Between Two Majorities | The Cordray Administration

[GlobeSoc]

State of the World: 2017 to late 2018

September 2018 - (London, United Kingdom) On the world stage, the Trump Administration was neither as risky as its detractors bet or as far reaching as the supporters hoped. Like the President himself, it was a cautious blend of soft power and strategic retreat. If there was one area where Donald Trump refused to risk things, it was foreign policy. A serious miscalculation could plunge the United States into war and risk the Administration looking foolish at a time where it couldn't afford to.

The President had been rather clear on his foreign policy inclinations. He looked askance at the Muslim world, praised Russia's Putin, and raised concerns about global treaties of almost any kind. The Trump foreign policy was a throwback, in a sense, to the Harding-Coolidge isolationist years, where the United States was limited in engagement and fearful of powerful enemies around it.

The muscular foreign policy of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush was gone, replaced by a more cautious United States. The memories of Iraq had cut deep into the Republicans and their hesitance stemmed from a fear that a quagmire could sink their political fortunes. In a real sense, the Republicans had gone from being a muscular party willing to challenge those who would question America to being a more hesitant, risk averse party, on the global stage.

When the President took power, he labeled China a currency manipulator. But beyond advancing President Obama's Asian pivot and positioning more naval assets in the Pacific Ocean, the President chose not to rattle the Chinese dragon too much. The reason was simple. The Republican business backers of the President didn't want to risk their investments in Beijing and risk a trade war that could wipe out precious gains being made. In that context, the President was very limited in what he could do without huge blowback.

The President also angrily rattled the saber at Iran. He threatened to rip up the treaty, but in the end, quietly abided by it. The reason? The instability in the region would have been too much for the new Administration and the strategic advantages afforded by Iran being in compliance was too strong. Additionally, neither France, Russia, or China seemed eager to resume sanctions. Facing a losing battle, the White House stuck by the deal. There was no real point in pushing Netanyahu's wars. 

Syria became a vassal state of Russia, as President Bashir Assad held onto power. He owed his power to Vladimir Putin's strategic maneuvers. The United States had no appetite for joining in the civil war or even aiding the rebels, and the President preferred to focus on ISIS. So in that calculus, Bashir Assad was allowed to retain power, in return for the Syrian regime's promising to focus on ISIS. The Trump Administration allowed this to happen, given that the White House did not want to handle a civil war.

As far as Russia went, given Europe's appetite for Russian business, and the White House's overt friendliness, the President sought to repair relations with America's erstwhile rival. By no means did the United States "submit" to Moscow, but the Obama era hostility was gone. The President's focus - as stated in the campaign - was fighting ISIS and "radical Islam."

To that end, the United States and Russia cooperated on a series of bombing runs and drone strikes around the Middle East. Most notably, the President struck at ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria, in a bid to destroy the emerging caliphate.

As far as Crimea went, it existed in a grey area. The United States neither recognized nor disavowed Russia's territorial conquest. The American interests. Sanctions on Russia were quietly lifted in return for the Russian help on ISIS and terrorism. Europe, as tied to Russia in business as it was, went along with this Faustian bargain.""

Of course, Vladimir Putin remained in power in Russia. Russia had become an autocratic state, ruled by Putin and his cronies. They were at a political relevance not seen since the dying days of the Cold War. Washington was more friendly to them and so was London and Brussels. Putin's party remained with 80% of the seats in the Duma.

Turkey remained a statist dictatorship. "Sultan" Recep Tayyip Erdogan ruled the nation with an iron fist, relying on radicalized Muslims and nationalist Turks as a power base. A purge of anti-Erdogan forces was undertaken and the nation increasingly turned from a peaceful democracy to an armed autocracy. The European Union, alarmed at this and dealing with its own rising Islamophobia, refused to allow Turkey to join the European Union.

The Paris Accords were ripped up, given the President's personal inclinations on global warming ("A hoax by the Chinese!"). Democrats howled, the world was aghast, but in the end, the rest of the world patched up and decided to go on with global warming talks and negotiations without involving the United States.

Meanwhile, the crackup of the United Kingdom continued apace. Scotland and North Ireland pushed for independence referendums, as the May Government struggled to deliver on Cameron's promises of devolution. Experts expected Scotland to succeed this time, given the impact of Brexit. The May Government hoped to delay any such referendum but it increasingly looked like Scotland would walk out. Brexit was finalized in March 2017, with the British people retaining a few EU rights, but ceding much of their abilities to participate within the EU.

In France, Marie LePen eked out a 51-49% second round victory over Francois Fillon for the Presidency of France. The alt-right's spread through the Western world - on the backs of an increasingly fearful European population -  continued apace. The Trump Administration hailed LePen's victory as a great one for "sovereignty." Brussels grimaced and bemoaned, but the European Union, increasingly powerless was unable to stop the nationalistic fever.

