican holdout, as it seems to have a suburban quality the other 3 districts don't have and relatively few AAs; that would be enough to prevent the timeline's wwc d trend from flipping the district at any level.

[President of the great nation of 🏳️‍⚧️]

While we're on the subject, I assume that the area encompassing NC-12 is still titanium D, correct?

[ShadowRocket]

Alternative timeline: The cfpb wins the case and Cordray stays on as cfpb head til 2018 then starts a radio show where he preaches progressivism and touts his jeopardy skills. He goes on to run solo in 2020 and wins BIGLY.

At this point, he is going to have to resign on his own accord rather than waiting on Trump to fire him if he really wants to run for governor in OH most likely.

[The_Doctor]

I'll answer your questions after I post this article, immediately coming up.

[The_Doctor]

The Current Party System: Conservative Neoliberal Nationalist Populism

After much consideration, I have decided to classify the current party system as “conservative neoliberal nationalist populism.” This essentially is a nationalism that is noted by neoliberal economics, strident nationalism (sometimes aligned with neoconservatism, sometimes not), and a culturally conservative populism. This locates the Presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, Donald Trump, and Michael R. Pence into a continuum that explains each and every presidency. The great trouble I had was locating Trump’s Presidency but as Sanchez is to be credited in allowing me to have the revelation that President Trump is the logical end point of this conservatism (and provided a number of other thoughts that help inform this article).

First, we have to understand the origins of the current era’s conservative hegemony. The transition really begins in 1964 and ends in 1980, although the origins start in the 1950s.

First, the South broke away from the Democratic Party and began voting Republican, beginning in 1952. Remember, in 1952 and 1956, President Eisenhower won a number of Southern states. In July 1961, John Hightower (R-Texas) became the first Republican senator elected from the state (to fill Lyndon Johnson’s seat, ironically). Readers know the rest so I’m not going to restate the historical lessons. The point is, however, this. The how they accomplished this is important to review.

Republicans campaigned on the concerns of whites who broke for George Wallace in 1968 but finally folded into the Reagan coalition in 1980. Their concerns were not economic as much as they were cultural. First, it was civil rights in the 1960s, abortion in the 1970s and 1980s, gay marriage in the 2000s, and now transgender rights and illegal immigration. Regions like North Florida, the Deep South, and rural Texas have been responsive to this message, as have the culturally suburban white suburbs. This constitutes our first leg of the three stools of the Republican Party: cultural conservatives.

The National Review Republicans, however, were also part of this show. These Republicans were limited government advocates and arguably, the original neoconservatives. People like William Rusher and William Buckley founded the National Review as an answer to Dewey - Eisenhower liberalism. They were aligned with the cultural conservatives but they were more focused on reining in government’s excesses and fighting the Cold War. They were later the clearing house of conservative thought in the Reagan White House. Later, the Cato Institute joined these people. This constitutes the second leg of the Republican Party: economic limited government neoliberals with a dash of neoconservative nationalism.

Finally, the neoconservatives of the 1970s were crucial. After the failure of Vietnam, angry hawks joined the Republican banner, as the Democratic Party became increasingly the haven of peaceniks and “abolish the Defense Department” types. Straussian neoconservatives that had backed Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s two presidential bids now joined the Reagan campaign, providing the last stool of the Republican majority. They wanted to rebuild the military and stand against detente and the Soviet Union (and later provided the ideological support on the War on Terror). These neoconservatives favored a safety net, which is important to remember. This constitutes the third leg of the Republican Party: neoconservative / national security hawks.

The moderates were always there, but after 1980, they weren’t as powerful as they used to be. They were important balancing agents in 1989 to 1993 and 2001 to 2008, but they were at best, a half wing that was often weak, and was used to make the conservative majority palatable to the electorate.

Election 1980 brought these wings together and made them a grand majority. Every Republican President from Reagan to Trump would run and govern on the same formula. Identify an external enemy (Soviet Union and Communists, terrorists, and radical Islam to use the precise naming order). They would deregulate, cut taxes, and promote the ruling cultural conservative ideas of the time. They all did it in populist conservative tones and language. I am going to note that none of these conservative majorities were ever able to cut the entitlement and safety net, because of how entrenched they were (except for welfare reform, done on a bipartisan basis. Read more here).

