Between Two Majorities | The Cordray Administration

[The_Doctor]

Everyone take a look at 2008. Don't answer if I PM'd you the answer. But if Obama was a foreshadowing President what should've happened in 2008 but didn't happen? Trust me it's a traditional major factor in the run up to a realignment.

I'll throw up two articles on this issue but I think what I've concluded will be interesting. You'll want to read it.

A serious 3rd party bid?

I'm thinking it's this - considering 1912 and 1968.

Yup. And the reason why it didn't happen is definitely interesting; sort of the Holmesian "the dog that didn't bark." It's also going to answer a number of questions about this majority.

I have the first article written, but I'll post it tomorrow after editing. Or tonight.

[The_Doctor]

The Weakest Realignment of American History and Why: Part I

I would recommend you read this and this. It provides you important background to the story I’m about to tell.

First, hat tip to darklordoftech for providing the key clue that solved a number of nagging doubts I had.

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So, the election of 1848, 1912, and 1968 saw the victory of a second minority coalition presidency over the dominant coalition - and a strong third party. The crucial key noted in the clue is that the third parties provided part of the coalition to the later realignment (1860, 1932, and 1980). The anti-slavery Free Soilers (1), the Bull Moose populists, and the conservative Southern Democrats all became integral to the ascendant majority coalition in the realignment.

These third parties at that point in time are critical to the ascent of a new majority because they allow factions of the old majority to pass through the third party candidacy on the way to integrating into the new majority. This was their way of shedding their partisanship and adopting a new one. (This is essentially, J. Strom Thurmond’s career).

By that logic, the election of 2008 should have seen a major conservative third party candidacy (maybe Donald Trump as an independent, had he thought about it). The old GOP neoliberal neoconservative evangelical majority was on the point of collapse with a failed Iraq war and neoliberal policies (that leave a rank taste to this day). However, strangely, it didn’t happen. The popular vote for the two major parties totaled 98.46% - with Senator Barack Obama (D-Illinois) taking 52.86% and a ten million vote lead over Senator John McCain (R-Arizona). During the Obama years, the ACA and a number of other initiatives proved that he was the foreshadowing presidency to the Great Realignment.

What gives? It seems the transition from the Republican neoliberal evangelical majority to the emerging Democratic populist socially liberal majority had missed a key stage.

However, when you look at the Reagan - Bush majority, a number of details leap out that look bizarre in a typical realignment.

In the first place, the Reagan-Bush majority never assumed the huge Congressional majorities the three prior realignments had provided. The Federalists never won a majority after Jefferson’s presidency (or even came close to; the Democratic-Republicans and the Democrats held huge majorities, on balance). The Whigs won it only once in 1842. At the midpoint of the GOP majority in 1896, it was 210-124 Republican in the House and 46-32 in the Senate (282-153 and 59-41 in modern terms). In 1960, at the midway point, it was 262-175 Democratic in the House and 64-36 Democratic in the Senate. But at the midpoint between Reagan and the likely realignment, the GOP held a 221-212 House majority and a 51-50 Senate majority after the 2000 elections. Even after 2014, they held a 247-188 edge and a 54-46 edge. Very clearly, the Reaganite and Bush Republicans never were able to command a majority on the scale of their predecessors.
 
The second oddity. The House popular vote is lost for us in 1828 and 1896 but we have the House popular vote for 1960: 55.4% Democratic, 44.8% Republican. Given the seats won in 1896 and 1828 by the confirmation president, we can probably assume these coalitions won the popular vote by a significant margin. But in the current metric, the Democrats have lost the popular vote by more than 5 points only (counting only post-1994, when the Southern Democrats were tossed out) in 1994, 2010, and 2014. Every other election, the Democrats have been within 2-3 points or won the popular vote. This is highly at odds with prior majorities. Even Lincoln’s Republican majorities, who had a rough decade in the 1880s, commanded strong, impregnable majorities at times (particularly the election of 1872).  

An important postscript. To be clear, President Ronald Reagan counted among his partisans many Southern Democrats. We can test how many Democrats effectively counted themselves as part of the Reagan Republican-Southern Democratic majority during his tenure based on his 1981 budget and tax votes. A crucial procedural vote on the tax bill in 1981 served as a proxy to test Reagan’s Southern Democratic - GOP majority. Reagan prevailed 238-190 with 48 Democrats joining 190 Republicans. A budget vote served as another test. 63 Democratic Congress members joined the Republicans to pass the sweeping budget of 1981 253-176. So we can guess the Southern Democratic - Republican majority was at 239-254 in the House; which is weak by historical standards but stronger than anything the GOP has garnered for the most part after 2000.

