The idea of life at conception

[Wiz in Wis]

Thought-experiment.

Technically, both the egg and sperm cells are "alive" as defined by the definition of a cell. Mono-cell organisms are clearly "alive" and therefore, both the sperm and egg are living beings as well. We don't consider them to have rights, as they have very short lifespans (at least the sperm do), and do not grow into full humans on their own. However, the idea that life begins at conception is technically wrong. Life exists through conception, it is simply a transformation between two completely random interacting human cells.

The question you really need to ask is "when do people intrinsically have rights?" At the moment that the sperm and egg merge, some time after but before birth, or only upon birth? Secondarily, at what point does the right of the mother to agency over her body, and the chemicals she ingests, become secondary to that of the fetus?

I'm not saying I have a clear answer, but I think the framing is wrong. "Life" doesn't begin at conception, it changes. Rights and agency are the topic at hand.

[World politics is up Schmitt creek]

Thought-experiment.

Technically, both the egg and sperm cells are "alive" as defined by the definition of a cell. Mono-cell organisms are clearly "alive" and therefore, both the sperm and egg are living beings as well. We don't consider them to have rights, as they have very short lifespans (at least the sperm do), and do not grow into full humans on their own. However, the idea that life begins at conception is technically wrong. Life exists through conception, it is simply a transformation between two completely random interacting human cells.

The question you really need to ask is "when do people intrinsically have rights?" At the moment that the sperm and egg merge, some time after but before birth, or only upon birth? Secondarily, at what point does the right of the mother to agency over her body, and the chemicals she ingests, become secondary to that of the fetus?

I'm not saying I have a clear answer, but I think the framing is wrong. "Life" doesn't begin at conception, it changes. Rights and agency are the topic at hand.

This strikes me as semantics. People generally have a pretty clear idea of what's being asked with this question.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Thought-experiment.

Technically, both the egg and sperm cells are "alive" as defined by the definition of a cell. Mono-cell organisms are clearly "alive" and therefore, both the sperm and egg are living beings as well. We don't consider them to have rights, as they have very short lifespans (at least the sperm do), and do not grow into full humans on their own. However, the idea that life begins at conception is technically wrong. Life exists through conception, it is simply a transformation between two completely random interacting human cells.

The question you really need to ask is "when do people intrinsically have rights?" At the moment that the sperm and egg merge, some time after but before birth, or only upon birth? Secondarily, at what point does the right of the mother to agency over her body, and the chemicals she ingests, become secondary to that of the fetus?

I'm not saying I have a clear answer, but I think the framing is wrong. "Life" doesn't begin at conception, it changes. Rights and agency are the topic at hand.

This strikes me as semantics. People generally have a pretty clear idea of what's being asked with this question.

I have to disagree. The fact that this question is so often used as a proxy for support or opposition to abortion rights strikes me as inherently tendentious, because it poses life (as opposed to other notions such as personhood) as the relevant criterion. Obviously, under this unspoken assumption, pro-lifers will akways have the high ground, because it's scientifically obvious that life exists after conception. Pointing out that life exists before conception too is a good way to challenge this assumption.

[World politics is up Schmitt creek]

Thought-experiment.

Technically, both the egg and sperm cells are "alive" as defined by the definition of a cell. Mono-cell organisms are clearly "alive" and therefore, both the sperm and egg are living beings as well. We don't consider them to have rights, as they have very short lifespans (at least the sperm do), and do not grow into full humans on their own. However, the idea that life begins at conception is technically wrong. Life exists through conception, it is simply a transformation between two completely random interacting human cells.

The question you really need to ask is "when do people intrinsically have rights?" At the moment that the sperm and egg merge, some time after but before birth, or only upon birth? Secondarily, at what point does the right of the mother to agency over her body, and the chemicals she ingests, become secondary to that of the fetus?

I'm not saying I have a clear answer, but I think the framing is wrong. "Life" doesn't begin at conception, it changes. Rights and agency are the topic at hand.

This strikes me as semantics. People generally have a pretty clear idea of what's being asked with this question.

I have to disagree. The fact that this question is so often used as a proxy for support or opposition to abortion rights strikes me as inherently tendentious, because it poses life (as opposed to other notions such as personhood) as the relevant criterion. Obviously, under this unspoken assumption, pro-lifers will akways have the high ground, because it's scientifically obvious that life exists after conception. Pointing out that life exists before conception too is a good way to challenge this assumption.

