AMA

[The_Doctor]

Have at it. I'll answer any questions you have.

[The_Doctor]

Do you have any plans for writing additional timelines?

Nah unfortunately. I poured all of my creative energy into BTM because I wanted to predict the future. It took a long time so I don't want to do the research again for an alternative timeline.

Do you really live in New Hamspshire? If so, my sincerest condolences.

Nay but it is my favorite state (with Arizona) and I live in the Northeast however. So I went with NH. It's an awesome libertarian paradise with a New England culture.

I've considered moving there; a friend did and loves it there.

Two important questions:

1. If you actually live in NH, or have any sort of interest in it at least, what are your thoughts on Democrats' chances in taking back the state legislature/Gov office in 2018?

2. If you had to choose, puppies or turtles?

1. I'd have to do some research before commenting, I haven't checked on NH politics in a while.

2. Puppies

What does TD stand for? I keep on thinking it stands for an infamous subreddit...

Originally “Truman democrat.” I coined it after Trump's win to denote being part of the conservative (temporary Dem) opposition to Trump but I have reverted back to my conservative leaning ways ideologically and probably will vote for Trump's successor (barring a few condition). But it's a pain to go back to Silent Cal as everyone calls me TD.  So I let it stand, regardless. [I Know Truman was a domestic liberal but he was a great Cold War hawk).

It could stand for The_Donald mockingly, I'd be okay with that lol

[The_Doctor]

Favorite line/paragraph from a political speech?

See my signature - Reagan's “Shining City on a Hill“ paragraph by Peggy Noonan.

[The_Doctor]

Do you see yourself voting straight ticket D until Trump leaves office and Trumpism dies out in the GOP?

Yes.

At this juncture the plan is to do that as its the only really meaningful way to force the Republicans to address the Russian issue and the alt right issues (not populist -- I mean alt right racial and ethnic issues). I'm not very fond of the idea but I don't really have a choice. Simply voting Republican for Congress and local office but voting against Trump changes nothing. They need to be pushed to take action on the investigation and reforming the party. The more pain the rank and file Republicans feel the more pressure they direct upwards.

So yes, the idea is to vote Democratic until the Republicans clear the party of their Russian and alt right issues. If I think Pence is innocent of collusion and rids the party of the alt right like Bannon I will vote Pence and the Republican ticket -- most likely. But that's an if contingent on many things.

I do anticipate myself voting Republican when the Democrats retake the White House, provided the Republican coalition is reformed.

[The_Doctor]

I've heard that there was a previous version of B.T.M. Is this true? And if so, could you send me a link?

How'd you hear of it? Yes there is. I deleted the first version as there were two duplicates but I'm putting it up on a website actually and when I finish up that in the next week, I'll paste the link in BTM.

[The_Doctor]

Hello TD. Big fan of your work.

1. What happens if the Democrats squeak by with a presidential victory in 2020? How would a 2020's Democratic realignment proceed in that case?

2. How accurate would you say this analysis is?

1. I have to contest that question.

Democrats squeaking by indicates we are still in the Reaganite age. It would also be an aberration from past patterns. For some very strange reason, we've had exactly two elected minority coalition presidents in every full blown realignment. In the 1st, there was William Henry Harrison (Whig of Ohio) and Zachary Taylor (Whig of Louisiana). I don't count John Q. Adams as a Whig because he ran as a Democrat-Republican explicitly. In the long Republican rule from 1860 to 1932, Grover Cleveland (D-New York) and Woodrow Wilson (D-New Jersey) were the minority presidents. And of course, Dwight Eisenhower (R-PA/KS/NY) and Richard Nixon (R-California) served as the Roosevelt age's minority coalition presidents.  And of of course, we've just finished the second run of the minority coalition presidency - Bill Clinton (D-Arkansas) and Barack Obama (D-Illinois). (Is there a loophole with Grover Cleveland winning twice on two separate occasions? I don't know).

So assume x wins in 2020 by 51-48%, narrow margin. Aside from breaking the pattern (when the Democrats win, in this realignment, they've won big -- every narrow victory has ended up going to the GOP), it would indicate the Reaganite age is still in full force because large swaths of the electorate hasn't broken tribal loyalty. In fact this is the big reason I had Pence winning in 2020. Anyway, that president would be in a weakened position because he or she would be elected as a pure reaction to Trump's foibles, not because the country had fundamentally shifted. She would be in that position where Obama was, after 2008. In fact, possibly weaker, because the GOP would still be stronger than they were in 2008.  

In that case, a Republican would win in 2024, and in 2028, as you've listed elsewhere, the Democrats would win huge.

2. I've been writing up a foreign policy article and that's as good one. Fairly accurate I'd say but I think the Left synthesizes both movements into a populist cosmopolitan whole that respects the globalization trends of 1945-2020 but also respects we've left behind people. Right now, people like Hillary and Macron are weighted too heavily on the neoliberal side, of making progress while people like Corbyn are too weighted on the populist side. In the end, the global upheaval and economic turmoil we could experience worldwide might push the Left to synthesize these movements and to push a combination.

For example, expect Labour to regain power sometime in the 2020s, but with an eye to marrying the best of Tony Blair and Jeremy Corbyn. It really depends on the extent of the economic crisis (definitely President Cordray is that synthesis of 1 and 2 you described). I can see a number of left parties figuring out this synthesis.