The final aberration comes in the popular vote. In every Presidential election since 1992 the Democrats have won the popular vote every single time except 2004. Not since 1988 have the Republican Party been able to win the popular vote by more than 2.5% (and lost every popular vote except 2004). To make matters worse, the Democrats won the popular by significant margins twice in that era and won it by a comfortable margin the other two times. Historically, this isn’t supposed to happen. The Democratic-Republican majorities were so strong that James Monroe (for some unknown reason as the man was a nonentity) won re-election unopposed. The Lincoln GOP prevailed in the popular vote 6 times leading up to 1896 (with 4 to the Democrats, including two electoral college losses). The Roosevelt Democrats swamped the Republicans four times in a row and won the fourth election by 4 points. (Over the entire era, they won 5 landslides and two close victories; the Republicans three landslides and one close victory).

Registration, throughout this period, should have favored the Republican Party. In 1960, roughly half of all voters were Democrats. There are no registration data for the earlier eras, but it is strongly assumed that the majority coalition held more political partisans. (Almost certainly, the Democratic-Republican coalition held a majority of the country's registered voters, if there had been registration). In 1980, 45% of voters were Democrats, 29% independent, and 23% Republicans. By 2014, according to Pew, that number was 39% independent, 32% Democratic, and 23% Republican. Exit polling in 1980 showed that 43% of voters were Democratic, 28% Republican, and 23% independent. In 2016, Democrats made up 36% of the electorate, 33% Republican, and 31% independent. This wasn't the sign of a strong GOP majority coalition; it was the sign of a weak one.

These three aberration from the three prior majorities are important clues. So is the fourth clue: Ronald Reagan never assembled a partisan Republican majority and relied on Southern Democrats to form his governing coalition. It is no accident that Bill Clinton, a Democrat from Arkansas, blew apart that coalition by being from the South and may have indirectly forced the Republicans to convert to being a straight up partisan majority.  

[To be Continued]

[The_Doctor]

So why was there no third party challenge? The answer is this.

The Republican majority formed in 1980 was the first plurality, not majority, coalition in American history. Traditional majorities enjoy broad support (in 1960, half of all registered voters were Democrats; today the Republicans are roughly anywhere behind the Democrats by 3-4% or at parity). However, the Republican House alone won 43-47% of the vote in the 1980s and only grew to majority support in the 1990s. The Southern Democrats were essential to garnering a majority.  However, in the 1990s, as they garnered that southern support, the Pacific Coast and Northeast broke away, leaving the GOP in a very precarious position as George W. Bush became President(2). The GOP had vaulted from a 45% majority with carry-and-support from the Southern Democrats to being a very narrow 51% majority.

Now, the answer to why no 2008 third party challenger.

Third party challenges usually form after a long period of hegemonic dominance by one party. 1992, 1968, and 1948 were all after clear and hegemonic dominance by the reigning majority. 1912 came after sixteen years of GOP rule, including the blowout victories of 1904 and 1908. 1924 was after the decisive GOP victory of 1920 (and even then so, Coolidge won 54% of the vote). Only once has a major third party candidacy emerged after a string of close victories - that would be 1892, when the Populists won 8.5% of the vote, even as Grover Cleveland won re-election.  

The majority coalition had a wing to break away and still remain the majority, in essence. Even without the South, the 1969 Democratic Party could enjoy political power. After 1912, the Republicans may have been weakened but still enjoyed broad national support (as the string of GOP victories from 1920 to 1928 showed). Without opposition in the 1850s, the Democrats successfully elected two one term presidents. They could afford to see breakaways and still govern. The Reagan-Bush GOP majority does not have that wing to break away and still remain a stable majority party.

But, for the current majority: as a result of the weak standing in the majority coalition, the Republicans chose to polarize and to harden their partisans to avoid further weakening. They had lost the moderate Republicans in the 1990s and 2000s by losing the Pacific Northwest and New England, which were incompatible with the strengthened South - Interior West GOP core. So, Fox News and talk show radio was drafted in this endeavor. As a result of their hardened partisanship, polarization soared and in 2008, even as they faced certain destruction, Republicans did not break ranks. This is why there was no major third party candidacy in 2008 -- even though there SHOULD have been.

This also goes a long way to explain why Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell acted the way he did in 2009 to obstruct at all costs. It is plausible, in fact, that the GOP was indirectly guided by this weakness and unknowingly acted to reinforce it. But in the act they invited even further pushback against the opposition gravitational forces arrayed against them. Given the kind of majority they had, they probably were locked into the strategy they chose.

This likely means the realignment will continue on pace but it may unfold in an unusual fashion, akin to 1980 on a bigger scale. That year, John Anderson won 6.5% of the vote which later voted for Ronald Reagan in 1984. The realigning Democratic Presidency is very likely to win power with 51-53% of the vote but the Republican vote would be between 35 and 40% of the vote and a third party conservative challenger (say, John Kasich, for argument’s sake) would take up 9-12% of the vote. However, four years later, the Democrats may expand their majorities by winning the Kasich voters in an accelerated timetable and the completion is seen eight years later after the realignment with the successful election of the Democratic Vice President. So, for example, Rich Cordray could win 52% of the vote in 2024 with 35% for the GOP nominee and 11% remainder to Kasich and 1% to assorted third parties, but win 58% of the vote against 40% for the GOP nominee in 2028; with Vice President Castro cementing the gains in 2032 with a solid 53-45% win.