But you could say the same thing about skin tags or gut flora (indeed, some posters have). Maybe I just think this because I'm pro-life, but it strikes me as trivially obvious that there's some ontological difference between a skin tag that's been cut off and a zygote, and representations otherwise come across as either bad-faith or indicative of some sort of ultra-modern or possibly postmodern divorce from long-received notions about ontology that I really don't know how to argue against. Al, I think, said something similar once about the futility and impossibility of coherently arguing against a poster who genuinely failed to see why creating new life forms was different from other avenues of biochemical exploration.

[afleitch]

I think ontology is important here.

First of all I've always found an irony in say, bodies like the Catholic Church making appeals to embryology as a scientific support for its position given what the study of embryology actually entails. Fetal personhood as a modern day ontological concept is only possible because people can actually see whats happening in the womb in it's earliest stages. Which as a pursuit of scientific understanding, involves the destruction of embryonic 'life'. Likewise with the backwards march of viability (which no one who is pro-choice has much issue with) due to advances in neonatology.

But that's not really what I take issue with. Ultimately what concerns me, is the pursuit of defining 'life' by some medical or scientific definitive point by which one can then martial morality around. This turns pregnancy and it's impact on a mother from what is a human experience, a female experience to something outside of that. I think many pro-life advocates are terrifyingly bleak on that proposition.

If you define 'life' at conception, then armed with the fact that 50 to 80 percent of even implanted embryos spontaneously abort, then those spontaneous abortions are the ending of a 'life', without anyone's knowledge. Something that happens as a natural cycle. This is before we even get to known miscarriages later in a woman's pregnancy. These are now 'deaths', even if you want to treat them or categorise them differently. You are then saying that the womb, that a woman's reproductive system effectively is a place where death occurs far more often than life. That's a dangerous psychological route to go down and a worrying subversion of womenhood and pregnancy.

Even from a scientific perspective there isn't a neat consensus. Gastrulation for example is the point at which an embryo can no longer divide to become identical twins. It can no longer become more than one thing. Surely before that point, then all that embryo is, is a 'potential'; potentially one thing, or two things or three things or nothing. I think Anthony's point on life v existence above is quite an important one.
 
I've always felt that the person who is pregnant should get to decide when it's a person and everyone can have different understandings of that and not be morally or legally judged. Which seems to be a strangely radical proposal these days.

A person's psychological health is vitally important to them. Pregnancy can be hell for women. For many women who fall pregnant, psychologically there is 'no child'. It's just a state of being. If a woman is pregnant and does not see it as a person, and does not wish to be in 'the state of pregnancy' and that is causing her psychological distress, then she has a right and her doctor has a right to respond to that harm.

Waving development charts about and talking about 'life' and being so clinical or scientific about what is happening inside 'women like her' without actually caring about whats happening inside her (and how she is responding to this) is of absolutely no relevance and no help to her. At worst, dismissing her psychological concerns in some weird utilitarian fashion, demanding the child be carried to term, then taken away from her if she doesn't want it, simply adds what could be a life long psychological response to pregnancy, delivery, post natal responses and removal of the child, onto what was already pre-existing.

[World politics is up Schmitt creek]

*snip*

This isn't really an "argument" I'm interested in having at great enough length or in great enough detail to respond substantively to a seven-paragraph post any more, because I've realized that I'm not familiar enough with either the life sciences or (obviously) what it is like to be pregnant to discuss it for more than a paragraph or so at a time (I know, I know, I probably should stop discussing it at all), but I just wanted to say that you've always been one of the voices on the forum whose ideas on this I've read with the most interest, and this post is no exception. Thank you for weighing in.

I only came back into this thread to correct what I think is an obviously false equivalency, but if I can't adequately explain why I think that then there really isn't any point.

[afleitch]

*snip*

This isn't really an "argument" I'm interested in having at great enough length or in great enough detail to respond substantively to a seven-paragraph post any more, because I've realized that I'm not familiar enough with either the life sciences or (obviously) what it is like to be pregnant to discuss it for more than a paragraph or so at a time (I know, I know, I probably should stop discussing it at all), but I just wanted to say that you've always been one of the voices on the forum whose ideas on this I've read with the most interest, and this post is no exception. Thank you for weighing in.

I only came back into this thread to correct what I think is an obviously false equivalency, but if I can't adequately explain why I think that then there really isn't any point.