I would point out the global left is facing this identity crisis. We're seeing it over and over - the Left trying to respond appropriately to the crisis but finding themselves split (Blair v. Corbyn; Macron v. Melenchon, SD v. the far left, etc etc).  Trudeau might be an answer in this case, the harbinger of the technocratic populist liberal. I'd have to research him more closely.

It's really hard to extrapolate global trends here. Europe has a much stronger safety net than we do so neoliberal economics hasn't been as huge of an issue for them (their problems concentrate on their populations shrinking, etc). India, the United States, Britain, and similar capitalistic minded countries might be in one bucket but France, Germany, Spain, and Scandinavia might be in another bucket.

The thing is, the last two American realignments were also global in scope. The Great Depression affected EVERYONE and so did the Reagan-Thatcher neoliberal 1980 realignment that pushed everyone towards neoliberal ideas. And with globalization being what it is, debt being what it is worldwide, I don't think America's realignment will be a localized phenomenon. The problem is that quite fundamentally, quite at root of everything is the great debate over two things: (1) How do we make globalization work for everyone? Aka talking about neoliberal policies and making them work for everyone - if possible (2) How do we figure out this debt issue that everyone is dealing with and guarantee a level of prosperity?

So that second question is an extremely complex question that asks you to keep two polar opposite ideas in mind - one of countries charting individual alignments and paths and one of countries also following a globalized realignment.

After all, Donald Trump won but Marie LePen lost, but Theresa May is winning, Narendra Modi won. But again, there is a commonality. When the center-right lets the populist right win, that victory is more likely, than when they don't. So it's an example of individual countries embracing drastically different outcomes but common forces pushing them. 

An interesting point - 1932 and 1980 became global realignments, because of, in part, of our interconnectedness by that point. So you could maybe expect the globe taking this step forward for Jet Age liberal policies that sort of ratify the path of 1945 (Bretton Woods, etc) but also fix the worst egregious stuff.

Sorry for the long rant. It's a highly complex issue I haven't immersed deeply so I don't have the best answers here.

[The_Doctor]

Virginia I haven't forgotten about you. I'll get to your answer later.

TT I have a slightly different take that you might like. I'm thinking on the fly as I usually do.

Within the majority coalition there's usually a first and second half right? Jefferson-Jackson Democrats had the Founders and the Democrats. Lincoln-McKinley had the Civil War radical Republicans and the Industrialists. The Roosevelt-Kennedy era had the New Deal and the New Frontier/Great Society (which is the same agenda). The Reagan-Bush era saw the Cold Warriors and the War on Terror hawks.

(I digress for a second here to talk about Reagan-Bush a second. Populism doesn't really fit in as a second half but guess what oddly does? The Cold War and 9/11 fit neatly as two halves.  Reagan is remembered for winding down the Cold War while George W. Bush is remembered for 9/11 and the War on Terror. Why not neoliberalism or whatever? I don't know. But it could be easily the National Security age. The digression is because I've been trying to think of Reagan-Trump as two halves but I just can't make that connection as well as Reagan-Bush).

To answer your question the failed presidencies seem to occur when a majority begins dying. Towards the first half of the J-J era Adams failed and Jackson replaced him while keeping the same coalition and reviving it. Hates, McArthur, and Harrison were losing the grip of the Civil War era electorate and McKinley revived it with the focus on the Industrial Age. Truman started losing control of the Great Depression electorate (he's not a failed president but he had to forego reelection in 1952). Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter presaged the slow collapse of the New Deal + Great Society coalition. Bush the Younger seems to have been JFK the first term and LBJ the second. This also corresponds with the slow death of the Reagan-Bush GOP.

The answer appears they were situated at a time where the party was losing the country's hold and they wound up failed. This is also a feature of the Trump Presidency so far
 

[The_Doctor]

This is what I love about TD. He is always willing to take the time to type out very thorough explanations for often good, wholesome theories.

Edit: In response to #1 - is it possible for them to get elected as a minority coalition president, but sometime during their term, for the electorate to fundamentally shift, and end up with them winning reelection by a large margin? It seems like we are coming awfully close to the official end of the Reagan era, and the electorate is already beginning to fill up with heavily Democratic voters, it seems like such a scenario might at least be possible, no?

I don't think so. That hasn't happened in American history that the alignment happened during the re-election, has it? Presidential coalitions don't rapidly change during a president's time in office. Most presidents only change their re-election victories by a few points in the two party popular vote.

The scenario you describe would have to see a president viewed radically different by people who voted against him/her the first time around and realign. Also remember a crisis propels a realigning presidency into power and realignments happen usually because the president in question has failed, paving the way for hisvsuccessor to succeed.

In short it might be possible but our constitutional system is, well, weird in that it assigns clear ways to elect or defeat a president and use the president as a way of expressing a sentiment about where we want our nation to go.

[The_Doctor]

To add to TT's discussion:

Also Obama left a fundamentally strong economy that had the weak parts propped up by the stronger parts. Let's not forget that. The reason I had realignment in 2024 is that I think our crisis won't happen that fast. It could be a constitutional one (Trump) but that doesn't change people fundamentally. The collapse (George Friedman agrees with me) will come when the middle and working class starts to really hurt and in turn their long held political beliefs turn. Obama's guaranteed this won't happen for a few years IMO.