There is also an outside chance of a rare short third term minority presidency but I’m skeptical of this because I think the Democrats are much more coherent and stable than the rapidly fragmenting Republican coalition (which is warring under Trump and the wars do not seem likely to calm after his departure).  

Now, the biggest question is: how did the GOP majority coalition start out so weak? And we’ll cover that next time.

--------------------------
1. A fun note: the Free Soilers won 26% of the vote in New York, their best major state showing outside Massachusetts. Twelve years later, it would be the deciding state that put GOP Presidential nominee Abraham Lincoln in the White House. Had you combined the Free Soilers and the Whig vote, the Midwest turns from Democrat Cass to Whig Taylor while the Northeast becomes a literal Whig fortress. This wound up the heart of the 1860-1932 GOP coalition. Republican Lincoln won a majority of the vote in every Midwestern state outside Kentucky and Missouri in both 1860 and 1864. Zachary Taylor’s showing in the South probably attributes to him being a Louisianan slaveholder, which, obviously, Lincoln was not.

2.  President Bush became the first Republican to fail to carry California and Illinois and upper New England while winning the White House twice. During his tenure, these states became increasingly Democratic on the state and federal level.

[GlobeSoc]

...thanks Tip O'Neil.

[The_Doctor]

The Weakest Realignment of American History and Why: Part II

This article is going to be a broad, short, and to the point; I haven’t read Perlstein’s trilogy in full so I may end up revising this article very heavily. As a consequence, it’s not as detailed as the first article in this segment. Nevertheless, having demonstrated that the Reagan coalition is several orders weaker than the prior realigning coalitions, it’s probably a good idea to explore why. And I don’t think you people want to wait like 5 months while I finish the trilogy.

So: the working theory I have right now is that the inability to overturn, significantly alter, or adequately replace the New Deal, the Great Society, and the administrative state has seriously weakened the Republican Party’s ability to govern as a true comprehensive majority party.

History time. The Southern Democratic - GOP minority of 1938 formed to resist the expansion of the New Deal, and in the 1950s, the National Review magazine resisted Eisenhower accommodationist conservatism, grumbling about how much Eisenhower was not only cementing but expanding the New Deal. Senator Barry Goldwater’s doomed 1964 bid was built on arguing against the modern welfare state. In 1976, Ronald Reagan called Social Security a Ponzi scheme and lost the Florida Republican Party for his troubles. And of course, every Republican agitated against Medicare between 1961 and 1965.

Having finished the first 100 pages of the Perlstein trilogy on the 1980 - present day realignment, I will add that many of the figures that propped up Goldwater had an extremely strong aversion to the New Deal, unlike the Tories of the 1950s. Clarence Manion, William Buckley, and Barry Goldwater all decried the New Deal among others; and the most powerful opponents of the New Deal and labor were small businesses and manufacturing interests.

So,  very clearly, there is an ideological history of resentment against the New Deal, the Great Society, and the progressive era and labor unions. The lodestar of the GOP is Calvin Coolidge, not Teddy Roosevelt. After all, William Taft and his ideological heirs won the fight of 1912 and set the GOP on a more conservative path. Up to 1952, Republicans were fighting to roll back the New Deal and there is significant evidence that they never wanted to give up.

The election of 1980 enacted an uneasy compromise. The Republican majority coalition was built on the backs of blue collar white voters who had switched their allegiances and populist Southerners who had revered Franklin Roosevelt. In short, the GOP would include the poorest region in the United States and link itself with populist voters, who were not naturally disposed to hate the New Deal. The binding social conservative + tax cuts + some budget cuts glue held together the GOP coalition for the next couple of decades. The safety net for these Republican voters would not be touched (but it was OK to cut benefits like welfare for Democratic minorities). Reagan lived up to his word in 1983 with a bipartisan proposal to protect Social Security.

However, Republicans don’t ever seem to have quite given up the dream. In 1994, the Gingrich Congress sought to end welfare as they knew it (winning bipartisan support from President Bill Clinton). Governor George W. Bush (R-Texas) campaigned on allowing people to invest a portion of their Social Security benefits into the private market (which spectacularly blew up in his face politically in 2005). In 2011, Rep. Paul Ryan (later the 2012 Vice Presidential nominee and Speaker) pushed for reform to Medicare. In 2017, despite Trump’s pledge to not touch Medicare and Medicaid, the Republicans are attempting to roll back the Medicaid expansion.
 
