Establishment Clause, Lee v. Weisman

[Emsworth]

The key rule in establishment clause cases should be that of coercion. Is the government compelling an individual to participate in or support religious activities? If so, then the establishment clause is violated. This is the minimum meaning of the establishment clause: if it means anything less, then it is utterly pointless.

Is there coercion in this case? I would say that there is. It is true that the students are not being compelled to actually participate in the prayer, but they are being compelled to attend a religious ceremony. Can a government compel a man to go to church, although not requiring him to actually pray? Of course not. The same rule applies with respect to schools. Just as the government may not compel an individual to attend a religious service in a church, so too can it not compel him to attend a religious service in a school.

It is only sufficient, now, to establish whether there is compulsion to attend the graduation ceremony. In this regard, the day of the ceremony should be regarded no differently than any particular school day. Therefore, the rule established in Engel v. Vitale should be controlling.

The decision was sound.

[Emsworth]

You're comparing a church and a graduation ceremony where there happens to be prayer? No, the latter is not a "religious ceremony," and the assertion that it is has absolutely no historical backing whatsoever.

Prayer, by its very nature, is a religious activity. It is not the graduation ceremony as a whole that is religious; rather, only the portion of it that involves prayer is.

[Emsworth]

The very small amount of religion is secondary.

Trivial infringements are unconstitutional as well.

Nor is the coercion argument the only one that can be made. Engel v. Vitale makes it clear that even if there is no coercion, government sanction for religion can be unconstitutional. For example, when the government writes or adopts an official prayer (as it did in Engel, and again in Lee), it has overstepped the bounds prescribed by the First Amendment.