How to Assert Meaning and Dignity in the Context of Reality?

[FEMA Camp Administrator]

When you take account of the holocausts that have preceded Present Man^TM, the idea of instilling in any particular human a certain amount of intrinsic value, let alone purpose, appears futile--if not an outright lie. How do we reconcile the real and ideal?

[World politics is up Schmitt creek]

"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality; even larks and katydids are supposed, by some, to dream."

[TJ in Oregon]

When you take account of the holocausts that have preceded Present Man^TM, the idea of instilling in any particular human a certain amount of intrinsic value, let alone purpose, appears futile--if not an outright lie.

Only if you start by assuming a materialist philosophy that in principle does not provide a mechanism for meaning. Otherwise, Imago Dei.

How do we reconcile the real and ideal?

Turn away from sin and be faithful to the Gospel. Though you may have been asking a different question. I'm not sure.

[Mopsus]

The intrinsic value of any human life is the value that it holds for the one who lives it. By sharing our world with Others, we enhance our appreciation for life in general.

That is all.

[Antonio the Sixth]

That's the point of an assertion: you don't have to justify it. People have intrinsic value because I say they do.

[FEMA Camp Administrator]

That's the point of an assertion: you don't have to justify it. People have intrinsic value because I say they do.

Interesting assertion.

[Antonio the Sixth]

That's the point of an assertion: you don't have to justify it. People have intrinsic value because I say they do.

Interesting assertion.

I was making a serious point. Any belief system is based on a set of statements that cannot be proved, but that just have to be accepted as such. In science, these are called axioms, but they are just as important to metaphysics and morality.

[True Federalist (진정한 연방 주의자)]

What is real?
What is ideal?
Are they different?
If they are, do they need reconciliation?
If they are different, does it matter?

You can go pretty deep down the philosophical rabbit hole considering such questions. But does such a trip to Wonderland accomplish anything useful?

[JA]

That's the point of an assertion: you don't have to justify it. People have intrinsic value because I say they do.

Interesting assertion.

I was making a serious point. Any belief system is based on a set of statements that cannot be proved, but that just have to be accepted as such. In science, these are called axioms, but they are just as important to metaphysics and morality.

Are the acceptance of these assertions not contextual? By that I mean, what is asserted and accepted by a specific group within a specific time, changes based upon material circumstances. Therefore, there's no universal or objectively acceptable assertion regarding intrinsic human value, but rather varying cultural interpretations based upon a set of conditionals. Am I wrong in that? Or is there an objective, discoverable intrinsic value to humans that's theoretically universally achievable and recognizable?

[Antonio the Sixth]

That's the point of an assertion: you don't have to justify it. People have intrinsic value because I say they do.

Interesting assertion.

I was making a serious point. Any belief system is based on a set of statements that cannot be proved, but that just have to be accepted as such. In science, these are called axioms, but they are just as important to metaphysics and morality.

Are the acceptance of these assertions not contextual? By that I mean, what is asserted and accepted by a specific group within a specific time, changes based upon material circumstances. Therefore, there's no universal or objectively acceptable assertion regarding intrinsic human value, but rather varying cultural interpretations based upon a set of conditionals. Am I wrong in that? Or is there an objective, discoverable intrinsic value to humans that's theoretically universally achievable and recognizable?

I'd argue that recognizing intrinsic value in a necessary implication of being willing to live in something we can call "reality". If we start from a position where everything we see, hear, feel, etc. only exists insofar as we see, hear, or feel it, then we don't need to ascribe value to anything, because everything is only an emanation of our own conscience. But if instead we're willing to admit that there is a reality out there independent of ourselves, what we're really saying is that there are other subjects who are capable of perceiving this reality independent of what our own perception of it is ("there is an objective reality but I'm the only one who perceives it" makes no sense as a position, because something can only be "objective" by contrast with a "subjective", and if I'm the only one who perceives something then there is no way to distinguish objective from subjective). And the only way we can think of how others perceive reality is by reference to our own perceptions. We thus have to assume that, at least in a basic sense, other people's minds are akin to our own, which in turn implies valuing them as we value ourselves.

[JA]

That's the point of an assertion: you don't have to justify it. People have intrinsic value because I say they do.

Interesting assertion.

I was making a serious point. Any belief system is based on a set of statements that cannot be proved, but that just have to be accepted as such. In science, these are called axioms, but they are just as important to metaphysics and morality.