Clearly, voters don’t like this and as a result don’t have the trust in the GOP that they did in prior political majorities. Consistently, voters have backed Social Security, Medicaid, and elements of the welfare state (outside TANF). They have acted consistently to punish Republicans when they thought Republicans were hurting these programs.  However, Republicans seem to have found an existential crisis here. The “starving the beast” refers to slowly killing the welfare state by lowering tax receipts in order to provide less funds to the state.

Voters don’t really agree with this. Including Republican voters. Here’s an example. (Thanks TT.)  



As you can see obviously, working class Republicans prioritize their benefits over ideological goals of budget deficit reduction. However, ideologically motivated Republican leaders and activists have long sought the destruction of the administrative state and the erasure of the Progressive era as a holy grail.

More to the point, 55 million Americans are on Medicare. 73 million Americans are on Medicaid. 60 million Americans are on Social Security.  Needless to say, the constituencies behind these programs are extraordinarily powerful. Roughly 10 million Americans are receiving subsidies to pay for healthcare. These constituencies cut across a broad swath of demographics and have done so since their inception. In the process, they have probably weakened a political coalition from being much stronger than they would have been otherwise.  

Republicans never comfortably became “Tories” as in embracing their European counterparts’ comfort with the welfare state across the continent. Their resistance to universal health care dates to 1949. The intrinsic opposition to socialism in the American conservative mind has probably created this radical opposition.  

The public routinely checked the GOP majority since 1980 by propping up enough Democrats to resist the GOP. When George W. Bush tried to reform Social Security in 2005, Democrats were backed by the public and won a decisive victory (and began the process of cracking Bush’s support). Governor Romney in 2012 was pilloried for supporting RyanCare. Today, the AHCA has the support of 17% of Americans, with the opposition of a majority of the voters. Voters are telling pollsters this is an issue that rates higher than the Russian investigation, and other issues.

On the issues of the day, the public routinely backs the more liberal option than the conservative option. That has only intensified in recent decades (gay marriage, the death penalty, among other issues).  That has also helped weaken the GOP’s ideological majority and probably kept it from attaining far more seats than they have otherwise.

Ultimately, it appears that the strength of the welfare and administrative state - and the Republican Party’s ideological opposition to it - have caused the GOP to be weaker than imagined when becoming a majority coalition. And coupled with the public’s liberal ideology on balance, the GOP finds themselves in a weak majority coalition with limited public backing.

I'll take questions and theories and ideas now.

EDIT: Added "or adequately replace" the New Deal and Great Society, June 19, 2017.

[GlobeSoc]

If the Republican coalition is very weak because the public is more comfortable with social programs and liberal in general than the GOP wants them to be and acts like they are, wouldn't that mean that the coming Democratic majority will be the strongest coalition in US history, at least in the first half?

[The_Doctor]

If the Republican coalition is very weak because the public is more comfortable with social programs and liberal in general than the GOP wants them to be and acts like they are, wouldn't that mean that the coming Democratic majority will be the strongest coalition in US history, at least in the first half?

Not known at this point. Could be a weak Democratic coalition, if I've gotten my analysis wrong on the why. Could be extremely strong. Nobody really knows what the next Democratic majority will look like and why. We've seen a number of precedents destroyed on this realignment, so it's hard to guess.

In theory yes ... but we don't know for sure. I'm venturing an educated guess on why the Reagan realignment was so weak.

Maybe part of the reason why the Reagan realignment was so weak was because it came too soon.
Jefferson--->Lincoln was 60 years.
Lincoln--->Roosevelt was 72 years.
Roosevelt--->Reagan was only 48 years.

I actually would point out the Roosevelt coalition lasted 48 years but was extremely strong. Technology might be speeding up realignments as news cycles become faster and information time lags are less and less. In other words, the next Democratic realignment is unlikely to be 60 years, but could be as short as 40 years, presaging a Republican realignment in 2056-2072 but that's kind of bonkers to guess on that.

[The_Doctor]

OK, I'm going to stop these articles because I really need to bang out this economic article, which is the final piece of the realignment supplementals and I want to finish the Perlstein trilogy. (So far, the trilogy is confirming what I knew from other books).

[ShadowRocket]

Were you still planning on writing the article on Elise Stefanik's election as the first Republican President post-Cordray that you mentioned earlier, TD?

[Burke Bro]

Although I'm new, I've been keeping up with your TL for awhile. I really like what you've done. All the events seem incredibly plausible.

[Cashew]

I'm curious, how different do you think your outlook would have been if we had a narrow Clinton victory? Or a weak Clinton landslide, winning Arizona and Georgia?

[The_Doctor]

OK, I'm going to stop these articles because I really need to bang out this economic article, which is the final piece of the realignment supplementals and I want to finish the Perlstein trilogy. (So far, the trilogy is confirming what I knew from other books).