As 2019 approached, the world remained a dark place, fevered by nationalistic politicians. The rosy post-Cold War World of 1995 that had looked so optimistic now looked increasingly fragile and dangerous, as Great Powers vied to be the helm on the wheel. Russia was aggressive, Europe accommodating, and the United States withdrawing (except to strategically combat radical Islam).

Finally, at home, the United States slammed the door shut on Cuba. Why? Senator Marco Rubio (R-Florida) led the GOP foreign policy brigade against the Castro regime and the Trump Administration went along. Cuba was an easy nation to pick on; with the Administration giving in on Iran, they had to hold the line elsewhere. Cuba was that line. It was a small island nation 90 miles off the coast of Florida and easy to antagonize without a lot of consequences. Thus, the White House rolled back the Obama Administration's opening up of relations, to satisfy the Republican Senate.

The international system was slowly crumbling and the legitimacy that held it together bleeding away. Decades later, many would say the seeds of World War III were begun in the 2008 crisis and the surly decade that followed. The struggle that was coming into view was to determine who would be king and who would run the international system that had ruled the world since 1945.

Does Macron change this in any significant manner?

[GlobeSoc]

Maybe being the minority party leads to pragmatism to preserve as much of their old majority era agenda as possible, and that pragmatism leads to the technocrats getting on board?

[GlobeSoc]

How would New England trend? I would guess that CT would become likely R,NH tilt R, Vermont lean D, Maine likely D, RI safe D. I might be missing something though.

[GlobeSoc]

Would Mark Cuban running as an independent candidate change much?  I'm guessing no, but he could cause the democrats to shift to Sanders-esque populism ahead of schedule

[GlobeSoc]

Can't seem to see your Virginia map

[GlobeSoc]

Ideologies cannot last forever. New developments arise: technological, economic, political. Wanting to not let go of an ideology that is part of what you think yourself as makes sense, but as conditions change, the issues change too. To play a meaningful role in politics, one must adapt to an ever-changing world. Those who can't adapt will be stuck voting for irrelevant 3rd parties every election.

[GlobeSoc]

Ideologies cannot last forever. New developments arise: technological, economic, political. Wanting to not let go of an ideology that is part of what you think yourself as makes sense, but as conditions change, the issues change too. To play a meaningful role in politics, one must adapt to an ever-changing world. Those who can't adapt will be stuck voting for irrelevant 3rd parties every election.

You say that, but in this TL, Roosevelt's ideology from the 1930s and 1940s made a comeabck with Cordray.

True, but it has some differences that separate it from the original New Deal era

[GlobeSoc]

I'm somewhat skeptical of Strauss-Howe right now because it currently looks more 3T than 4T even though we're supposedly 8 years into the crisis, but it might be useful for understanding what's going on.

[GlobeSoc]

Also, in the realignment, how do the social issues and regional attitudes on them evolve? Do Southern states become more socially liberal or not, do major cities become more socially conservative etc. And which ones will fade into irrelevance or burst onto the scene?

[GlobeSoc]

I've been thinking about this timeline and I thought, what states and regions are most often strong for the minority coalitions?

I'm thinking that the plains are a bit above average in terms of this, not existing until 1892, and then aligning 1896 for the WJB-Wilson democrats, then gradually slipping to the republicans in FDR and Truman's term and then being solid republican most of the time.
So their loyalty would have been:
Nonexistent:(1789-1892)
Populist dems(1886-1948)
Eisenhower Republicans(1952-1980)
Reagan Republicans(1980-Present)

[GlobeSoc]

I've been thinking about this timeline and I thought, what states and regions are most often strong for the minority coalitions?

I'm thinking that the plains are a bit above average in terms of this, not existing until 1892, and then aligning 1896 for the WJB-Wilson democrats, then gradually slipping to the republicans in FDR and Truman's term and then being solid republican most of the time.
So their loyalty would have been:
Nonexistent:(1789-1892)
Populist dems(1886-1948)
Eisenhower Republicans(1952-1980)
Reagan Republicans(1980-Present)

I don't get this post?

Yeah, I was in a rush when I wrote this but uhh...I would want to know how the states and regions fit into this. What drives a state to mostly back the minority over the majority coalition through the eras? I know you mentioned that the Northern technocrats are a big thing in post-FDR minority coalitions a while back, but are there other factors that make a state predisposed to backing the minority?

Regional realignments, such as the ones in Appalachia in the 2000s and 2010s, and the Plains in the 40s and 50s that happen partway into these eras are also a point of interest to me. How does this type of event relate to the nationwide political situation in these eras?