It was just a general response from me. It wasn't aimed at anyone to respond to Someone very close to me (who I have to anonymise because people can get crazy about this stuff) is one of this countries top embryologists, which I say out of sheer swelling pride for them rather than anything else. We have good conversations about all this, which is a learning experience and has made it into something I like to ramble on about.

[muon2]

If you define 'life' at conception, then armed with the fact that 50 to 80 percent of even implanted embryos spontaneously abort, then those spontaneous abortions are the ending of a 'life', without anyone's knowledge. Something that happens as a natural cycle. This is before we even get to known miscarriages later in a woman's pregnancy. These are now 'deaths', even if you want to treat them or categorise them differently. You are then saying that the womb, that a woman's reproductive system effectively is a place where death occurs far more often than life. That's a dangerous psychological route to go down and a worrying subversion of womenhood and pregnancy.

Even from a scientific perspective there isn't a neat consensus. Gastrulation for example is the point at which an embryo can no longer divide to become identical twins. It can no longer become more than one thing. Surely before that point, then all that embryo is, is a 'potential'; potentially one thing, or two things or three things or nothing. I think Anthony's point on life v existence above is quite an important one.

Thanks for the embryological back up to what I was saying in response to GIA. I firmly agree that it is very hard to make a case for personhood before that point. I would also add that we have the technology to cause stem cells to begin forming clones. A single cell or simple division definition could add all those stem cells to the list, because in the right conditions they can grow to be a human like a fertilized egg.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I think ontology is important here.

First of all I've always found an irony in say, bodies like the Catholic Church making appeals to embryology as a scientific support for its position given what the study of embryology actually entails. Fetal personhood as a modern day ontological concept is only possible because people can actually see whats happening in the womb in it's earliest stages. Which as a pursuit of scientific understanding, involves the destruction of embryonic 'life'. Likewise with the backwards march of viability (which no one who is pro-choice has much issue with) due to advances in neonatology.

But that's not really what I take issue with. Ultimately what concerns me, is the pursuit of defining 'life' by some medical or scientific definitive point by which one can then martial morality around. This turns pregnancy and it's impact on a mother from what is a human experience, a female experience to something outside of that. I think many pro-life advocates are terrifyingly bleak on that proposition.

If you define 'life' at conception, then armed with the fact that 50 to 80 percent of even implanted embryos spontaneously abort, then those spontaneous abortions are the ending of a 'life', without anyone's knowledge. Something that happens as a natural cycle. This is before we even get to known miscarriages later in a woman's pregnancy. These are now 'deaths', even if you want to treat them or categorise them differently. You are then saying that the womb, that a woman's reproductive system effectively is a place where death occurs far more often than life. That's a dangerous psychological route to go down and a worrying subversion of womenhood and pregnancy.

Even from a scientific perspective there isn't a neat consensus. Gastrulation for example is the point at which an embryo can no longer divide to become identical twins. It can no longer become more than one thing. Surely before that point, then all that embryo is, is a 'potential'; potentially one thing, or two things or three things or nothing. I think Anthony's point on life v existence above is quite an important one.
 
I've always felt that the person who is pregnant should get to decide when it's a person and everyone can have different understandings of that and not be morally or legally judged. Which seems to be a strangely radical proposal these days.

A person's psychological health is vitally important to them. Pregnancy can be hell for women. For many women who fall pregnant, psychologically there is 'no child'. It's just a state of being. If a woman is pregnant and does not see it as a person, and does not wish to be in 'the state of pregnancy' and that is causing her psychological distress, then she has a right and her doctor has a right to respond to that harm.

Waving development charts about and talking about 'life' and being so clinical or scientific about what is happening inside 'women like her' without actually caring about whats happening inside her (and how she is responding to this) is of absolutely no relevance and no help to her. At worst, dismissing her psychological concerns in some weird utilitarian fashion, demanding the child be carried to term, then taken away from her if she doesn't want it, simply adds what could be a life long psychological response to pregnancy, delivery, post natal responses and removal of the child, onto what was already pre-existing.

To a large extent I agree with you here. Where I differ with you is, as usual, over the absolute priority you seem to give the individual, without any concern of the effects of actions on society. Or rather, on your apparent assumption that one can maximize social good by having a society where each individual is free to act to maximize their personal good. It's a good starting position, except for your point of view that if a woman doesn't think that if what is inside her is not a child, then it isn't one, regardless of the views of others. That sort of logic can easily lead to the justification of dehumanizing various groups of humans. It's why the individual perspective should be the starting point, not the finishing point for determining social positions.