The Republican majority era is divided into two halves; Reagan’s bipartisan Southern Democratic - GOP coalition and George W. Bush’s enduring (if collapsing) partisan GOP coalition. The first half was marked by an alliance between Southern Democrats and Republicans to push through a conservative agenda at the federal and local level. The second half is a straight up partisan GOP coalition.  

The second half is of interest to us. Starting in 1994 with Gingrich’s Contract with America (which satisfied the three stool requirement) and Fox News opening in 1996, the GOP moved from the Southern Democratic - GOP alliance to a purely partisan GOP majority centered in the Midwest, South, Great Plains, and the Interior West. Fox News and talk radio provided an ideological outlet and support for the emerging GOP majority that held together the base, no matter what. This was essential for the GOP starting in 1995 to provide cover against the liberal Democratic editorial firepower in the mainstream media’s editorial pages.

The election of George W. Bush is the “confirmation” presidency purely because Bush presided over the first sustained GOP majority since 1928 while also presiding over one of the the conservative era’s “titanic” moments - 9/11. The transformation from the Southern Democratic - GOP alliance to a purely GOP majority rivals the Lincoln Civil War Radicals transforming into the McKinley Republican majority of the earlier era. Bush campaigned as a neoliberal with populist themes and a boogeyman (starting in 2001). Between the War on Terror and socially conservative populism and neoliberal economics, Bush was the culmination and zenith of the GOP’s conservative reign.

The problem for the current Republican majority is that the Bush presidency saw two major wings destroyed. The neoconservative wing was destroyed by Iraq and then, the neoliberal wing was destroyed by the 2008 crash.

This meant only one thing. To recapture the White House they could either have embraced a conservative reformer Presidency (Jeb Bush or Scott Walker) or go for the one remaining wing that had cachet: the cultural conservatives. Enter, President Donald Trump.

Republicans in the 2016 primary consciously made a decision to reject both the neoconservative nationalists and the neoliberals in making Trump the nominee. Whether consciously or not, Trump seized on the one remaining wing that hadn’t been burned in the 2000s and used it to supercharge the Republican majority to compensate for the other wings.

Think of an airplane, for example. There are four engines two for each wing. Neoliberalism, neoconservative nationalism, and conservative populism and the moderates / libertarians forming the fourth wing. During Reagan and H.W. Bush, these wings were all working well. By the end of the Bush Presidency, neoliberals and neoconservatives saw their engines blown off. Moderates saw their half wing damaged but not blown off. The only remaining wing that worked was the socially culturally conservative populist engine. That now powered the entire plane.    
 
Trump used that one wing to land the plane at the White House and with GOP majorities. He campaigned on four things. He campaigned against NAFTA and TPP, he campaigned against the ACA, he campaigned on a wall, and he campaigned on conservative judges. Very little was honestly given over to advancing a policy set of ideas but his was a reactive conservatism. If you notice, point 1 is a strike against the neoliberal wing of the Party and a socially conservative populist talking point as well as a nationalist & American sovereignty type point.  Point two is for the neoliberal wing, who hated the ACA, plus the social conservatives. Point three was definitely for the consumption of social conservatives who hate the idea of unchecked illegal immigration (hi there). Four is the social conservatives, again. All of these platform planks supercharge the culturally conservative wing.

Trump deliberately blew off the neoconservative wing by holding a softer line on Russia and blew off the neoliberal wing by favoring NAFTA and TPP’s dismantlement. This was intentional. In fact, Trump’s abandonment of neoconservatives parallel the Democratic Party’s abandonment of hawks in the 1970s.

The attacks on the mainstream media are considered legitimate by this coalition, because cultural conservatism (and angry anti-establishment theme) is now the dominant strand of the Republican Party. The resentment of eastern establishment liberalism is now manifested in resentment towards the mainstream media.

The coming crisis as detailed in this timeline will confront a Republican Party that is working on only one sustainable wing. Like the Democratic Party of the 1970s that saw its New Deal economic wing depleted and its neoconservative wing defecting, the Republican Party will face the looming crisis not at full strength, but below half strength.

For all these reasons, we will call this era “conservative neoliberal nationalist populism.”

[The_Doctor]

Can I ask for your take on what will happen to the area in AR-3?