The other reality is that the Democratic Party has to toss a lot of the geriatric 1990s type people and stop with all these people whose glory years were the Clinton era. The Left isn't quite ready to assume the mantle of power either because unlike the New Deal era they have been pretty sidelined up to the Obama times. This is one reason I think 2018 won't be the Democratic blowout on the federal level but will be on the state one.

Trump's popular vote loss is what made me conclude 2024, because had he won by 3-4% I would've said 2028. The GOP grip on the country's political center is quite strong and won't be dislodged that easily. I think, anyway.

[The_Doctor]

On the flip side I rejected 2032-2040 because of demographics. The current white dominated Republican evangelical and suburban conservative voter base runs headlong into the minority urban Democratic coalition that is increasingly too powerful. It's just too many 51% victories by adding 3-4% of white voters per cycle to the Republican Party each election. As I've long said the 35% of whites are to some degree really liberal and core Democrats. The GOP would be basically unable to govern.  

Minority voters,  on the flip side, don't just work under the Republican coalition's white evangelical business ideology. You need an urban Republican coalition that's more technocratic to start pulling them into your tent. The current Republican model is based on the southern strategy, remember and pulling in northern and Midwestern suburban whites who are culturally conservative and not urban.

So, the Republican Party would need to fundamentally change to reach 70% of white voters and let's be honest. The last time they could've done this was 2016. But that would've required an experienced party builder who knew what he was doing. Let me put it this very simply. Had the Republican nominee been a experienced Donald Trump with say two terms of a New York governorship we might be taking about Reagan-Trump, not Reagan-Bush as the alignment name (ironically also the name of the 1980 Republican ticket. If an age ever was so blindingly clear at the outset…).

I've felt for a while that 2016 was the turning point between this being the second half of a Republican majority or cementing 2000 as the half point. Given that an inexperienced politician from New York became the nominee and won the presidency with a deficit in the popular vote and remains extraordinarily unpopular I surmise we're in the ending stages of Reaganism-Bushism. Unlike the McKinley industrial ideology or the New Frontier civil rights movement or the evangelical neoconservative heyday of W the Trumpite ideology is highly inchoate and hasn't been fleshed out or capably used.  There's been no legwork to develop the idea for effective use for decades to propel the United States forward. Basically it's a bunch of memes rather than coherent policy prescription.

Anyway long and short of it, that's how I came to 2024.

[The_Doctor]

TT, to answer your question, I would preface that answer with the fact the coalition of this Republican is going to be determined by a lot of variables we don’t know. We do know the GOP 2012 and 2016 nominees were urban Northerners who had moderate streaks; whether this represents the GOP or not, in the future, that depends on what happens in the next two decades.

For the record, I do not think that we will see a traditional 12 year pattern where the Opposition party regains the White House. It was 24 years after Lincoln for Cleveland, 20 years after Roosevelt for Eisenhower, and 12 for Reagan for Clinton. The first opposition party president came 40 years after Jefferson.

The Republican coalition and Party - along with the donors and infrastructure - will be very different. Fox News will have collapsed or gone mainstream, and the policy tanks on the Right will have significantly reshaped themselves to be either more mainstream or gone out of business. The evangelical base will have been restructured to be supportive of the GOP and more centrist. The business wing will still be in force but we’re going to be contending with a different America and a different set of issues. For that reason alone, this is a highly speculative guess.

Racially, the GOP will have made a huge shift in appealing to a pan-racial coalition and dumped the Southern strategy for a technocratic national strategy concentrated on winning moderates and conservatives alike who like the idea of refining some of the Cordray-Castro reforms.

Anyway, this coalition would assume 58% white voters, 15% African Americans, 20% Latinos, and 8% Asian. This isn’t the election of 2032 but most likely 2036 or 2040.  The Republican in question would probably see widespread exhaustion with Democratic rule after 12 to 16 years of the Democrats holding the White House. The GOP nominee will carry 64% of whites to the Democrats’ 35%, 20% of African Americans to the Democrats’ 79%, 48% of Latinos to the Democrats’ 50%, and 55% of Asians to the Democrats’ 44%. Whites would make up 69% of the GOP coalition, down from 90% today.  

As you can see, there is significant support among minorities for the GOP nominee. They carry 40% of minorities, up from 25% (roughly) today. This is a sea change (you can see the tie among Latinos. (This assumes there is no strong third party, for the record, but this is still useful, because we know that Perot voters would have split between Clinton and Bush if he wasn’t in the race, and Eisenhower and Stevenson won 99% of the vote and ditto Cleveland and Blaine in 1884 (97% of the vote)).  

Presumably, the Republicans would do very well in the suburban counties and the areas outside New York City, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and so on. I expect this nominee to be highly competitive in winning socially moderate or even liberal voters but fiscally conservative voters. A lot of issues like healthcare, global warming, and so on will be squared away, allowing the GOP to push a highly technocratic message of reform of government that is appealing to a lot of voters who wanted reform, got it, and now want to refine and fine tune that reform.

So that's how I see that playing out.

[The_Doctor]

Would you vote for a Ron Wyden/Gavin Newsom 2020 tickets? Are those two good examples of the kind of Democrat you think may win elections soon?

I don't know much about Wyden beyond his civil libertarianism but I don't think either would make a good ticket, based on what little I know of them. Newsome is basically a Clinton-type Democrat who is socially liberal, right? Most prominent thing I know about him is gay marriage. Wyden is civil liberties.