My own viewpoint is that personhood begins at some point between when the embryo becomes a fetus and viability. I don't have any strong views on where therein to define the point where under the law a life becomes a human life. Biblically, quickening might seem like a good point except we now know that the perception of quickening does not happen in every pregnancy at the same point of fetal development. Still, the fact that point rather than once a pregnancy was known to be was used seems a strong argument to me against claiming conception as the point for those arguing from religion.

[afleitch]

I think ontology is important here.

First of all I've always found an irony in say, bodies like the Catholic Church making appeals to embryology as a scientific support for its position given what the study of embryology actually entails. Fetal personhood as a modern day ontological concept is only possible because people can actually see whats happening in the womb in it's earliest stages. Which as a pursuit of scientific understanding, involves the destruction of embryonic 'life'. Likewise with the backwards march of viability (which no one who is pro-choice has much issue with) due to advances in neonatology.

But that's not really what I take issue with. Ultimately what concerns me, is the pursuit of defining 'life' by some medical or scientific definitive point by which one can then martial morality around. This turns pregnancy and it's impact on a mother from what is a human experience, a female experience to something outside of that. I think many pro-life advocates are terrifyingly bleak on that proposition.

If you define 'life' at conception, then armed with the fact that 50 to 80 percent of even implanted embryos spontaneously abort, then those spontaneous abortions are the ending of a 'life', without anyone's knowledge. Something that happens as a natural cycle. This is before we even get to known miscarriages later in a woman's pregnancy. These are now 'deaths', even if you want to treat them or categorise them differently. You are then saying that the womb, that a woman's reproductive system effectively is a place where death occurs far more often than life. That's a dangerous psychological route to go down and a worrying subversion of womenhood and pregnancy.

Even from a scientific perspective there isn't a neat consensus. Gastrulation for example is the point at which an embryo can no longer divide to become identical twins. It can no longer become more than one thing. Surely before that point, then all that embryo is, is a 'potential'; potentially one thing, or two things or three things or nothing. I think Anthony's point on life v existence above is quite an important one.
 
I've always felt that the person who is pregnant should get to decide when it's a person and everyone can have different understandings of that and not be morally or legally judged. Which seems to be a strangely radical proposal these days.

A person's psychological health is vitally important to them. Pregnancy can be hell for women. For many women who fall pregnant, psychologically there is 'no child'. It's just a state of being. If a woman is pregnant and does not see it as a person, and does not wish to be in 'the state of pregnancy' and that is causing her psychological distress, then she has a right and her doctor has a right to respond to that harm.

Waving development charts about and talking about 'life' and being so clinical or scientific about what is happening inside 'women like her' without actually caring about whats happening inside her (and how she is responding to this) is of absolutely no relevance and no help to her. At worst, dismissing her psychological concerns in some weird utilitarian fashion, demanding the child be carried to term, then taken away from her if she doesn't want it, simply adds what could be a life long psychological response to pregnancy, delivery, post natal responses and removal of the child, onto what was already pre-existing.

To a large extent I agree with you here. Where I differ with you is, as usual, over the absolute priority you seem to give the individual, without any concern of the effects of actions on society. Or rather, on your apparent assumption that one can maximize social good by having a society where each individual is free to act to maximize their personal good. It's a good starting position, except for your point of view that if a woman doesn't think that if what is inside her is not a child, then it isn't one, regardless of the views of others. That sort of logic can easily lead to the justification of dehumanizing various groups of humans. It's why the individual perspective should be the starting point, not the finishing point for determining social positions.

My own viewpoint is that personhood begins at some point between when the embryo becomes a fetus and viability. I don't have any strong views on where therein to define the point where under the law a life becomes a human life. Biblically, quickening might seem like a good point except we now know that the perception of quickening does not happen in every pregnancy at the same point of fetal development. Still, the fact that point rather than once a pregnancy was known to be was used seems a strong argument to me against claiming conception as the point for those arguing from religion.

I don't think 'society' has a claim to the destiny, or finality if you will, of a womans embryo. That sort of thinking can lead to eugenics; decisions taken by the state or authorities to force a woman to abort against her will. Do not assume that 'society' or rather who exerts influence within it, is benevolent in that regard.