Cool

What role (if any) does Sherrod Brown play in this timeline from 2020-2024 and onwards?

Al Smith.

I'm curious, how different do you think your outlook would have been if we had a narrow Clinton victory? A weak Clinton landslide, winning Arizona and Georgia?

Defeat in 2020, realignment in 2024 or 2028.

Were you still planning on writing the article on Elise Stefanik's election as the first Republican President post-Cordray that you mentioned earlier, TD?

Maybe sometime in the fall.

Although I'm new, I've been keeping up with your TL for awhile. I really like what you've done. All the events seem incredibly plausible.

Thank you and welcome to Atlas.

[The_Doctor]

So something else that's bothering me. Take a look at the House elections of 1848 and 1860; 1912 and 1932; 1968 and 1980. For some reason the majority coalition matches in both the foreshadowing and realigning election. The popular vote and House majority in 1968 to 1980 are eerie.

Use the link here and change the year at the end in the url.

For the life of me I don't understand why the realignment appears briefly in the House totals but not the White House. The third party candidates have their voters voting for the realigning party down-ballot but they aren't doing it up ballot. And I don't understand why.

I'm gonna study these four elections more and figure out why. I'll try to get the popular vote for the House in these years and also examine the election of 1848 [Whig Zachary Taylor was the second minority coalition presidency -- his vice president Millard Fillmore, ran for president as a third party candidate in 1856].

A friend says that the sample size is too small and that's a plausible answer. The question is is that the answer? Or is it something more than coincidence?

Anyone have thoughts? Is the theory crazy?

[The_Doctor]

^ Wish I could find an answer to your question but I'm stumped for answers.

Could you see Pence replicating the Trump coalition but not being able to narrow the gap enough with Hispanics and Asians to where he narrowly loses the popular vote but wins the EC in 2020?

How do you think that'll affect his presidency in your timeline? Do you think Cordray makes any attempt to change the EC or does 2024-onwards present such an innate advantage for the Dems in the EC that they'll just forego reform entirely?

1. I think Pence ekes out an Electoral College and popular vote victory, although I'm now thinking that it will not be on his own strength but Kasich mopping up third party votes from both sides, allowing Pence to rely on his base to take the White House for a full term of his own. (I'll be revising the 2020 stories and totals). Kasich could serve as the breakup vehicle of the Republican Party and if he runs but Pence wins, these morass of voters could shift to the Democratic Party in 2024.

2. It's really a tossup on the Electoral College. I have no clue what President Cordray would do on the Electoral College. A popular vote loss but EC win would definitely fuel the flames to where the EC is going to go through severe reform. The EC might go, or it might stay, it all depends on what Democrats wake up in 2025 and how they feel with their majorities.

[The_Doctor]

Friendly reminder that this, written December 2016, is now an active objective for the Republican Party. In this timeline, the law is set to take place in 2018, if memory serves. I'm speaking of the Kobach "election integrity" commission.

As for race in America? It continued to be a violent, messy, and thorny issue. Republicans in the states continued to expand "voter ID" requirements and to cut early voting hours in a bid to limit minority voters. The Trump Administration joined them in a national voter ID law and in a bid to force the states to adopt the restrictive laws that would help the Republican advantage. But in the end, these laws amounted to a flimsy gate against the dam of destiny.

I'm also especially proud of the RyanCare article on page 1 of this timeline.  We'll see what happens though on that front. But I like that the dynamics were captured accurately as far as passing a major entitlement reform law went.

[The_Doctor]

We now have a Table of Contents thanks to NJ is Better than TX. Thank you to him! I've updated the first page with full credit to him.

[Unapologetic Chinaperson]

We now have a Table of Contents thanks to NJ is Better than TX. Thank you to him! I've updated the first page with full credit to him.

You're welcome.

[ShadowRocket]

OK, I'm going to stop these articles because I really need to bang out this economic article, which is the final piece of the realignment supplementals and I want to finish the Perlstein trilogy. (So far, the trilogy is confirming what I knew from other books).

Cool

What role (if any) does Sherrod Brown play in this timeline from 2020-2024 and onwards?

Al Smith.

I'm curious, how different do you think your outlook would have been if we had a narrow Clinton victory? A weak Clinton landslide, winning Arizona and Georgia?

Defeat in 2020, realignment in 2024 or 2028.

Were you still planning on writing the article on Elise Stefanik's election as the first Republican President post-Cordray that you mentioned earlier, TD?

Maybe sometime in the fall.

Although I'm new, I've been keeping up with your TL for awhile. I really like what you've done. All the events seem incredibly plausible.

Thank you and welcome to Atlas.

Great. I look forward to reading it.

Something else I wanted to ask you was does Julian Castro do anything of note between now and 2024 that makes Cordray pick him as VP in your timeline? Having been just a mayor and cabinet secretary thus far, he struck me as an odd choice.