Democrats that I think are good types and will win elections soon: Gwen Graham, Jason Kander, Sherrod Brown, Rich Cordray. Maybe Beto O'Rourke if he decides to come back after his 2018 loss (if he loses) and Brian Schweitzer, and Steve Bullock and Jon Tester. Democrats who can answer the issues of neoliberal economics leaving people behind while maintaining a socially liberal line that isn't bordering on gun grabbing or offensively SJW will be big winners over the next decade. Basically, the Joe Biden Democrats.

The big issue over the next decade is not - for most people - whether the government is spying on us (although it is a serious issue in its own right) or gay rights -  but guaranteeing economic prosperity to all groups, including those left behind in the economic stagnation of 2000 and beyond. Democrats like Sanders are resonating (although he is a highly imperfect messenger) because of this.

In 2020, I'd vote for any Democrat versus Trump. Versus Pence, it depends, again, on the contingent factors involved.

[The_Doctor]

TD, with those numbers among minorities and that strategy in mind (courting socially liberal, fiscally conservative voters) I could see the GOP taking not only the PNW in 2040ish but also California by a few percentage points.

That's plausible. California will have gone Democratic, what, every election from 1992 to 2040? So, roughly, 44-48 years, so that would make a lot of sense that it's ripe for a new GOP coalition to win it once in 50 years. Not sure how the GOP can lose the largest state in the Union consistently for 50 years and hope to win a mandate. (FL will take until 2040 to match CA if memory serves).

[The_Doctor]

TD, with those numbers among minorities and that strategy in mind (courting socially liberal, fiscally conservative voters) I could see the GOP taking not only the PNW in 2040ish but also California by a few percentage points.

To expand on this, the GOP nominee would win huge in the Inland Empire, North California, the suburbs outside Los Angeles, Sacramento, and San Francisco, and do well in Southern California. It would be, I guess, a 52-47% GOP victory if it came to that.  I thought the 50% Democratic vote among Latinos + 79% support among African Americans might be just enough to keep the Democrats in contention in CA. In my 2040 map, the GOP does well among states that aren't like 70% minority. (Isn't CA supposed to be like that much in 2040?)

Anyway any GOP victory/loss would be kind of like this, with North California's shore a little (Atlas) bluer:



(Also wait, what? George H.W. BUSH won 51% of California and ... 5,054,917 votes, compared to Donald Trump's 4,483,810 and 31%. How did the GOP in fact decrease in raw net votes by roughly 600,000 in nearly 30 years? Down 1,000,000 from W's 44% in CA btw)

[The_Doctor]

TT: this is fascinating. The Democratic vote surged by 4 million votes while the GOP vote dropped 600,000 votes  in that same period. 1988 was the last time the GOP won California in the Presidential election. Even in W's time to Trump's, the GOP vote dropped 1 million votes. (5.5 million to 4.5 million).

Had Trump matched W's performance in California, he would have lost the popular vote by 1.85 million, not 2 million. W. was better than his father by 500,000 votes in 2004.  

In raw votes, in California, get this, Trump did WORSE than Ronald Reagan in 1980 in raw votes. Trump was the worst performing Republican in California in 36 years.

You would assume the GOP to at least outpace their predecessors in raw votes but no, Trump did so badly in California that the Gipper won 40,000 more votes and Ford did only 600,000 votes worse than he did in 1976 (40 years ago) (the Democratic vote is up 5 million from 1976 for the record).

This is a strong argument against Trump being a realigning president, for the record, if there weren't already strong arguments against that. Or a confirming president.

[The_Doctor]

I'm writing a Reagan in 1976 (that does not imply a Reagan victory-he might lose and come back in 1980. Or George Bush comes back in 1980. Or Reagan does win and wins again in 1980 against all odds-stay tuned) timeline and I'm curious to know whether you think how'd an earlier Presidency (if he gets one) would play out in different economic conditions than OTL.

Probably Reagan would've failed and been a one term presidency. Remember it would've been 12 years of a Republican White House without interruption. That's extremely hard to imagine. The break from 1977-1981 gave the GOP enormous ability to reimagine itself from the Nixon era to a more forward looking Reagan one.

But a realignment would've still occurred by 1984. Probably, in some ways, we might have been better off in the sense we suffer from both the best and worst of Reaganite thought. The 1984 realignment might have been headed by George Bush 41 or another Californian who was conservative but less hard nosed about it. Because Ronald Reagan realigned our politics what he chose to pursue also influenced our future politics. Notably: George Bush 41 might have reconciled the issue of taxes and our budget deficits better while taking important influences from Reagan's 1977-1981 presidency. Or someone else took the conservative movement in a slightly different direction and realigned our politics better.

For instance a 1984 presidency might have dragged with it control of both chambers, which might've preempted the 1994 Gingrich Revolution (which was built off a 1985 Reagan State of the Union). That would've revolutionized our politics given the Democrats controlled the House throughout the 1980s.

However the Cold War might not have ended in 1992 but 2000 (likely under a Democratic president). The meltdown of the Soviet Union would've been slower because the realist camp chose the path of detente and coexistence. Reagan would've pushed his anti-detente policies in 1977 no matter what.
His one term would've probably put the realists into a permanent pole position within the Republican Party. As a matter of fact they did regain power in 1989 but Reagan's neoconservative ideology had become too entrenched to reverse by that time.