It's poor, rural, and white. It's 87% white. There aren't enough minorities to unite with enough southern whites to propel it to the Democrats. It should remain Republican although will get closer during the Cordray years. The Cordray coalition rests on some working class whites and minorities to form a majority coalition.

While we're on the subject, I assume that the area encompassing NC-12 is still titanium D, correct?

Yes. It's titanium D.

[The_Doctor]

If you really look at the supercharged cultural conservatives that make up the base of the GOP, they can be boiled down to three groups with their own concerns (with overlap of course):

1. Evangelical Christians (Abortion, LGBTQ issues)
2. Gun owners (Gun control)
3. Nativists (Illegal and legal immigration)

The issues that have been hammered away at to rally up the GOP base now caters primarily to these factions and their interests. How the GOP governs might be different, but how they campaign is centered around this culturally conservative trifecta.

In instances where economics or foreign policy confronts the above groups, it's done in a way that appeals to their cultural grievances first. Whether that's trade protectionism with nativists, Obamacare abortion provisions with evangelical christians, etc.

Yeah. I should point out this was not Trump's original plan. He campaigned in California and tried to talk about raising the minimum wage and didn't rule out raising taxes on the rich. But that was quickly shut down by his aides. Trump, in fact, is not a populist.

He tried to expand his base after the primaries and tried to project a more reasonable image. The problem for him is that the GOP voter base and the GOP apparatus is fundamentally at odds and the only way to reconcile them both is supercharged cultural conservatism.

I should point out that economic populism is not a viable strategy for Trump because of the apparatus, if you consider the fact most of official Washington GOP and state leaders and the like are still stuck in Reaganite three stool conservatism. So Trump can't really push the party in that direction because his political capital is pretty weak. So he has to rely on cultural conservatism.

Trump's victories in this timeline relate mainly to cultural conservatism (Justice Sykes, illegal immigration, passing an anti-media law, the wall, deportations). Trump likewise pulls out of the Paris Accords (big for cultural conservatives in the sense that it's important to their livelihoods) and is off hands on intervention unlike W. Not until now did I realize all of them are intensely popular with the cultural conservatives and only tax reform appeals to the neoliberals.

The AHCA is a very neoliberal product, which has little support even among the President's supporters which may be a big reason it's going down to defeat given how it's portrayed.

On that note, the next article will compare the timeline with reality to date.

[The_Doctor]

If you're bored how about race and ethnicity in the Cordray era? How the tensions compare to that of the Trump/Pence era and how we transition demographically from a white to multi racial society. Or does the definition of whiteness expand enough to keep the country majority white with intermarriage between whites/Asians and latinos/whites?

I think during the long Democratic hegemony Latinos will be reclassified as white. It happened to the Irish and Eastern Europeans; no reason it shouldn't happen to Latinos here as well. The honest truth is that white has always been an ever expanding definition and that's usually a political one at heart.

Intermarriage and interracial dating is up obviously. So either we become chill with the idea of a multiracial and multicultural society or expand the definition of white or both. They're not mutually exclusive.

Tensions will ease by the 2030s to 2050s as we move past the cultural conservativism that marks this current period. President Cordray will probably ease tensions with his landslide wins and remaking the nation's political consensus.

By 2040 with minorities making up 45-50% of the vote the Republicans and Democrats are competing for their votes on an almost equal footing. Republican partisans will eject Trump from the collective memory in order to win and will reject his legacy to maintain their competitiveness.

This isn't up for debate as an inevitable Republican strategy. There isn't an 80% white America voting for the GOP. They can't win the 35-40% of white Americans who vote Democratic and that means the Republican Party has to move beyond the southern strategy and the cultural conservatism (which carries the legacy of Dixiecrats).

[Beet]

Note: A bit of a throwback but essential reading. Last throwback article and then we’ll move on to the GOP and Democratic Conventions in 2020. It’s a minor (relatively) story about how Trump disabled the North Korean nuclear regime and marks one of the few successes in the Trump era. It will be referenced by the 2020 GOP Convention so we should talk about it.  Yes, we’re retconning Giuliani and putting in Tillerson. Normally I wouldn't do that but Tillerson's unique background makes it hard to put in a politico like Giuliani.