[The_Doctor]

I picked him mainly to represent the emerging power of the Latino coalition and the integral nature of the Sunbelt to the Democratic Party. Traditionally, realigning tickets tend to have one or both members from the rising majority's geographic dominance. (Reagan - Bush, Lincoln - Hamlin,  Roosevelt - Gardner, Jefferson - Burr). The Midwest is not necessarily going to remain a Democratic stronghold. There is an even odds it could emulate Reagan's California and Pacific Coast and become Republican after the Cordray Administration.

It could be easily Kamala Harris but it will be someone from that region or the South.

Castro seemed a rising star in the Democratic Party's growing Sunbelt - South geography and spoke to the increasing power of Latinos within the Democratic Party so I thought it was a natural fit.

EDIT: Ah, I didn't make him a statewide officer. Whatever lol. I had originally planned him to make him a governor or Senator but I screwed up the planning. You get the idea. If Donald Trump can be president ...

[ShadowRocket]

I picked him mainly to represent the emerging power of the Latino coalition and the integral nature of the Sunbelt to the Democratic Party. Traditionally, realigning tickets tend to have one or both members from the rising majority's geographic dominance. (Reagan - Bush, Lincoln - Hamlin,  Roosevelt - Gardner, Jefferson - Burr). The Midwest is not necessarily going to remain a Democratic stronghold. There is an even odds it could emulate Reagan's California and Pacific Coast and become Republican after the Cordray Administration.

It could be easily Kamala Harris but it will be someone from that region or the South.

Castro seemed a rising star in the Democratic Party's growing Sunbelt - South geography and spoke to the increasing power of Latinos within the Democratic Party so I thought it was a natural fit.

EDIT: Ah, I didn't make him a statewide officer. Whatever lol. I had originally planned him to make him a governor or Senator but I screwed up the planning. You get the idea. If Donald Trump can be president ...

That makes sense. I figured that being a governor, Cordray would be more likely to go with a sitting Representative or Senator with a familiarity with foreign policy and/or national security to balance the ticket in regards to experience. Like Kamala Harris as you mentioned or the other Castro brother Joaquin.

[The_Doctor]

#TwoPaths: The Republican Populist Third Party Candidacy
 
I’ve decided to not alter this timeline regarding John Kasich’s likely third party candidacy (or a Republican populist independent candidacy). I should have incorporated it into the timeline but in hindsight, I’m glad I didn’t. One reason is that I cannot decide between 2020 and 2024. I’ll explain why in a bit. In lieu of rewriting the timeline, I’m going to write a supplemental arguing that a Republican will launch a significant third party bid in 2020 or 2024. How that plays out will factor into the Democratic Party’s eventual realignment.
 
For a variety of reasons, I think that the third party candidacy will resemble Ross Perot’s 1992 bid. J. Ross Perot ran for President despite being a Reagan Republican in the 1980s on a nationalist economic agenda that called for opposition to NAFTA and balancing the budget. A lot of Perot voters had been Reagan - Bush voters, but shifted towards Perot in 1992 and 1996. Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton picked up some of these voters in his 1996 re-election and Texas Governor George W. Bush won them over in 2000 on his compassionate conservative platform. In sum, Perot introduced a - dare we say, Kasichian - strain of conservatism in the 1990s that played out well and defined the Democratic Party. I think history is due for a repeat.
 
Likewise, as the Republican Party’s civil war intensifies, Governor Kasich has played up the #TwoPaths theme that has dominated his political discourse since Donald Trump became President. In fact, as Donald Trump fails to enact his agenda that his base voted for, Kasich could easily step into the opening and couple it with his moderate conservatism. It would be a good fit for an Ohio Governor who has experience in playing to blue collar voters and has emerged as a bipartisan moderate figure. He also, famously, was the House Budget Chairman when the budget was balanced in the 1990s.
 
The Republican Party’s establishment is probably at the weakest point since 1964, when Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) launched a successful insurgency to win the nomination. For a dominant majority, it is at the weakest point since President William Howard Taft (R-Ohio)’s 1912 re-election bid. The alt-right grassroots, the moneyed political establishment, and the swing moderates all hold the keys to the GOP majority but increasingly are at loggerheads and locked in a civil war.
 
The alt-right holds the grassroots and the White House. However, they don’t have a majority of the Party and have reluctant buy in from the other wings of the Party. Without a serious ideological framework or path, or strategic direction, they are unable to really execute a takeover of the Party. With President Trump’s 46% and significant popular vote loss, they are not in a position to claim serious legitimacy. The GOP establishment has been crippled by President Trump’s insurgency nomination and later election, but they retain the party’s donors and political class, thus retaining influence. The moderates hold the keys to the Republican Party being a 50% party instead of a 40% party. Given their wars with each other, it seems increasingly improbable that the Party can be unified behind a common agenda. President Trump’s chaotic tenure is also threatening any unity that was possible after the 2016 election. In fact, the President is demonstrating that he is the weakest Party leader in the White House since Jimmy Carter in the 1970s.
 