For a lot of reasons Reagan's and Ford's loss set a lot of major events in motion and defined our political times today. Any alternative timeline having Reagan be a one term presidency might have to contend with the alternate ideology that came up. The period between 1972 and 1980 are really open ended defining periods where any number of things would've happened to define the coming era.

[The_Doctor]

If Hillary won, how do you think this would have affected your theory (Or whatever you want to call it)?

I would have probably shelved it. If she had won, I would have assumed my theory was wrong and reassessed. Even more since in our political history, a president succeeding another president from the same party has not been consistent since the New Deal unless a realignment was involved. Or I would have assumed that 2020 would be the year BTM was back on track. Like most people, I assumed Hillary would win so I literally discarded what I wrote as silly.

So, as a matter of fact, Trump's victory and my re-reading of my timeline which closely mirrored how he won is what prompted me to finish Between Two Majorities.

I'm going to paste a couple of articles from the original; Sanchez and Bessell can verify they are from the originals (they read them way back). Some of it is wrong, some of it is right. Completely wrong on Walker, so I include that.

You must be logged in to read this quote.

(More coming).

[The_Doctor]

This is the electoral map I produced in March 2015.

here's the explanation on Walker also dated March 4, 2015

Tone: Present Day
Notes: This is Part I of the analysis. Meta is part II.

Why Walker Won

Date: November 20, 2016

Scott Kevin Walker, Republican of Wisconsin, is - surprisingly - the forty fifth President of the United States of America.  As the Left nursed wounds, the Right cheered, and America stood curious about her new President, the "why" of the victory - how it came about was asked.

Governor Walker had won several states back from President Obama - Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Florida, and Nevada. Additionally, Maine and Michigan were very close, as was Minnesota. But the Governor had failed to take back Colorado and New Mexico; counting in Florida and Colorado testified to the fact that the Governor had prevailed among whites but lost badly among Latinos. The victory had wound up being a racially polarized victory - with whites and substantial numbers of Asians voting Republican, but everyone else voting substantially Democratic.

69% of voters were white, African Americans made up 12% of the electorate and Latinos made up 12%. Asians made up 4% and others (mixed, etc) made up 3%. Governor Walker won whites 60-38%, while Secretary Clinton won African Americans 88-11%, Latinos 62-36%, Asians 55-44%, and others 56-42%. This accounted for much of the results, where Governor Walker performed especially well in whiter states and Secretary Clinton did better in minority majority states or states with a large minority population. Governor Walker won those over 65 60-38%, identical to his majority among whites. Among younger votes (18-29), he lost 55-44%, while 30-44 split their votes 51-48% for him. The 45-64 crowd voted 53-46% for the Governor. And men had (at 48% of the electorate) voted 56-43% for Governor Walker, while women (at 52%) voted 54-45% for Secretary Clinton.

What did this all mean? It meant that racial polarization was continuing apace in America. Past Democratic nominees had broken the 40% barrier among white voters, but Secretary Clinton fell to 38%. But minority groups were growing and voting Democratic, in stronger numbers. Governor Walker improved on Governor Romney's anemic 27% among the Latino coalition, but it was a 9% improvement. Asians however were a dramatic 18 point improvement over the 2012 results. The "lighter skinned" coalition voted Republican while the "darker skinned" coalition voted Democratic. It was an ugly reality about how racial polarization continued to impact voting patterns, in the United States. It had been true back in the day, as well. Asians had been voting Republican up to 1992, although the demographic subgroups within the Asian community split based on ethnic factors.

The African American community's share of the electorate dropped a point, in reflection of the fact that the first African American President wasn't on the ballot anymore. Did that possibly hurt Secretary Clinton in North Carolina, or Ohio or a number of other states where she lost narrowly? Analysts said yes, given the fact that white voters weren't voting for her in the numbers they had embraced her husband. President Barack Obama's 2008 nomination had irrevocably set the Democratic Party on the path of needing minority voters more than they needed white voters to win. That victory had been a repudiation of President Clinton's Southern offensive, where "bubba whites" had been part of the Democratic coalition in the 1990s.

Why the polarization? Political scientists pointed to a strange but intriguing political relationship. The stronger the percent of minorities in a state, the more whites voted opposite the way minority voters did. The relationship had strengthened on a national scale, but if you took a state like Maine or Oregon, it was a little different. Both states were heavily white, and while whites voted more Republican across the board, minority voters weren't truly present in these two states. It was a reason Hillary Clinton may have eked out the victory in them. In states like North Carolina, Florida, Ohio, Missouri, Michigan, and Nevada, this ugly relationship played out. It had played out in 2012, but the President had racked up larger numbers among minority voters, to the extent that Governor Romney could not overcome them.

The last eight years had also polarized both groups. White voters (and to some extent, Asian voters) - for whatever reason - believed that the President did not share their cultural values and increasingly turned to the Republican Party. Asians had actually voted 50-49% Republican in exit polling; and whites had voted north of 60% for Republican candidates. Meanwhile, African American and Latino voters pushed back and aggressively believed that Republican candidates did not reflect their values or goals. African Americans were especially angered by the attacks on the President.

The analysis of both candidates was interesting. First, the Democratic nominee, Secretary Clinton.