Trump strikes at North Korea Regime; Disables Nuke Program

(October 2017) -- (Washington, D.C.) -- President Donald Trump struck at the North Korean regime in a surprise attack at dawn (Pyonyang time) and disabled the nuclear program that the regime had built. After months of warning and negotiations between the United States and China, the Americans had decided to unilaterally disarm Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear capabilities.

President Obama had advised his successor that the North Korean nuclear program would need to be seriously curtailed or else the region faced imminent danger. Soon after President Trump was inaugurated, the United States held high level secret talks with the People’s Republic of China. They put pressure on Beijing to rein in Pyonyang and to force Kim Jong-Un to dismantle his program. The Chinese stalled, angry at the United States’ economic retaliatory measures and for months, talks dragged out without resolution.

In early September, the National Security Council convened to draw up plans to take out the Korean nuclear missile program unilaterally. In a series of limited strikes, the United States would attack and take out North Korea’s missile program - the first time any military power had taken action against another military power for the express purpose of destroying its nuclear program. The President, not usually a man prone to military action despite all his bravado, approved the limited strikes and advised his Council that the Chinese would need to be onboard with the program.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson shuttled between Washington and Beijing, brokering a high level deal where the Chinese agreed to turn over intelligence regarding the program and to refuse to come to North Korea’s aid in the aftermath. In response, the United States would give in on key concessions regarding China’s dominance in the South Pacific. Japan’s Abe Shinzo was also appraised and signed off on the mission as did the South Korean government.  

In early October, the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan was sent to the naval base in Yokosuka, Japan and prepared for the mission. In final secret negotiations, Kim Jong-Un refused to give up his nuclear warheads and Washington walked away. Believing that the talks would continue on the North Koreans were in the dark.

On the morning of October 12, 2017, U.S. bomber planes flew over the secret facilities and struck them, decisively and with precision. Before a single nuclear warhead could be fired, U.S. warplanes had taken out the facilities, rendering North Korea without the capabilities to take out South Korea or Japan. Shortly after the 8:00 bombing runs, the Chinese Ambassador to North Korea notified the government that China would not help in any retaliation against the United States - and indeed, were action to be taken to that end, China would respond with military action against the regime.

Furious, Kim Jong-Un tried to rally the military for an armed invasion of South Korea. But without the nuclear warheads and with the USS Reagan sitting offshore,  the regime’s leader was not in much of a position to argue. He reluctantly agreed, within 48 hours, to allow the United Nations to investigate freely any nuclear facility within the country, and to allow international inspectors free rein. The regime was seriously destabilized by the attack and Kim Jong-Un’s power was under siege. Within a few years, the North Korean regime would fall and Kim Jong-Un would be forced to flee overseas for his personal safety.

At home, the Trump Administration was applauded for its decisive action on the North Korean nuclear program. China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea all lauded the White House for decisively ending a threat to regional stability and for a time, the President would be praised as a decisive leader.

This is wildly optimistic. Russia and China have already opposed military strikes, South Korea likely would as well, and Japan would be reluctant at best. Even Mattis has said that a strike on North Korea would be 'tragic on an unbelievable scale'. Further, given that Trump has rightly stated that it could spark a 'major, major' war, a strike of these implications without Congressional authorization seems to step over the line even in these days of expansive presidential powers.

While I would be happier than anyone if the North Korean problem were resolved so easily, that is not likely. Most likely it will require a buildup of conventional forces on the peninsula, a reintroduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea, a buildup of missile defense, and adopting a posture of overwhelming retaliation.

[The_Doctor]

If it's wildly optimistic why is China negotiating with us on North Korea and why do we have two military subs and a carrier group in the area? 

Not sure why you picked that article of all of them to critique but the Chinese - US diplomacy on North Korea has been proven true. Trump has called it one of the biggest threats to the United States. He's also proven better at foreign policy than domestic policies and we haven't ruled out anything including military strikes.

Nobody wants military strikes but I don't necessarily buy that the US won't act unilaterally. We have before and will again and we will drag our allies into echoing our line.

I don't necessarily know if the outcome will be positive but I do think it will remain an option that we bomb North Korea. Neoconservatives have called to bomb Iran over its nuclear program -- why not try to take out the nuclear program of a rogue state that, if it loses it's patron, would be isolated completely?

