Due Process, In re Winship

[A18]

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)

OPINION: Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

... This case presents the single, narrow question whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.

Section 712 of the New York Family Court Act defines a juvenile delinquent as 'a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime.' During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing, conducted pursuant to 742 of the Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that appellant, then a 12-year-old boy, had entered a locker and stolen $112 from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, 'if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of Larceny.' The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rejected appellant's contention that such proof was required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judge relied instead on 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act which provides that '(a)ny determination at the conclusion of (an adjudicatory) hearing that a (juvenile) did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.' During a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of 18 months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his 18th birthday-six years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion, 30 A.D.2d 781, 291 N. Y.S.2d 1005 (1968). The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four- to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of 744(b), 24 N.Y.2d 196, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 247 N.W.2d 253 (1969). We noted probable jurisdiction 396 U.S. 885  ( 1969). We reverse. ...

[Emsworth]

Unsound.

"Due process of law" means nothing more than "by the law of the land." It has nothing to do with "fundamental fairness." Whether a different standard of proof is unfair or not is completely irrelevant; all that matters is, what standard has the legislature prescribed?

It is true that, a body cannot be considered a "jury" unless it has certain essential characteristics. For example, the jury must be composed of twelve people, must reach its verdict unanimously, must be chosen from the public rather than from among judges, etc. However, the reasonable doubt standard is not one of these essential characteristics. It was developed long after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. It only materialized in the English courts in 1798, and in the American legal system during the nineteenth century.

[Yates]

Justice Emsworth said it right.