You raise an interesting point with 'the quickening'. As much as women now can know much earlier of their pregnancy, the point at which she knows and accepts her pregnancy as her 'future child' then barring medical issues that require an induced abortion, that to me is her moment of defining it's personhood. For some women that is early. For others it's after thought for the future of herself and her family. For some, it can be never because cannot, in her own mind and of her own volition cannot carry it to term.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I believe neither that society is inherently good or evil nor that individuals are inherently good or evil. Relative benevolence is not a factor here. Rather it is that individuals don't function in isolation. They are part of a society, and thus restrictions on individuals that benefit society as a whole are generally a good thing. (I'm aware that not every such restriction put forth with that claimed goal actually is beneficial to society as a whole.)

Not only that, but I doubt that even you would argue in favor of allowing infanticide if a woman gave birth yet felt no connection to the infant. So clearly there's something beyond the woman's point of view to be considered in deciding when a life becomes a human life. Something determined by society.

[afleitch]

I believe neither that society is inherently good or evil nor that individuals are inherently good or evil. Relative benevolence is not a factor here. Rather it is that individuals don't function in isolation. They are part of a society, and thus restrictions on individuals that benefit society as a whole are generally a good thing. (I'm aware that not every such restriction put forth with that claimed goal actually is beneficial to society as a whole.)

Not only that, but I doubt that even you would argue in favor of allowing infanticide if a woman gave birth yet felt no connection to the infant. So clearly there's something beyond the woman's point of view to be considered in deciding when a life becomes a human life. Something determined by society.

When a woman gives birth the baby is clearly a human with associated rights. I'm talking about defining personhood before the point of viability which I think rests with the mother. I have no idea what you are trying to argue about.

[DC Al Fine]

I believe neither that society is inherently good or evil nor that individuals are inherently good or evil. Relative benevolence is not a factor here. Rather it is that individuals don't function in isolation. They are part of a society, and thus restrictions on individuals that benefit society as a whole are generally a good thing. (I'm aware that not every such restriction put forth with that claimed goal actually is beneficial to society as a whole.)

Not only that, but I doubt that even you would argue in favor of allowing infanticide if a woman gave birth yet felt no connection to the infant. So clearly there's something beyond the woman's point of view to be considered in deciding when a life becomes a human life. Something determined by society.

When a woman gives birth the baby is clearly a human with associated rights. I'm talking about defining personhood before the point of viability which I think rests with the mother. I have no idea what you are trying to argue about.

I'm not Ernest, but I think he is saying that "mother's connection" is a too arbitrary standard. It would lead to the absurdity of Baby A and Baby B having more or less identical characteristics (heartbeat, feel pain, whatever), yet only one would be a person.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

I believe neither that society is inherently good or evil nor that individuals are inherently good or evil. Relative benevolence is not a factor here. Rather it is that individuals don't function in isolation. They are part of a society, and thus restrictions on individuals that benefit society as a whole are generally a good thing. (I'm aware that not every such restriction put forth with that claimed goal actually is beneficial to society as a whole.)

Not only that, but I doubt that even you would argue in favor of allowing infanticide if a woman gave birth yet felt no connection to the infant. So clearly there's something beyond the woman's point of view to be considered in deciding when a life becomes a human life. Something determined by society.

When a woman gives birth the baby is clearly a human with associated rights. I'm talking about defining personhood before the point of viability which I think rests with the mother. I have no idea what you are trying to argue about.

While there's no place today that I'm aware of that condones infanticide, historically that hasn't always been the case. To argue that birth makes someone clearly human is not self-evident, but a societal norm. A norm I'm glad is a norm, but to pretend it's not a norm is to pretend that your subjective viewpoint is objective. Unfortunately, abortion is one of those issues where a lot of people on all sides make the mistake of presuming their subjective position is an objective one.

I'm not Ernest, but I think he is saying that "mother's connection" is a too arbitrary standard. It would lead to the absurdity of Baby A and Baby B having more or less identical characteristics (heartbeat, feel pain, whatever), yet only one would be a person.

Pretty much any definition of when a human life begins is going to be arbitrary, be it the physiological definitions that generally are the subject of the abortion debate or the physiological definition Andrew is giving. My objection is not over it being arbitrary but his position giving absolute preference to individual concerns regardless of societal concerns.