That said it's very possible Trump does successfully end the nuclear program some other way.

[The_Doctor]

Do you think Asians will also go the same route that you're describing with Hispanics?

Eh not so clear how you define them as white.

[Beet]

If it's wildly optimistic why is China negotiating with us on North Korea and why do we have two military subs and a carrier group in the area?

Uh, first of all we have three carrier groups moving into the area.

Second, China negotiating with us <====================================> China agreeing to a preemptive strike on its nuclear powered ally.
  

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Because it's about a potential nuclear war, and a first-in-human history preemptive attack on a nuclear power. If one nuke is missed, what then? Under 'use it or lose it', Kim fires it into Seoul, a city of 24 million people, and millions could die. It's by far the most risky/dramatic event on your timeline. How glib people are about this is just as insane as anything coming out of North Korean propaganda.

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I'm not sure what this even means. Firstly it's arguable how good Trump has been at foreign policy. Second, that doesn't mean he can just snap his fingers and fix a foreign policy problem that has dogged presidents for decades just by starting a war. China agreed to halt coal imports from North Korea until the end of the year, but other kinds of trade continues, and fuel shipments appear to continue unabated. They haven't turned on North Korea by any means.

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I mean, if the US "acts" unilaterally (aka attacks a nuclear power) then somebody wanted it. Missiles don't just magically fly out of ships as accidents of nature.

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There's no indication North Korea has lost China-- and there is evidence that Russia is now patronizing North Korea as well. If anything, it has two patrons.

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Fair enough.

[GlobeSoc]

In Appalachia, are the historically Republican areas or the historically Democratic areas going to trend Dem faster?

Monongalia would obviously be one of the strongest Dem counties in WV, but I have no idea what anything else would do.

I guess the real question is which set of counties is poorer. If it's the downballot d southern WV, obviously it would be the region that puts cordray over the top. If it's the other region, we might see a very weird map from WV

[The_Doctor]

In Appalachia, are the historically Republican areas or the historically Democratic areas going to trend Dem faster?

Monongalia would obviously be one of the strongest Dem counties in WV, but I have no idea what anything else would do.

I guess the real question is which set of counties is poorer. If it's the downballot d southern WV, obviously it would be the region that puts cordray over the top. If it's the other region, we might see a very weird map from WV

Might be a mix between this



and



I'd assume the Appalachian border between Ohio and West Virginia would go blue, providing the key vote totals. Look at Joe Manchin's number's to see where the vote for the Democratic nominee in WV would come from. Whatever his 2018 numbers will be close to the same counties that Cordray wins in 2024. (Unless Manchin loses in a blowout).

Throughout Appalachia, a number of voters will switch from their GOP trends (that have been ongoing since 2000) and switch to the Democratic Party. This turns VA into an absolute beast with 60% of the vote going Democratic (I need to check Cordray's numbers in that state) because the Shenandoah Valley will go to Cordray adn coupled with North Virginia, it will make Virginia Titanium D. Further south, it would be a case by case basis. I expect as I said, coastal South Carolina to vote D while Interior South Carolina is still some shade of Republican. In MIssissippi, some white working class counties follow the Black Belt (as it's called) to form a majority. In Georgia, the vote runs through Atlanta and the suburbs plus some working class counties.

Appalachia is a historically Democratic stronghold. So the "Republican areas" that weren't Republican in 1996 will flip back. The Democratic areas that have survived to date will obviously still be strongly D. Any county Dole through Trump, however, will remain GOP.

[The_Doctor]

If the Democrats become the more hawkish interventionist Party, will this increase their vote share in the Deep South especially among southern whites? Historically the south is known for its very pro military attitude.

Yes - at the very least, in the border South.

The Democratic Party is slowly becoming the party of nationalism. The Russia scandal is energizing the Democratic Party's nationalism and Obama was a pretty pro-hawkish president. A lot of people mistook him for a dove but Obama authorized a ton of drone strikes, helped in the Gaddafi overthrow, almost went into Syria, and continued the war in Afghanistan. And of course, Obama struck a far more hawkish line on Russia and tightened sanctions around Iran. Obama also maintained Bush's national security apparatus including the secret spying and so on. All of Obama's actions are around the common theme of strengthening the United States' role as "First among Equals" and "Upholding the International Order." These are actions Republican Reagan and Bush would have endorsed.