The Secretary had not run one of the best political campaigns in recent memory. In fact, time and time again, clumsy organization, questionable chains of command, and the struggles dividing the Democratic Party also split her camp. Clinton aides from the Bill Clinton era clashed with newer staffers, and the sprawling organization never recovered its footing. Buffeted by the national mood, that called for a change, and the Democratic Party's base, which called for populism, the Clinton camp struggled all election to find its footing. What it did well was to showcase Secretary Hillary Clinton's humane side and to try to make emotional connections with the electorate. What it did not do well was to articulate a clear message on why the Secretary would be a good choice for the Presidency. This muddled message was the norm throughout the race, only finally being honed in the last weeks.

Why did Secretary Clinton fail to win minority voters to the extent President Obama did in 2012? The reality was that the Southern offensive deployed by her husband in the 1990s had left minority voters feeling raw. Welfare reform, tough on crime, advocating class based affirmative action, and displaying a persona that appealed to Southern whites - these actions had helped, on some level, to push minority voters into the Obama camp in 2008. And in 2016, they had kept some minorities from deploying the lever for Secretary Clinton. For some, the outbursts of President Clinton rubbed many raw - especially African American voters. Turnout among Democratic leaning minorities fell, as a result. They voted for her, but their heart, like their liberal white brethren, wasn't in it. And for many minority voters, the excitement of seeing one of their own in the Oval Office had worn off. The replacement - a white woman - wasn't enough for some of them to come out to the polls.  

Why did Secretary Clinton fail to win the kind of voters she needed to win? The simple reason was that she was caught between two Presidents. By that, she was caught between President Bill Clinton and President Barack Obama, and different eras. She was a bridge between the two but a bridge voters were unwilling to cross. She represented both the Third Way Democratic Party that had dominated in the 1990s and - in name - the populist more liberal Democratic Party that President Barack Obama presided over. In struggling to appeal to both Democratic Parties and the general electorate, she failed to appeal to 50%+1 of the electorate. She was also a poor messenger of populism; with an increasing swath of Democrats asking for a populist standard bearer, she was the wrong candidate for the times. She was linked to Goldman Sachs, to the free trade and pro-business policies of her husband, rather than the Elizabeth Warren wing of the Democratic Party. Her persona had been built on opposing the kind of populism that dominated both the Democratic Party and a significant swath of the voters that she needed to convince. Despite all this, she tried to advocate a hybrid of both third way policies and populism, to appeal to these voters that she so sorely needed. As a consequence of this, liberal Democrats weren't as motivated for her as they had been for President Obama. Even in 2012, liberal ambivalence had driven President Obama down to 51% from 53%.

[The_Doctor]

Her campaign had struggled between two messages. One message was that she was the agent of populism, that could enact the kind of changes that many asked for. The recovery, she acknowledged, hadn't been that stellar. She argued she could further the recovery, and make it real for those who hadn't yet recovered from the economic disaster of 2008. The other message was that she could compromise and strike deals with a Republican Congress, and move to the center, tweaking things here and there. Both messages stood in diametrical opposition to each other in a sense. She was trying to appeal to as many people as possible, and was caught in a vise grip. It was not entirely her fault. The country, after eight years of President Obama, was asking for a different direction, even if Democrats wanted more of the same.

She also failed to win enough women over to her candidacy. Many saw her as emblematic of the past. While they appreciated her candidacy, and appreciated the potential of a female Presidency, many chose not to vote for her because she did not represent the break with the past that many wanted.  She had been on the national stage for decades and had decades worth of history. While she would be making history, it would be far less impactful than if another woman had emerged on the national stage.

And that last factor worked against her the most. She faced a Republican who had been unknown before his 2010 victory. When she had become First Lady in 1993, Governor Walker had just left Marquette University a few years prior and lost his first race. Twenty four years in the public eye had allowed people to form an opinion long before she ever entered the race. She claimed to represent the future, but for many, she was from the era of the Windows 3.0 and the early PC's, the original Age of Empire games, N'Sync, and Fresh Prince of Bel Air. In short, she was running twenty years after she first emerged. In exit polling, 58% said she represented the past, while only 38% said the future. Governor Walker had scored a 49-43% answer to that very same question.

Now to the victor - Governor Walker.

The Republican Governor had run, and run hard. He had won a contentious Republican nomination by being appealing to virtually every wing of the Party. He had won the Presidency by being appealing to the crucial subset of voters - white middle class voters. And he had done it by repeating his message, staying on message, and doggedly campaigning. It was the same thing as he had done in Wisconsin - a tight circle of Walker aides, a clear chain of command, and a black and white message, with Walker aides and surrogates doing the hatchet work. Governor Walker himself would deploy the "old school" folksy charm that had helped him win in Wisconsin and he steadfastly avoided embroiling himself in any controversy that could damage his chances to high office.


Governor Walker had built himself as the champion of middle class whites. The lack of a college education had actually been an asset among these voters, who had struggled for the last eight years. And Governor Walker knew it. The Republican victory had been built on a strong performance in the Midwest, and on the back of these white voters. The connection forged between Governor Walker and these voters mirrored the connection that he had forged with similar voters in Wisconsin. Rural and suburban areas voted Republican, while urban areas voted Democratic. And they were fervently in his corner.