Are the acceptance of these assertions not contextual? By that I mean, what is asserted and accepted by a specific group within a specific time, changes based upon material circumstances. Therefore, there's no universal or objectively acceptable assertion regarding intrinsic human value, but rather varying cultural interpretations based upon a set of conditionals. Am I wrong in that? Or is there an objective, discoverable intrinsic value to humans that's theoretically universally achievable and recognizable?

I'd argue that recognizing intrinsic value in a necessary implication of being willing to live in something we can call "reality". If we start from a position where everything we see, hear, feel, etc. only exists insofar as we see, hear, or feel it, then we don't need to ascribe value to anything, because everything is only an emanation of our own conscience. But if instead we're willing to admit that there is a reality out there independent of ourselves, what we're really saying is that there are other subjects who are capable of perceiving this reality independent of what our own perception of it is ("there is an objective reality but I'm the only one who perceives it" makes no sense as a position, because something can only be "objective" by contrast with a "subjective", and if I'm the only one who perceives something then there is no way to distinguish objective from subjective). And the only way we can think of how others perceive reality is by reference to our own perceptions. We thus have to assume that, at least in a basic sense, other people's minds are akin to our own, which in turn implies valuing them as we value ourselves.

That's not necessarily a logical extension of the former, but is dependent upon certain moral values to draw that conclusion. The question then becomes, from where did those moral values arise and are they objective or, as I previously stated, contextual and dependent upon material circumstances? If they're objective, then the golden rule of "treat others as you'd like to be treated," which stems from the conclusion that other people's minds are akin to our own, is universally applicable and separate from any sociocultural basis. However, how do we know whether or not the golden rule is a form of objective morality or the consequence of particular ethical values arising from unique material circumstances?

[Antonio the Sixth]

That's the point of an assertion: you don't have to justify it. People have intrinsic value because I say they do.

Interesting assertion.

I was making a serious point. Any belief system is based on a set of statements that cannot be proved, but that just have to be accepted as such. In science, these are called axioms, but they are just as important to metaphysics and morality.

Are the acceptance of these assertions not contextual? By that I mean, what is asserted and accepted by a specific group within a specific time, changes based upon material circumstances. Therefore, there's no universal or objectively acceptable assertion regarding intrinsic human value, but rather varying cultural interpretations based upon a set of conditionals. Am I wrong in that? Or is there an objective, discoverable intrinsic value to humans that's theoretically universally achievable and recognizable?

I'd argue that recognizing intrinsic value in a necessary implication of being willing to live in something we can call "reality". If we start from a position where everything we see, hear, feel, etc. only exists insofar as we see, hear, or feel it, then we don't need to ascribe value to anything, because everything is only an emanation of our own conscience. But if instead we're willing to admit that there is a reality out there independent of ourselves, what we're really saying is that there are other subjects who are capable of perceiving this reality independent of what our own perception of it is ("there is an objective reality but I'm the only one who perceives it" makes no sense as a position, because something can only be "objective" by contrast with a "subjective", and if I'm the only one who perceives something then there is no way to distinguish objective from subjective). And the only way we can think of how others perceive reality is by reference to our own perceptions. We thus have to assume that, at least in a basic sense, other people's minds are akin to our own, which in turn implies valuing them as we value ourselves.

That's not necessarily a logical extension of the former, but is dependent upon certain moral values to draw that conclusion. The question then becomes, from where did those moral values arise and are they objective or, as I previously stated, contextual and dependent upon material circumstances? If they're objective, then the golden rule of "treat others as you'd like to be treated," which stems from the conclusion that other people's minds are akin to our own, is universally applicable and separate from any sociocultural basis. However, how do we know whether or not the golden rule is a form of objective morality or the consequence of particular ethical values arising from unique material circumstances?

How we get from abstractly valuing others to specific normative prescriptions is an incredibly tricky question, yes. It's one I'm trying to make some headway on, but it is a challenge and it's certainly hard to avoid answers that aren't situational or subjective. I'll elaborate on that when I have more time.

Still, I would maintain that ascribing some intrinsic value to other people based on some kind of analogy to ourselves (which might not necessarily mean to imply equal value exactly, although I hope it would) is both a universal requisite for any ethical framework and a necessary consequence of accepting their reality. It is a necessary consequence of accepting their reality because the only way we can distinguish them ontologically from anything else that's ultimately reducible to our own senses (and thereby denying the very existence of reality) is by positing an analogy between our subjective experience and that of other people. This analogy doesn't mean that we all feel the same things exactly the same way, but it does mean that we can try to understand how others feel based on our own experiences. In turn, this means that other people must have some kind of intrinsic value that we ascribe to ourselves as emotional beings (our emotions are the ultimate source of any value judgment we make, so being able to feel emotions means that we have to value ourselves to begin with).