One lasting result of the anger that the Democrats feel over Russia's interference is that the Party may shed its more accommodationist stature and start using warlike language in 2020 and beyond to confront what they deem as global threats to our internal security. See Emmanuel Macron's hard line towards Putin as a model.

Meanwhile, Trump is slowly embracing the policies of the minority coalition, which is to look askance at our global role. He wants to roll back sanctions on Russia, wants to end the Iran deal (which strengthens our hand), and wants to not intervene in Syria drastically. Trump sees a circumscribed role in global affairs and doesn't envision the United States leading the free world. This was a view very typical of minority Democrats from 1984 to 2008 and minority Republicans from 1948 to 1976. (Remember Taft Republicans?)

Trump is doing this in part because the populists in the GOP are more non-interventionist, since the neoconservative wing crashed and burned in 2008. The populists have the upper hand in the GOP and the neoconservative credibility is in tatters. (But notably: Democratic internationalist neoconservatism is NOT in tatters. It's their Republican brethren that have the credibility problem).  The populists are very wary of foreign entanglements because historically and today, they see the idea of shedding American blood for ungrateful foreigners as abhorrent and a waste of our treasure and blood. So Trump, by virtue of how he got to the Presidency and the GOP coalition running on the remaining solvent wing, is unable to really be a neoconservative President.

Remember how they all freaked when he bombed Syria? I saw a ton of populists angrily denounce him and I think that reminded Trump that he could not be a neoconservative President, even if he wanted to be. It's also one reason the Russia issue isn't damaging his base as much. They don't care what Russia does; in fact, they may even welcome a partnership with Putin to take out ISIS, viewing it as a shared endeavor where we're notably not the only one shedding blood. (Heck, they may even see Russian blood being spilled better than American blood).

So, the Republicans who are becoming less interventionist and globalist while the Democrats are moving towards assuming the traditional majoritarian role of "leader of the free world." Pacifist liberals are going to be very unhappy as the Democrats become more like the JFK muscular liberals and assert the United States pushing a dominant role on the global stage.

Politically, this will play well in areas of Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, North Carolina, and Virginia. I'm undecided on Tennessee and Alabama. I don't think the Party's newfound hawkishness will damage it in the Northeast, Northwest, or California. I think liberals, as a whole, are abandoning their 1980s and 1990s identity as a more pacifist ideology and are resuming their old Cold War  sensibilities. I would not be shocked to see a Democratic President in 2024 uttering the words "radical Islam" (while being more careful than Trump to respect Muslims; but that's the neoconservative in me talking maybe).

[The_Doctor]

You'll remember why the liberals were so spooked of international engagement. The memory of Vietnam and Iraq has kept the Left from being fully hawkish but I think Obama's presidency has expunged, to a great deal, that ghost and Russia's engagement in the 2016 election may push the Left towards a more hawkish identity.

The fear of failure by the United States abroad is more felt on the Right than the Left, which I personally find fascinating. The Left may be less fearful than the Right because they didn't shoulder the failures directly in Iraq and Vietnam was two generations ago. Obama's presidency provided a framework, in my mind, for Democratic hawks to push forward and aggressively promote American interests abroad, and maintain our hegemonic role. I think one thing is going to happen and that the United States will act as the head of a multilateral globalist coalition to advance the West's interests.

President Cordray certainly in this timeline does aggressively push the United States towards taking the lead on a number of initiatives. Hard to say whether he deploys military troops on a significant level but I definitely see Cordray not being unwilling to bomb a country or two to convey the American message while the Right screams.

[GlobeSoc]

You'll remember why the liberals were so spooked of international engagement. The memory of Vietnam and Iraq has kept the Left from being fully hawkish but I think Obama's presidency has expunged, to a great deal, that ghost and Russia's engagement in the 2016 election may push the Left towards a more hawkish identity.

The fear of failure by the United States abroad is more felt on the Right than the Left, which I personally find fascinating. The Left may be less fearful than the Right because they didn't shoulder the failures directly in Iraq and Vietnam was two generations ago. Obama's presidency provided a framework, in my mind, for Democratic hawks to push forward and aggressively promote American interests abroad, and maintain our hegemonic role. I think one thing is going to happen and that the United States will act as the head of a multilateral globalist coalition to advance the West's interests.