The tea party launched the Republican Party’s internecine warfare (and arguably, the Tea Party existed because of the lack of a strong conservative third party candidacy in 2008 to “let off the steam”). Donald Trump’s takeover of the Party did nothing to end the civil war, as many Republicans refused to endorse him.  I think it’s clear that since 2010, the GOP is undergoing a long civil war that will come to mark the end of its majority. Had Trump won a clear popular vote victory, I might have said the Tea Party successfully recreated the 1896 and 1960 election, where they would lead the second segment of the Reagan realignment, but at this point, I am more convinced that President Trump represents the first failed Presidency.  (It’s worth noting the GOP civil war of 1992 mirrors closely the current GOP civil war, except the Buchananites have gained more this time around).
 
So with that said, let’s sketch out 2020 and 2024. Both have the same outcomes but the coalition assembled by Kasich (let us say for simplicity’s sake, he’s the 2024 third party candidate as well). 
 
In 2020, in this timeline, Vice President Mike Pence is the incumbent Republican in the White House.  As we’ve said in this timeline, he has acted both Trumpian and establishmentarian, meaning that he is unlikely to placate everyone given the hostility the wings have to each other. It’s likely that Governor John Kasich could use this moment to launch a bid against the President, to strengthen the moderates and the pragmatic Perotian Republican ideology that prevailed in the 1990s. Governor Kasich has expressed deep dismay for how the GOP has governed and could utilize the disunity to campaign as such. He would pick up a lot of GOP votes and possibly Democratic votes. Nevertheless, it’s difficult to see the Republican coalition breaking up in 2020 absent a major crisis, so it could literally be the rerun of 1924, where President Coolidge won re-election but Robert LaFollette won 16%. This would lead to this outcome:
 
Michael Pence/Nikki Haley (Republican) - 65,257,064 - 46.44% - 328 - WINNER
Sherrod Brown (Democratic) - 62,769,876  - 44.67% - 209
John Kasich/Evan McMullin (Independent) - 10,932,385  - 7.78%
Independents - 1,559,762 - 1.11%
 
Totals:  140,519,087  | 1.77% margin
 
The Kasich coalition would be disaffected mainstream Republicans, some economic populists who might be disappointed in how the Trump-Pence ticket didn’t deliver on their populist agenda, and some upscale voters who voted for Romney-Clinton but were disgusted by the GOP. They may even include a good deal of voters who were Obama-Trump in the Midwest, in search of a candidate who would shake up the system. This eclectic mix could easily transition in 2024 to becoming part of the Cordray coalition as the crisis deepened and they evaluated their options. One reason I am hesitant to say that 2020 will feature this and the transition would be easy is that for one, prior such major third party candidacies voted for the realigning party downballot, but if Pence won re-election he would be maintaining GOP Congressional majorities. In any case, I’m uncertain so I can’t make a prediction.
 
I’m not clear that Governor Kasich would cause President Pence’s defeat either, for one reason. President George H.W. Bush lost because of the economic downturn, not because of Ross Perot. He also lost, tangentially, because the Republicans had held the White House since 1980. Likewise, if the economy was on stable ground, President Pence would win re-election, although without a clear majority. I’m simply not seeing the crisis come that fast by 2020 that would bring down Mike Pence.
 
The other intriguing thing about 2020 under this framework is that President Pence would be able to rely on the Republican base to deliver 44-45% of the vote, picking up some #NeverTrump voters, and would reinforce the narrative that the Republican Party is a weak majority coalition unable to establish a majority on its own. In essence, Kasich would play enabler to President Pence by allowing him to have an easier time to reach victory by needing a smaller pool of voters in a stable economy. We have to see if this is actually what will happen or if Pence will be forced to reach a much higher 48-49% of the vote to claim the 328 electoral votes I expect him to.
 
Were Kasich to launch a bid in 2024, amidst the realignment crisis, it would also be logical in a sense. The GOP crackup would be fully underway and the President would be in an extremely weak position. A segment of the Republican Party would be disillusioned (the aforementioned Kasich voters of 2020, basically) and ready to flock to the third party candidacy. A crucial distinction from 2020 is that they would probably, most likely, vote Democratic downballot but vote for Governor Kasich.  It would make sense as the GOP finally broke apart that a Republican third party would be able to mop up a significant amount of votes and per realignment theory, this segment of the electorate would go to the Democrats in 2028 as they completed their transition. (Of course, it should be said, while I don’t endorse this, Kasich could play a 2024 esq role in 2020 if the crisis came earlier).
 