The victor also had broadened his minority appeal from past Republican Presidential nominees. Interestingly, during the campaign, he worked to win over Asian voters. Republican strategists had targeted these voters as more persuadable than either African Americans or Latinos, based on the 2014 midterm elections. While Governor Walker had made a pitch to the Latino community, he also had made a pitch to Asians. And it paid off, with 44% of the Asian community voting for him. At 4% of the electorate and fast growing, the governor made the bet that they could pay dividends. Among Latinos, increasing his share of the vote to 36% had helped him eke out a victory in Florida and Nevada. Even though he had won Arizona, the increasing Latino clout had lowered his final margin there to 53% of the vote. It was a warning sign to some Republicans that the future, even on this night, wasn't as rosy as they imagined.

The recovery also aided, indirectly, Governor Walker. While the recovery was real, it hadn't reached the middle class and the subset of swing voters that needed to feel it. These voters - making $30-50,000 - voted Republican 55-44%. They were struggling and the Obama recovery left them cold. In other words, they were ripe for the taking, and no matter what the Clintons had done in the 1990s, they were primed for Governor Walker. Incomes had not risen as rapidly as the unemployment rates had fallen, and people were working multiple jobs. They felt they had given the President eight years to make his case and they, in turn, were now ready to give the other side a chance. GDP growth had been 3% in 2016, unemployment at 4.8%, but to the voters, it felt nothing like the blistering economic booms of the 1980s and the 1990s.

Now, for the general variables. The President's approval rating stood at 48% approve and 50% disapprove, on Election Day. Opinions of him and his Administration had hardened to the point that roughly half of the nation would approve and half would disapprove, no matter what happened. The recovery, as said, was not that strong enough to push him into Reagan-Clinton territory. Given that, 48% would approximately match what Secretary Clinton ultimately received on election day.

Money? Both sides had enough money to meet their needs, and more. $1.5 billion was spent apiece by the campaigns, their Super-Pacs, and supporting organizations, including the Democratic and Republican National Committees. It, like every Presidential election cycle before it, broke records. It was notable, only in the sense that Governor Walker picked up a third of his donations from small donors, in comparison to Governor Romney's 9% in 2012. The Democrats picked up roughly half of their donations from small donors (under $200 donations).

The Republican assault on Secretary Clinton, beginning in the spring of 2016, had done its dirty work. It had damaged her and in that sense, the early G.O.P convention and the ad barrage had helped keep Secretary Clinton's numbers at the range where Governor Walker could keep polling parity with her.

Technology? Technology - the great magic secret for the Democratic Party - vanished as an edge. While Democrats had the technological edge, Republicans had achieved near parity in the election. And technology, for all its wonders, could not shift the mood by more than 1-2%.  The Democrats and Republicans alike micro-targeted, had elaborate set ups to get out the vote, to motivate their voters, and excelled in early voting. Republicans in particular had done well in that sphere, building on their 2014 successes. Democrats, for their part, blew past benchmarks hit in 2012. The Democratic loss came down to national mood and other variables, not technology. 

[The_Doctor]

The Democrats had erred in assuming demography as destiny. It had been illogical, in the sense that the Democrats could not hang onto power forever, based on demographics - be it women, minority voters, or so forth. The Democratic majority still needed a reason to vote Democratic, and not just because the Republicans were the Republicans. More than that, there were still enough white (and Asian, now) voters to hand the Republicans the country.  The Electoral College had been cracked thanks to these white voters.

For specific states, going the way they did, it was fairly easy to explain.

New England faltered - but returned Democratic. Maine and New Hampshire were the contested states. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut all returned Democratic, solidly. But white middle class voters and blue collar workers in Maine had re-elected Paul LePage to the governor's mansion in 2014. Turnout had been 60% in 2014, signaling that they would be amicable to voting Republican in a general election. They had done exactly that, in 2016. Only the fact that Bangor and urbanites voted in droves saved the Democrats. New Hampshire, for their part, reverted to their Republican tradition and voted their libertarian heritage after 12 years. New Hampshire's overall Republican lean also lifted Sen. Kelly Ayotte to a narrow victory. Had Secretary Clinton won the state by the margin President Obama had in 2012, it would have been conceivable that Democratic challenger and Governor Maggie Hassan would have won the state.


The Mid-Atlantic saw the defection of Pennsylvania, which chose to vote as a Rust Belt state, rather than a Middle Atlantic state. Every other state chose to vote as they had in 2000 to 2012. Of these states, in the Empire State of New York, Governor Walker scored 41% - the first time Republicans had broken 40% since President George W. Bush's re-election in 2004.  Pennsylvania had seen the T-region and the suburban areas vote Republican, while the cities returned Democratic. The turnout from the G.O.P areas - especially Allentown - was enough to put Pennsylvania in the GOP column for the first time since 1988. Turnout was slightly down in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, with Democrats unable to counter the rural and suburban trend. Governor Walker's victory here also helped Senator Pat Toomey win by a stronger margin than he would have otherwise. The Republican turnout was simply too much for Admiral Joe Sestak to overcome.

