I. Section 6 of the Promotion of Democracy Act
We find the plaintiff's initial argument that Article I Section 5 Clause 20 does not provide sufficient basis for the constitutionality of this section to be compelling. The clause is clearly intended to allow for state to state relationships and the law in question bypasses the governments of Lebanon and Iran in ways that their governments might feel were not to their benefit.
However the promotion of policies by other countries can be considered as a method for enhancing the common defense of our republic and hence constitutional under Article I Section 5 Clause 21. The desirability or effectiveness of those policies is a political question beyond the scope of this court.
I agree with the court deferring any judgement on this Act.
II. The Community Revitalization Act
The provision adjusting tax rates is inherently unconstitutional.
Article I Section 5 Clause 1 requires uniformity in our tax code so that wherever a taxed activity occurs, the tax will be the same. Further the requirement that the Senate seek "a single market where competition is free and undistorted" in Article I Section 5 Clause 4 also argues against the constitutionality of this zone. The act's main function is to give an income tax break to selected businesses based in part on their location. We therefore find the tax break granted under the Act to be unconstitutional.
This essentially means the federal government can't do this because of the necessity of uniformity in the tax code, but the Regional government can. (my interpretation) I'm actually ok with this as well.
III. The Preserving our National Parks Act
The claim made by the plaintiff that Article I Section 5 Clause 26 restricts the types of land that the Federal Government may own is without merit. The clause restricts where the Government may excericise sole soveregnity without being subject to the powers of a Region. As such it would be applicable only if this Act interefered in the exercise of powers of a Region which we do not find that it does.
Sections I-III of the Act are clearly constitutional. They are no more than an expression of the rules that a land owner (in this case the Republic of Atlasia) has chosen to use in allowing persons onto said land. Clearly if a private entity owned a national park it could choose to do what those three sections entail.
Section IV raises the level of a fine and directs how the increased
revenue is to be spent, which in and of itself is perefctly constitional.
Section V raises fines in certain circumstances, and we find no reason to judge those circumstances unconstitional.
Therefore we uphold the entirety of the Act.
I also agree with this ruling.
IV. Titles 16 and 29 of the US Code
The plaintiff failed to show cause that the whole of titles 16 and 29 should be found unconstitutional, and a quick perusal indicates that they would be by and large upheld. As this court should decline to seek out that which may be unconstitutional without argument from a plaintiff on a specific potrion and a specific cause, we decline to find any portion of either title 16 or title 29 of the US Code to be unconstitutional at this time. However, this Court invites the plaintiff or others to raise cases on specific chapters or sections thereof.
Also looks good to me.
V. Chapter 8 of title 42 of the US code
Subchapter II of chapter 8 has already been repealed, leaving subchapters I, II-A, II-B, III, and some sections prior to subchapter I that are not part of any subchapter.
The sections of chapter 8 prior to subchapter I and section 1439 of subchapter III of chapter 8 deliniate various procedural aspects of administrating the law and are in of themselves constitutional under Article I Section 5 Clause 28.
The programs administered under section 1440 of subchapter III of chapter 8 and subchapters I, II-A and II-B of chapter 8 employ a means test based of income level in order to determine eligibility of persons to gain assistance under it. In keeping with the precedent of the first Bono v. Atlasia case, programs employing such tests are inherently unconstutional. This court does not rule at this time on the constitutionality of such programs absent of such test.
Since I am not a knowledgable person with regards to the US code, could you point out a link to the provisions discussed here?
VI. Chapter 8A of title 42 of the US code
Subchapter 8A provides for the establishment of minimal standards of housing and implements programs to facilitate such standards. Housing is clearly an item of commerce and as such the Senate has authority under Article I Section 5 Clause 9 to set such standards.
I also agree with this.
VII. Chapter 34 of title 42 of the US code
There remain only three portions of this chapter that have not been repealed, Part C of subchapter I, and subchapters VIII, and X.
Subchapter I Part C - Federal Work-Study Programs
A clear usage of the Senate's power under Article I Section 5 Clause 15.
Subchapter VIII - Native American Programs
Programs that provide benefits to people based solely on their
ethnicity are generally unconstitutional as they deny people equal treatment under the law.
Subchapter X - Legal Services Corporation
Subchapter X of chapter 34 employs a means test based of income level in order to determine eligibility of persons to gain assistance under it. In keeping with the precedent of the first Bono v. Atlasia case, a program employing such tests is inherently unconstutional. This court does not rule at this time on the constitutionality of this program absent of such test.
This makes logical sense from the former precedent of Bono v. Atlasia.
VIII. Chapter 45 of title 42
The only potential avenue of constitutionality we can see for this
chapter is as an application of the authority under Article I Section 5 Clause 9 to set standards for items of commerce.
In the case of housing that is sold, once sold the seller is no longer able to enforce and preferences as to who may buy the property in the future. Thus such preferences in such a case is not part of the item of commerce and hence cannot be regulated under Article I Section 5 Clause 9. The same reasoning clearly applies in the case of rental property where a lessee has the ability to sublet the property without the approval of the original lessor. Thus in general this chapter is unconstitional when applied to such sale or lease. However, part of the
provisions of chapter 45 include the prohibition of the misrepresentation of a property as being for sale or lease to all when in fact there exists a hidden limitation based on the conditions outlined in this chapter.
Such misrepresentation falls within the scope of Article I Section 5
Clause 7 and thus to the limited extent of requiring open disclosure of certain preferences the seller has in potential buyers or lessees, this chapter is constitutional.
With rental property where the owner maintains control over who
potential lessees will be, such preferences can be viewed as part of the item of commerce in question. Therefore, in the absence of some other provision of the constitution preventing the Senate from applying such a standard, this chapter is constitutional in whole when applied to such rentals. No such provision having been brought to my attention, we can only conclude that in this case the chapter is constitutional.
IX. Chapter 119 of title 42 of the US code
Subchapters I and II being of a general adminstrative nature are upheld as an exercise of power under Article I Section 5 Clause 28. We agree with the plaintiff's assertion that subchapters III, IV, and V of this chapter lack constitutional backing in light of the precedent set by the previous case of Bono v. Atlasia. The plaintiff declined to present a case against subchapter VI at argument and rightfully so as it an expression of the Senates's power under Article I Section 5 Clause 15.
I agree with these last two, as far as my understanding of US code goes, which as I said before is not as strong as it should be.