[GlobeSoc]

Right now your timeline seems very bold on wwcs swinging dem. Aside from impeachment, what else itl will make wwcs trend D?

[GlobeSoc]

Right now your timeline seems very bold on wwcs swinging dem. Aside from impeachment, what else itl will make wwcs trend D?

The debt/economic crisis what flips them, not impeachment. Neoliberal economics still reigns in the Republican Party despite a collapse in the party's ideological wing. These WWC's are not and never have been neoliberal; in fact they're its biggest victims, aside from minorities. They were hooked into the GOP coalition through populism and social conservatism.

That's what today's article talks about actually (the sixth party system defined).

Alright, but what happens to FOX, breitbart, etc.?

[GlobeSoc]

Can I ask for your take on what will happen to the area in AR-3?

My guess is that it will be a straight-ticket republican holdout, as it seems to have a suburban quality the other 3 districts don't have and relatively few AAs; that would be enough to prevent the timeline's wwc d trend from flipping the district at any level.

[GlobeSoc]

In Appalachia, are the historically Republican areas or the historically Democratic areas going to trend Dem faster?

Monongalia would obviously be one of the strongest Dem counties in WV, but I have no idea what anything else would do.

I guess the real question is which set of counties is poorer. If it's the downballot d southern WV, obviously it would be the region that puts cordray over the top. If it's the other region, we might see a very weird map from WV

[GlobeSoc]

You'll remember why the liberals were so spooked of international engagement. The memory of Vietnam and Iraq has kept the Left from being fully hawkish but I think Obama's presidency has expunged, to a great deal, that ghost and Russia's engagement in the 2016 election may push the Left towards a more hawkish identity.

The fear of failure by the United States abroad is more felt on the Right than the Left, which I personally find fascinating. The Left may be less fearful than the Right because they didn't shoulder the failures directly in Iraq and Vietnam was two generations ago. Obama's presidency provided a framework, in my mind, for Democratic hawks to push forward and aggressively promote American interests abroad, and maintain our hegemonic role. I think one thing is going to happen and that the United States will act as the head of a multilateral globalist coalition to advance the West's interests.

President Cordray certainly in this timeline does aggressively push the United States towards taking the lead on a number of initiatives. Hard to say whether he deploys military troops on a significant level but I definitely see Cordray not being unwilling to bomb a country or two to convey the American message while the Right screams.

Appears that the majority president disaster before the minority pre-alignment president has heightened suspicion against their foreign interventions. Maybe it's a result of the minority party being in a period where their strength is increasing and thus able to get popular support for their criticism (amplifying the unpopularity the majority-aligned president gets from the aging majority policy failing on its own) but before they take the national security mantle?

[GlobeSoc]

What happens in rural Texas 2024?

Here's my take:
First, North Texas:
From what I know of it, the region has one of the lowest turnouts of the country, is fairly poor, and has a fairly large hispanic population. While the picture we get in the present era is that the local hispanics are conservative, this may be because of a very low turnout by the demographic.

Based on these characteristics, I would conclude that it would have one of the biggest D trends in the country in your 2024 scenario, even if neighboring Oklahoma has a decently sized R trend. In particular, one thing that could boost the trend would be a 2022 pickup of TX-GOV, as it could pave the way for a loosening of Texas's highly restrictive laws on voter registration and such that may be reducing the turnout 'artificially'

Rio Grande Valley:
This is another region with very low voter turnout, but it already votes democratic by a large margin, and that margin doesn't seem to have much room for improvement. However,the low turnout means that a likely R trend in 2024 will not have as much meaning, as higher voter turnouts will make the margins that Cordray gets in these counties matter more.

Central Texas:
With a decent turnout(Don't quote me on that), a relatively small latino population, and last voting Dem in 76(they kept it fairly close as recently as 96 tho), this is one that somewhat eludes me. I think it will trend R and behave like the plains states because it has voted pub for a long time, certainly longer than East Texas, but it may have a southern streak that at least keeps it's trend neutral, being carried along with the rest of the southern wwc.

Between Houston and the RG valley:
See North Texas

East Texas:
Seems like the most 'Southern' of these regions, and looking at the county maps it appears Bill might have actually won it in 96. Seems like it will have a moderate-to-large D trend and be somewhat close, in spite of the low latino population.

Really, I just want someone with more information than me to evaluate this take.

[GlobeSoc]

When will they be released?

[GlobeSoc]

Everyone take a look at 2008. Don't answer if I PM'd you the answer. But if Obama was a foreshadowing President what should've happened in 2008 but didn't happen? Trust me it's a traditional major factor in the run up to a realignment.

I'll throw up two articles on this issue but I think what I've concluded will be interesting. You'll want to read it.