President Cordray certainly in this timeline does aggressively push the United States towards taking the lead on a number of initiatives. Hard to say whether he deploys military troops on a significant level but I definitely see Cordray not being unwilling to bomb a country or two to convey the American message while the Right screams.

Appears that the majority president disaster before the minority pre-alignment president has heightened suspicion against their foreign interventions. Maybe it's a result of the minority party being in a period where their strength is increasing and thus able to get popular support for their criticism (amplifying the unpopularity the majority-aligned president gets from the aging majority policy failing on its own) but before they take the national security mantle?

[The_Doctor]

You'll remember why the liberals were so spooked of international engagement. The memory of Vietnam and Iraq has kept the Left from being fully hawkish but I think Obama's presidency has expunged, to a great deal, that ghost and Russia's engagement in the 2016 election may push the Left towards a more hawkish identity.

The fear of failure by the United States abroad is more felt on the Right than the Left, which I personally find fascinating. The Left may be less fearful than the Right because they didn't shoulder the failures directly in Iraq and Vietnam was two generations ago. Obama's presidency provided a framework, in my mind, for Democratic hawks to push forward and aggressively promote American interests abroad, and maintain our hegemonic role. I think one thing is going to happen and that the United States will act as the head of a multilateral globalist coalition to advance the West's interests.

President Cordray certainly in this timeline does aggressively push the United States towards taking the lead on a number of initiatives. Hard to say whether he deploys military troops on a significant level but I definitely see Cordray not being unwilling to bomb a country or two to convey the American message while the Right screams.

Appears that the majority president disaster before the minority pre-alignment president has heightened suspicion against their foreign interventions. Maybe it's a result of the minority party being in a period where their strength is increasing and thus able to get popular support for their criticism (amplifying the unpopularity the majority-aligned president gets from the aging majority policy failing on its own) but before they take the national security mantle?

Can you simplify this and give me an example what you mean? I assume you're talking about World War I and the 1920s isolationism, for example?

[The_Doctor]

Notes: So, first an announcement about the remaining articles. I’ve decided that there are a firm cutoff of three or four more supplemental articles. This has been one of the most enjoyable hobbies I’ve engaged in a long time but I think this work should stand on its own legs and we’ll see if it portends the future or not. I feel like GRRM writing a book on the Seven Kingdoms and all the political and factional intrigue and by now, “Westeros” has become a very large sprawling empire that is increasingly hard to keep track of.

These articles will be a 1) campaign finance and voter ID article about where we go in the future under President Cordray 2) this prediction article 3) the economics article and 4) a 2036 or 2040 article about New York Republican Gov. Elise Stefanik’s successful bid to win the Presidency. I think all four articles are highly relevant and 5) a map of the Majority in 2023 with a quick primer.


Prediction Update Through May 2017

So, our current article. I’m not going to quantify the right stuff gotten or what I got wrong, I’ll just try to list them.

On domestic policy the Trump Administration has listed tax reform, healthcare reform, and infrastructure as the main three priorities. That was what I guessed. What I got wrong is that I expected tax reform to come first and a symbolic repeal of ObamaCare later. The White House tried a frontal assault on the ACA and is losing. If you count RyanCare as the AHCA (and in my defense it cuts Medicaid and has been called RyanCare) -- well I was broadly right. It narrowly passed the House on the second try and is set to die in the Senate. The administration plans to do tax reform and infrastructure reform next but I'll get back to that. I was right about a Supreme Court Justice passing (wrong on the name) and nearly nailed the margin. Infrastructure reform's been delayed and I thought it would be done by now but it's definitely the third part of the agenda. I was wrong that the wall would be part of the budget in April (largely, some riders were attached but it was largely clean and it doesn’t seem with illegal immigration dropping that Trump will substantially build a wall).

I was right on the inaugural them (“hardnosed speech about defending American interests at home and abroad”) and the abortion executive order, plus the repeal of Obama's last executive orders (if you consider the Senate overturning them; Trump chose to have Congress repeal them, not do it by executive order). The deportations were on target although I stupidly thought Trump would never do a Muslim ban, although I did say he would bar people from high risk areas (“implemented the ban on immigrants from "high risk" nations”).