In either scenario, what is happening is that there is a transition that ends the GOP’s majority and transforms the Democratic Party into a majority coalition. That has been a necessary precondition in the past three realignments. With the current populist mood, and given the role Perot played in 1992, it’s easily seen that President Cordray would reprise President Clinton’s triangulation - this time towards the Left and cementing the Kasich - Cordray coalition into one grand Democratic coalition that was a majority coalition, instead of a minority one.
 
So the results would be something on the order of:
 
Richard Cordray/Julian Castro (Democratic): 72,856,418 - 50.19% - 478 -- WINNER 
Michael Pence/Nikki Haley (Republican): 56,830,619 - 39.15% - 60
John Kasich/Evan McMullin (Independent): 13,862,897 - 9.55%
Others: 1,611,290 - 1.11%
 
Totals: 145,161,224 | 11.04%

[The_Doctor]

The re-election would be basically the Kasich + Cordray voters, while the GOP slipped to something like 37%. (So 61-38% Cordray which this timeline also says will happen).
 
One thing that is overlooked is that about 7 million voters voted for both Presidents Obama and Trump. They are clearly politically alienated and deeply angry at Washington’s inefficiency. They are not explicitly racist (having voted for a black man)  but may hold semi-culturally conservative viewpoints. They might be a natural constituency to a Kasich candidacy that plays upon their anger at Washington’s dysfunction. 7 million out of a possible 140 million is not nothing. That’s 5% of the electorate, and if doubled, is 10%. Clearly, this group of voters are the group that is willing to realign and the winning party that cements this group’s loyalty might be the realigning party. I should add that since Obama won clear majorities, both times, while President Trump won 46%, this group might even lean a little to the Democratic Party.
 
I’ve said, consistently, that white working class populist Republicans are crucial to the emerging Democratic majority. Midwestern white working class Democrats who voted for Trump, or, working class white voters in the South who might vote Democratic on the local but not federal level - and may not be rich enough to vote Republican on economic grounds. Think West Virginians who have retained a Democratic Governor in 2016 but voted for a GOP Legislature (and in the same breath, re-elected Sen. Joe Manchin in 2012). While upscale voters are also going to come along for the ride, they are far more likely to be temporary transients that return to the Republican Party, post crisis. Think of the Rockefeller Republicans that abandoned the Republicans in 1992 for the Democrats after sticking with Reagan post-realignment.  So, places like Georgia’s Sixth would temporarily be Democratic, but as the Republican Party realigns itself to be a technocratic party, that type of place returns to the GOP. But these are also areas John Kasich could do well in.
 
With independents growing, it’s not unreasonable to imagine a Presidential election where John Kasich plays a strong third party role. I just can’t decide because 2020 and 2024 are equally viable candidates and the political situation is in flux enough that it could happen either year. I’m fairly confident in that it will happen on some level; Evan McMullin’s 2016 bid is a harbinger of that, but I just can’t tell when. (McMullin won 500,000 votes in his little funded bid that focused on Utah; and a lot of Republicans did write in votes).
 
So, this timeline is officially predicting a major Republican populist third party candidacy in 2020 or 2024. I am also saying that this candidacy - if it happens - will be the vehicle for a segment of Republican voters to become Democratic voters, akin to the Northern Free Soilers of 1848, the progressive Republicans of 1912, and the Southern Democrats of 1968. It may not preclude a realignment on its own but it could aid one.

[The_Doctor]

The irony, when I wrote this, I was designing it to make the Republicans happy the first half of the series then the second half much more friendly to the Democrats (since I figured, that way, both sides would take away stuff they liked). The Walker timeline is very Republican-leaning in language and closely predicts the Trump win in a lot of ways. There were a lot of things in the timeline(s) for both sides to appreciate.

For instance, Republicans should be heartened that the immigration stuff remains into the Cordray era and obviously, Walker/Trump won and Clinton lost. There's a lot of GOP legislation and stuff done between 2017 and 2021.

Meh.

I could've written it better. But welcome to Atlas!

[The_Doctor]

How much does Pence preach his religiosity in 2020? You mentioned that the strategy was to go for a 2000/2004 compassionate conservative angle in 2020. They wanted to humanize the candidate as a way of reaching out to more minority voters.

Does Pence's religiosity play a role at all? Because Donald Trump virtually never mentioned religion on the campaign trail (something I hadn't realized until I heard him mention God in his inaugural address).

Yes. Pence's religiosity is designed to cover up for the harder edged parts of Pence's ideology and is designed to present a studied contrast to Trump's agnostic and realist behavior that tends to be less moralistic and far more transactional and pugilistic. so, i imagine President Pence would use his faith to bind together the Republican coalitions behind him and to paper over divisions.

Think Coolidge in 1924 after Harding's presidency was more or less judged a disaster.

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I'd like to ask, apologies if it has been posted already, but what were the results of the 2018 IL Governor's race in this timeline?