A serious 3rd party bid?

[GlobeSoc]

...thanks Tip O'Neil.

[GlobeSoc]

If the Republican coalition is very weak because the public is more comfortable with social programs and liberal in general than the GOP wants them to be and acts like they are, wouldn't that mean that the coming Democratic majority will be the strongest coalition in US history, at least in the first half?

[GlobeSoc]

Illinois Gubernatorial Election, 2030:
U.S. Rep. Jason Barickman / State Senator Cheryl Grothman
1,879,662 - 52.55%
Fmr. Lieutenant Governor Ameya Pawar / Decatur Mayor Rex Collins
1,602,810 - 44.81%
Others
94,430 - 2.64%

Elected in 2020, Jason Barickman is one of the few House Republicans to survive the brutal losses of the 2020s, and finds himself in pole position to run for Governor. Facing only token opposition in the primary, he selects as his running mate the 36-year-old Cheryl Grothman, who represents the impoverished areas of down-downstate Illinois that Cordray made massive inroads into during his two campaigns.

Meanwhile, on the Democratic side, incumbent Governor Napoleon Harris grows increasingly unpopular, largely due to scandals pertaining to misappropriation of federal infrastructure money, and the simple fact that Illinois continues to lag behind the rest of the country even in a time of economic recovery Former Lieutenant Governor Ameya Pawar seeks a rematch with his 2026 primary rival, and they engage in a brutal primary fight where Pawar accuses Harris of single-mindedly gunning for a 2032 Presidential bid, and Harris attempts to tie Pawar to J.B. Pritzker's controversial tenure as Governor. Ultimately, Harris's attacks don't stick, and Pawar wins the primary comfortably by cleaning up with the Cordray coalition downstate while roughly breaking even in Cook County. He selects Decatur Mayor Rex Collins, whose city was a success story of the recovery, in a bid to retain Cordray's inroads downstate.

In the general, Barickman runs as a competent technocrat, in clear contrast to the Harris years, and proposes an expansion of business partnerships to improve integration of Medicare-For-All and the infrastructure investments. Pawar, in contrast, presents himself as a bold progressive who will expand on President Cordray's policies and expand state jobs programs. However, Pawar's fundraising and organizational abilities prove lackluster, and as the President's popularity wanes through the fall, what was a close race grows less and less so. Barickman's natural appeal to the moderate suburbanites in the Collar Counties and geographic pull with populist downstaters leads him to a comfortable eight-point win, carrying all but three counties and catapulting him into the top tier of Republican rising stars.

Sorry If I'm asking for too much, but what's the dem county percentage map?

[GlobeSoc]

Weird question, but are there any races in 2018 that are particularly likely to show signs of during/post-realignment maps? I'm thinking OK-GOV, KS-GOV, MA-GOV, WV-SEN, AZ-SEN, NV-SEN are races with this characteristic.

Here's why:

In NV and AZ we might see what are for this alignment anomalously high democratic margins thanks to republican infighting, but would show the map post-realignment democrats would regularly get in those states.

WV might show what areas of the state will 'reactivate' for dems(I think TD mentioned this)

MA might show what areas of the state are open to the business republicans later on in the realignment, when the republicans moderate

OK and KS both have a small scale crisis caused by republicans, giving democrats an opening to these governorships. The maps in a close election in either would likely be similar to, if perhaps more democratic leaning than, the races the realigning dem would run in those states.

Are there any races that I missed?

[GlobeSoc]

Are there any weird signals in the generic ballot polls right now? I remember reading a thing that said that in order of most republican to most democratic trend, nonwhites(~2 point shift D), white college educated men(~10 point shift D), white non college men(~15 point shift D), white college educated women(~25 point shift D), and white non college women(~30 point shift D) are all swinging democratic compared to the exit poll in November . Would seem to both narrow the education and race gaps while widening the gender gap.

[GlobeSoc]

Some international predictions:

The UK will shift to be very left wing.

Germany will stay where it is, thus making it very right wing on the new alignment's ideological axis.

France will shift left, but only by enough to be considered centrist by the new alignment

The Scandinavian countries will stay where they are and thus be considered center-left

Canada will shift left slightly, and be firmly in the center-left

Japan will shift right and become far-right wing. Affluence, homogeneity, and age will cause this.

The rest of democratic east asia will become right-wing, but not to the extent of Japan.

BOLD PREDICTION: Most of MENA will be considered socially centrist or center-right. This is because the terrorist attacks and civil wars will forge an association of fundamentalist=death. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, most of the MENA will liberalize. If Iran has not been invaded by the US, the same applies there, except the shift would be bigger and place them firmly center-left and democratic.

I will post more as I think of them.