[muon2]

I'm not Ernest, but I think he is saying that "mother's connection" is a too arbitrary standard. It would lead to the absurdity of Baby A and Baby B having more or less identical characteristics (heartbeat, feel pain, whatever), yet only one would be a person.

Pretty much any definition of when a human life begins is going to be arbitrary, be it the physiological definitions that generally are the subject of the abortion debate or the physiological definition Andrew is giving. My objection is not over it being arbitrary but his position giving absolute preference to individual concerns regardless of societal concerns.

Though as I said upthread, a definition that is consistent with the end of life is less arbitrary. Right now there are separate definitions for the beginning and end of human life. If one definition is arbitrary, then arguably both are. If there is only one definition at all stages of human life then even if it arguably arbitrary, it is only one such definition, not two.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines." — Ralph Waldo Emerson

Devising an identical measure for both the beginning and end of life is no less arbitrary than any other.  In part that's because I can't think of one that would not ignore the difference in future potential that exists at the beginning and end of a human life. Or ignore the importance of existing attachments with others that that life be it human or not, has.

[Antonio the Sixth]

There's another problem with Muon's argument: that, like many pro-lifers, he starts from the assumption that life and personhood are one and the same. You can certainly make the argument that one is a person if and only if they are alive, but acting as if those two are conceptually the same thing is disingenuous.

It's disingenuous not only because (as some pro-choice argument goes) it's theoretically possible to be alive and not be a person, but also because (and this is the potential "pro-life" rebuttal to Muon's argument) one can also not be alive and still be a person! Indeed, are dead people non-persons in our society? The fact that the judiciary takes care to ensure that wills are respected suggests the contrary: clearly, dead people are considered still be individuals with certain rights (even if they are limited in their ability to exercise them by virtue of being... well, dead). So you could well argue that a dead person is still a person. And similarly, an abortion opponent could accept your argument about the need of a heartbeat to be considered alive, and still consider that the "non-alive" fetus is a person deserving of rights.

[muon2]

Actually I think I have avoided the issue by constraining myself to the definition of legal person. Life already has a number of different definitions depending on the context. Even within scientific use there are multiple definitions. Hence I'm not interested in trying to contest between them, since sometimes the differences in definition are useful. I also recognize that both sides for the debate are going to find issue if they are attached to one of the various definitions of life. My main point is that a definition of legal personhood can be crafted that functions at all points in time, rather than one that relies on a definition that shifts after personhood begins.

[Antonio the Sixth]

Actually I think I have avoided the issue by constraining myself to the definition of legal person. Life already has a number of different definitions depending on the context. Even within scientific use there are multiple definitions. Hence I'm not interested in trying to contest between them, since sometimes the differences in definition are useful. I also recognize that both sides for the debate are going to find issue if they are attached to one of the various definitions of life. My main point is that a definition of legal personhood can be crafted that functions at all points in time, rather than one that relies on a definition that shifts after personhood begins.

Then how do you respond to the argument that someone's personhood doesn't actually end with their death? I don't know if I would necessarily make this argument, but I think it's a reasonable one to make in light of what I've pointed out.

[muon2]

Actually I think I have avoided the issue by constraining myself to the definition of legal person. Life already has a number of different definitions depending on the context. Even within scientific use there are multiple definitions. Hence I'm not interested in trying to contest between them, since sometimes the differences in definition are useful. I also recognize that both sides for the debate are going to find issue if they are attached to one of the various definitions of life. My main point is that a definition of legal personhood can be crafted that functions at all points in time, rather than one that relies on a definition that shifts after personhood begins.

Then how do you respond to the argument that someone's personhood doesn't actually end with their death? I don't know if I would necessarily make this argument, but I think it's a reasonable one to make in light of what I've pointed out.

If I understand your argument, then the question is whether there is a situation when death occurs but personhood continues. Would this be something like when someone who is clinically dead is subsequently revived? If so, then the legal person existed past death because the cessation of heart or brain activity was not irreversible.

[Meclazine for Israel]

Most cellular development in the first embryonic stages after conception is common amongst all mammals.

Because of evolution, we share the first stages of the lego instruction kit.

There is nothing uniquely human about the embryo until it starts to get its own blood supply from mother and form a foetus.

From a legal and religous point of view it is easier to place the start of life at the first cell combination.

But from a scientific perspective, it is more complex where you draw the line.