In the Midwest, the fact that the Governor was a man who knew how to appeal to the Midwest was a big factor. In state after state, in the Midwest, the Governor romped among white voters who were in the middle class. Only Michigan and Minnesota stood against the new Republican firewall in the Midwest. Detroit and Ann Arbor had been the holdouts, even as Wayne County went Republican with a vengeance. Wisconsin, of course, was Governor Walker's home state. In Iowa, the same dynamic that had played out in Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin played out - with suburban and rural areas, full of white middle class and blue collar voters, going Republican. Missouri held to its Republican tradition, with St. Louis and Kansas City as the outliers. The Governor's Presidential romp throughout the Midwest also saved Republican senator after Republican senator. Analysts speculated that would be a key factor in G.O.P loyalty to the Walker Administration in the Senate. One senator - Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) particularly owed a 8,000 vote victory to the President-elect. It was all but a given that had Governor Walker been not on the ticket, former Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) would have won. In Illinois, the one state where Governor Walker fell short, Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) fell to Rep. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.). In Ohio, it is hard to imagine that Senator Portman would have staved off a challenge by former Ohio Gov. Ted Strickland (D) by the margin he did if the Walker-Portman ticket hadn't carried the state.


The South went Republican - for all the usual reasons. God, guns, but not necessarily the gays. Like the rest of the country, Dixie might have held philosophical objections to the gays but they didn't care that much. North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida were the only competitive states here. Virginia voted more like a Mid Atlantic state, with North Virginia pulling the state into the Democratic column. Why? Federal workers in North Virginia stood to be hit the most under a Walker Administration, and they voted their interests. It also helped that Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) was on the Democratic ticket. In North Carolina, the research Triangle area voted to preserve their grants and against Walker's evangelical tendencies. But in the rural and suburban areas, Republican strength was too strong. Florida has already been discussed, but North Florida and the I-4 corridor went Republican, while South Florida had a slight dropoff in turnout - thus delivering the state to Governor Walker. But there was a caveat. Walker had to run ahead of President George W. Bush's 2004 numbers, among whites, to win the state. It was a testament to the fact that minority growth had been strong in this state that Florida was among the last states to be called.  While Senators Burr and Rubio were never in real trouble, the victories by the Republican ticket was helpful.

The Great Plain states and the Interior West were not that surprising. They returned solidly Republican, as they had for almost every presidential election since 1964. Nebraska's first district went Republican, as the Walker-Portman ticket carried the state with 64% of the vote.

Out in the Sunbelt, the story got interesting. The Walker-Portman ticket ran the weakest in any competitive region in the Sunbelt. Latino voters delivered Colorado to the Clinton-Kaine ticket. In Arizona, they narrowed Governor Walker's victory and in Nevada, they kept the race close against Gov. Brian Sandoval's Republican machine - which delivered the state for the President-elect and the Senator-elect anyway. For this reason, Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.) held off Rep. Mike Coffman (R-Colo.). It was also the reason the Reid defeat took so long to report.

The Pacific Coast was interesting. Washington and Oregon were two heavily white states that were affected by the national wave. Oregon, in particular, had been too close to call, with the Democratic ticket finally winning by two points. That closeness had allowed 2014 gubernatorial contender, Dennis Richardson, to become the first Republican Governor since 1987. It was the first Republican victory in Oregon's gubernatorial races since 1982. President George W. Bush had come close to winning in Oregon in 2000, losing by just 7,000 votes. Likewise, Governor Scott Walker fell short by 30,000 votes.  Washington saw Gov. Jay Inslee (D) re-elected and in California, Governor Walker scored 42% of the vote - also the first time Republicans had done that since President Bush had won re-election in 2004. The states of Alaska and Hawaii went to their respective corners, with no surprises.

With that, Election 2016 entered the history books.

[The_Doctor]

That was shockingly accurate, minus the part about Asian voters.

What would you reassess in your analysis in regards of Asian voters TD?

You should have seen the Wisconsin numbers for Feingold v. Johnson. They were eerie.

Gonna add Latinos here.

Asians and Latinos are why Trump didn't win the popular vote. Walker won the popular vote in my timeline by 20,000 votes or something. This was because he boosted his Asian and Latino vote totals. By alienating Latinos he took Nevada off the table. The white 22% gap predicted here wasn't enough because these groups made up 2-3% in the popular vote which would have allowed Trump to narrowly win.

The fact that they were so turned off is a bad sign for GOPers, since they broke 50-50, basically, in 2014. If they swing hard against  the GOP, it's marginal but it makes the popular vote and AR stuff harder to win.

So, yeah, rereading this is why I finished BTM. Trump's popular vote loss and campaign shortened the timeline, as I've said, by 4 years. As we're now discovering why. I never factored in impeachment for Walker, lol.

[The_Doctor]

Could you explain the general plot of BTM1. I don't want spoilers or anything, but it seems really interesting.

It's the story of 2016, as I forecast it in 2015. It basically talks about the squaring off of a GOP backed by white working class voters versus the neoliberal dynastic Clinton Democratic Party. I got a number of things wrong (Walker did not wind up the actual nominee). It ended ten days into the Walker Presidency because I was having a very hard time conceptualizing the Walker White House. (I did say that Walker would not end the Iran deal, that the Senate would curtail the filibuster for SCOTUS nominees).

It is written in a rather GOP hack mode because I was much more rabid back then. Kinda.

[The_Doctor]

Different type of question:  Are you in college (or high school, I guess, but I assume you're at least 18) right now, or in the workforce?  And what's your area of study/employment?

College grad type, I work, and I do IT/database server stuff, who was originally poli sci.