On foreign policy, the President definitely has done what I expected and withdrawn American leadership from around the globe in accordance with a new isolationism fueled by his populist base. Notably, he has pulled from the Paris Accords, will rip up the Cuban deal, and largely (aside from a bombing run in February) not challenged Putin's plans for Assad's Syria. I expected him to not do much on challenging China's trade policies but he didn't even label them a currency manipulator (I expected him to, but he didn’t). He also has withdrawn from TPP and restarted NAFTA talks (which will conclude around October). I also got that he would stay in the Iran deal to not weaken the U.S. geopolitical hand in the Middle East. As far as negotiating with China on North Korea that's definitely ongoing. All of this is in keeping with his cultural conservative base and America First Rhetoric. This was the area I was most spot on.
 
One thing I am miserable at is foreign elections (0-3 so far). I've concluded that it simply isn't my expertise and I don't have the experience or the expertise to talk about it. It's like an astronomer trying to talk about American political realignments so I’m going to admit defeat and leave it alone. Each nation is complex with its own history and timeline. I’ll stick with American elections.

The Russian storm that was projected for 2019 seems to be happening in 2017 and that leads me to make two guesses on a change to the range of plausible outcomes prediction wise.

First, Trump went underwater in February and didn't focus on starting with tax reform (a winning traditional GOP issue). He hasn't racked up a major legislative win and I certainly didn't expect a special counsel. Given that Trump's incompetence and inexperience has been deeper than guessed (this was my biggest mistake plus thinking Russia wouldn't become a major issue until 2019) I think that warrants two major changes that doesn't alter the timeline's 2024 end date.

I now believe impeachment or resignation may come before the midterms but as a result two things will happen. 1) President Pence will not be the Republican nominee in 2024. He would be constitutionally ineligible. So Vice President Haley or whatever would be the inevitable loser. This has a precedent in which President James Buchanan didn't run for a second term in 1860 but a realignment happened anyway. 2) It will fall on President Pence to enact the tax cuts and major Republican agenda items that require the heavy lifting and political capital that President Trump has been unable to commit to.

I notice I didn’t really fill in much of what Pence did as President, and that’s because I assumed it would all be front loaded with Trump. But now, I’m starting to think Pence will be the one to sign the tax reform and maybe infrastructure package in law. We’ll see. I could be wrong but my sense is that Pence will be the one who shepherds the GOP agenda through, not Trump. He seems a more able uniter, but if Pence is implicated, it could be Ryan who does the uniting. We’ll see how far the scandal goes.

I do think if President Trump remains in power that the Congressional Republicans will sustain significant losses in 2018, given how hardened the opposition is and how unpopular he is. Of course, he could right himself and we could see the original timeline playing out.  

The crassest reason I believe Republican leaders force President Trump’s resignation is that essentially he is too weakened, politically incompetent, and damaged to lead the party and enact the party’s agenda. They will be concentrated by the 2018 and 2020 elections and worried he presents a mortal threat to the GOP (the Bush Presidency will be fresh in their minds). He creates daily media battles forcing GOPers to duck and cover or go out to defend whatever happened. I think this becomes the biggest reason Pence becomes President. GOP leaders have pretext and they have a way to remove President Trump. They want the calm and stability of a President Mike Pence. Allan Lichtman has made this argument and I agree.  

If the Democrats win either chamber (or crucially limit Senate losses) in 2018 the realignment is probably 2020. I believe strongly that the Democrats won't regain the White House without a realignment election. It feels like we’re in a transitory period so I don’t think the Democrats will regain power until the new Democratic coalition comes into being.

Since Trump lost the popular vote in 2016 that's a good hint that it will be 2020 or 2024. The incumbent party usually loses significant ground margin wise after two terms. It hasn't happened since the election of 1904 in fact. (And McKinley was a popular vote winner in 1896).

Why I don’t think it will be 2020: I just believe since President Obama left us a strong economy that realignment is still a better bet for 2024, not 2020. It will take time for Obama's reforms to be wound down and the debt crisis to reach its apogee.

Overall as far as my timeline goes I'm pretty happy about the veracity of my predictions and educated guesses about where we've ended up five months in (and why).

If you need sourcing, see page 1-2 of this timeline. Feel free to ask any questions. As you can tell, I enjoy this hobby a lot.